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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an historical commentary on Lykourgos' prosecution speech Against 
Leokrates. The introduction comprises various sections. The first is a brief 
consideration of the specific historical background to the oration in Athens and 
the wider Greek world. The second looks at the orator Lykourgos himself, one of 
the most significant figures of Classical Athenian history who could be described 
as a fourth-century equivalent of Perikles. Lykourgos was 'Controller of Athenian 
finances' for more than a decade following the Athenians' defeat by Philip at 
Khaironeia in 338 B.C. During this period, Lykourgos used his dominant position 
effectively to rebuild Athens structurally, aesthetically and culturally. He could 
thus be considered to be of far greater significance than his much better-known 
contemporary Demosthenes, even if it is accepted that he was a less effective 
orator. There are, however, reasons to believe that he was in fact not less 
effective, for the ancient view of Lykourgos as a prosecutor was that his 'pen was 
dipped in blood'. This has, indeed, proved a puzzle in tenns of this one surviving 
speech, which Lykourgos has unanimously been deemed to have lost. The 
remainder of the introduction looks in detail at eisangelia, the procedure under 
which Lykourgos prosecuted Leokrates, and the sole reference to the outcome of 
the case (Aiskhin. 3.252), and re-evaluates this assessment. It concludes that there 
are juridical and rhetorical reasons to suggest that Aiskhines has been 
misinterpreted and that Lykourgos in fact won this case, failing by one vote on a 
second ballot to secure a majority for a punishment of execution. The introduction 
concludes by re-evaluating the structure of the speech which has been 
overwhelmingly seen as a mass digression into poetic quotations. It suggests that 
previous assessments of the speech as a failure have worked against an objective 
consideration of Lykourgos' tactics, and have therefore masked the structure 
inherent to the speech as a whole. The commentary itself has an historical, rather 
than rhetorical or linguistic, focus, and is subdivided into sections which reflect 
the structure outlined in the introduction. 
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are times when this has proved extremely difficult: some words which are very 
familiar in English simply look wrong when transliterated. I have therefore been 
unable to bring myself to discard 'Aegean' and 'Corinth', though Lykourgos and 
Aiskhines seem more acceptable than Lycurgus and Aeschines. This has led, at 
times, to an uncomfortable co-existence, but one which has at least minimized the 
need for wholesale Latinization. In a similar vein with transliterated upsilon, 
sykophantes and asty seem right, whereas toy emporioy simply looks wrong; I 
admit defeat in achieving consistency in this respect. 
The text used is Conomis 1970. Also useful for comparison have been those of 
Petrie 1922 and Durrbach 1956. 
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PREFACE 
Forensic oratory presents some awkward methodological problems. Speeches, 
originally produced to achieve a legal victory, were delivered in a judicial setting 
and might then be published, perhaps to advertise the logographer's abilities or as 
a teaching aid for rhetoricians. The speeches we have inherited, therefore, mainly 
through Alexandrian copyists who often canonized oratorial models for stylistic 
and rhetorical purposes, may not be the original versions.! MacDowell suggests 
that it may, in fact, 'have been a quite common practice to write out an improved 
and polished version of a speech for circulation after it was delivered, either to 
disseminate political or other views or to enhance the author's oratorical 
reputation,.2 Dover, too, considers that there is 'a substantial gulf". between 
what was uttered and what was put in writing', though he notes that it is obvious 
that an orator's reputation would not be remotely harmed by 'detection of 
inaccuracies and distortions in his published speeches': what mattered was the 
result of the case and this affected his reputation far more than the discovery of a 
lie or mistake.3 This would clearly militate against the need for revision, and Todd 
argues that despite the 'improvements' which have clearly been made to the two 
matching pairs of Aiskhines 2IDemosthenes 19 and Aiskhines 3IDemosthenes 18, 
preserved speeches seem to offer little evidence for 'touching up' an initial oration 
to eliminate error or specious argument.4 
Despite the fact that, unlike the jurors in their immediate audience, orators were 
able to read and re-read the speech before publication, they often seem not to 
remove many examples of suppression, fallacy and illogicality, if not downright 
lies. Although it is, as Todd notes, probably a SUbjective judgement in the end as 
to whether and why a speech has been polished, it must be assumed that not all 
such imperfections, nor their eradication from the published version, resulted from 
weak cases, or cases where the extant speech represented a client 'in the wrong,.5 
I See Gabba, 60ff.; Humphreys 1985c, 316f.; Todd 1990a, 164 ff.; Worthington 1991, 
passim; MacDowell 2000a, 567f. 
2 MacDowell 2000a, 567. 
3 Dover 1968, 169ff. See too Ober 1989a, 49 n. 113. 
4 Todd 1990a, 167. 
5 Todd 1990a, 171 f., arguing especially against Isager and Hansen's methodology of 
assuming that lies or suppression indicate weakness of case, and proceeding to build the 
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The problems raised by such alterations, together with questions of whether, and 
why, numbers and dates were changed, and whether 'private' and 'public' 
knowledge was adapted, are unyielding, perhaps insoluble, yet further difficulties 
exist.6 
One is our frequent inability clearly to determine when the text is making 
assumptions about our background knowledge, and whether that knowledge 
would represent genuine facts, or simply something the speaker wishes us to 
identify with. 7 There is the difficulty, too, of the type of procedure the oration is 
prepared for. Todd cites Lysias 13 as a prosecution which failed as a result of a 
weak case supported by fatuous arguments; for Todd, Lysias' case, and the 
argument he chooses to support it, is not the main issue and, in any case, the jury 
was not there inquisitorially, but to decide which thesis they preferred. 8 By using 
an apagoge and risking the penalty for not securing the vote of one-fifth of the 
jury, Lysias must have felt, Todd suggests, that passions were running so high that 
he could not lose. If this was the case, then Lysias' judgement was evidently 
flawed. Perhaps, however, the use of the procedure itself was a bluff, the jury 
being supposed to think that Lysias would not risk such a process if he were not in 
the right, however weak his argument was. If this scenario is correct, then Lysias' 
gamble did not payoff. Clearly more than one interpretation is possible of the 
rationale behind a prosecutor's choice of procedure and, similarly, behind the 
construction of his speech. 9 
Problems are also posed by very clear cultural differences in ideas about the 
nature and function of witnesses and impartiality, and indeed evidence, which 
included the laws themselves. lo None the less, Todd argues that further 
commentaries on extant orations are essential, and suggests that one approach 
might be to disregard anything an orator says that actively helps his particular 
presumed facts of the case from that assumption. See too Dover 1968, 151 ff.; Carey and 
Reid, 15f.; Worthington 1994c, 115-118. 
6 Todd 1990a, 167. 
7 See Arist. Rhet. 1408a25-36; Dover 1968,148-174; Usher 1976, 36f.; Humphreys 
1985c, 318; Ober 1989a, 48 n. 112; Boegehold 2000,599; Pelling, 37-43. 
8 Todd 1990a, 172f. 
9 See too R. Osborne 1985a,passim; Todd 1993,7-10. 
10 See Harrison 1968-1971, ii, 134f.; Todd 1990b, passim; Todd 1993, 58ff. 
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case, and to accept only incidental remarks made without elaboration. I I As 
Harding notes, indeed, there is no trick known to modem politicians that was not 
known to ancient orators. 12 Yet there is often no way of knowing what is 
incidental, or where knowledge is being taken for granted, without the 
background of legal framework and rhetorical devices which commentaries 
provide.13 It is hoped that this commentary will provide some such background 
for Lykourgos against Leokrates, and that it will contribute to the generic corpus 
of commentaries in which, for too long, this sole surviving Lykourgan speech has 
been largely ignored. 
II Todd 1990a, 168, 174. 
12 Harding 1987,passim, esp. 38f. 
13 See too Wolff 1975b, passim. 
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INTRODUCTION 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
ATHENS 
After Philip of Macedon's victory at Khaironeia in 338 B.C., overall control of 
Athenian state finances passed to LykourgoS.1 4 For the twelve years during which 
he remained, at least nominally, in control, Athens experienced inordinate 
prosperity, at least in fourth-century terms, as annual state income increased from 
400 to 1200 talents and a series of public expenditure programmes echoed the 
Periklean glory days of the previous century. IS It was, perhaps, Athens' relative 
success which simultaneously facilitated and undermined the spirit of nationalism 
prevailing in the period after Khaironeia, for although Athens had the leisure and 
prosperity to consider what action she might take, there was a clear need to reach 
some sort of pragmatic accommodation with Macedon to maintain that leisure and 
prosperity, rebellion being practically, as well as financially, inadvisable. 16 
Perhaps the principal pragmatist in this respect was Aiskhines, though he, like 
Demosthenes, was at pains to play down his part in the negotiations of the Peace 
of Philokrates. 17 Sealey argues that Aiskhines had little ulterior motive in his 
14 Both the date and the office itself are disputed, see introduction, 17f., below. 
15 Burke 1985, 251f., 260ff., assesses the most likely state sources of the increased 
income as the mines and the Peiraieus, since only these 'possessed the necessary 
potential'. Non-state sources comprised commercial and fiscal incomes from the much 
expanded metic population and the increased business of the courts and emporia. See too 
Andreades, 126-189,268-303. 
16 See Reinmuth 1971a,passim; Mitchel 1973, passim; Will, 22f., 98ff., argues that the 
idea that Lykourgos was passionately anti-Macedonian was a fiction, though he perhaps 
goes too far in seeing Lykourgos as prepared to compromise Athens to quite a large 
extent. The situation changed in 323 B.C.: Alexander was known to be dead; Athens had 
had a decade and a half of peace and prosperity and now had a reorganized and 
apparently effective fighting force; there was a consensus for rebellion which included 
even the Thessalians and the Aitolian League; and the cream of the Macedonian troops 
were in Asia. Yet the forces under Antipater still outnumbered those nominally under 
Athenian control, and the military preparation and prosperity provided during the 
Lykourgan era could not compensate for the inevitable lack of fighting experience and 
practice of troops which were no longer battle-hardened. See too Hammond and 
Walbank, 107-117; Adams, 231f. 
17 Aiskhin. 3.58-68,148-151. 
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prosecution of Ktesiphon in 330 B.C. to disclaim his part in the peace.! ~ Yet 
Aiskhines was attempting to display Demosthenes' advice as consistently hannful 
to Athens as well as hypocritical, and it would be in his interests both to show that 
Demosthenes was responsible for isolating Athens in negotiations with Macedon, 
and that Demosthenes had once more turned aside from a chance to fight. the 
course of action which Aiskhines had originally advocated. Aiskhines therefore 
implies that he had only grudgingly accepted the Peace of Phil ok rates in 346 B.C., 
after repeated attempts to rally a Greek alliance had failed, and when Athens itself 
needed an individual accommodation with Macedon to protect the grain supply in 
the face of Macedonian advances in Thrace. 
Harris suggests that Aiskhines had bowed to the inevitable and never again tried 
to revive his earlier policy of allied resistance, pouring cold water on what was 
effectively Demosthenes' conversion to his ideas. 19 Yet in his speech against 
Timarchos in 345 B.C., Aiskhines was still defending, if not boasting, of the part 
he had played in negotiating the Peace.20 By 343 B.c., however, when the 
expected fruits of the Peace had failed to materialize, and in view of Hypereides' 
successful prosecution of Philokrates for treason, Aiskhines shifted his position, 
needing to defend himself against Demosthenes' charges of treason with regard to 
the second embassy.21 Thus he justified his part in negotiating the Peace on the 
basis of the contemporary contingencies of the situation in Athens, offering little 
in the way of a defence beyond a different interpretation of the facts and the 
suggestion that the peace was, at least, better than war.22 
None of this undennines Harris' argument, however, that Aiskhines was in fact a 
committed patriot who had, on the one hand, overestimated Philip's interest in 
Athens and, on the other, underestimated Philip's desire for a balance of power in 
the Greek states to obviate rebellion against Macedon.23 Macedonian involvement 
in the Greek political world had changed all the rules, and there were inevitable 
18 Sealey 1993,164. 
19 Harris 1995, 150. 
20 Aiskhin. l.166--169, 174. 
21 Aiskhin. 2.3-6. 
22 See too Ellis 1994b, 760ff.; Harris 1995,50-6,107-123. 
23 Harris 1995, 153f. 
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disagreements on policies such as whether and how to resist Philip, and how to 
recover Athenian prosperity.24 It is, however, perhaps in the area of financial 
administration that such disagreements in policy can best be perceived, 
exemplified by a general entrenchment and moderation of the radical democracy, 
and the new financial offices of the fourth century to which officers were elected, 
as well as by an increasing specialization ofrhetors and strategoi. 25 
SPARTA 
Further afield, in 334 B.c., Alexander disbanded his fleet, apparently planning to 
undermine the Persian fleet by depriving it of its bases on the Mediterranean 
coasts. A large Persian fleet was sent to the Aegean, where Dareios III handed 
over its control to Memnon of Rhodes. The Persian plan seems to have been to 
secure the major Eastern Greek islands and take the war to Macedon. Memnon 
was victorious at Khios and besieged Mytilene, dying there of disease, and was 
succeeded by Pharnabazos, to whom Mytilene yielded?6 These operations 
aroused Spartan and Athenian attention and both sent embassies to Dareios.27 
Agis III, King of Sparta since 338 B.C., was himself attempting to hire 
mercenaries with Persian financial help, but whilst he was conferring with 
Pharnabazos, news of Issos arrived and Phamabazos' fleet of allies disintegrated 
to make peace with Macedon.28 Agis now had no naval support and needed to 
delay his challenge to Antipater; taking 8000 mercenaries who had fought for 
Dareios at Issos, Agis captured cities in Crete to increase his force, which took 
most of 332 B.C. His gains, however, for Cartledge and Spawforth, were as 
nothing compared with the disaster of the defection of the Persian fleet, which 
24 See too Ferguson 1911, 7ff.; CawkweIl1969,passim; Markle 1976, passim; Bosworth 
1988, 211ff.; Ober 1989a, 333-336; Lane Fox, 143-155. 
25 See too Mitchel 1973, passim; J.T. Roberts, 168-82; Hansen 1983b, 39f, 49-55; 
Hansen 1983c, passim; Rhodes 1986, 139-142; Hansen 1991,270. 
26 Arr. An. 1.18.6-2.1.5; Curt. 3.1.19ff.; D.S. 17.23.1-31.6; Plut. Alex. 17f.; see too 
Hammond 1986,601-608; Sealey 1993,205; Heckel, 193-199. 
27 The Spartan envoy was Euthykles, who bore the same name as a previous envoy to 
Susa in 337 B.C. Athens' envoy was Iphikrates, son of the famous Iphikrates who had 
served the Persians in the Egyptian campaign in 373 B.C. The envoys seem to have been 
carefully selected, and late in 333, after Dareios had been defeated by Alexander at Issos, 
they were captured by Parmenion at Damascus. 
28 Sealey 1993, 205f.; Heckel, 198, suggests that Phamabazos had met Agis with the 
intention of fostering revolt in the Peloponnese. 
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gave Alexander control of the sea.29 In spring 331 B.C., Agis put his plan into 
action, and at the same time, in what might have been a co-ordinated action, 
Memnon, whom Alexander had left to control Thrace, revolted. Agis' campaign 
was successful at first, but after Antipater and Memnon reached a compromise 
whereby Memnon continued to govern in Thrace, Antipater was free to advance 
to the Peloponnese. Battle was joined at Megalopolis, where Agis was killed and 
his forces defeated. 30 
Cartledge and Spawforth dismiss claims that Agis' action was a minor skinnish, 
despite Alexander's cursory dismissal of it as inconsequential. Even allowing that 
Badian's count of the opposing forces might be optimistic, they grant that it is not 
seriously amiss. Towards 32,000 men were deployed under Agis, facing 40,000 
under Antipater: the largest land battle on Greek soil since Plataia. 31 There was, 
none the less, no overt Athenian action at this time, though there are indications 
that Athens considered and rejected becoming involved. 32 According to 
Deinarkhos, Demosthenes did little or nothing during Agis' uprising; Sealey 
suggests that he perhaps refused to sanction Athens joining the Spartans because 
they had opted out of Khaironeia and he wanted to wait and see what effect 
Dareios had on Alexander. If so, Sealey argues, he made the wrong choice 
because there was now no opposition left to Macedon: worse than doing nothing, 
Demosthenes had seen that nothing was done. 33 
Perhaps, though, Athens' inaction was grounded in the proximity of the 
Macedonian garrison on the Theban Kadmeia, which was nearer to Athens than 
the equivalent garrison at Corinth was to Sparta.34 Moreover, there might have 
29 Cartledge and Spawforth, 21f. Dareios' forces scattered after Issos: Arr. An. 2.11.8, 
3.2.3-7; Curt. 3.11.1-13.17,4.1.27-37; D.S. 17.34.7-35.1; Bosworth 1988, 62f. 
30 Sparta perhaps now corralled into the League of Corinth: Sealey 1993, 206; doubted by 
Cartledge and Spawforth, 24f. Antipater's tactics and manpower: Badian 1994,268-277. 
31 Cartledge and Spawforth, 22f.; see too Badian 1967, passim; Borza, passim; Lock, 
passim; Badian 1994, 259-268. 
32 Dem. 17.5-9; Plut. Mor. 818E; see too Mitchel 1973, 17lf; Will, 71-77. 
33 Sealey 1993, 206f.; see too Mitche11973, 171. 
34 Sealey 1993,207; see too Potter, passim, who suggests that Agis was not necessarily 
seen as a saviour either by Athens, or by other Greek states, but was viewed, perhaps, still 
as an enemy capable of sinking to any depths to regain Spartan hegemony. Harding 1995, 
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been little point in any alliance from Sparta's viewpoint, for despite Athens' 
relative prosperity, most Greek cities not only continued to recognize Messenia, 
but were also impoverished and debilitated: thus they turned to Persia instead. 35 
Recriminations in Athens inevitably followed the Persian defeat at Issos and Agis' 
failure, and Bosworth suggests that Aiskhines used the occasion to indict 
Demosthenes' entire political career.36 It was also at this low point that the city's 
chief financial officer and self-appointed moral guardian, Lykourgos, prosecuted a 
certain Leokrates for fleeing from Athens eight years earlier, in the immediate 
critical aftennath of the defeat at Khaironeia. 
109 argues for a cohesive Athenian policy which saw little point in wasting men or 
money on the enterprise. 
35 Thus Cartledge and Spawforth, 19f. 
36 B osworth 1988, 213f.; see too Sealey 1993, 211f. 
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LYKOURGOS 
The origins of the Eteobutadai are linked with Butes, a mythic Ionian who appears 
in different places, but always with a connection to Poseidon. 37 The family had 
lost one member in Kimon's Thracian campaign and one of the grandfathers of 
the orator Lykourgos, also named Lykourgos, had been executed by the Thirty. 
This elder Lykourgos was probably a member of the wealthy, ruling elite, and 
may have been one of the Hellenotamiai, though it is impossible to be sure 
because the principal source, Plutarch's biography of the orator Lykourgos, is 
particularly ambiguous in its opening remarks. 38 According to Stratokles' 
honorary decree of 307 B.C., the elder Lykourgos received public burial in the 
Kerameikos, together with his father, Lykomedes, great-grandfather of the orator. 
Nothing is known ofthe elder Lykourgos' son, Lykophron, father of the orator. 39 
The orator Lykourgos was born in 390 B.C., and was a pupil of both Plato and 
Isokrates.4o One branch of his family held the hereditary priesthood of Poseidon 
Erekhtheus, the other, the priestesshood of Athene Polias.41 Aleshire argues that 
since Plutarch reports how one of Lykourgos' sons, Habron, stepped aside for 
another, Lykophron, to take up the priesthood of Poseidon Erekhtheus, its 
hereditary nature is called into question; the known holders in Plutarch's 
genealogy are Habron and Lykophron, and then a late second century B.c. 
politician connected in some way with Lykourgos' family on the female line: 
other priests, from the first and second centuries A.D., are completely 
unconnected with the family. Aleshire concludes. therefore, that the priests were 
probably elected by lot from the Eteobutadai genos, and argues that if Plutarch 
had not included the genealogy, no-one would ever have suggested that the 
37 RE 3, s.v. Butes (Wernicke); Toepffer, 113-133. 
38 See [Plut.] Mor. 841A-B; PAIAPF, 9249 = 9251 Lykourgos III; RE 13, s.Y. 
Lykourgos(14) (Obst); Krentz, 80; see too Toepffer, 122f.; Blass iii2, 96; Mitchel 1973, 
173ff.; Humphreys 1985a, 199; Parker 1996, 291. 
39 Lykomedes: PAIAPF9232 = 9251 Lykomedes. Lykophron: PAIAPF9260 = 9251 
Lykophron I; RE 13, s.y. Lykophron(5) (Obst); Toepffer, 122f. Stratokles' decree: 
introduction, 17, 20f., below. 
40 PAIAPF, 9251 Lykourgos IV; RE 13, S.Y. Lykourgos(10) (Kunst); [Plut.] Mor. 841B; 
Jebb, ii.375ff.; Blass iie, 97. 
41 See too Farnell i, 270ff.; Mitchel 1973, 204ff.; Garland 1984,83-86,91-94, 106; 
Christopoulos, passim; Parker 1996, 290-293. 
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priesthood was hereditary.42 Keams, moreover, suggests that sortition might be an 
expected 'form of appointment of a gentilician priesthood, although the numbers 
of those eligible might not be large,.43 Yet the claim that Habron received his 
office Aaxwl.I EK TOO 'Y€VOIJ~ could mean either that sortition took place within the 
genas or that he succeeded to the priesthood as part of his inheritance. Plutarch 
says, moreover, that having received the priesthood, Habron stepped aside 
(7Tapaxwpr{JO"a~) for his brother and it is difficult to see why this necessarily 
invalidates the view that the office was hereditary. 
A more difficult problem is the chronology of the three sons. Plutarch records that 
Lykourgos had three sons from his marriage to Kallisto, daughter of Habron of 
Boutadai.44 Of the three, Habron and Lykourgos died childless, but Lykophron 
had a daughter; the male line was, therefore, continued by adoption.45 Scholl 
argues that the assumption that Lykophron was the eldest son is based on 
misunderstandings which arise both from the fact that the eldest son was 
frequently, but not always, named after the grandfather, and because Lykophron 
took legal action to enforce the right he claimed as his own to dine publicly in the 
Prytaneion, a right that had been granted in perpetuity, after Lykourgos' death, to 
his eldest son.46 Davies echoes this emphasis on a probable misunderstanding, 
suggesting that because it was Habron who inherited the priesthood, he is almost 
certainly the eldest, the error probably arising from editorial confusion over 
Lykophron's claim to a right belonging to the eldest son.47 Moreover, that 
Lykopbron needed to take legal action to enforce a right granted to the eldest son 
suggests that he did not inherit it: this suggests to Scholl that since Habron and 
Lykourgos were childless, it was perhaps Lykophron's status as a father that made 
him argue that he should be treated as the eldest son.48 
42 Aleshire, 328-331, citing [Plut.] Mar. 843F. 
43 Kearns, 210. 
44 [Plut.] Mor. 843 A, E. 
45 See too RE 13, S.V. Lykourgos(ll) (Kahrstedt, 1927); Toepffer, 123f.; Blass He, 107; 
Parker 1996, 291ff. 
46 SchOll,passim. See too [Plut.] Mor. 851F-852A. 
47 See too [Plut.] Mor. 843A, C, E. 
48 SchOll, 52ff. The order of Habron, Lykourgos and Lykophron is retained in RE 13, 
s.vv. Lykophron (5), (6), Lykourgos (14) (Obst). The right to dine at public expense in 
the Prytaneion was granted during the archonship of Anaxikrates, therefore in 307/6 
B.C., for Lykourgos' countless services to the state and his personal integrity. Kunst, RE 
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Lykourgos was in control of Athens' finances from the time of Khaironeia until 
his death, probably in 325/4 B.c., raising the annual state revenue to 1200 talents 
per annum. Buchanan suggests that Lykourgos' office of 0 Err; -rn ~'OIKrf}(T€1 may 
have been an extraordinary one, established by decree at a dark point in Athens' 
history and effectively forming a token of 'coalition government': this could 
explain, he suggests, Aristotle's silence on the post, for he was consulting nomoi, 
not psephismata.49 Meritt, however, claims epigraphical evidence for the office, 
which may name Xenokles as its holder around 340 B.C., and which might cast 
doubt on claims that the post was specifically created for Lykourgos; the precise 
date of the inscription is unclear, however, and Rhodes prefers to place it 
generally in the Lykourgan period: thus Xenokles perhaps held titular office only 
to enable Lykourgos to continue his administration. 50 
There is also confusion over Lykourgos' length of tenure. Stratokles' decree refers 
to twelve years' service, an assessment perhaps arising from the internal 
administration of the prytany boards, one of a series of new commissions in the 
fourth century, which produced official records annually but kept inventories in 
four year groups, presenting them at the end of a penteteris, probably at the time 
of the Great Panathenaia, a sequence to which Lykourgos' tenure is naturally 
linked. He thus could appear to have held the post, himself and through others, 
13, s.v. Lykourgos(lO) thus concludes that Lykophron was the youngest son who, after 
the premature death of the eldest brother, Habron, claimed this right for himself. This 
raises the question, however, of why the middle son, Lykourgos, did not do so. 
Humphreys 1985a, 220, considers that the honour, initially awarded mainly to victors in 
major athletic events and, after the fall of the Peisistratid dynasty, to figures who had 
performed fundamental patriotic services (e.g. Kleon after Sphakteria in 425 B.C., or 
Iphikrates after the peace with Sparta of 371 B.c.) seems partly to have been debased 
after Khaironeia, with awards going to citizens and non-citizens who had acted as 
intermediaries between Athens and Macedonia. None the less, the posthumous awards to 
Lykourgos and Demosthenes suggest some degree of continuity in the ideology of such 
an honour. See too Mol. Osborne 1981b,passim; MJ. Osborne 1981c, 172ff.; Rhodes 
1984, passim. 
49 Buchanan, 77; see too Durrbach 1890,19-38; Mitchel 1973, 174f.; Andreades, 372-
381; Rhodes 1993, 515f. 
50 Meritt 1960, 2ff. #3; Rhodes 1993, 516. See too Markianos, passim, who suggests that 
there may have been no law that prohibited Lykourgos holding office consecutively, but 
that he was attempting to forestall the proposal of such a prohibition. 
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every year for twelve years. 51 According to Sealey, however, Stratokles might 
have exaggerated his claim, for he was not, after all, writing a history, but setting 
out reasons for honouring Lykourgos; thus, Lykourgos perhaps held office for 
only one or several individual years of these penteterids and was possibly even in 
charge of the financial affairs of Athens by means of more than one post, maybe 
even as tamias stratiotikon, rather than as 0 Err; -rfj ~/oIK'i;uEI.52 There is evidence for 
Demades, too, being involved in financial administration at the same time, which 
suggests that Lykourgos was not solely responsible for Athenian financial 
affairs. 53 
It is perhaps unsurpnsmg therefore that the date from which Lykourgos 
administered Athens finances is disputed. For Sealey, the period immediately after 
Khaironeia was problematic, thus Lykourgos' tenure cannot pre-date 337/6 B.C. 54 
Develin claims 336/5 B.C., whilst for Buchanan, Lykourgos' death in 325/4 B.C., 
before the Harpalos case, makes it reasonable to assume that he did indeed serve 
twelve consecutive years in power and that they ran from 337/6 to 326/5 B.C., at 
which point his arch-enemy Menesaikhmos took overall control. 55 The earliest 
secure note of the office of 0 Err; -rfj ~/oIwi;uEI itself in extant inscriptions is from 
307/6 B.C., immediately after the downfall of Demetrios of Phaleron: the holder 
is Lykourgos' son Habron.56 
51 Develin 1986, 71 f.; see too Durrbach 1890,21-25; Daviero-Rocchi, 38f., 45; Sealey 
1993,209ff. 
S2 Sealey, 1993, 210f. Stratokles' decree: introduction 20f., below. See too Durrbach 
1890,26-38; Humphreys 1985a, 199f., who notes that Kallias, Lykourgos' brother-in-
law, was treasurer of military funds in 338/7 B.C. 
53 Demades had served as treasurer of the stratiotic fund in 334/3 B.c., and collaborated 
in Lykourgos' policy of retrenchment, he was also involved in making golden Nikai: 
there is no reason to believe that others were not generally involved as well. See too 
Kallet-Marx, 228-232, whose principal focus is the fifth century but who suggests that 
financial expertise was not widely accessible. 
54 Sealey 1993,210. 
55 Develin 1989, 363: on 480, he also lists Lykourgos' other appointments as envoy in 
343 B.C., financial administrator in 336/5, hieropoios in 330, epimeietes amphiaraia in 
329, and kategoros in 325; Buchanan, 76f.; see too Durrbach 1890, 21-25. 
56IG jj2 463; see too Kahrstedt 1936, 11 ff., 80, 144, 194; Buchanan, 77; Will, 24 with 
n.156. Davies 1994a, 204f., suggests that although the tamias stratiotikon was a single 
official, the Err; -rfj ~fOll<ti;UEI were a board of officials. For Rhodes 1993,516, there might 
variously be one or a board of officials depending on 'the complexion of the regime'. 
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Despite these uncertainties, Lykourgos' influence was clearly profound for much 
of the 330s.57 The evidence is complex and confusing, not least in the area of 
iteration of office. If Rhodes is correct, Lykourgos may have been able to be re-
elected to his post, certainly only the minor offices tended to be sortitive, and 
although the nine archons were selected by lot, the process was preceded by the 
formation of a short list by election or selection. 58 The silence of the sources on 
this particular point, however, together with their suggestion that others held the 
position nominally for him, makes it unlikely that he was re-elected. Indeed, 
although the treasurer of the stratiotic fund and the administrator(s) of the theoric 
payments may have been re-electable, Lykourgos' post, most likely created by 
psephisma rather than nomos, would not fit comfortably into the general 
procedures applicable to other financial offices. The office continued, however, 
and with different incumbents, even though psephismata most often applied to a 
particular person or time, and it may therefore initially have been an extraordinary 
post later ratified by nomos, in which case re-election may not have been 
excluded. 59 
Lykourgos was one of the most respected and trusted orators of his time. 
According to the third letter attributed to Demosthenes, his word alone was 
perceived as sufficient for the Ekklesia to approve a motion and for the jurors to 
convict.60 Plutarch claims that in addition to a stern and humourless nature, 
Lykourgos wore the same clothes in summer and winter and habitually wore no 
shoes.61 The orator's moral character is reflected, for Blass, in his intolerance, 
which led him to demand the highest penalty whenever he prosecuted. He was, 
57 See e.g. Perlman 1967, 175f.; Mitchel 1973, 190ff.; Humphreys 1985a, passim. 
58 See [Arist.] Ath. 3.2-4, 8.1, 22.5, 26.2,43.1,55.1,62.3, with Rhodes 1993. 
59 It is also difficult to assess whether the Hellenotamiai could resubmit for further tenure. 
After reforms of 411 B.C., the Treasurers of Athene were merged with the Treasurers of 
the other gods; both they and the Hellenotamiai were then elected from an elected 
shortlist, the functions of the Hellenotamiai simultaneously incorporating those of the 
kOiakretai ('paying officers of the state treasury': Rhodes 1993, 139). All seem to have 
followed a tribal cycle of appointment, but this does not necessarily preclude 
reappointment. See [Arist.] Ath.7.3, 30.2, with Rhodes 1993; Ferguson 1932,3,10,81, 
141ff.; W.E. Thompson,passim; Rhodes 1972a, 102.; Andreades, 370ff.; Ostwald 1986, 
383; Brock 1988, 137f. 
60 See Dem. Ep. 3.6; Hyp. 4 (Eux.). 12; [Plut.] Mar. 841D-F; Blass iie, 103; see too 
Goldstein, 3f., 31-34, 211-234. 
61 [Plut.] Mor. 842C. 
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Blass suggests, therefore feared, rather than respected.62 There seems, however, to 
be a certain amount of caricature in such a picture, with Lykourgos emerging as a 
cross between Perikles and Sokrates, or for Conomis, between Perikles and 
Antiphon, whose religious pronouncements Lykourgos seems to echo. 63 
de Marcellus, however, considers that the image might be grounded in some 
degree of reality and that Lykourgos, a student of Plato, might have consciously 
adopted a Sokratic image.64 This view perhaps finds some support in Webster's 
argument that the fourth-century characterization of philosophers as humourless, 
money-grabbing, eristic, and aloof reflects how Lykourgos would have appeared 
to ordinary citizens of the time.65 
Stratokles' honorary decree lists Lykourgos' significant political services, decrees 
and laws.66 He had statues of Aiskhylos, Sophokles and Euripides erected, and 
had an official copy of their works transcribed and kept in the Metroon; these 
originals were later borrowed by Ptolemy II Philadelphos for the Alexandrian 
library.67 He constructed the Panathenaic stadium on the south bank of the 
Illissos; rebuilt the Lykeian gymnasium to the east of the city under Mt. 
Lykabettos; refurbished in stone the Theatre of Dionysos on the south slope of the 
Acropolis, incorporating marble seating and some stage parts, of which some are 
still visible today. Lykourgos' building programme had similarities to that of 
Perikles a century earlier, but was less extensive and clearly more intentionally 
functional; none the less, it also was publicly financed, the entire programme 
probably costing somewhere between 750 and 1000 talents.68 A fleet of 400 
triremes was equipped; work resumed on the naval arsenal and dockyards; armour 
62 Blass iie, 104ff. 
63 Conomis 1961,74. Jebb, ii. 375f., suggests an analogy between Plutarch's claim that 
Lykourgos' pen was dipped in blood and Demades' view of Drakon, whose laws were 
"written in blood". Kennedy 1963,249, calls Lykourgos an Athenian Cato because of his 
view that all crimes were equal and should receive the same punishment. Fairweather, 
237-254, esp.251, citing [Plut.] Mor. 843E, & BGM 277. 145ff., suggests that Lykourgos 
was credited with divine ancestry on account of his association with the priesthood of 
Poseidon, but notes that whilst some biographers set varying accounts side by side, others 
tried to make syntheses, e.g. [Plut.] Mar. 840A ff., in order to fill out their anecdotes. 
64 de Marcellus, 129f. 
65 Webster, 5 Off. 
66 Only fragments exist, but it is preserved in [Plut.] Mor. 852A-E. 
67 See too Blass iie, 99; Buchanan, 78f. 
68 Burke 1985, 254f. 
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and a supposed 50,000 items of weaponry on the Acropolis was accumulated, 
which brought Athens into line with Macedonian developments; the Ephebeia 
remodelled; the golden Nikai which had been melted down for coins at the end of 
the fifth century were re-established, and ornaments provided for religious 
processions; dithyrambic and histrionic contests were instituted, and there were 
also major works undertaken at Eleusis.69 For Buchanan, this is a kind of fifth-
century revival, achievable only by reducing the emphasis on the theorika, in a 
programme of conservatism and belt-tightening which probably led, amongst 
other things, to the removal of free tickets for theatrical performances.7o 
Tradition has it that Lykourgos' extradition, and that of Demosthenes and others, 
was demanded by Alexander, but that the demand was refused. Different names 
are recorded by different sources. Arrian lists nine: Demosthenes, Lykourgos, 
Hypereides, Polyeuktos, Khares, Kharidemos, Ephialtes, Diotimos and 
Moirokles.71 The Suda names ten: as Arrian, plus Thrasyboulos, though the date is 
69 Durrbach 1890,47-115, Buchanan, 78f., Mitche11965,passim, Mitche11973, 190-
214, Will, 77-93, Humphreys 1985a, 201-214, de Marcellus, 137-143, Parker 1996, 
242-250, Hurwit, 253-260, and Knell, passim, all look at this programme in considerable 
detail. Will, 93ff., suggests that the reforms did not begin until 336 B.C., when immediate 
defensive work had been carried out in Athens in the face of the imminently anticipated 
Macedonian invasion. He also argues, 61f., that Lykourgos' anti-piracy measures, 
including sending out Diotimos as strategos to deal with pirates directly, should be seen 
in the context of an agreement with Alexander that Diotimos' ships should be equipped to 
the highest standard, reflecting less an ambition to reinstate a thalassocracy than 
financially astute close negotiations with Macedon involving an attempt to increase metic 
traffic. See too Berve, i. 239ff.; D.M. Lewis 1959, passim; de Marcellus, 24-49,123-
169; Lambert, passim, esp. 1-4,269-291. 
70 Buchanan, 57f., 78-82. The theoric fund was probably originally administered by a 
single elected officer, though there was later a board of officials, perhaps often 
representing the tribes. When Euboulos became Treasurer of the fund in 354 B.C., it was 
principally used for public festivals, a religious focus which probably lay at the root of 
Demosthenes' difficulties of transferring surplus funds to the strati otic fund. After Philip 
had withdrawn from his assault on Byzantium, however, Demosthenes' proposal was 
approved, and Lykourgos was appointed as commissioner. The theoric distributions 
continued in the Lykourgan period, though they probably decreased in frequency, ifnot 
in amount, following Hegemon's legislation of335 B.C. The fund probably did not 
survive the Lamian War. See Aiskhin. 3.25; [Arist.] Ath. 43.1, with Rhodes 1993; Dem. 
1.19f., 3.10f., 33-36, 13. passim, 19.291; Plut. Mor. 1011B; CawkwellI962,passim; de 
Ste Croix 1964, passim; Pickard-Cambridge 1968, 27Off.; Rhodes 1972a, 235-240; 
Hansen 1976b,passim; Andreades, 259-263, 372-381; Hammond 1986,565. 
71 Arr. An. 1.1 0.4. 
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different here, being 322, rather than 335 B.C.72 Plutarch gives what he calls the 
most genuine/approved list he could find, naming eight: Demosthenes, 
Polyeuktos, Ephialtes, Lykourgos, Moirokles, Demon, Kallisthenes and 
Kharidemos; he also says that there was an alternative list of ten. 73 Diodorus, too, 
says that there were ten, but only names Demosthenes and LykourgoS. 74 Of 
contemporary sources, only Demosthenes says anything about the matter, namely 
that he was included in those summoned for extradition, a claim apparently 
confirmed by Aiskhines.75 Will is highly sceptical about the whole thing, arguing 
that Plutarch's list has been prioritized because Schafer accepts it, and that there 
are significant reasons to distrust Plutarch, especially since he gives two differing 
accounts. Probably, Will suggests, Plutarch received the list uncritically and was 
unable to offer a critique of his sources: in the absence of any transmitted details, 
later historians then inserted prominent anti-Macedonians into the liSt. 76 
Whether or not Lykourgos had reason to require shielding from Alexander, his 
domestic enemies were unable to get at him until after his death. Then, however, 
his sons were successfully prosecuted by Menesaikhmos, perhaps embittered 
because of Lykourgos' prosecution of him, possibly for religious offences 
connected with the cult of Apollo on Delos. 77 Lykourgos' sons were imprisoned, 
despite a defence by Hypereides, and seem to have been released only after an 
letter of appeal was sent by an exiled Demosthenes.78 Pausanias reports that after 
Lykourgos' death, a bronze statue was erected prominently in the agora near the 
shrine of the Eponymoi, and that his grave, on the outskirts of the city on the road 
to the Academy, was near those of Themistokles, Perikles, the tyrannicides and 
other luminaries.79 
72 S d 'A' u a, s.v. VT'7TaTpo~. 
73 Pluto Dem. 23.3; Phok. 17.2. 
74 D.S. 17.15.1. 
7S Dem.18.41, 322; Aiskhin. 3.161. 
76 Will, 44 n.303, citing Schafer, iii. 138f. n.2. See too Blass iii2, 10 I, for whom 
Alexander's demand was fuelled by Lykourgos' position as treasurer and leader of those 
who had urged the Thebans to revolt. 
77 See too Conomis 1961, 98ff., 141ff. 
78 Suda, s.v. AUKOOP'YO~, AUKOcPpOVO~. 
79 Paus. 1.8.3, 1.29.15. 
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LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Of a maximum of fifteen orations by Lykourgos, only one survIves, this 
prosecution of Leokrates for treason following his flight from Athens at the news 
of the defeat at Khaironeia. In his speech, Lykourgos maintains that democracy 
and the prosperity of the polis principally depend upon three things: the code of 
laws; the votes of the dikasts; and individuals who are prepared to prosecute 
despite the view that prosecutors were regarded not as patriots but as busybodies. 
This is why, he claims, he is prosecuting Leokrates for treason, impelled not by 
enmity nor litigiousness, but by justice and his view that crimes which affect the 
public offer public grounds for outrage. The prosecution was an eisangelia on the 
grounds of prodosia, a treasonable betrayal of Athens. 
Blass claims that Lykourgos, unlike Demosthenes, lacked a sense of committed 
juridical interest and placed so little value on the letter of the law that he not only 
left unread the law on which his case against Leokrates was based, but also did 
not explain it, nor the others which he mentions but does not quote.80 In the light 
of recent comparative social-anthropological scholarship on the nature of law and 
the laws in Athens, however, this now seems rather nai've. 81 Moreover, Lykourgos 
was no juridical novice, and his other prosecutions were sufficiently successful 
that it was possible to claim that his pen was dipped in blood, and that no 
prosecutor was more feared. 82 It is better, perhaps, to see Lykourgos' supposed 
lack of juridical interest in terms of a different concept of law, of the 
particularities of the single case which has come down to us, and the 
circumstances prevailing in Athens at the time of the trial. 
Blass' impression is, indeed, part and parcel of the unammous vIew that 
Lykourgos failed to secure a condemnation in this case, whether as a result of his 
lack of a specific law or his failure to apply a particular law effectively, or 
because of a poorly-structured speech which tends to waffle and degenerate into 
an undifferentiated and wholesale reliance on extraneous matter. Every part of this 
80 Blass iie, 100ff. 
81 See Todd 1993, 18-29; Todd and Millett, passim, esp. 11-18; §§5-6, below. 
82 [Plut.] Mor. 841E. 
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VIew IS open to challenge. The actual composition of the speech will be 
considered later because interpretations of its (lack of) structure are closely bound 
up with ideas of the result of the case. 83 First, therefore, the outcome needs to be 
explored, but to establish the legal context within which the verdict should be 
considered, an investigation into the specific procedural basis of the trial is 
necessary. 
Although Aristotle attributed the institution of eisangelia to Solon, its origins defy 
any firm reconstruction.84 Much of the problem lies in the nature of the sources, 
which are overwhelmingly late; Fuks suggests that with nostalgia for an ancestral 
constitution, reference was increasingly back-dated as greater traditional authority 
was sought, and Ephialtes, Kleisthenes, and Solon were cited respectively as its 
creators.85 Hansen accepts that Solon may have introduced the procedure of 
eisangelia and that cases were conceivably heard originally by the Areopagos, but 
is inclined to believe that its introduction belongs to Kleisthenes' reforms of 50817 
B.C., and that all cases were, from the outset, heard either by the Ekklesia or the 
Dikasteria.86 
Although this view involves rejecting Aristotle's report that Themistokles was 
charged with Medism under the procedure, Hansen argues that the account has 
been accepted only in desperation, and that this simply goes to show how difficult 
it is 'to produce any evidence proving that eisangeliai before 462 were brought 
before the Council of the Areopagos' .87 Rhodes finds the attribution to Solon 
plausible, however, with the procedure being reformed later by Ephialtes when 
the right to try eisangelia was removed from the Areopagos. He is wary of 
'crediting Cleisthenes with an otherwise unattested judicial reform', particularly 
when Ephialtes' reforms clearly concerned the transfer of powers away from the 
83 Introduction, 36-39, below. 
84 [Arist.] Ath. 8.4, with Rhodes 1993. See too Wilamowitz 1893, ii. 188ff.; Lipsius i. 
178f.; Busolt 1920-1926, ii. 847ff.; G. Smith, 63ff.; Bonner and Smith i. 298f.; Hignett, 
90; Harrison 1968-1971, ii, 52f.; Hansen 1980a, 90f.; Carawan 1987,passim. 
85 Fuks, 8ff., 95f. See too §§4, 80-81, below. 
86 Hansen 1975, 15-19. 
87 Hansen 1975, 19, citing [Arist.] Ath. 25.3f. 
- 25-
Areopagos. 88 Moreover, in line with the attribution to Solon. eisangelia seems 
likely to have originally constituted an appeal against a magistrate's decision, 
forming a precedent, in tum, for the fourth-century process of apophasis, in which 
the Areopagos acted as a commission of enquiry for the Ekklesia and Dikasteria. '8,9 
In the middle of the fourth century, however, procedural reforms removed the 
right of the Ekklesia itself to hear eisangeliai, a change that is probably best 
explained by a requirement to cut the cost of a full assembly, the required quorum 
for such cases. The precise date of these reforms is uncertain, but probably 
belongs in the period from 36211 B.c., after which no eisangelia by the Ekklesia 
is known, to the mid-350s B.c., when Isokrates called in his Areopagitikos for the 
Council to be restored to its ancient powers.90 It is around this time, moreover, 
that a somewhat clearer picture begins to emerge of the exact provisions of the 
Nomos Eisangeltikos which governed the types of cases for which the eisangelia 
process was applicable. There are four principal sources: Pollux, who says that the 
law covered specific crimes and those for which no law existed;91 Theophrastos 
and Kaikilios, who are quoted in the Lexicon Rhetoricum Cantabrigiense, where 
Theophrastos claims that it was used only for specific cases and Kaikilios, that it 
was for offences governed by no other existing law;92 and Hypereides, who cites it 
in his defence speech for Euxenippos for instances of overthrowing or attempting 
88 Rhodes 1972a, 162, 199-201. See too [Arist.] Ath.8.4, 25.3f., with Rhodes 1993. 
89 Apophasis seems to have been fuelled primarily by the need to investigate public 
officials on corruption charges, though Carawan 1985, 138, suggests that the right to 
conduct apophaseis on its own initiative was granted to the Areopagos after Khaironeia 
not to protect against public officials' corruption, but as an internal mechanism for 
investigating charges against Areopagites: 'The earliest known apophaseis, soon after the 
peace of Philo crates, were directed against [those] held accountable for that ignominious 
peace, Aeschines and Phi10xenus; many of the most notorious cases involving exile or 
execution came soon after Chaeronea, when the Areopagites were given special authority 
against treason and conspiracy.' See §§52-54, below. 
90 See Hansen 1975,51-57; Carawan 1985,124; Rhodes 1995b, 311-319. Eisangeliai to 
the Boule may have been unaffected by these putative reforms. Hansen 1975, 118ff., lists 
three known eisangeliai to the Boule all of which occurred between 362 and 355 B.C., 
though they could clearly have pre-dated any reform which transferred all eisangeliai to 
the Dikasteria: #142 ;;:: Aristophon impeached trierarchs in 361 B.C; #143 ;;:: Pamphilos 
impeached Timarkhos for embezzlement as a Bouleutes in 36110 B.C; #144 = an 
unknown accuser impeached the trierarch Theophemos in 357/6 B.C. 
91 Pollux 8.5lf. 
92 Lex. Cant. s.v. fiua,),,),fAla; see too Szegedy-Maszak, 19ff. 
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to overthrow the constitution, betraying the forces, bribery on the part of orators 
and fonning conspiratorial clubs. 93 
Rhodes and Hansen have disagreed fundamentally on these sources. For Hansen, 
Theophrastos and Hypereides agree that eisangelia was related to attempts to 
overthrow the democracy, treason or corruption. Their view is intrinsically in 
conflict with that of Kaikilios: it is impossible that both opinions are right.94 
Rhodes, however, argues that Kaikilios conflicts not with Hypereides, but with 
Theophrastos: since, moreover, Kaikilios' and Theophrastos' views are known 
only from the lexica, we cannot really be assured that a conflict existed.95 For 
Rhodes, we must complement Hypereides with Pollux and the Lex. Cant. to 
obtain a definition, and by adding Demosthenes 49.67, we can append 'deceiving 
the people with false promises', but even then we cannot be certain that this 
constitutes the full extent of the law and that further offences were not part of the 
Nomos Eisangeltikos.96 
For Bonner and Smith, such speculation is largely pointless: the law was clearly 
intended to ensure that eisangelia was used in certain political cases.97 They argue 
that the Nomos Eisangeltikos, at least in the form known to Hypereides, was 
probably passed around the time of Antiphon's impeachment as a traitor in 411 
B.c., and that further, later provisions provided for heavier penalties.98 The 
confusion might, indeed, be mediated by allowing for an accretion of clauses, 
whereby an original Nomos Eisangeltikos, specifically referring to certain cases, 
93 Hyp. 4 (Eux). 8,29, 39. 
94 Hansen 1975, 12-20. 
95 Rhodes 1979, 107f. See too Hansen 1980a, 89ff. 
96 Rhodes 1979, 107. Hansen 1975, 12ff., also argues for supplementing Hypereides 
because he omits the clause referring to taking bribes and acting contrary to the demos' 
interest, and argues for the addition ofDem. 20.100, 135, for the law forbidding 
deceiving the people with false promises. See too Hansen 1980a, 91 ff. 
97 Bonner and Smith, i. 295-309. 
98 See too Lipsius, i. 192-195, who argued for the middle of the fourth century because 
heavier penalties were applicable thereafter. There are other possible dates: Ostwald 
1955, 115ff., supports 403/2 B.C., as part of Eukleides' reforms; Hansen 1975, 17, argues 
that since we know from [Arist.] Ath. 29.4, that eisangelia was abolished by the 400 in 
411 B.C., but reintroduced by the 5000, and since the law expressly forbade 'the forming 
of hetairika, precisely the vehicle for the oligarchic propaganda in 411', 41110 B.C is the 
most likely date for any revision; see too Thalheim, 342-352. 
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was deemed to be insufficiently broad to cover serious cases for which no law 
existed. Kaikilios is referring, perhaps, to an extension of law intended to remedy 
this problem, and Hypereides, needing only specific references to bolster his own 
case, citing old provisions still in force under the revised measures. A refinement 
of this argument is offered by Hager, for whom eisangelia was precisely defined, 
but was widely used by prosecutors ascribing a crime to one of its specified 
definitions: Lykourgos, for example, defines Lykophron's adultery as an attempt 
to overthrow the democracy and Leokrates' flight as treason; the crimes governed 
by eisangelia could thus accommodate any other crime provided that the 
prosecution referred to some section of the law. 99 
Hansen argues that it would be 'characteristic of Athenian legal procedure that 
some formalities had to be strictly observed before a case was allowed to be 
heard', and that both Lykourgos and Hypereides provide 'sufficient proof that 
neither the Assembly nor the Council was allowed to accept an eisangelia if the 
prosecutor did not refer expressly to one of the three sections of the Nomos 
Eisangeltikos,.100 Yet the most straightforward reading of the sources suggests 
that certain offences were strictly defined as being within the jurisdiction of the 
eisangelia procedure but that other crimes, too, which were not covered by 
existing laws could be so tried. This is also the view taken by Bonner and Smith, 
who argue that 'there is plenty of evidence that any sudden or serious wrong was 
normally dealt with by this process', and by Harris, who suggests that 'the statute 
obviously attempted to cover treasonable acts in general, but did so by listing 
various kinds of treasonable activities instead of offering a comprehensive type of 
treason,.IOI 
The question seems to boil down to the issue of whether Athenian law was 
primarily procedural or substantive, an issue which has been subject to a great 
deal of analysis. For Hansen, 'our sources show that the Athenians took much 
more interest in procedural law than in substantive law'; thus the laws themselves 
99 Hager, 78; see too Durrbach 1890, 135ff.; Conomis 1961, 128ff.; Hansen 1975, 19f., 
106 #119; Szegedy-Maszak, 21f. 
100 Hansen 1975, 20. 
101 Bonner and Smith, i. 309; Harris 2000, 68. 
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'dealt more with procedure and less with the subject matter which brought about 
the employment of the procedure prescribed' .102 Todd too argues that the principal 
concern in Greek law generally was 'not so much to define ... , but to indicate a 
fonn of action which may (not 'must') be taken' against an alleged criminal. I03 
Carey sees a hardening of the consensus for a procedurally-based Athenian legal 
system and argues that the model simply cannot work for the entire system. 104 It is 
true, as Cohen argues, that 'on any particular day offenses ... were whatever the 
mass court of ... untrained lay judges thought they were. Further, since the judges 
could not even debate the case amongst themselves, what this situation implies is 
that the common community understanding of ... offenses provided the basis for 
judgement' .105 None the less, arguments can be put for a substantive 
interpretation. 106 
Hansen himself notes that on one occasion the Eleven refused to accept an 
apagoge until the two words err' O,v-rOcPWP41 had been included in the indictment: 
here definition is clearly a matter of fundamental concern. I07 Todd also notes 
similar nit-picking over allegations of slander: it is difficult to see how the 
question of whether someone called someone else a 'murderer' or merely stated 
that 'he had killed his father' could arise if the system was purely, or even 
overwhelmingly, procedural. 108 Harris argues, indeed, that there is a clear danger 
of drawing the wrong conclusions about the procedural basis of Athenian law, for 
careful attention was clearly paid to substantive issues and questions about the 
interpretation of law. I 09 Rhodes suggests that the clear interest shown by the 
statutes in offences rather than procedures indicates that the legal system was 
indeed concerned with substantive as opposed to procedural law, at least in the 
102 Hansen 1975, 10, 14. 
103 Todd 1993, 66f., 269ff.; see too R. Osborne 1985a, 48-53; Ober 2000, 543ff. 
104 Carey 1998,passim. 
105 D. Cohen, 242. 
106 See too §§8, 9, 128-132, below. 
107 Hansen 1975,20, citing Lys. 13.86. Noted, in his section on procedure, but without 
any real acknowledgement of the implications for a substantive interpretation, by Todd 
1993,80,126. 
108 Todd 1993,258-262, citing Lys. to. 
109 Harris 2000, passim, esp. 78f. 
- 29-
first instance. llo His view has been challenged by Todd, most notably on the 
grounds that the offences are listed not to provide a definition, but to show the 
appropriate procedure for them; this is, however, in a work which claims priority 
for procedural law while allowing 'over half of the total book' to discussion and 
detail of substantive law. III 
Notwithstanding the difficulties that exist with the definition or scope of the 
Nomos Eisa ngeltikos , there are further problems in respect of the procedure 
required for the introduction of eisangeliai. To Hansen's argument that major 
public eisangeliai were presented first to the ekklesia and only exceptionally to 
the Boule, Rhodes contends that since a probouleuma was necessary before the 
ekklesia could discuss anything, a probouleuma could have offered an open 
invitation at kyria ekklesia to discuss any proposed eisangelia, but did not 
necessarily do so, allowing eisangeliai to be instituted in a variety of ways. Thus, 
there could be an invitation by probouleuma at kyria ekklesia, or a presentation to 
the Boule at any time. The difference of view seems to come down to a question 
of imprecision and invariability. Hansen is surely right to consider that in a polis 
which had a procedure for dealing with procedures, eisangeliai would be precise 
and unvaried; Rhodes, however, convincingly argues that different laws, enacted 
on different occasions, gave the citizens options on how to proceed with such 
eisangeliai, and that therefore different procedures could merge, lead from one 
into another, or be separate with different penalties in a fluid system. 112 Thus 
options existed for instituting the procedure, though they required close attention 
to juridical detail when applied. 
An eisangelia to the assembly involved bringing the charges before the ekklesia 
which, upon acceptance of the impeachment, ordered the Boule to draw up a 
110 Rhodes 1979, 106f. 
III Todd 1993, 66f, 70. 
112 Hansen 1975, 10; Rhodes 1979, 108-114; cf. Hansen 1975,21, where he concedes 
that one offence could be dealt with by several procedures and that one procedure could 
cover several charges. Rhodes 1995a, 196, suggests that after the reforms of 360 B.C., it 
is possible that eisangeliai could be instigated in the kyrios assembly without prior 
application to the Boule, other eisangeliai being instigated in the normal way in any 
assembly. See too [Arist.] Ath. 43.4,45.2, 53.6, 59.2, with Rhodes 1993; Rhodes 1972a, 
162-171; MacDowe111978, 238; Todd 1993, 114f. 
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probouleuma which was discussed and ratified at the next ekklesia: the case was 
heard either at the following ekklesia or in a court. I 13 In the fifth century and the 
first half of the fourth at least, penalties did not have to be fixed; the penalty was 
either proposed in the nonnal way with the jurors voting twice, as in other agones 
timetoi, or a penalty was pre-set and became automatic in the event of a guilty 
verdict. The position in the second half of the fourth century is not, at first glance, 
as clear. Lipsius argues that from the middle of the fourth century, eisangelia 
became an agon atimetos, carrying an automatic, and pre-set, death penalty, along 
with confiscation of property and loss of right to burial in Attika. 114 This putative 
refonn must have post-dated the trial of Timotheos in 356/5 B.c., because the 
general was fined 100 talents; it might also have post-dated 353/2 when 
Demosthenes seems to refer to timesis in eisangelia as still applicable. I IS Hansen 
has looked in detail at the twenty-eight cases of eisangelia known from the period 
353/2 to 322 B.C.: in nine, the result is unknown; four eisangeliai were withdrawn 
prior to the trial; eight resulted in acquittal and one in a guilty verdict, but there is 
no information on the sentence; and five cases are known to have carried the death 
penalty. The one remaining case is that of Lykourgos against Menesaikhmos, a 
case prosecuted before 325 B.C. This prosecution achieved a guilty verdict but 
could not have resulted in a death sentence, because Menesaikhmos succeeded 
Lykourgos in the capacity of financial administrator and prosecuted his 
predecessor's sons, after their father died, for an alleged fiscal deficit. Hansen 
argues, therefore, that Menesaikhmos must have only been fined and that this one 
case proves Lipsius wrong; thus eisangeliai remained agones timetoi down to 322 
B.c. 116 
113 Hansen 1975, 26ff.: [Arist.] Ath. 45.2 claims that eisangeliai to the Boule were 
restricted to cases against magistrates, an argument reinforced by IG iiliii2 1631, 398-401 
which refers to prosecution of harbour officials and the Eleven's secretary. Hansen 
accepts Aristotle's claim despite quibbles over the vague use of the word magistrate, but 
suggests that Lys. 22 would violate the theory if it could be proven to be an eisangelia 
rather than an apagoge. Hansen argues that the magistrates could also be impeached in 
the Boule for offences unrelated to their office but which had been committed whilst they 
were empowered. See too n.90, above. 
114 Lipsius, i. 192ff.; see too Hansen 1975, 33-36. 
lIS See Hansen 1975,34,101 #101; Oem. 24.63f. 
116 Hansen 1975,34; see too Conomis 1961, 140ff. 
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Hansen suggests that the alternative penalty procedures from the fifth and early 
fourth centuries outlined above therefore continued throughout the fourth 
century. I 17 Thus eisangeliai could be subject to a penalty, though not 
automatically the death penalty, pre-set by the Boule or by an Ekklesia decree 
referring the trial to the Dikasteria; there was at least one case in the second half 
of the fourth century where this procedure was used. 118 The Ekklesia would 
probably have accepted any recommendation for a penalty which formed part of a 
probouleuma issued by the Boule, whether this was issued in the first instance or 
when a proposal for eisangelia was referred from the Ekklesia to the Boule for 
drafting. It may, indeed, also have been possible for the Ekklesia to refer a 
probouleuma back to the Council for any recommended penalty to be changed 
before the case came to trial. I 19 Such a penalty clause was optional, however, and, 
in the fourth century particularly, it is likely that the decision concerning an 
appropriate penalty was left to the increasingly sovereign authority of the courts 
by means of the alternative procedure of permitting proposals for a penalty to be 
suggested directly by prosecution and defence, with a second vote following a 
guilty verdict as in other agones timetoi. 120 
When these issues are applied to the outcome of Lykourgos' prosecution of 
Leokrates, it is possible to reinterpret the sole reference to the result in Aiskhines 
3.252. Much has been made of Aiskhines' comment that a difference of one vote 
117 Hansen 1975,33, acknowledges that 'the scanty evidence does not allow us to arrive 
at any decision as to whether these two procedures were regulated by law or whether the 
Assembly and the Councilor perhaps the prosecutors were empowered to choose 
between them in each particular case' . 
118 Hansen 1975,35, citing Demosthenes' eisangelia against Anaxinos of ca. 340 B.c., 
where it was the death penalty which happened to be stipulated; see too Aiskhin. 3.223f.; 
Oem. 18.137. 
119 See too Billheimer,passim; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 57, 82; Rhodes 1972a, 167, 168 
with n.4; Brock 1988, 137. The similarity with probole is striking in some regards, 
notably that there was a preliminary hearing by the ekklesia but the actual case, if it was 
to proceed to prosecution, was tried in the courts. Similarly too, a prosecutor in an 
eisangelia suffered no penalty ifhe withdrew his prosecution. In an eisangelia to the 
Boule where a guilty verdict was passed, but where the maximum enforceable penalty of 
500 dr. was insufficient, the case would be referred to the courts for a penalty vote alone: 
Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 13f., 59-64; MacDowell 1978 194f.; Todd 1993,121. 
120 Hansen 1975 33f., notes several fifth-century eisangeliai where the penalty was pre-set 
both by the Ekklesia and the Boule, but in the trial of Kephisodotos in 359 B.C., 'the 
jurors had to take a second vote ... to fix the sentence'; see too Dem. 23: 167; §2, below. 
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would have resulted in Leokrates being cast out without burial, or exiled -
lJ7fepWpIUTe, with scholars unanimously concluding that the vote was tied, and that 
the defendant was acquitted on the legendary precedent of Athene's acquittal of 
Orestes, escaping execution by the one casting vote. Hansen argues, indeed, that 
the remark shows that there was only one vote taken by the jury. 121 This is not 
necessarily so, however, for a penalty might not have been specified by 
probouleuma, and if it was not, then Aiskhines would by definition be referring to 
the second vote on whether the death penalty should be applied to a man who had 
already been found guilty. 
Aiskhines had, in fact, every reason only to refer to a second vote, for he was 
attempting to create the greatest possible distinction between the punishment of 
the crime committed by Leokrates and the proposed reward for the crimes alleged 
to have been committed by Demosthenes. He would not, anyway, need to refer to 
a first vote which had resulted in a guilty verdict since this would have been 
common, and recent, knowledge because the cases were only separated by a few 
weeks at most. The whole tenor of what he says and the way in which he refers to 
Leokrates, indeed, does not indicate that Leokrates was found Not Guilty, even by 
a single vote. For whilst Aiskhines is minimising the crime Leokrates has 
committed, a crime judged seriously enough for the Ekklesia to ratify an 
eisangelia eight years after Khaironeia, his rhetoric implies that Leokrates is 
someone who has been punished for committing an offence which Demosthenes 
has exceeded by far, and for which it is proposed he should be rewarded. 
According to Aiskhines, Demosthenes is a coward and a deserter; great care is 
taken to set up a vivid comparison between the city's heroes and cowards, a line 
of attack that makes a mockery of using as an example a man who had been 
acquitted of cowardice. 122 Moreover, Aiskhines is arguing in the context of the 
erosion of democracy, with private citizens being held to account for their 
misdeeds, however trivial, whilst politicians, rhetors and the like, do as they 
please and even seek to be rewarded for things which should carry an automatic 
121 Hansen 1975,35. 
122 Aiskhin. 3.153ff. 
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death penalty. 123 Within the context of this rhetoric, Aiskhines can only mean that 
Leokrates would have been executed and cast out without burial if Lykourgos' 
penalty had been accepted but that, in the event, Leokrates was given an 
alternative punishment, perhaps exile or a large fine as proposed by the defence. 
Indeed, the other example Aiskhines uses of behaviour which contrasts with 
Demosthenes' own is a citizen who was simply trying to sail to Samos and was 
executed by the Areopagos on the same day. It would seem to undermine his 
argument fundamentally if his other example, Leokrates, had received no 
punishment whatsoever, and especially ifhe was actually found Not Guilty. 
Yet a hung jury, on either vote, would be remarkable bearing in mind the numbers 
of jurors involved: from Deinarkhos it is apparent that multiple panels of up to 
2,500 jurors could hear eisangeliai. 124 There is a precedent, however, for a guilty 
verdict being followed by an extremely close penalty vote. In Kephisodotos' 
eisangelia of 359 B.C., where Demosthenes spoke as synegoros for the prosecutor 
Euthykles, a guilty verdict was followed by a penalty vote in which Kephisodotos 
escaped execution by a mere three votes, being fined five talents instead. 125 
Hansen quotes four other examples of eisangeliai, moreover, where the accused 
was fined though the prosecution demanded the death penalty; the first two, 
Miltiades and Perikles, are from the fifth century, but the latter two, Ergophilos 
and Timotheos are from 362 and 356/5, tried by the Ekklesia and the Dikasteria 
respectively. 126 
On two occaSions, however, Lykourgos himself seems to contradict this 
interpretation of the outcome of his prosecution. First, he explicitly says that the 
jurors have a single vote in the case, and secondly, that they should either acquit 
Leokrates or execute him - apparently a straight choice in a single vote between 
acquittal or execution. 127 If Lykourgos can be taken at face value, then the penalty 
123 Aiskhin. 3.248-251; see too Hyp. 5 (Dem.). 24-27. 
124 Dein. 1.52; see too Oem. 24.9; Bonner and Smith, i.243ff.; MacDowell 1978, 36-40; 
Rhodes 1993, 728f. 
125 Aiskhin. 3.51f.; Oem. 23,167; see too Hansen 1975, 33, 98f. #96. 
126 Hansen 1975,69 #2,71 #6,94 #86, 101 #101. 
127 §§ 146-148, 149-150. 
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was pre-set at death, and there was only one vote with no possibility of any 
alternative proposal from the defence. There are good reasons, however, to 
suspect that Lykourgos' words are misleading precisely because they appear to fit 
with the alternative procedural possibility, and that he is, rather, making highly 
emotive and rhetorically effective points, first that a single vote covers a 
multiplicity of crimes, all of which Leokrates has committed, and secondly that 
the defendant must be saved or destroyed in accordance with the two voting urns 
which represent the destruction of the city or its safety and propserity. He is 
seeking to show what one vote can do, and using appropriate and anticipated 
rhetoric to obtain his desired verdict. His carefully composed and perhaps genuine 
outrage, his rhetorical skill, and the jurors' expectations, require that he does 
nothing less. 
Kennedy, whilst arguing that Lykourgos' failed prosecution of Leokrates was an 
act of rhetorical irresponsibility and indulgence, and a fine example of 
unreasonable prosecution built on confidence in rhetorical technique, concludes 
that Lykourgos actually had a great chance of success. Lykourgos' skill, the 
emotional atmosphere in Athens at the time of Khaironeia, and in the jury during 
the trial, all contributed, Kennedy suggests, to the presentation of a case which, if 
not grounded firmly in law, had a basis in fact, and which should have been a 
foregone conclusion. 128 Harris, too, sees the unsuccessful prosecution as a trial 
that Lykourgos 'should have won hands down', but which he lost because he 
failed to persuade the jury to agree with his definition of Leokrates' actions as 
treason under the terms of the Nomos Eisangeltikos.1 29 Will, indeed, argues that 
Lykourgos was motivated by the general apathy of the Athenians in 33110 B.C. to 
prosecute a case without any basis in law in an attempt to reintroduce political and 
patriotic sentiments in the Athenians. 130 Yet Lykourgos seems to have had a case 
that the jurors would deem to be strong in fact, law and emotion, a case which was 
reinforced both by Leokrates' apparently open admission that he had left Athens, 
and by the precedent of Lykourgos' successful conviction of Autolykos for 
128 Kennedy 1963, 251. 
129 Harris 2000, 74f. 
130 Will, 102. 
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secreting his family out of Athens at the time of Khaironeia. 131 It seems, 
moreover, that he could well have been able to rouse emotionally-charged 
patriotic sentiments by rhetorical technique and the judicious extraction of laws, 
epigrams and poetry, and win his case. At the very least, the traditional and 
unanimous understanding of the implications of Aiskhines 3.252 for Lykourgos 
against Leokrates cannot continue to be considered safe. 132 
131 §§5-6, 14-15, 16, 17-18, 19,25,26-27,28-30,52-54. 
132 See too Sullivan 2002, paSSim. 
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STRUCTURE OF LYKOURGOS AGAINST LEOKRATES 
Analyses of Lykourgos against Leokrates have almost universally deemed the 
speech to be fundamentally unstructured, citing the mass of quotations which 
Lykourgos uses in the second half of his prosecution as evidence of a mass 
digression on the orator's part. 133 One of the most recent examples of this 
approach is that of Usher. Despite crediting Lykourgos with originality of 
approach, noting that the narrative of §§38-41 owes 'little to previous narratives 
in its combination of stressed action', Usher concludes that 'the speech seems to 
be a rich and triumphant marriage of epideictic and forensic rhetoric, combining 
pathos and vividness in its narratives; but its debt to earlier oratory in both genres 
is always apparent and it falls short of the best of those models in structural 
compactness' .134 This opinion is consistent with the general view that Lykourgos' 
speech is fundamentally flawed, and that 'grand old patriotic themes and ancient 
oaths, delivered in a dignified style, continue to serve in place of argument based 
on evidence' .135 Thus Lykourgos' failure to conform to traditional structural 
requirements weakened his speech and his prosecution, and led to an unfavourable 
outcome of the trial itself. 
Another recent example of this trend is Danielle Allen's analysis of Lykourgos 
against Leokrates. She too, although offering an acute reading of the content of 
the speech, and interpreting Lykourgos' avowed disinterested prosecution as a 
new style of 'prosecutorial voice', none the less concludes that Lykourgos 'lost 
the case by one vote, which perhaps reveals both the power of the norm of 
personal involvement and the degree to which it was possible to change it. Echoes 
of Lycurgus's speech tum up in two speeches given later that year, suggesting that 
his new and dramatically public voice did have a noticeable impact on Athenian 
politics' .136 At the root, however, of her view that the trial resulted in Leokrates' 
acquittal, again lies the assumption that the speech is structurally weak, albeit 
133 See e.g. Jebb, ii. 376f.; Blass iii2, 118f.; Kennedy 1963,251; Parker 1996, 25lff.; 
Wilson, 313f. 
134 Usher 1999, 326ff. 
135 Usher 1999, 327. 
136 Allen 2000a, 157-160, citing Aiskhin. 3.252f., & Oem. 18.204; see too Allen 2000b, 
passim. 
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because of what she sees as Lykourgos' problematic self-presentation as 
disinterested prosecutor, rather than of rhetorical inadequacy.137 Thus there is 
again little leeway to perceive a 'prosecutorial' victory. Her perception, therefore, 
of the similarities in Aiskhines' and Demosthenes' speeches of a few weeks later 
is based upon her interpretation that it was Lykourgos' 'new and dramatically 
public voice' which was echoed by the other two cases, whereas if the speech 
were viewed as a structurally sound and balanced entity, it would be possible to 
see these resonances as attempts not just to echo Lykourgos' new 'public voice', 
but his successful prosecution. 138 
The speech can, in fact, be viewed in this way, its structure demonstrated by the 
striking use of a transitionallk€V 01511 to introduce each new section. This occurs in 
§§7, 23, 36, 55, 110, 124, 141 and 149, the sole exception in §95 being 
contextually and grammatically valid in its own right. The text thus divides into 9 
sections as follows: 
1: §§I-6-prooimion; 
2: §§7-15;16-20; 21-23 - introductory exhortation; narrative; disinterested 
general evidence; 
3: §§23-27; 28-35 - specific contractual evidence; argument; challenge to slave 
torture; 
4: §§36-45; 46-51; 52-54 - decree and narrative; eulogy to the dead of 
Khaironeia; juridical precedents; 
5a: §§55-58; 59-67; 68-74 - defence arguments and their refutation; 
5b: §§75-78; 79-82; 83-89 - tradition and oaths; 
5c: §§90-97; 98-101;102-110 - divine rationale for trial and divine requirement 
for extreme punishment; poetic authority from tragedy; poetic authority from 
Homer; 
6: §§ 110-116; 117-119; 120-123 - precedents of traitors from history and 
ancient history, with decrees; 
137 Allen 2000b,passimlOf., 25ff., 29; §§5-6. 
138 This might also help to explain the problems scholars have evidently had in 
determining whether Aiskhines or Demosthenes would have been more encouraged by 
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7: §§124-132; 133-140 - precedents of traitors against the democracy and 
aspirants to tyranny; demolition of synegoroi; 
8: §§141-148-peroration; 
9: §§149-150 - concluding remarks. 
Central to the speech is section 5, where the arguments Leokrates is expected to 
use are presented with their refutations, and the claim of his synegoroi, that 
Leokrates' flight is comparable to the departure from Athens for Salamis, is 
dismissed on the grounds that that particular heroic action was an example of 
shifting the scene of battle rather than of refusing to fight. The Athenians' sea 
victory at Salamis is complemented here by the Plataian victory as an example of 
how the defence argument can be rebutted. At the very heart of the speech, 
Lykourgos places the Plataian and Ephebic oaths, providing a backdrop against 
which he brings into relief most vividly both his own motivation for initiating the 
prosecution and the jurors' motivation, according to their own heliastic oath, for a 
guilty verdict. These arguments are then reinforced by the extra-legal authority 
provided by the gods, the tragic poets and Homer. The various strands of 
Leokrates' anticipated defence are, accordingly, comprehensively demolished in 
this central section. 
The second half of Lykourgos' prosecution speech against Leokrates is not a mass 
digression into a structurally-flawed conglomeration of poetic quotes, oaths, 
decrees and folktales, but is, rather, carefully constructed and balanced with 
argumentation and authority from precedent provided in a cohesive fonn. The 
traditional reading of Aiskhines 3.252 is at the root of assumptions that Lykourgos 
lost his case, but the view that the speech is poorly structured is closely bound up 
with this.139 It is difficult to identify how great a part this view has played in the 
construct of Leokrates' acquittal. It is not inconceivable that purists would find it 
difficult to acknowledge that a speech which appears to fail to confonn to 
traditional rhetorical requirements could have been successful. This would be 
fuelled by the fact that Lykourgos against Leokrates has not received much 
the result of Lykourgos' 'hung jury' in forcing the delayed prosecution of Ktesiphon into 
court: See Tam, 445f.; Burke 1977, passim; Bauman, 103; Harris 1995, 174. 
139 Introduction, 31-35, above. 
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detailed attention, despite its extensive and selective citation to back up a variety 
of arguments. There would therefore be little incentive to look again at 
Aiskhines 3.252 and to consider different possibilities for its meanmg. 
Conversely, however, with the usual interpretation of that brief passage, there 
would be little reason to look more closely for a structure to a speech that has 
always been criticized for poor arrangement. It has been all too easy to blame 
Lykourgos' legal failure, at least in part, on a poorly-structured oration. 
This is not to say that Lykourgos won, if he won, simply because his speech was 
well structured. Events and attitudes at the time were such that Aiskhines felt 
confident that he could successfully arraign Demosthenes' entire career. 140 
Lykourgos himself had reputation, status and enormous moral authority.141 There 
was also the prospect of a hefty fine for the demos, if the jurors so chose.1 42 A 
well-structured speech would not, however, have done his cause any harm and 
such a reinterpretation of his arrangement of this oration can be viewed either as 
providing justification for, or a reinforcement of, a new reading of 
Aiskhines 3.252, or both. 
140 Introduction, 10-14, above. 
141 Introduction, 15-22, above. 
142 Leokrates clearly had considerable wealth, and Carey 1994b, 183, goes too far in 
suggesting that he was a rather shabby character: Schafer, iii 1 .199ff.; Ourrbach 1890, 150; 
Blass iii2, 111; Burke 1977, 330f., 339; Millett 1991,139; §§23(ii}-24. Bosworth 1988, 
207f., suggests that there was a financial motive behind more than one of Lykourgos' 
prosecutions; certainly, in the case ofOiphilos, the polis gained 160 talents: [Plut.] Mor. 
8430. Jurors were thought, at least by elite defendants, to condemn for the financial 
benefit for the polis, which included, of course, their own remuneration: A.H.M. Jones, 
58-61; Ober 1989a, 20Of. 
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COMMENTARY 
HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis of Lykourgos against Leokrates is the only extant scholiastic 
writing on the speech, though it is impossible to date. The author is similarly 
unknown, but he clearly assumes that the prosecution was based on the violation 
of the decree of the demos which, through its categorization of flight as prodosia, 
effectively prohibited departure from Athens. 143 Since this is not a claim that 
Lykourgos ever makes, the attention paid to the decree here might suggest a 
different cultural concept of a law, and thus that the hypothesis was written quite 
some time later. 144 It would clearly be speculative to attempt to identify a type of 
author, but the text might have been used as part of a rhetorical educational 
schema, which might also help to account for the evident academic thought that 
has gone into identifying a classification for the case. 
The hypothesis claims that the case should be classified as one of contradictory 
definition, opo) O,ViOIJO/La'wlJ, Leokrates admitting his departure but denying the 
charge of betrayal. The author allows, however, that there are two other views. 
First, that since Leokrates admits his departure, the case is one of conjectural 
intention, (TTOx(J,U'/LOIJ o'1T'O r.'wWY)~, namely whether Leokrates left for betrayal or 
trade. Second, that since Leokrates explicitly claims to have left for purposes of 
trade, the case is one of counterplea, O,Vi;(TT(J,U'IIJ. The author's definition of 
contradictory definition is, in fact, a virtual mirror image of counterplea, for in 
both views Leokrates admits his departure but denies betrayal. The only 
difference in the two definitions is the concrete existence in the second of motive, 
but this is implicit in the hypothesis' original classification. There are no grounds 
for defining the charge as one of conjectural intention since the arguments on both 
sides are clear, and differing definitions of laws were often presented in the 
courts, selectively excerpted and interpreted. 145 
143 See §§52-54, below. 
144 S . d . 2 b ee too mtro uchon, 3, a ove; §§5-6, below. 
145 S ee too Bonner 1927, 177ff.; Todd 1993,58, 61f., 65,90; Carey 1997,10. 
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The hypothesis ends by companng the subject matter to the prosecution of 
Autolykos, presumably Lykourgos' prosecution of the Areopagite who had 
removed his wife and children from Athens in the face of the anticipated 
Macedonian invasion in 338 B.C. 146 
146 See too introduction, 34f., above; §§52-54, below. 
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§§ 1-6. 
Lykourgos opens his speech with a prayer to the gods whom Leokrates has 
wronged, to make him a worthy prosecutor, and to enable the jurors to reach a just 
verdict on behalf of their ancestors, children, wives, country and temples, all of 
which Leokrates has betrayed. The polis, Lykourgos claims, needs prosecutors as 
one of the three foundations of democracy, along with the system of laws and trial 
by jury, both of which are powerless without the willingness of accusers to go to 
trial. This case has arisen as the result of Leokrates' publicly outrageous 
behaviour, not Lykourgos' own enmity. Justice must be the jurors' first concern, 
as it is in Lykourgos' prosecution. The city might not appreciate prosecutors 
sufficiently, but Lykourgos will run the gauntlet of the anticipated accusations of 
meddlesomeness because he knows the defendant is liable to all aspects of the 
eisangelia, and because such cases preserve democracy itself and ensure the 
continued prosperity of the polis. 
§ 1. ~'Ka,;a,)I: The speech starts with an emphatic '~/Ka;av', generating an 
immediate image of justice and the laws with which Lykourgos is attempting to 
identify. Dover notes that dikaios also reflects the concept of paying back that 
which is due and behaving in a way unlikely to generate enemies: in 'tit for tat' 
style, dikaios is the conceptualisation of upright behaviour in opposition to the 
justification of vengeance for wrong-doing. 147 This is also, therefore, the model 
for the behaviour required of the jury in return for Lykourgos' righteousness and 
in revenge for Leokrates' wrong-doing. The laws, as well as the dike personified 
by the prosecutor and intrinsic to his case, convey his own patriotism and 
conformity to approved social norms, however unusual his disinterested approach 
to the case is, and they require no less than absolute vengeance for the defendant's 
147 Dover 1994, 180r., 306f. 
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unpatriotic crimes which contravene any standard of conventionally acceptable 
behaviour. 148 
The concept was not unfamiliar in the courts. Demosthenes claimed that the laws' 
existence was rooted in the need both to prevent actions which are not dikaios and 
to ensure that punishment made others better, and argued that in the absence of 
laws, the jury should confer the most dikaios judgement. 149 Lykourgos will argue 
in a similar vein, though he will offer his own particular interpretation of what 
would be dikaios on this occasion, and his emphatic opening is therefore 
especially significant in view of the absence of any specific laws which the 
defendant will be accused of violating. 150 
§I 
w 'Afh}llrJ.'Iol: The composition of juries of 'Athenians' has been much debated. 
Demographically, a significant two-thirds of the adult male citizen popUlation was 
eligible for dikastic service: the majority of jurors would thus necessarily not have 
been selected from the wealthier sections of society. Jury pay at the rate of two 
obols a day was introduced in the 450s B.C., a measure ridiculed by the rich for 
producing a deterioration in the composition of juries, which suggests that from 
this time jury service was a means of obtaining pocket money for the elderly and 
poor. It is noteworthy too that elite speakers extend their flattery of jurors in an 
attempt to assimilate their circumstances to that of their audience. 151 Jury pay was 
soon raised to 3 obols, probably by Kleon, and was still at that level by the time of 
148 See too Dover 1994, 186; Allen 2000a, 39f., 50f, 157-160 citing only three other cases 
where claims of disinterested prosecution were made (Hyp.l, Dein. 1, Lys. 22); §§3, 5-6, 
11-13, below. 
149 Oem. 25.17, 39.40f.; see too Isok. 19.16, for whom dikaios appears to be an adjunct to 
the strictly legal; §§9, 11-13, below. 
ISO See introduction, 23f., above; §§5-6, below. 
151 See [Arist.] Ath.27.4, with Rhodes 1993; Ar. Vesp. passim, though despite 
Philokleon's supposed poverty, Bdelykleon appears comfortably enough off; Oem. 
21.182,211, 24.123f.; Isok. 7.54, 8.129f., 15.152; [Xen.] Ath. 1.18. See too Lotberg 
1917, 13ff.; Mosse 1962, 312f.; A.H.M. Jones, 36f., 124; Markle 1985, 266f., 281-289; 
Ober 1989a, 97, 255f., 306ff.; Hansen 1990c, 222f.; Todd 1990c, 158-170; Hansen 1991, 
183-186; Sinclair, 127-135; Todd 1993, 88f.; Lanni, 186f.; Pelling, 13ff. Ruschenbusch 
1994, 190f., sees attendance fees for both assembly and courts as being as much the result 
of great depopulation at the end of the fifth century resulting from war and plague as of 
political developments. 
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the composition of the Athenaion Politeia. 152 Brock suggests that after the 
juridical hiatus which resulted from the coups at the end of the fifth century, 
restored jury pay no longer kept pace with inflation and the constitution of the 
Aristophanic popular courts changed, 'increasing the representation of the more 
prosperous' . 153 
The position had clearly altered again by the 360s B.C., when private suits were 
apparently suspended for some years, and again in 348, when jury pay could not 
be afforded as a result of the campaign in Euboia, circumstances which suggest 
that panels of jurors may once more have been composed principally of the old 
and poor and were accordingly difficult to man without pay.IS4 Lykourgos could, 
in fact, be inferred to distinguish between the wealthy and the jury he is 
addressing by decrying Leokrates' synegoroi who, he argues, will claim gratitude 
for horsebreeding and the performance of liturgies. It must be noted, however, 
that he appears also to make a distinction between the jury and the elderly, in 
whose hands Athens' hopes rested after Khaironeia. 155 
§I 
lea; fixn~ lea; itrrfP V,."roll lea; itrrfP nOli 6ewII ••• -rr7l1 XWpa.1I ;~PIJ,dllO'~: The gods are 
enlisted for the prosecution almost immediately, and will later be presented as 
playing a fundamental part in bringing the defendant to court. IS6 They, along with 
the heroes, as well as the poets and law-makers of the past, allow Lykourgos to set 
out his stall as pious public defender from the outset: he is, after all, a member of 
the Eteoboutadai genos which held high-profile hereditary priesthoods, and the 
gods and oaths will be foregrounded throughout the speech. IS7 He is also, 
however, clearly intending to make the most of all the reserves of goodwill and 
respect his civic persona could call upon, for he had himself played no little part 
in the rejuvenation of Athens' public space. ISS 
152 [Arist.] Ath. 27.3,62.2, with Rhodes 1993; see too Schol. Ar. Ve:.p. 88,300; Arist. Pol. 
1274a8-11; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 48f.; Hansen 1991, 188f. 
IS3 Brock 1988, 138; see too Thouk. 8.67.3. 
IS4 Oem. 39.17,45.4; see too Hansen 1991, 189. See too Aiskhin. 3.85ff.; MacDowell 
1990, 5ff.; Ellis 1994b, 771f. 
ISS Elderly: §§36-39, 40-41,59-64. Synegoroi: 135-137, 138-140, below. 
156 See §§90-92, 93, 94-97, below. 
157 See too Vielberg, passim. 
158 See Knell, 93-96,126-147,182-195. See too introduction, 20f., above; §§46-51, 
below. 
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el ,uIJ e1oVrrreAI<(J, ••• UprrEPWIJ 7rpo'}'OIJWIJ 7rapaJE~O,uIJ(J,(j: The immediate contrast of 
Leokrates the impious traitor confinns that the case is an eisangelia. 159 The 
betrayer of gods, temples, statues and sanctuaries has violated everything that 
Lykourgos is defending. Timai and thusiai are specifically linked to ancestral 
Athenians, who will be a major theme of the speech. 'illka~ I<Q,; is not certain in the 
text, but Mitchel notes that Lykourgos himself, 'and his supporters were generous 
in proposing honours to those whose actions showed them to have been public 
benefactors'; such honours included ceremonies for the dead with epitaphiai, 
sanctuaries, and special privileges to foreign victims of pro-Macedonianism, to 
'donors of large sums, ... [and] to public officers and priests who had carried out 
their jobs honestly and well' .160 The total cost to the state of gold and foliage 
honorary crowns, inscriptions and bronze statues has been estimated as high, with 
Wright suggesting an annual sum of perhaps between 10.5 and 15 talents, based 
on her calculation that over one-fifth of honorific decrees resulted in the bestowal 
of gold crowns, and that a 1000 dr. crown, which was not uncommon, would have 
fed fifty people for a year: a bronze statue was calculated in antiquity to be worth 
3000 dr. 161 
§I 
Leokrates' own status in these respects is unknown, but can be presumed to offer 
a poor contrast, at least in the prosecution's hands. There is no reference to him 
holding public office, though Lykourgos will make capital out of his membership 
of a symmory for collection of the two per cent tax. 162 He probably never received 
a crown, for Lykourgos would probably have used any such award to argue for 
the defendant's duplicity; Aiskhines, too, might have mentioned it in his 
prosecution of Ktesiphon, where he directly contrasts Leokrates' crime and 
159 See introduction, 23-31, above. 
160 Mitchel 1973, 201 f. See too Whitehead 1983, 67, who notes that honorific decrees 
were primarily proxeny degrees; Gauthier 1985, 103-149, 181-191; de Marcellus, 21 ff.. 
who suggests that ephebes were honoured at or after the end of their service by honorific 
decrees: §§75-76 77-78, below. 
161 Wright. See too Henry, 22-25. Tax exemptions, ate/eia, added an additional, but 
difficult to estimate, burden to Athens' honorific expenditure: Henry, 241-245. Right to 
dine publicly in the Prytaneion in perpetuity: SchOll, passim; Henry, 262-278; 
introduction, 16, above. Humphreys 1985a, 217f., contrasts the public honours 
inaugurated by Lykourgos with his deprecation of those who desire rewards for actions 
which have a personal benefit only; see too §§135-137, 138-140, below. 
162 § 19, below. 
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Demosthenes' crown. 163 There is no evidence, either, for Leokrates' perfonnance 
of a liturgy, nor of any liability to eisphora. 164 
Apart from the sacrifices at great public festivals, thusiai could be small, family-
based sacrifices which were performed at domestic altars. Leokrates, however, 
stands accused of harming not only the city but also his own ancestors, and in the 
most impious ways. As Burkert notes, when prospective archons were examined 
for their eligibility, they were required 'to prove their full citizenship not only by 
naming their parents and grand-parents but also by stating "where they have their 
Zeus Herkeios and their Apollo Patroos and their family graves". These places of 
cult are not transferable and thus indissolubly bind the man to his polis.' 165 
Leokrates will be portrayed as having loosened his own bonds with the city in 
every respect. Abandoning even his own home, he will be shown to have deserted 
the graves of his ancestors where sacrifices would have been performed at regular 
intervals. The third, ninth and thirtieth days after death were marked by rites 
perfonned at the graveside, known respectively as To' TpiTa, To' EvaTa, and TrL 
Tp,aKOO'T'la, the last alternatively known as Tp,aKa,;, or Tp,aKa,~€;, but there were 
also annual celebrations which were 'incorporated into the general celebrations 
with which the city honours its dead every year' .166 
§2. E,u ,uv ~'Oll ••• Ka.' iJ./J' UpiiJlI TWV ~'Ka.tniiJlI: In a Ikev ... ~€ clause, Lykourgos 
explicitly presents himself as acting on behalf of the demos and the polis, and the 
jurors as agents of family and country. Ostwald argues that the demos is, not 
surprisingly, associated most with the ekklesia: the courts were a smaller 
representative body, like the Boule, and it is to be expected that demos would refer 
163 Aiskhin. 3.252f 
164 Leptines was prosecuted for proposing the abolition of the additional honour of 
exemption from liturgies: Oem. 20, passim. See too §§ 138-140, below. 
165 Burkert, 255f., citing [Arist.] Ath. 55.3: q.v. with Rhodes 1993; see too §25, below. 
166 Burkert, 194. Genesia, anniversary rites for the dead: Hdt. 4.26, though Kurtz and 
Boardman, 147f. note that there were other purported annual celebrations known as 
nemesia, nekysia, epitaphia, and eniausia. Aponimmata, libations which perhaps doubled 
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to the most representative body. 167 Hansen accepts that 'demos' does not apply to 
the courts as an institution, but denies that the ekklesia is representative of the 
demos; for him, it is the demos, whereas the Dikasteria, being a part of the demos, 
cannot be referred to in such terms. He argues that the Dikasteria acted on behalf 
of the demos, and suggests that it is better to see them as a part of the demos of 
which they are intrinsically representative, rather than as a substantive 
representative of it. 168 
For Ober, Hansen contradicts himself by arguing simultaneously that the courts' 
powers were not delegated to them, and that the Dikasteria represented the demos, 
and thus exercised their powers on behalf of the demos: Hansen counters that the 
term demos has mUltiple meanings and that he sees the Dikasteria not as 
empowered by the assembly, i.e. the demos as an institution, but by the demos as 
the state. 169 This whole argument seems, however, to be grounded more in 
semantics than in constitutional theory, and, in any case, largely ignores what is 
perhaps the most important perspective, namely that of the individual citizen, who 
would probably have seen himself as the demos incarnate whether as ekklesiast or 
dikast.170 
§2 
For Rhodes, the Ekklesia was the undivided heliaia, and therefore sovereign, 
when it met to exercise its judicial functions and, with regard to the trial of 
eisangeliai, which power the Ekklesia retained almost to the middle of the fourth 
century, this was almost certainly the case.171 The whole issue of sovereignty, 
however, is a thorny one which has been as hotly debated as the issue of the 
representative nature of the assembly and courtS.172 The principal problem seems 
to be that the matter is so closely related to the issue of representation, which itself 
might be little more than a red herring, that there is a real danger of becoming 
as a means of purification for the celebrants: Athen. 9.78. See too Humphreys 1980,98-
101; Garland 1985,39,43; Antonaccio, 248f.; Parker 1996, 48f. 
167 Ostwald 1986, 34f. with n.131. 
168 Hansen 1989b, passim. 
1690ber 1989b, passim, esp. 330; Hansen 1989b, passim. See too Sealey 1982, 302; 
Maio,passim; Montgomery, 18ff.; Brock 1988,137; Hansen 1989c,passim; Ober 1989a, 
22f., 95-103, 144ff., 299-304; Hansen 1990c,passim; Hunter 1994, 185ff. 
170 See e.g.: Dein 1.105f., 3.1, 15f.; Oem. 21.2, 193f., 214ff., 22.10; Is. 5.38. 
171 Rhodes 1972a, 168f.; see too Hansen 1975, 5lf.; introduction, 24f., above. 
172 See esp. Ostwald 1986, passim; Sealey 1987,passim. 
-48-
further ensnared in semantic niceties. This is, effectively, Davies' view, according 
to which 'sovereignty', despite its convenience as a 'shorthand tenn', is far too 
anachronistic and legally-loaded a tenn and one which, moreover, can hardly be 
technically applicable in the first place. 173 Indeed, if the relationship between the 
politeia and its organs is synecdochial, as Ober argues, then sovereignty 
intrinsically resides in the politeia, whether perceived as the laws themselves, the 
demos, the ekklesia or the Dikasteria - whether composed of dikastai or 
nomothetai. 174 Again, it is the perspective of the individual citizen that is most 
noticeably lacking. In his role as dikast, any juror would feel himself to be both 
representative of, and the representative of, the laws and the people as a whole, by 
whom he would be held to account, at least informally. 175 This was perhaps 
particularly so when judging cases like eisangeliai, which had formerly been 
brought before the Ekklesia. 
173 Davies 1994b, passim. See too Todd 1993, 299f. 
§2 
174 See Ober 1989b, 330f.; Ober 1989a, 299-304. After the revision of the law code at the 
end of the fifth century, panels of jurors, nomothetai, were instituted, marking a new legal 
distinction between nomoi and psephismata. The latter fell within the jurisdiction of the 
Ekklesia, and were specific and/or temporary measures; the former, that of the dikasteria, 
and were for general measures and of no specific time limit. An annual revision of the 
laws was carried out by the thesmothetai, who brought any contradictory laws before the 
nomothetai so that one in each case could be invalidated. Disputed psephismata passed by 
the Ekklesia, like nomoi passed by the nomothetai could be challenged in the courts by 
means of a graphe paranomon, but nomoi could also be disputed by means of a graphe 
nomon me epitedeion theinai. Both types of case were tried by the jurors in their capacity 
as dikastai, and it is possible that some of the nomothetai who referred a law or decree to 
the courts would then be involved in the resulting trial. This whole area has an enormous 
secondary bibliography, see e.g.: Bonner 1933, 1-24; Atkinson, 107-142; Harrison 1955, 
passim; lW. Jones, 124-128; Ruschenbusch 1957,passim; Quass,passim, esp. 2ff., 14-
44, 55-60, 68-72; Rhodes 1972a, 49-81; de Laix, 52-68; Hansen 1974, 16ff.; 
MacDowell 1975, passim; MacDowell 1976, passim; Hansen 1978a, passim; Hansen 
1978b, passim; MacDowell 1978, 41-50, 258f.; Hansen 1979a, passim; Hansen 1980b, 
passim; Rhodes 1980b, 305-309; Hansen 1981, passim; Clinton, passim; Sealey 1982, 
passim; Hansen 1985b, passim; Rhodes 1985, passim; Ostwald 1986, 511-522; Gamer, 
136-140; Sealey 1987,32-45, 134ff.; Hansen 1989b,passim; Hansen 1989c,passim; 
Ober 1989a, 95ff.; Ober 1989b, passim; Hansen 1990a, passim; Hansen 1990c, passim; 
Robertson,passim; Hansen 1991, 161-177; Rhodes 1991 ,passim; Sinclair, 83f.; Todd 
1993, 18f., 56f., 294f.; D. Cohen, 238-244; Rhodes 1995b,passim; Todd 1996, 126-131; 
Millett 2000, passim. See too Aiskhin. 3.38ff.; And. 1.81-89; [Arist.] Ath. 29.3f., 35.2, 
45.4,59.2, with Rhodes 1993; Lys. 30.2ff.; §§7, 124-127, below. 
175 See too §§141-145, below. 
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§3. 'E$oIJAOIJ.'rJ1J ~' 0.11, W o.lI~PE~ ... TO;~ 'FroAAo,~ inre,)..tijtb6a,: Aristotle implies that 
before Solon's reforms, a law-breaker could only be prosecuted by his victim, or 
his victim's family. In order to ensure that crimes which affected the public, and 
perhaps also those where the victim was unable to proceed to court personally, the 
modified constitution allowed anyone who wished, ho boulomenos, to prosecute 
wrongdoers. 176 MacDowell suggests, however, that since, in practice, it had 
always been possible for anyone to report a crime's perpetrator to a magistrate, 
the innovation may in fact have been in the provision of the right to conduct the 
prosecution personally in court. l77 Rhodes notes that in classical times, at least, ho 
boulomenos was principally restricted to prosecuting graphai, with dikai being the 
preserve of the victim personally.178 A prosecutor was usually the original 
plaintiff, but an alternative could be appointed by the Boule or Ekklesia if the 
individual who laid the information was, for example, a woman or a slave, and 
thus incapable in law of taking action. 179 
§3 
IIW ~ mp'60'T'J}K€1I ... ovll4>epOlITW~ T'fi 'FrOM,: Lykourgos contrasts his own view of 
prosecutors as philanthropic with what he suggests is the prevailing opinion that 
they are tbIA01fpa'YIJ.OllE~.180 Polypragmatism in its broadest sense was a 
characteristic that could be attributed to the Athenians generally, but in its 
narrower sense it was defined in terms of sykophantia and contrasted with 
apragmatism, a quietude which could be the result of lack of leisure, and therefore 
176 [Arist.] Ath. 9.1, with Rhodes 1993. See too Plut. Sol. 18; Lipsius, ii. 237f. with n.l; 
Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 76f.; Rubinstein 1998,passim, especially 128ff.; §§5-6, below. 
177 MacDowell 1978, 53f. 
178 Rhodes 1993, 160. See too Lipsius, ii. 237-244; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 76ff. 
Rubinstein 2000, 91-111, 148-172, 186-198, suggests that hoi boulomenoi could work 
as a team and gain political advantage from association with elite orators, particularly 
because they probably would not have shared the risk of being fined for failing to achieve 
20% of the jurors' votes, that risk being borne by the initiator of the action ho 
grapsamenos, alone. 
179 MacDowell 1978, 62, 183; MacDowell also notes, 190f., that in apophasis, the 
Ekklesia or Boule, upon receipt of the Areopagos' decision, decreed the details of the 
prosecution, which included the appointment ofprosecutor(s). In these and many other 
instances there may have been a team of prosecutors, a practice that Rubinstein, 2000, 
passim, especially 24-75, suggests was commonplace. It is, in fact, possible that 
Lykourgos was not the only speaker in the eisangelia of Leokrates: see too §§ 19, 31-35, 
52-54, below. 
180 Philanthropia is often associated with pity and compassion, generally for the 
defendant, but also for the city too: Oem. 21.184f., 25.81; see too Dover 1994, 201ff. 
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banausic in concept. 181 Clearly there was a need here, too, for the moderation 
intrinsic to the concept of sopbrosune, indeed Dover defines the philopragmatic 
individual as one who is 'determined to keep the initiative in dominating those 
whose interests he regards as conflicting with his, ... [who has] recourse to 
litigation on trivial grounds, ... or presses ruthlessly for satisfaction'. 182 
It is not difficult to see why, as Lykourgos claims, such behaviour aroused public 
enmity against prosecutors (Vrrip TWII I<OlllWII a:rr€,Xfio,IIQIk€1I01l). The litigant who had 
too great a knowledge of the law was suspect, hence the various apologies for a 
clear understanding of juridical procedures. 183 This helps further to explain why 
he meets this matter head on, for not only does he need immediately to dispel 
suspicions of meddlesomeness, but also to provide a basis for the professedly 
disinterested, and therefore philanthropic, nature of his prosecution, and to obviate 
the allegations of sykophantia which could still be levelled at him, despite his 
status and authority.184 
§3 
TPio, ?,Q.p EUTI Ttl ,u?,ItrrrJ. ••• ~II -rij, nOAeCJJ, E~,p.ollio,lI: The tripartite system of 
law which Lykourgos describes was also argued by Aiskhines to underpin the 
democracy, as opposed to the unconstitutional methods employed by tyrants and 
oligarchs. 18s Lykourgos is continuing to present his case as one which has been 
generated by the needs of the city and one which is grounded firmly in the laws. 
This is especially necessary in this introductory section because it creates an 
impression of legal solidity which may help to distract the jurors' attention from 
the lack of any particular law which Leokrates is alleged to have violated. 186 
181 E • ~-LJ l! J.' '.l: • , " " , "\' " Th k 
.g.: "fJ'Y€/rroo,I ••• ~lJlLljIopall T€ OIJX ·"UUOII "fJO'VX,o,lI o,rrpo,'YlkOllo, "fJ o,UXOI\Io,lI €'TTIrrOIlOIl: ou. 
1.70.8f.; see too Ar. Av. 39-44; Pl. 898-925; Dem. 4.42, 10.70,36.53,40.32; Thouk. 
6.18.7,87.3; Ehrenberg 1947, passim; Kleve,passim; L.B. Carter,passim; Sinclair, 209f.; 
Dover 1994, 188f.; Christ 1998, 118-192. 
182 Dover 1994, 188, citing Dem. 21.137, 39.1; Is. 4.30, and Ar. Pax. 191. 
183 E.g.: Oem. 49.5, where bankers can justify themselves by their requirement to keep 
records; 54.17f., where the speaker claims that he was forced by Konon to discover the 
law. Practised speaking too was a matter for opprobium: e.g.: Aiskhin. 1.117, 170; Dem. 
22.4,23.5. See too Ober 1989a, 166-177; Dover 1994, 189f. 
184 See too §§2, 3, above, 5-6, 11-13,31-35, below. 
185 Aiskhin. l.4f. 
186 See too introduction, 23f., above; §§1, above, 5-6, 9, 52-54,120-121, below. 
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§4. 7rpWTOIi pk,I7j TWII 1I0/UlJ1I niSI, ... 7rapaJl~oaua KP;UI, : Through the course of the 
sixth and fifth centuries B.C., appeals against magistrates' decisions resulted in 
the courts becoming responsible for trials in the first instance. MacDowell notes 
that there is no evidence for when magistrates ceased to give decisions, nor for 
when democratic juries came into existence, but they were clearly in operation by 
the middle of the fifth century, when jury pay was introduced. ls7 Prior to the 
revision of the law code at the beginning of the fourth century, a board of six 
archons, the thesmothetai, was responsible for many of the cases which were to be 
decided by the courts. ISS Their name is problematic, however, for they appear to 
pre-date Solon, and perhaps even Drakon: it is difficult, therefore, to assess their 
function at this early stage because they would appear to have existed prior to the 
institution of the written law code with which they were concerned. By the fourth 
century, however, the thesmothetai were primarily concerned with the 
administration of the courts, though they retained responsibility in some cases of 
d .. 189 en elXIS. 
There was a variety of trial procedures under which the jurors exercised their 
powers, and a number of different courts in which cases could be heard. 190 Cases 
were divided into public or private trials, 'Ypac/>al and (J'Kal, and were subject to 
fixed or variable penalties, aT;IL'f)'iOl and TIIL'YJTO;.191 Prosecutors in public 
prosecutions who failed to achieve twenty per cent of the jurors' votes were fined 
1000 dr., and forfeited the right to prosecute in such cases again,192 Until the late 
187 MacDowe111978, 33f. Development oflegal code: §9, below. Fourth-century revision 
of law code and jurors as nomothetai: n.174, above. 
188 Property matters fell within the jurisdiction of the Eponymous Archon, religious cases 
and homicide within that of the Basileus Archon, and disputes between citizens and non-
citizens within that of the Polemarkhos: [Arist.] Ath. 55.1-59.7, with Rhodes 1993. 
189 [Arist.] Ath. 52.1,59.1-7, with Rhodes 1993. See too Oem. 24.22; Hansen 1976a, 20; 
MacDowell 1978, 75; n.174, above. 
190 Procedural versus substantive definition oflaw: introduction, 27ff., above. Jury voting 
procedure: §§ 149-150, below. Variety of courts: §§ 14-15, below. 
191 [Arist.] Ath. 48.4; 53.2; 67.1, 68.1, with Rhodes 1993; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 74-82; 
MacDowell 1978,57-61; R. Osborne 1985a,passim; Todd 1993,99-112. 
192 And. 4.18; Oem. 21.47, 22.21, 23.80, 24.3, 53.1f.; MacDowell 1978, 64, suggests that 
the 'ban on future prosecutions ... was a kind of partial disenfranchisement' and might 
account for the references in some of the sources to an additional punishment of alimia 
for such unsuccessful litigants; see too Hansen 1975, 29. See too Harris 1999, passim; 
§§ 11-13,40-41, below. 
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fourth century, no such penalty applied to prosecutors in an eisangelia, where 
public participation was highly desirable and much to be encouraged. 193 
o ~ ')'Q.,o vOlUJ~ 1rEcf,Uf(E ••• TOU~ ,a'f(O~ ;~E': Lykourgos will later contrast the 
laws with poetic authority: the laws do not teach, he will argue, but, because of 
their conciseness, merely state that which must be done. 194 Here, however, he 
states that the laws have developed so as to declare those things which are 
forbidden. Thus the laws need the assistance of jurors and especially prosecutors: 
the law is the foundation of society, and of this case, but on its own it is not 
enough. 
§4 
The laws themselves were kept in the Metroon, where a citizen could ascertain 
whether his suspicions were justified and follow the requisite procedure to bring a 
criminal to justice. Sealey suggests that the decree of Teisamenos in 403/2 B.c., 
proposing the continuation and completion of the process of revising the law 
code, legislated for the laws to be inscribed on the walls of the Stoa of the 
Basi/eus. 195 For Sealey, the prominence given there to sacred law is remarkable, 
but it is possible that this Stoa was the natural location for the inscription of 
religious law, whose violation came within the jurisdiction of the archon Basi/eus, 
and that other laws were inscribed elsewhere. This is the view taken also by 
Richardson, who argues that fourth-century laws were generally set up in places 
appropriate to their content: thus coinage decrees were located in the agora and 
the Peiraieus, and a decree for the repair of walls in the Peiraieus and Mounykhia 
was established at Mounykhia itself. 196 Bonner, too, suggests that laws which 
referred to murder were set up on the Areopagos. 197 
It is unclear whether from the outset laws would be inscribed in this way in 
addition to a copy being kept in the Mefroon, or whether the creation of an archive 
was a later addition to the process. Hansen suggests that the Metroon quickly 
came to be used for archives preserved on perishable materials because revisions 
193 See §7, below. 
194 §§ 102-103, below. 
195 S I ea ey 1987, 35ff.; see too Todd 1993, 57f. 
196 M. B. Richardson, passim. 
197 Bonner 1905, 59. 
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came thick and fast after 410-399 B.C. He argues that laws continued to be 
inscribed on stone, but were updated in archive form: only in the Metroon, 
therefore, could a citizen be assured of consulting the appropriate, up-to-date 
edition of the law he sought to clarify. For Hansen, the Metroon was clearly used 
as early as the beginning of the fourth century when Diokles' law was ratified, 
since this explicitly legislates for dates to be added to revisions, a practice not 
associated with stone versions until the second half of the fourth century: the law 
code inscribed on stoa walls therefore probably comprised only a part of the 
complete code and was superceded within a few years by the Metroon. 198 
Having determined his charge, the prosecutor summoned the accused in front of a 
witness and required him to report to the appropriate magistrate; originally, two 
witnesses were required, but by 420 B.C. at least, one was sufficient. 199 There 
were, however, other options open to him. He could initiate an eisangelia, without 
a summons, in the Boule or the ekklesia.2oO He could, alternatively, take more 
immediate action, since a summons was similarly unnecessary in apagoge or 
ephegesis, but the procedures could be instigated on the spot. 
Apagoge was summary arrest followed by delivery to the Eleven, who were in 
charge of the prison, whereas in the case of ephegesis, the plaintiff led the 
appropriate magistrate to the lawbreaker and required an arrest to be carried out 
on his behalf.201 Endeixis could also involve arrest and imprisonment, though it is 
unclear whether it was a separate procedure whereby a criminal was denounced to 
a magistrate for later arrest, or part of the process of apagoge: Hansen's analysis 
of instances of endeixis where the arrest was carried out by the prosecutor makes 
198 Hansen 1990b, 71. See too Bonner 1905, 58ff., for whom the Metroon seems to 
function as a repository for those laws not inscribed elsewhere. See too [Arist.] Ath. 7.1, 
with Rhodes 1993; Isok. 7.41; And. 1.83f.; Atkinson, 145ff.; Clinton,passim; Ostwald 
1986,410; Garner, 136-140; Robertson,passim; Rhodes 1991 ,passim; Shear, 171-178; 
§§66-67, 124-127, below. 
199 Ar. Nu. 1218; Vesp. 1408; Dem. 40.28; 53.14; MacDowell 1978, 238; Sealey 1987, 
53ff.; §20, below. 
200 See introduction, 29, above. 
201 [Arist.] Ath. 29.4,52.1, with Rhodes 1993; Bonner 1927,46; Hansen 1976a, passim; 
MacDowe111978, 58,65, 75, 113, 120ff., 148,238; Sealey 1987, 55f.; Todd 1993, 117; 
Hunter 1994, 135ff. 
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the latter seem likelier.202 In such instances, the prosecutor delivered his charge to 
the relevant magistrate, which was, in most instances, one of the thesmothetai, 
though the Eleven or the Archon Basileus might be appropriate depending on the 
charge: Andokides, for example, was being prosecuted on religious charges which 
fell within the jurisdiction of the Archon Basileus, so it seems to have been the 
nature of the charge which was the determining factor in choice of magistrate. 203 
The prosecutor then had the option of allowing the law to take its course or of 
removing the criminal from society pending his trial. MacDowell argues that this 
was the most significant aspect of the procedure, but notes that there is, 
unfortunately, no evidence for whether a summons was necessary on occasions 
when an arrest had been deemed unnecessary.204 Hansen, though arguing that a 
summons was in fact necessary in such cases, offers corroboration only from 
Antiphon, which merely shows that a summons was issued in that particular 
instance.205 
§§5-6. E'YW I' w 'Afhrvo.'o, ••• TO'~ 'YE'YP~'~ EV~OV OJlTQ,: Despite the vivid 
picture Lykourgos will paint of the desperate days in 338 B.C., when Athens was 
expecting imminent invasion by Macedon in the wake of the battle of Khaironeia, 
the dangers were less real than perceived.206 Lykourgos refers to Leokrates' 
personal betrayal of 7TQ.Uo,)) n7)) UJL€TEpo,)) ~))o,Jl.I)), a theme which he will develop 
with the claim that one individual can be held responsible for the destruction of 
that which is the concern of al1.207 Throughout the first half of his speech, 
Lykourgos will also build up a complete picture of the charges to which he alleges 
Leokrates is liable, referred to here as a/fro,ul ~€ TOI~ 'YE'Ypo,Jl.Jl.E))OI~ E))OX,Oll oVTa, and 
202 Hansen 1976a, 13-17. See too §§ 112-115, below. 
203 See And. 1.111; [Arist.] Ath. 29.4,52.1, with Rhodes 1993; Dem. 24.105; Hansen 
1976a, 20ff. 
204 MacDowell 1978, 75, 238. 
205 Hansen 1976a, 21f., citing Ant. 5.13; see too Dem. 20.156, 24.22; Harrison 1968-
1971, ii. 221. 
206 See §§ 36-39,40-41,43-45,52-54, below; Pickard-Cambridge 1914,392-400; 
Mosse 1962, 322ff.; Reinmuth 1971a,passim; Frolov,passim; Hammond 1986, 570f.; 
Hammond and Griffith, 604-611, 619-623; Hammond and Walbank, 79. 
207 §§59-64, below. 
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will start his central section with a definitive statement that this has been 
demonstrated, and that Leokrates is €1I0XO~ ••. TO~ E;tT7}'Y'YE~€1I0l~ a1TaO"IlI. 208 
It is noteworthy that there is no reference here, nor in the speech as a whole, to 
any particular law or decree which Leokrates has violated. This has led Blass to 
believe that because Hypereides cites laws in detail, even if it is disputed whether 
he quotes the Nomos Eisangeltikos in full, and because Demosthenes and 
Aiskhines seem regularly to have spelled out the laws which they alleged had 
been broken, there was, in fact, no law applicable to this trial.209 There appear, 
moreover, to be problems with the two decrees which Lykourgos does mention. 
The first of these empowered the strategoi to man the fortifications of the city 
with Athenians and metics, and in this particular respect, Blass acknowledges the 
weakness of his general argument that Lykourgos was principally concerned with 
the spirit, rather than the letter, of the law: Lykourgos does not go into detail, but 
this, for Blass, had less to do with any lack of feeling for the law than with the 
problem that, by going into detail, Lykourgos would have to admit that this decree 
said nothing about punishing any absconders, even if they were due for service.2lO 
The second decree was passed immediately after Khaironeia and effectively 
forbade flight from the city.2l1 Yet even assuming that the decree had lapsed 
during the eight years between the crisis and the prosecution, Lykourgos could 
have argued that it applied at the time, and perhaps even that it applied 
retroactively if Leokrates had already left before it was passed by the ekklesia. 
Certainly, it is not possible to be as dogmatic as Hansen, who argues that 
Lykourgos' notably brief reference to 'highly relevant precedents is undoubtedly 
because Leokrates has left Athens immediately after the defeat at Chaeronea, 
before the passing of the decree referred to in 53' .212 Yet, such arguments may 
betray unconscious cultural assumptions about the nature of law itself, for 
208 See §§8, 55-58, below. 
209 Blass iii2, 100-113; see too Vielberg, passim, for whom Lykourgos tries to hide 
behind a religious fa~ade in order to disguise this problem. 
210 BI ···2 112 . ass 111 , ; see too mtroduction, 23f., above; § 16, below. 
2ll See too §§S2-S4, below. 
212 Hansen 1975, 108 #121. 
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Lykourgos noticeably does not say that they should ignore the fact that it was 
inapplicable, nor that they should consider it still to be so. 
This is telling, and comprehensible only within the context of a different concept 
of law.2J3 In an Athenian court, a law, although capable of close definition, 
provided a persuasive backdrop to a defendant's actions, rather than a specific 
legal yardstick against which his behaviour was measured.2J4 Thus despite Blass' 
conclusion that this decree must have been the one on which the case was based, 
and despite the fact that it categorized flight as prodosia, Lykourgos does not, and 
does not need to, focus on any single decree. 2J5 Indeed, rather than concentrate on 
anyone particular charge, he defines Leokrates' behaviour as treacherous in 
general, and therefore intrinsically capable of definition as prodosia under the 
terms of the Nomos Eisangeltikos. Any specific legislation that he chooses to cite 
is offered as additional ammunition to support his general characterization of 
Leokrates as the sort of person whom the demos legislated against immediately 
after Khaironeia. As he did in the prosecution of Lykophron, if not also in that of 
Autolykos, Lykouros is attempting to secure a conviction on as broad a front as 
possible.2 J6 
TQ,~lJ ~lJ E10YllY?'eAia.lJ hrol~lI: It is unknown whether this eisangelia was 
raised in the Ekklesia first, or whether the impeachment was initially proclaimed 
in the Boule, which then issued a probouleuma for the prosecution to be debated 
in assembly. Hansen argues that Lykourgos' reference to Phyrkinos' accusation 
that Leokrates had harmed his share of the pentekoste demonstrates that the case 
was an eisangelia to the Ekklesia, though it is not self-evident that Phyrkinos' 
speech was directly connected with the eisangelia itself.217 If it was, however, he 
may even have been one of a team of prosecutors.z J 8 
.. ~'!!...tI -'.~- ' ...,' ... '\ , S' I ovre (II c~IiF)(l"/I OIlflf!II-'Q,1I ••• TOVTOII TOil WYWIla. 1rpoe"'OIl-£1l0~: mce vo untary 
prosecution was encouraged, particularly in cases which affected communal 
213 See too Todd 1993, 68ff. 
214 See too §20, below. 
215 Bl ···2 112f . ass 111 , .; see too Hams 2000, 70f. 
216 See introduction, 23-29, above. 
217 Hansen 1975, 108 #121; see too introduction, 29ff., above; §19, below. 
218 See nn.178, 179, above, 451, below; §§19, 31-35, below. 
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interests, personal enmity was an acceptable motivation to prosecute for reasons 
other than those provided by a competitive culture alone. In some respects, 
indeed, it was desirable, since it provided an added impetus to litigation aimed at 
assisting and protecting the laws.219 Private hatred could, moreover, be offered as 
a motivation for the litigant to avoid the suspicion of meddlesomeness, or even 
sykophantia, which would be even more important in cases where financial 
incentives existed.22o None the less, personal grudges were generally given an 
additional 'public interest' factor, not least to undermine a defence based upon the 
claim that a case would not otherwise have been brought to court since no crime 
had been committed.221 Thus although it might be expected that Lykourgos would 
argue that he was not prosecuting out of sheer joy of litigation, he appears, at first 
glance, to be undermining his substantial credibility by claiming that he is not 
prosecuting as a result of personal enmity either. 
There is no need, however, to see Lykourgos as hiding behind a mass of oaths and 
quotations from poetry in order to disappear from his own prosecution and 
construct a public and disinterested prosecutorial voice.222 His rhetoric is 
extremely clever and has a double indemnity, for by disclaiming personal enmity 
as well as ph ilon ikia, he can argue that his disinterested prosecution displays overt 
philanthropia, and he is able to place the emphasis upon patriotic and responsibly 
executed duty. At the same time, by asserting that enmity has rightly been aroused 
in a public respect, he provides the expected grudge even as he disclaims it, and 
the jury is given an early signal that only by sharing his publicly grounded enmity 
can they themselves display equal virtue.223 
219 See e.g. Aiskhin. l.If; Oem. 21.1 f., 22. If., 24.6-9,53.1, 58. If., 58ff., 59.11ff.; 
Montgomery, 32 with n.6; Sinclair, 72f.; Dover 1994, 182; Rhodes 1998, passim; Todd 
1998, passim; Allen 2000a, 39f., 50. 
220 See Lys. 24.2; §§3, above, 11-13,31-35, below; see too Cloche 1960, 89f.; Bosworth 
1988,207f. 
221 An explicit claim, for example, in Lys. 24.1 f.; implicit in Aiskhin. 2.1-10. 
222 Allen 2000b, passim. 
223 Rowe, 139, notes that orators could make use ofa rhetorical device,parrhesia, by 
which they seem prepared to risk the listener's goodwill through being candid, but 
actually gain credence by appearing to take a risk. This is akin to the rhetoric Lykourgos 
is using here. See too Harris 1999, 123f., citing Oem. 18.123,278, for the argument that 
jurors should not be asked to support private feuds and grudges. 
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Q))..' Q,;~l1 Ell1Q,/ 1I01J.;(TQ,) ... ~) 1rP~ Q,Vrou) ~/a4opa.,: €1L/3illollTa conjures up the 
vivid image of Leokrates barging into the agora, metaphorically invading 
communal areas and public sacrifices.224 The word thus provides not only an 
effective contradistinction with Lykourgos' own action in prosecuting Leokrates, 
but also an emotionally-charged impression of Leokrates as, effectively, an 
atimos, and therefore as someone who should have been banned from such a 
space. Indeed, Lykourgos calls Leokrates' behaviour a disgrace, ;;lIEI~Oq, an 
emotive word applied, for example, to Oidipous' daughters, and evocative of the 
pollution attached both to that king and to the murderers who were forbidden to 
enter public or religious areas for the duration of the three preliminary 
investigations, prodikasiai, and who were meanwhile therefore debarred almost 
entirely from the life of the polis.225 Mere association with such people was 
evidence of impious behaviour.226 The conspicuous behaviour Lykourgos 
attributes to Leokrates was, at the very least, considered vulgar, if not downright 
offensive: Apollodoros, for example, clearly felt the need to defend his own 
manner of walking and talking against charges ofvulgarity.227 
224 See too §§21-23(i), below. 
225 ;;II€/a~: S. OT. 1494; see too Ar. Akh. 855; Aiskhin. 2.164. Prodikasiai: §§ 112-115 
with n.848, below. Tainted presence of polluted murderers necessitating trials in the open, 
and frustrating proper performance of rites and safe transit: Ant. 5.10f., 82; Theophr. 
Char. 25.3-4. See too §§133-134, below. 
226 See Dem. 22.2; §§ 14-15, 135-137, 138-140, below. 
227D f em. 45.77. See too Sattler, 59 .; Ober 1989a, 147; Trevett, 153f. 
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§§7-23(i). 
With the first transitional f..£E'II OU'II of eight, Lykourgos exhorts the jurors to treat the 
crimes which Leokrates is alleged to have committed as a matter for great public 
concern to each private citizen.228 The defendant's crimes are heinous and far-
reaching, and the verdict will be a lesson to posterity. This is necessarily so, 
because the crime and its penalty have not been defined by law: thus the jurors 
will be both law-makers and educators as they attempt to designate an appropriate 
penalty for unprecedented and unforeseeable crimes. Lykourgos describes the 
events leading up to the defendant's flight, and concludes the section with 
narrative evidence from disinterested witnesses to the general circumstances 
surrounding Leokrates' departure from Athens and arrival at Rhodes. 
§7 
§7. "A7ra.~ p.& ow",,} ... fJAa.~/IJ ~IJ 7l'OAIIJ: In the fifth century, the graphe 
paranomon was concerned with laws and decrees passed by the Ekklesia; the 
procedure was suspended in 411 and 404 B.c., and after the restoration of 
democracy and the revision of the law code, it became concerned only with 
decrees passed by the Ekklesia.229 A new procedure, the graphe nomon me 
epitedeion theinai, was instituted probably at this time and dealt only with laws 
proposed to the nomothetai. The graphe paranomon, like the graphe nomon me 
epitedeion theinai, dealt with the suitability and legality of legislation. Both fell 
into the category of public cases with a variable penalty, which in the example of 
Eudemos in 382/1 B.C., was death. There was also a 'three strikes and you're out' 
rule in respect of the graphe paranomon, for an additional penalty of atimia was 
applied to persistent offenders. A time limit of one year was probably applicable 
after which the proposer could not be punished, though the proscribed measure 
228 , 'i' • d . 3 b Ike'll au'll structure: Intro uetlon, 7, a ove. 
229 Aiskhin. 3.191; Dem. 24.154. 
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could still be annulled: this was the case, at least, with the graphe nomon me 
epitedeion theinai. 230 
o ~ vW EvEtrM}K~ ... Q)).' Vrrip o'}.."1~ ~~ 7rQ,TP;~~: Although Lykourgos argues that 
this eisangelia is not concerned with a relatively minor constitutional issue, but 
with a major issue of long-lasting and widespread significance, Humphreys 
suggests that he was using a sledge-hammer to crack a nut. 231 Yet Hypereides 
suggests that by the middle of the fourth century, and probably earlier, eisangelia 
was widely employed for the most trivial offences, and was abused by being 
applied to almost anyone and for virtually any crime.232 This criticism accords 
with the view of the Nomos Eisangeltikos being more widely applied in the fourth 
century than in the fifth, though Hansen sees eisangeliai becoming more specific 
and subject to stricter definitions in the fourth century: Hypereides would thus be 
quoting these tightened provisions.233 Yet Hypereides' citation of the restrictions 
of the Nomos Eisangeltikos has to be seen within the context of his explicit 
complaint that they are violated, and to such an extent, indeed, that Euxenippos 
had been impeached because he misrepresented his dreams. 
§7 
Perhaps to obviate such frivolous misuse of the procedure, it seems that there 
might have been an amendment which allowed for prosecutors to be fined if they 
received less than twenty per cent of the vote. The timing of such a revision, 
however, is extremely problematic. Hypereides' defence of Lykophron is dated 
reasonably securely to 333 B.C., where there is explicitly no concern in respect of 
such a penalty.234 Demosthenes, however, implies that by 330, the date of his 
speech in Ktesiphon's trial, such a measure was in place.235 Yet Demosthenes is 
referring to the time of Khaironeia eight years previously, and it is somewhat 
difficult to credit that he might have believed, or expected the jurors to believe, 
230 [Arist.] Ath. 45.4,59.2, with Rhodes 1993; Oem. 24, 138,51.12; Hyp. 2 (Phil). 1 If.; 
Plut. Phok. 26; Lipsius, ii. 383ff., 396, iii. 8S2f.; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 172, 176; Wolff 
1970, passim; Hansen 1974, 44-48; Hansen 1978b, 325-329; MacDowell 1978, SOff.; 
Sealey 1982, 291ff.; Ostwald 1986,125-129, 135f.; Sealey 1987,44, 49f., 54ff., 135; 
Ober 1989a, 95f.; n. 174, above. 
231 Humphreys 1985a, 218f. 
232 Hyp. 4 (Eux). 1 ff. 
m Hansen 1975, 16f.; see too introduction, 25-29, above. 
234 Hyp. 1 (Lyk). 8, 12, with Whitehead 2000; see too Hansen 1975, 106f. #119. 
235 Dem. 18.250. 
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that a measure which had been introduced only within the last three years had, in 
fact, applied eight years previously.236 Moreover, in Hypereides' defence of 
Euxenippos, which Hansen dates to 330 B.C. at the earliest, there is again 
apparently no concern about such a penalty.237 
"0,, KQ,nJ, '7rQ,~ TOO Q,;w~ ••• rn.'Y'')'IIO,uvo., -rr]1I KP;(TllI: A prosecution argument 
that the verdict will effectively be a paradigm of correct judgement, on the 
assumption of course that the defendant is found guilty, is far from uncommon in 
forensic oratory, though the concept of precedence was, if anything, psychological 
rather than legal. 238 The emphasis is thus on the effect a verdict will have on 
society and future juries rather than on that which society or earlier juries have 
determined previously and which should be binding on the jury. Lykourgos, 
however, will use both forms of precedence argumentation, and will refer to prior 
verdicts reached by the Areopagos and earlier panels of jurors, as well as to a 
decree passed by the Ekklesia. 239 
§8. oVrw "(ILp fOT. &-.WlI ... eAa.TTOlI ~ TWlI AEWKpQ.TOlI, QJ'K'rJp.Q,TUllI KQ,6itT'T'r1KE: It is 
noteworthy that Lykourgos does not mention the probouleuma which would have 
been prepared by the Boule. If it had contained a specific penalty 
recommendation, he would be remiss not to mention it here, since it could have 
been incorporated into his precedence argumentation to offer reinforcement for 
his view of the severity of the crime, arguing that if a crime was deemed severe 
enough to warrant an automatic death penalty, it would be criminal to acquit 
Leokrates on the slightest of doubt. 240 On the contrary, indeed, he explicitly states 
that no suitable categorization nor punishment has been found for such crimes, 
which would seem to make his paradigmatic ho boulomenos, who benefits the 
236 Dem. 18.248ff. See too Whitehead 2000, 78-82; Rubinstein 2000, 115ff. 
237 Hyp. 4 (Eux). passim, with Whitehead 2000; see too Bonner and Smith, i.296ff., 305; 
Hansen 1975, 29ff., 109 #124; MacDowell 1978, 64,186; Rhodes 1979, 113; §§4, 5-6, 
above. 
238 See e.g Aiskhin. 1.192f., 196; Lys. 1. 34ff., 14.4. See too Bonner 1927, 181ff.; J.W. 
Jones, 133ff.; Todd 1993, 58-61. 
239 See too §§10, 52-54, 110(ii)-III, 122, below. 
240 See §9, below. 
-62-
polis through his right to prosecute, aporos here, with no mechanism to facilitate a 
charge. 
The impression is thus of a substantive, rather than procedural, basis for Athens' 
legal system, an impression reinforced by the use of wpiu6al, and of a system 
which, moreover, might render prosecutors impotent in the absence of a clearly 
defined law.241 However, despite this apparent weakness, Lykourgos' own 
prosecution has evidently not been hindered. Rather, he appears to have 
constructed a prosecution by redefining the crimes, here enumerated 
simultaneously for the first time, to comply with the definitions of treason in the 
Nomos Eisangeltikos.242 He will, however, almost immediately develop, if not 
contradict, his argument that the crimes committed by Leokrates are so great that 
previous law-makers were at a loss to set an appropriate categorization or 
penalty.243 
§8 
Lykourgos makes the first of many calls for the death penalty and urges the jury 
to additional severity by imposing a punishment worse than death.244 Jurisdiction 
for executions was in the hands of the Eleven and was performed immediately 
after the trial by a professional executioner, except during the annual voyage of 
the sacred trireme to Delos.245 Three forms of execution are known: the chasm, or 
pit; the tympanon; and the prescription of hemlock. Execution by the pit seems 
originally to have involved throwing those who had been condemned to death into 
the chasm while still alive, and Barkan argues that this was perhaps adopted to 
obviate the need for executioners actually to shed blood themselves.246 It seems, 
however, that at a later date criminals were put to death first by an alternative 
241 See introduction, 27ff., above; §9, below. 
242 See §§5-6, above; introduction, 25f., above. 
243 §9, below. 
244 Other calls: §§26-27, 46-51,52-54,66-67,77-78,79,120-121,123, 133-134, 141-
145, below. 
245 MacDowell 1978, 254, argues that although the executioner was known 
euphemistically as 'the public man', demios, this should not necessarily be taken to mean 
that he was a public slave. Sokrates' execution was delayed pending the return of the 
sacred trireme: PI. Phd. 58a-c. 
246 Barkan 1936a, 55. 
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method, with their corpses being thrown into the depths as a debased burial rite. 247 
The chasm was known as barathron in the fifth century, and as orygma in the 
fourth: the location is unknown, but the change of name may imply a change of 
location, rather than merely of name, since orygma, from opu(J'(J'w, implies a dug 
trench or the like: probably in line with this development, the executioner's name 
was also changed in the fourth century, to (; En; TOU OPU"Yll-o,TO;/T(jJ OpU"Yll-o,TI.248 
§8 
The tympanon was a board to which murderers, traitors and thieves were fixed 
with five iron rings around the neck, wrists and ankles; death presumably resulted 
from exposure, though MacDowell suggests that strangulation by the ring around 
the neck was possible.249 The use of hemlock, despite its notoriety as the means of 
Sokrates' execution, has most recently been seen less as a general means of 
execution, or as a mechanism for enforced suicide, than a privilege granted to 
those convicts who had the means to pay for what was, probably, quite an 
expenSIve draught.250 There was, however, a fate worse than death since 
additional punishments could be inflicted on the corpse: property could be 
confiscated or demolished; the right to be buried in Attica could be denied; and 
the executed criminal's descendants could suffer atimia. 251 
247 See too Arist. Eq. 1362; Ra. 574; Pl. 1107ff.; Xen. Hell. 1.7.20; Barkan 1936a, 59-62; 
MacDowell 1978, 254f.; Allen 2000a, 218-224, 324f. 
248 See Dein. 1.62; Hdt. 7.133; §121, below; Barkan 1936a, 56-59. Allen 2000a, 220ff., 
suggests that the barathron was on the border of Attica, whereas the orygma bordered the 
city of Athens itself. 
249 MacDowe111978, 255; see too Ar. Thesm. 930ff.; Arist. Rhet. 1385alO-13; Dem. 
19.137; Lys. 13.56; Bonner and Smith, ii. 278-287; Barkan 1936a, 65ff.; MacDowell 
1963, IlIff.; Allen 2000a, 200f., 213ff.; Todd 2000, passim. Crucifixion, at least in the 
sense of being nailed to something, was also possible, if apparently rare: Dem. 21.105. 
250 See And. 3.10; Lys. 12.17, 18.24f.; PI. Phd. 117a ff.; Xen. Hell. 2.3.56; Barkan 1936a, 
76ff.; Bonner 1973, passim; Gill, passim; MacDowell 1978, 255; Allen 2000a, 201, 232-
237; Todd 2000, 33, 39f.; Sullivan 2001,passim. It is interesting to speculate whether this 
can be the common privilege of an easy exit from life in Dem. 24.7. 
251 See D.S. 13.101.7; Plat. Grg. 516d; [Plut.] Mor. 833D-834B; Xen. Hell. 1.7.22; 
Hansen 1975, 33ff., 82f. #62, l13ff. #135-7; MacDowell 1978, 255f.: MacDowell 176f., 
suggests that whilst Xenophon could be omitting the obvious in not mentioning the death 
penalty when he describes refusal of burial in Attica, it is possible either that there were 
separate penalties or that this was a penalty given in isolation, or in expectation of being 
unable to inflict the death penalty on criminals who escaped, or were expected to escape, 
into voluntary exile, which is one of the possible meanings of the emended text in 
Aiskhin. 3.252; Connor 1985,passim; see too §§40-41, 112-115, 117-119, below. 
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§9. 1UI(J€,u(Ja., ~E ~~ VrrEP ••• rn;~oSo~ ET~, ~ufJa.,: Despite Lykourgos' 
previous claim that law-makers had been at a loss about how to deal with the 
prospect of crimes such as those committed by Leokrates, he now argues that such 
offences were never anticipated.252 Neither argument, however, is plausible. 
Drakon's law code, although instituted within a decade of Kylon's fruitless 
attempt at tyranny in the late seventh century B.c., seems, as MacDowell argues, 
to have been a clear response, whether attributable or not to a real or mythical 
Drakon, to the socio-political machinations which lay behind the abortive coup, 
despite the lack of evidence to give concrete support to a theory of the impetus 
behind the legal innovations.253 All that can now be discerned of Drakon's code 
are the measures concerned with homicide, the remainder being superseded, 
though he was also credited with the institution of the Ephetai, the fifty-one 
magistrates who tried cases which fell outside the jurisdiction of the Areopagos 
and who were, perhaps, therefore a committee of Areopagites. 254 
§9 
Solon's legal code of 59413 B.C., also, can hardly be seen simply as little more 
than an unsuccessful effort to avert an anticipated tyranny, but seems primarily to 
have resulted from the social, political and financial disputes and upheavals which 
followed the Drakontian reforms. It, too, was unable fully to resolve 
dissatisfaction, and in the years following the reforms a period of literal anarchy 
ensued culminating in Damasias' attempt to hold onto his archonship, and the 
establishment of the Peisistratid tyranny?55 As later laws came to be attributed to 
him, Solon's reforms came to be considered far more wide-ranging than in fact 
they were, his legislation being recorded in his own verse and inscribed on 
252 See §8, above. 
253 MacDowell 1978, 4lff.; see too [Arist.] Ath. Lost Beginning (bH.5, with Rhodes 
1993; Dem. 20.158; 23.51; Plut. Sol. 12f., 17; Wilamowitz 1893, i. 49-98; Stroud 1968, 
passim; Gagarin 1981, passim. In the immediate aftermath, Kylon's supporters were 
killed by followers of the Alkmaionid archon, Megakles, whose family was later 
condemned for sacrilege and its dead exhumed and cast out of Attica: Hdt. 5.70ff.; 
Thouk. 1.126. 
254 The Ephetai tried cases in the courts detailed in Paus. 1.28.8-12, the exception being 
killings where the murderer was unknown, in which case the trial was held by the 
Basileus Archon in the Prytaneion: [Arist.] Ath. 57.4, with Rhodes 1993; MacDowell 
1963,53-57; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 36-43; MacDowe111978, 27f., 117; Todd 1993, 
81f. See too §§4 with n.188, above, 65, below. 
255 [Arist.] Ath. 5-15, with Rhodes 1993. 
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publicly-displayed wooden axones. 256 Kleisthenes' democratising measures from 
50817 B.C., too, arose from, and were clearly aimed at obviating stasis. Having 
abolished the old tribes and inaugurated ten new tribes based on the tripartite 
subdivisions of Attica, trittyes, of city, coast and inland, the Boule of 100 
Bouleutai from four tribes was reformed to comprise 50 from each of the ten 
tribes. Ephialtes' reforms of the constitution and powers of the Areopagos, 
probably in 46211 B.C., resulting from the increasing power of that Council, seem 
again to be grounded in social unrest, with the transfer of power from the 
Areopagos to the assembly and law-courts: the ancient Council retained 
jurisdiction only in cases of intentional homicides and certain sacred crimes.257 
§9 
Although Ephialtes' reforms were among the most radical, the overall pattern is a 
reactionary one, especially when compared to Lykourgos' attribution to previous 
law-makers of either aporia or inability to imagine crimes of such Leokratean 
magnitude. The argument is, however, probably disingenuous rather than 
erroneous. The intention is to pave the way for the flattering argument that the 
jurors must now be reactionary nomothetai themselves, following the precedents 
set by Drakon, Solon, Kleisthenes and Ephialtes.258 Thomas views such appeals to 
ancient law-makers in forensic oratory in a distinctly anti-democratic, if not 
oligarchic, light: her argument is plausible and, ifher model is correct, Lykourgos 
may be subtly and simultaneously appealing to ancient law-makers and thus to a 
disregard of the laws, or more precisely the lack of laws, applicable to his case, as 
well as flattering the jurors by effectively comparing them to the likes of Solon 
and Kleisthenes and urging them on to extreme severity.259 
256 Fuller discussions: Ruschenbusch 1966; Forrest 1966; Hignett; Ehrenberg 1968; 
Drews; Murray 1993. See too D. Cohen, 241, (with Rhodes' comment, 245) who suggests 
that 'certain features of Athenian litigation and the administration of justice contradicted, 
or existed in tension with, democratic principles of the rule of law'. 
257 See [Arist.] Ath. 20-22.6; 25.1-2, with Rhodes 1993; Hdt. 5.66ff; G. Smith,passim; 
Hignett, 124-159; Ober 1989a, 68-78; Carawan 1990, passim; Hansen 1994, passim; 
Badian 2000, passim; Rhodes 2000a, 469. 
258 See §2 with n.174, above. 
259 Thomas 1994,passim. She also argues, 121ff., that many of the references to Solon in 
fourth-century oratory, especially in Aiskhin. 1, can be seen to have an educational thrust, 
with emphasis on the law-giver's moral outlook and motivation: see too § I 0, below. 
Similar strategy of law-makers' aporia: Lys. 31.27; see too §65, below. 
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~,o Ko,; pMurr' ... Ko,mAEiTrEofJo,I Tro.p/JJEI'YIUJ. TO'~ rnl'YI'YJIo,uvol~: Behind his flattery 
of the jurors with the magnitude of their power, Lykourgos is conflating their 
tasks of giving a verdict and determining the penalty. Since the penalty in this 
case had probably not been defined in the probouleuma, Leokrates' punishment 
would result from the jury's choice between his penalty proposal and that of 
Lykourgos. 26o Lykourgos at least seems in no doubt as to what his proposal is to 
be, though litigants presumably did not generally make their final decision in 
advance, but waited until they knew that there was to be a second vote, and based 
their suggestion on the margin by which the defendant had been condemned. In 
theory, penalty suggestions were totally at the discretion of the opposing parties. 
Sokrates famously claimed that he had intended to propose the public honour of 
dining in the Prytaneion as a punishment but had been persuaded by his friends to 
suggest a fine instead, and MacDowell notes that although 'no doubt it would 
have been silly to put that forward as his proposed penalty, ... it would not have 
been illegal. In practice, however, only certain kinds of penalty were imposed', 
notably death, exile, atimia and fines. 261 
Fines generally were the property of the state, except for half the value of the fine 
in phaseis and three-quarters in an apographe, which went to the successful 
prosecutor. 262 Imprisonment seems not to have been generally used as a 
punishment, but as an optional means of detention prior to trial, or pending the 
repayment of fines, for violating atimia restrictions, for mercantile offences, or 
where such precaution was required according to the terms of the judgement; the 
situation is not clear cut, however, with various arguments from time to time 
suggesting that imprisonment was recognized as a normal penalty.263 More 
260 See introduction, 29ff., above; §8, above. Argument for jurors to act as law-makers: 
Lys. 14.4. 
261 MacDowell 1978,254; PI. Ap. 36b-37c; D.L. 2.40-42; see too §8, above. 
262 Phaseis were akin to graphai in that they could be prosecuted by ho boulomenos, the 
principal difference between the cases being the retention of half the imposed fine in 
phaseis. Non-payment of fines resulted in the classification of the defaulter as a state 
debtor. See [Arist.] Ath. 43.4,52.1, with Rhodes 1993; Oem. 40.22, 53.1 f.; Hyp. 4 (Eux). 
34; Lys. 17.4; Bonner and Smith ii. 41, 50, 71, 271; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 211-221; 
MacDowell 1978, 58, 62, 158f., 166,257; Todd 1993, 118f. See too §§4, 7, above. 
263 See e.g. Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 177, 241-244; Allen 1997, passim; Allen 2000a, 
226-230. See too And. 4.4; Oem. 21.47, 24.92, 105, 114, 132, 146,33.1, 35.46f.; PI. Ap. 
37b-c; Barkan 1936b,passim; Todd 1993, 140; Hunter 1997, 306f.; §§112-115, below. 
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certainly, enslavement was not an option unless the defendant was an unregistered 
or tax-evading metic, an alien exercising citizen rights, or living with a citizen as 
spouse: freed slaves who did not adopt their previous owner as patron could also 
be reassigned to that owner. 264 
Exactly what Lykourgos means by illY; (TcPo~pa 7repleiA'Y}cPell Ell; ollop,aTI 
7rpo(Ta"Yopeu(Ta~ is unclear. He specifically said in §8 that law-makers had not 
legislated in respect of the combination of crimes of abandonment, desertion, 
flight and betrayal, the grounds on which he is prosecuting, and therefore appears 
to be alluding to the particular charge of prodosia when he claims that Leokrates' 
crimes are not individually categorized, but are designated as a single offence 
which itself does not do justice to the magnitUde of the offences. It is possible, 
therefore, that this is a direct reference to the Nomos Eisangeltikos, and if this is 
so, then the law seems clearly to have covered undefined, as well as specific, 
crimes, a scenario that is plausible for a law which was intended to underpin 
voluntary prosecution against precisely those crimes which most affected the 
polis.265 
§ 10. E~ ~. iO'"TE ... TrO'~' TOO ~'Ka.;OIJ: Apart from this specific reference to the 
education of the young, Humphreys argues that Lykourgos generally used the 
assembly and law courts as educational vehicles in his reforms, thus 'Paideia of 
the young, ... consists of punishment of offenders and rewards to the virtuous .... 
He made a point in some cases of personally proposing honours to benefactors of 
the city in the Assembly, ... and by the use of eisangelia in prosecutions he 
ensured that sanctions against offenders also got pUblicity in Assembly 
meetings.'266 She contrasts this behaviour with the distinction Lykourgos makes 
between agonistic liturgies which bring glory to the individual, and epidoseis 
which should be singled out for reward since they benefit the whole 
community.267 Here, Lykourgos stresses the double thrust of education which 
264 See Oem. 25.57; Lys. 23. passim. See too Lipsius, ii. 625; Harrison 1968-1971, i. 26, 
165,181-6, ii. 168f., 186; MacDowell 1978, 70, 78f., 87,256; Todd 1993,139,182,208; 
§4, above. 
265 See introduction, 25ff., above; §§1, 5-6, 8, above, 55-58, below. 
266 Humphreys 1985a, 217. 
267 Humphreys 1985a, 216ff.; see too §§135-137, 138-140, below. 
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might be expected in a highly competitive culture, and reinforces his argument 
that judgements, honours and punishments set precedents which are too important 
to be taken lightly.268 
Since there was no obligation to provide any specific education for children, 
learning was chosen and privately bought by a child's parents. Opportunities 
existed for basic training in fundamental aspects of education, from literacy and 
numeracy to music and gymnastics, or for individual tuition in specific areas: 
basic literacy was taught by grammatikoi, numeracy by !ogistikai, music by 
mousikoi, and gymnastics and athletics by gymnastikai and paidotribeis. Choices 
would clearly be based on a variety or combination of factors and considerations, 
including practical requirements, cost, and status, and the duration of individual 
children's education thus varied.269 The sophists too offered an additional 
education in persuasiveness. Although sometimes much-derided, this training in 
public speaking, argumentation, and virtue seems to have been subordinate to the 
principal concerns of the concept of education itself and the ability of paideia to 
produce arete and leadership.270 
§ § 11-13. ilol-.70-01141 ~ KWyc.O ... a.lI'OA~I Ko/rrrrOp'a.1I eUfJflll: Although 
Aristotle claims that opposing litigants swore on oath not to stray from the point at 
issue, he implies that this oath was taken only in private cases. For Rhodes, 
however, it is dangerous to construct from silence an argument that the oath was 
not actually sworn in public cases. There are, he argues, plentiful occurrences in 
both types of cases of deviation from the point, at least from a modem 
perspective, which implies that a rule broken in one instance is being broken in 
the other also.271 It was, certainly, far from unusual for speakers to insist that they 
268 See too Dover 1994,229-232, 236f.; Thomas 1994, 119ff.; §§1, 7, above. 
269 See Arist. Pol. 1337a33-1338b8; Isok. I5.I8If., 295f.; PI. Prt. 3I8e, 325e-326a; Ober 
1989a, 157-165,182-191; Robb,passim. 
270 See Aiskhin. 1.9-12; Ar. Eq. 185-93; Nu. passim; Ra. 718-37; Isok. 7.40-51, 10.1-
13, 13. passim, esp. 12f., 19f.; Jaeger, i. 283--405, iii. 105-130; Kerferd, 17, 131-138; 
Ober 1989a, 170-174. 
271 [Arist.] Ath. 67.1 with Rhodes 1993; see too Lipsius, iii. 918f.; Hommel, 103f.; Bonner 
and Smith, ii. 162f.; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 163. 
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were maintaining relevance and to allege that their opponents were attempting to 
mislead the jurors not only by straying from the point, but also by using dishonest 
arguments, and seemingly related but actually irrelevant details. 
There is, however, a significant problem of perspective. Was it, in the view of a 
fourth-century juror, deviating from the point for a litigant to speak of indirectly 
related historical events, public scandals or concerns, and to include character 
analysis and quotations from epic, tragedy and epigraphs? Bers has demonstrated 
the power of thorubos to disrupt proceedings if a speaker aroused a jury's 
hostility, with misdemeanours ranging from mispronunciation to obvious lies.272 
The lack of such uproar in respect of these sorts of issues suggests, therefore, that 
from the jurors' perspective, it was considered appropriate and to the point. 
Bonner has argued, indeed, that it was the prevailing practice to use such tactics, 
and despite orators' requests for the jurors not to shout or interrupt at points where 
they clearly anticipate interruptions, there is no real evidence in the speeches for 
actual interruptions?73 It is hard to see how there could be such evidence, of 
course, but speakers were aiming primarily to rouse the jurors' interest and, in this 
respect, deviation was probably essential. It is also difficult to see how certain 
common mechanisms of argumentation, like character analysis for arguments 
from probability, would have been possible without straying from the immediate 
point at issue?74 
The rules themselves, moreover, could be interpreted subjectively. The death 
penalty was the ostensible punishment for citing a non-existent law but, as 
Thomas notes, litigants effectively did this constantly by appealing to the ancient 
law-makers and their intentions, as well as to the tragedians in their capacity as 
moral authorities.275 Lykourgos is clearly being disingenuous here, fitting into a 
272 Bers 1985,passim; see too Lofberg 1917, 12; Ober 1989a, 104, 147; Lanni, 187f. 
273 Bonner 1905, 14-20. D. Cohen, 244, suggests that 'much of the judicial rhetoric which 
has been too readily dismissed as "irrelevant" or a "perversion of legal process" is really 
central to the process of judgement as the Athenians conceived it'; see too Ober 1989a, 
125; §§52-54, below. 
274 See Arist. Rhet. 1376a23-32; Sattler, 57-61; Carey 1994c, 40-43. 
275 Thomas 1994,passim; see too Aiskhin. 1. 6ff. , 141-152; Oem. 26.24; Bonner 1905, 
14-20, 39f., 59f.; Bonner 1927, 177ff.; Calhoun 1927, 132; Clinton, 35f.; Gamer, 136-
140; Johnstone, 25-33; §§90-92, 98-101, below. 
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pattern easily illustrated by Aiskhines and Demosthenes, who frequently accuse 
each other of deviation whilst insisting on their own rhetorical propriety, and who 
allow a great deal of time to answer alleged irrelevancies.276 Digression was 
evidently effective and viewed with anything but opprobium by the jurors for 
whom it may have provided as welcome an entertainment and distraction as 
hearing professional speakers or actors recite for their pure entertainment.277 
Q))..' OU ~'KQ,'OIl u~ 000 ~'KQ,'Q,II TrO.E'i'o&.. n711 Kp'U.II: Panels of jurors fell largely 
into one of two camps for rhetorical purposes: they were 'a soft touch', sometimes 
because of their simplicity and fairness, but more often because they were easily 
hoodwinked as a result of their indifference and desire for entertainment; or they 
were fierce and relentless, like a hornet with a vicious sting in its tail. Antiphon, 
adopting an admonitory tone, argued that jurors had often repented of imposing 
the death penalty; he had, however, already claimed that he would have had faith 
in the intrinsic justice and forgiveness of jurors even had they not taken an oath.278 
Such statements were evidently grounded not only in the particular rhetorical 
requirements of the argument, but also couched in terms that flattered even as they 
criticized.279 Speakers could therefore adopt a hectoring persona whilst voicing 
fears that jurors were easily tricked and misled by sophistic speakers, but it 
represents, all the same, a delicate balancing act to avoid the appearance of 
arrogance.2SO 
Elite orators thus clearly made efforts to bring themselves down to the level of 
their audience. They also, none the less, insisted upon a community of interest and 
took for granted a tacit acknowledgement that the elite had something valuable to 
contribute to the pOIiS?Sl Aiskhines, however, was explicit: it was laughable the 
way jurors now paid no attention even when the charges were being read out, a 
complaint reinforced by Demosthenes' claim that juries let defendants off for one 
276 See e.g. Aiskhin. 2.4; Dem. 18.9. 
2TIE 9 
.g. Ar. Vesp. 57 -582, 1101-1105. 
278 Ant. 5.8, 91. 
279 Dover 1994, 27, notes this effect in 'the prosecutor trying to induce severity by stem 
admonition (almost, at times, by taunts) and the defendant trying to induce leniency by 
persuasion and flattery'. 
280 See too Ober 1989a, 174ff.; Dover 1994, 23ff.; §§ 135-137, 138-140, below. 
281 See Markle 1985, 282ff.; Ober 1989a, 219-233, 259ff., 304-309; Todd 1990c, 167ff 
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or two sophisticated witticisms.282 This is more akin to the tone in which 
Lykourgos addresses the jurors: they should mimic the Areopagos which is hard 
but scrupulously fair. This Council, therefore, which retained respect even during 
periods of unpopUlarity, and whose representation thus itself represented a 
delicate balancing act, could be identified as a model of propriety in the hands of 
an elite orator.283 Dover, indeed, notes the similarities between Aristophanic 
comedy and fourth-century orators: both were 'upholders of conservative virtues 
and a scourge of demagogues,.284 This was a persona which Lykourgos could 
adopt with ease and, probably, with impunity: as a familiar conservative leader of 
the polis identified with personal and public austerity, his tone also provides a link 
with the poets whom he will later use in their traditional capacity as guarantors of 
the public conscience who exhorted, rather than cajoled, citizens to proper public-
spirited behaviour.285 
7rPO, ;; ~, KQ,; u~ a.7ro~rno~ ... ~/WKOlJ(1'llI i1KIrrra. tTtJKOc/JQ,l/Telll: Whilst jurors, 
swearing the heliastic oath, undertook ~,at/nic/)/OOp,al 1T€P' aUToO ou all rf} ~;WSI~ ~, 
forensic speeches delivered to the Areopagos were required by law to avoid egw 
TOO 1Tparp,aTOs AErflll.286 Lykourgos uses the same terminology to urge the jurors 
to be exactly like their esteemed counterparts; he might, indeed, have used the 
combination of hortatory rhetoric and flattering comparison frequently, a 
technique which perhaps formed a not inconsiderable element of his overall 
success. Lykourgos claims that his advice is aimed, in part, at reducing the risk of 
sykophantia. He cannot mean to imply that he himself is the sort of prosecutor of 
whom the jurors should be wary, and he has in any case already insisted on his 
own disinterested prosecution.287 He seems, rather, to be characterizing himself 
almost as the moral conscience of the demos, a persona that not only puts him 
above every allegation of sykophantia, but also above any hint that his case is not 
fully worthy both of prosecution, and of a gUilty verdict. 
282 Aiskhin. 3.192; Dem.23.206. 
283 See §§S2-S4, below. 
284 Dover 1994,26, see too 23-33. 
285 See too Carey 1999,371,388-391; introduction, 19f., above. 
286 Dem. 24.151 ; [Arist.] Ath. 67.1 with Rhodes 1993. 
287 §§3, 5-6, above. 
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'Fig-revealers' were restricted to prosecuting graphai, since ho boulomenos could 
not involve himself in others' private legal concerns. Sykophantai are traditionally 
viewed as public nuisances who were highly, if not solely, motivated by the 
financial rewards available to prosecutors in, for example, phaseis and 
apographai, as well as by the prospect of monetary gain from blackmai1.288 Thus, 
although sykophantia might be defined in tenns of the protection of democracy, 
underpinned by Solonian law to pennit ho boulomenos to protect the polis, 
attempts were clearly made to discourage what has been called 'vexatious 
litigation': a penalty of a 1000 dr. fine, together with limitations on future 
prosecutions, was imposed for failing to secure one-fifth of a jury's vote.289 In 
addition to these indirect mechanisms, there were also various direct means for 
prosecuting sykophantai: probole cases, heard once a year in the assembly, and 
the graphe sykophantias both provided a means of active discouragement to 
citizen and metic alike.290 
This traditional view of sykophantai has been strongly challenged by Osborne, 
who argues that sykophantai were a vital part of Athenian legal proceedings but 
not the malicious and financially-motivated caricature understood by the tenn. He 
suggests that the word indicates more a nuisance, 'a pest causing ... the court 
unnecessary trouble' .291 Harvey, however, considers that there is 'much to be said 
in favour of the traditional view of the sykophantes as one who abused the rights 
of ho boulomenos,.292 Thus, speakers generally stressed their patriotism and 
public-spiritedness to defend themselves against charges of sykophantia, and fell 
back on the 'much more cogent argument' of personal enmity; Lykourgos, 
however, eschews such a defence, finnly drawing the fine line between the 
288 See Ar. Pl. 898-923; Dem. 39.2, 40.9f., 53. Iff., 57.34, 58.12f.; Lys. 7.20f., 25.3; Isok. 
18.9f.; Calhoun 1913, 47f.; Lofberg 1917,26-48; Bonner 1927, 63ff., 70; J.W. Jones, 
123f.; Mosse 1962, 270; Adkins, 309f.; MacDowell 1978, 62-66; Harvey 1985, 78; Ober 
1989a, 173f., 255; Sinclair, 73; Todd 1993, 92ff.; Hunter 1994, 125ff.; Christ 1998,48-
71; R. Osborne 2000a, 75-78. 
289 See R. Osborne 1990,passim. See too §§3, 4, 7, above, 31-35, 120-121, below. 
290 See [Arist.] Ath. 43.5, 59.3 with Rhodes 1993; Isok. 15.313ff.; Lofberg 1917, 19-25, 
53,86-95; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 61 with n.3, 62; MacDowell 1978, 65; Christ 1992, 
passim; Sinclair, 159. 
29) R. Osborne 1990, 94. 
292 Harvey, 1990, 103, and passim. 
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discouragement of malicious prosecution and invitation of public-spirited actions 
according to his own, strictly defined terms.293 
Ko,; UIJ.III t:UOPKmT'7}1I ••• (Jeu6o" n711 ~Oll: Jurors swore an oath at the start of every 
year rather than at the outset of an individual case. The actual text of the oath is 
unknown, but appears to have been at least paraphrased by Demosthenes: the 
jurors agreed to reach a verdict in accordance with Athenian laws and decrees; to 
reach a decision that would be considered the most just where a law or decree 
either did not exist, or was insufficiently exact to correspond with the case at 
hand; and to enforce rules relating to the restrictions of terms and numbers of 
posts of public officials.294 MacDowell suggests that although the text has been 
considered to contain 'misquotations and spurious clauses'. it none the less 
corresponds with what might be expected and presumably contained several, if 
not many, other clauses which were not germane to the cases of those who quoted 
it.295 It is, indeed, unlikely that it could be seriously misrepresented before jurors 
who would themselves have sworn it. Since once a year was deemed sufficiently 
often for the oath to be sworn, it may have been extensive and comprehensive, 
attempting to cover any contingency but also to make allowances for instances 
where this was inadequate. 
Johnstone has considered the dikastic oath at some length and concludes that 'an 
authoritative text would not guarantee a single valid meaning, if for no other 
reason than because the oath itself, just like the laws, was subject to debate and 
interpretation in the courts' .296 He argues that Harris' view that the oath required 
jurors to vote strictly in accordance with the law is too rigid an interpretation, and 
that litigants who give this impression are, rather, attempting to persuade the 
jurors to behave in a particular way: thus a litigant uses the oath 'to claim 
293 Hansen 1991. 194f.; see too Aiskhin. 1.1.2.145; Lys. 12.2f.; Lofberg 1917, 1-19; 
R. Osborne 1985a, 44-48; Sinclair, 209; Allen 2000a, 151-167; Allen 2000b, passim; 
§§3, 5-6, above, 43-45, below. 
294 See Oem. 24. 149ff.; see too [Arist.] Ath. 62.3, with Rhodes 1993; Aiskhin. 3.6; Oem. 
20.118,23.96,39.40; Bonner and Smith, ii. 152-155; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 48; 
MacDowell 1978,44; Todd 1993, 54f., 58, 59f., 83. 
295 MacDowell 1978,44. 
296 Johnstone, 35. 
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authority for his interpretation of the law' .297 Johnstone's suggestions are 
plausible, though his claim that 'Lycurgus ... made no reference to the oath at all' 
is difficult to understand, particularly since Lykourgos' point about the oath could 
conceivably be taken to reinforce Johnstone's view that the oath was an 
interpretative rhetorical tool. 298 Here, in any case, it is debatable whether 
Lykourgos intends anything more than the statement of fact that disallowing 
disgression will help the jurors to pass their judgement more easily in accordance 
with their oath. 
§§14-15. ll.e'~· W a.v~, ~ ... 'TO', rn,~iJO',v eKe,: In his first reference here to 
Leokrates' voyage to Rhodes, Lykourgos appears to take it for granted that the 
jurors are well informed about the detail of the charges and, implicitly, the 
defence of trade which Leokrates will make. 299 The jurors would have had a 
chance to hear the charges in the preliminary hearing in the Ekklesia, but a greater 
knowledge, particularly of a likely defence, is likely to have been provided by 
gossip and pre-trial canvassing. Prior information for litigant and jurors alike 
could also arise from attempts to settle things informally before trial, or at an 
anakrisis or in arbitration, or from advisers or logographers consulted in common 
and bound neither by rules about conflict of interest nor about confidentiality. 300 
There were also stock arguments which allowed educated guesses to be made 
about what was likely to be said. Any or all of these could account for the many 
instances of 'of course you all know .. .' that are found. 301 
Lykourgos will speak later in far more detail about the deeds of ancestral 
Athenians; for now he is concerned to set the seal on the distinction between them 
and Leokrates, to stress the likelihood that other Greeks will discuss the result of 
297 Johnstone, 36 citing Lys. 22.6f.; see too Harris 1994, 136f. 
298 Johnstone, 42. 
299 See too §§17-18, 26-27, 55-58, below. 
300 Anakrisis and arbitration: Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 66ff., 94-105; MacDowell 1978, 
207ff., 239-242; Todd 1993, 126-129; see too §§36-39, below. 
301 See too Dorjahn 1935, passim; Dover 1968, 167ff.; Humphreys 1985c, 351; Ober 
1989a, 148-151; Millett 1998,211-218. 
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the case, and the particular importance, therefore, of a guilty verdict to broadcast 
the opprobium of the defendant's fellow citizens.302 Although it was clearly in the 
interests of orators to magnify as far as possible the impression of Athens at the 
centre of affairs, it is not difficult to believe that significant cases from Athens 
were of interest to other Greeks. Athenian influence had declined after the Social 
War of 357/6-355 B.C., with Philip in control of Amphipolis and Olynthos, and 
Euboian independence proclaimed; following Khaironeia, moreover, the Second 
Athenian League was formally disbanded and Athens was corralled into the 
Corinthian League, despite retaining her navy.303 None the less, interest about 
events in Athens and the manner in which she managed her internal affairs was 
clearly maintained, for any successfully co-ordinated resistance to Macedonian 
hegemony and intervention would inevitably involve the erstwhile leader of the 
greater part of the Greek world, as Agis' failure had recently shown.304 
In practical terms, this interest would not have been difficult to feed. The precise 
location of the Dikasteria has been much disputed but there is little doubt that 
trials were openly conducted.305 Some trials seem to have been held in the stoas, 
and it is possible that several courts occupied a large section of the east side of the 
Agora, an area subsequently covered by the Stoa of Attalos II of Pergamon; in 
Aristophanes' Clouds, Strepsiades looks at a map of the world and refuses to 
accept Athens' location because he cannot see the courts, and although the joke 
centres on the supposed litigiousness of the Athenians, the physical courts 
themselves may perhaps be inferred to have existed in a variety of locations, 
including the Odeion and the Stoa Poikile.306 It is unknown where eisangeliai 
generally and this trial in particular were heard. Multiple panels of jurors would 
have been allocated to them, and if they were held in a building rather than on the 
302 See too §§46-51, below. 
303 See Reinmuth 1971a,passim; Hammond 1986, 515f., 533-570; Bosworth 1988, 187-
192; Heskel, 182-186; Schwenk 1997,25-33; §42, below. 
304 Introduction, 12ff., above. 
305 [Arist.] Ath. 63.2-67, with Rhodes 1993; Aiskhin. 3.56, 207; Ant. 6.14; Dein. 1.30, 
2.19; Oem. 20.165, 54.41; MacDowell 1978,248; Lanni, passim. See too §§ 11-13, 
above. 
306 And. l.77ff.; Ar. Nu. 206ff.; Vesp. 120,389, 1109; Arist. Pol. 1300bI3-35; Oem. 
23.65-79,59.52; Paus. 1.28.5,8-12; IG ie 1641; IG ii2 1670; Phot. Bibl. 535a22-34; Poll. 
8.121-123; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 36-43, 46f.; MacDowell 1978, 35f., 40, 116ff.; 
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Pnyx, the Odeion, which is possibly the court known as the Meizon, would have 
been large enough to hold multiple panels of jurors; although the Odeion is the 
largest attested enclosure in which trials were held, however, there is no firm 
evidence for any trials being held there except for those introduced by the 
Eponymous Archon. An alternative location is the building known as the 
Metiokheion or the Temenos of Metiokhos, but the exact location of this building 
is still disputed and there are no fourth-century sources which confirm its use 
either as a popular court or for eisangeliai. 307 
t\ "'" ,t I "f ~_J..' , , , , 
01 TraHali 'MJII OIKOlJlJ.EVr}1I ••• olJ'rOS' OIUApIJ'YOI T/#UJJPlall: rrarrall T'YJ1I OIKOlJf.1.Evr;lI IS 
ambiguous. It can indicate the entire inhabited world, but can also refer 
specifically to the Greek world, as opposed to barbarian territories. 308 Lykourgos 
probably intends the former connotation, for it is rhetorically effective to imply 
such an extent for the rumour of Athens' degradation for which Leokrates is 
responsible, and to play to a fond self-image of world-wide renown. Yet the 
reference to the false reports of Athens' capture which Leokrates allegedly made 
in Rhodes explicitly connects him with the traders there to whom he spoke, an 
association that is rather dangerous for Lykourgos, for in the central part of his 
speech he will fiercely attack the anticipated defence claim that Leokrates' 
departure was motivated by trade.309 
In this respect, Lykourgos is trying to have his cake and eat it, for he will argue on 
the one hand that Leokrates' trading activities provided no service at all for 
Athens, but were intended merely to line his own pocket, and on the other hand 
that, in any case, he did not leave Athens for such purposes. This type of all-
encompassing defence, however, is understandable where litigants had only one 
speech in which to cover all aspects of their case, and where any of a number of 
possible defence arguments had to be anticipated.3lo It is clearly an additional 
Wycherley 1978, 53-60; Sealey 1987, 70ff.; Todd 1993, 81 f.; Boegehold 1995, 3-16, 
43-50,91-98,121-192; Millett 1998, 217f.; Shipley 2000, 87. 
307 See Boegehold 1995, Sf., 1 If., 177f.; see too §§98-101, below. 
308 See Arist. Mete. 362b20-30, where Ethiopia and India are included; Oem. 7.35. Hyp. 
4 (Eux). 33 probably means 'the whole world'. 
309 See §§17-18, 26-27,55-58, below. 
310 See too §20, below. 
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advantage if, in the process, Lykourgos can highlight the contrast between the 
defendant's behaviour and the patriotic excellence of ancestral Athenians. 
Lykourgos' identification of himself with such exemplary models is emphasized 
by the mirroring of his opening ~/I<a;all and €UU€~ with his current analysis of 
how Athenians differ from all others - €VU€(3w~ .. . ou;w~ ... c/}/AOT;/1-W~ €X€/II. 311 
Leokrates' abandonment of familial and social obligations thus marks him out as 
au€{3r(J). The phraseology hints at divine, rather than human law, and its use may 
therefore be significant, for Leokrates' crimes implicitly breach the limits within 
which mankind can legislate, and require a generalized categorization such as 
prodosia.312 If Lykourgos intends the jurors to draw this inference, the argument, 
though subliminal, is similar to that commonly found in murder trials, where the 
pollution of the' guilty' individual is envisaged as a potential risk of infection for 
the jurors.3!3 Dover, indeed, suggests that the conjunction of dikaios and hosios 
recognizes precisely such a legal distinction and it is dikaios which Lykourgos 
links with hosios, eusebes and ph ilotimia. The jurors must, clearly, avoid any 
personal risk of divine retribution and, in the process, will acquire the renown 
associated with public benefactors and be deemed philotimoi. 3!4 
§ 16. !::,.eop.o" ~' upijJlJ ••• l£EP.lJ'ijofo., WEpt Q,VrWlJ: The request that a jury listen to a 
speech through to the end without interruption or irritation is commonplace and 
illustrates the tendency of jurors, noted by Bers, to disrupt proceedings with 
thorubos.315 This rhetorical technique was a necessary element of the orator's 
arsenal, for certain references might antagonize any audience, not just a jury, and 
it was important for a speaker, whilst evoking outrage at the events described, 
simultaneously to convey his concern for his listeners' sensibilities (not least to 
generate their sympathy for his supposed predicament), and to invoke a communal 
311 See too Dover 1994, 247f., 276; §1, above, 40-41, 43-45, below. 
312 See too introduction, 23-29, above; §§5-6, above, 90-92, 94-97, below. 
313 See e.g. Ant. 1.31, 2.0,.3, ,},.9ff., 3.,},.llf. See too Parker 1983, 110; §§5-6, above. 
314 Dover 1994, 230f., 250ff. See too Ant. 1.25; Lys. 13.3; Whitehead 1983, 56-66. See 
too §§1, 3, above, 43-45, 135-137, 138-140, below. 
315 See §§11-13, 14-15; see too Bers 1985, passim; Lanni, 187f 
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ethos which excluded his particular opponent.316 There is also, perhaps, an 
element of caution in respect of mentioning 'unlucky' matters, for even if such 
sentiments were not held by Lykourgos himself, they could have been held, or be 
thought to be held, by many in the jury; they are, at least, frequently expressed in 
fifth-century tragedy where speaking of ill-omened events is portrayed as 
(re)generating the very thing to be avoided.317 
rf?,~V't'X" ?,Q.p T'ij~ h Xa.'paJIJEi". ~~: Within a year of the conclusion of the 
Peace of Philokrates in 346, Demosthenes, with Timarkhos, charged Aiskhines 
with misconduct during the embassies in which their negotiations had been 
conducted.3lB The trial eventually took place in 343 B.C., after Aiskhines had 
successfully prosecuted Timarkhos, and was prosecuted by Demosthenes alone. 31 !) 
Aiskhines was acquitted, even though Philokrates had recently been prosecuted by 
Hypereides and found guilty of treason, fleeing before the death sentence could be 
carried out. 320 
Demosthenes' volte/ace was grounded in Philip's actions, for following the Peace 
of Philokrates, Philip had seized Thermopylai and forced a Phokian surrender, 
ending the Third Sacred War in 346 B.C.; subsequently, he laid siege to 
Byzantium and Perinthos, installed tyrannies in Oreus and Eretria, and captured at 
Hieron a shipment of grain bound for Athens.321 The Athenians fought back by 
forcing Philip to abandon his siege of Byzantium, regaining Euboia, seeking and 
obtaining Persian support, and forming alliances with, amongst others, erstwhile 
members of the Second Athenian League; although these alliances included even 
Thebes, Sparta was uninterested in proposals to unite against Macedon, for 
316 See, e.g. Aiskhin. 3.252; And. 1.9; Lys. 31.8. See too Sattler, 59ff.; Carey 1999, 386ff. 
Even a tragedian needed to avoid causing undue distress to his audience, as Phrynikhos 
found on the production of his Taking of Miletus: Hdt. 6.21. 
317 See e.g. A. Ag. 1078f., S. EI.1211ff.; E. Hek. 208-214; See too Vemant 1990, 260f.; 
Carey 1999, 372ff. 
318 See Aiskhin. 2. passim; Oem. 19. passim; Schafer, ii.274f., 358-390; Hammond 1986, 
551-558; Sealey 1993, 145-159; Harris 1995,70-77,89-101. 
319 See Aiskhin. 1, passim, with Fisher 2001; Harris 1995, 101-106. 
320 Hyp. 4 (Eux). 29; see too Aiskhin. 2.6; Hansen 1975, 102 #109. According to Oein. 
1.28, Oemosthenes conducted Philokrates' defence. 
321 Oem. 18.7lff.; 0.S.16.74.2-77.2; FGH 328F 162 - Philokhoros; FGH 115F 292-
Theopompos; see too Parke and Wormell, i.216-231; Hammond 1986,556-564; Harris 
1995, 124ff.; Schwenk 1997, 28ff. 
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ironically, in 338 B.C.322 
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Confrontation became inevitable when Philip, who controlled the Amphictyonic 
Council, was invited to settle the Fourth Sacred War, which had arisen after the 
Athenians had rededicated their victory at Plataia against the Persians and 
Thebans, an act which naturally offended Thebes to a great extent. Thebes had 
accordingly persuaded the Amphissans to accuse Athens of sacrilege, because the 
rededication had been made whilst Delphi was under the control of the Phokians 
who had outrageously robbed the sanctuary before Philip's settlement of the Third 
Sacred War. 323 
Aiskhines was present when the Amphissans were due to level their accusation 
and turned the tables by pre-emptively accusing the Arnphissans themselves of 
sacrilege for misuse of sacred land. The Amphictyonic Council, attempting to 
rectify this misuse the following day, was assaulted by the Amphissans; it 
therefore resolved to hold an extraordinary meeting at Thermopylai to determine 
both a resolution and suitable punishment. Aiskhines' success in deflecting 
Theban machinations, however, was undermined by Demosthenes, who was 
convinced that continued enmity between Athens and Thebes was 
disadvantageous: he ensured that the Athenians were absent from the Council's 
extraordinary meeting. Thebes was also absent, her anger exacerbated by 
Thessaly's seizure of Ekhinos, a Theban stronghold around the bay from 
Thermopylai. In response, the Thessalian garrison was expelled from Nikaia, 
another stronghold near Thermopylai.324 
After the Arnphictyonic Council had failed to enforce its sanctions against 
Amphissa, Philip's help was requested. He descended into central Greece and 
demanded both the surrender of Nikaia, and Thebes' co-operation against Athens: 
322 Oem. 18.73-80; O.S. 16.62.4-63.1; Paus. 3.1O.4f.; Pluto Ag. 3; Ph ok. 14; Str. 6.3.4; 
FGH 115F 232 - Theopompos; see too Hamilton 1982,61-83; Hammond 1986,580; 
Hammond and Griffith, 586-584; Cartledge and Spawforth, 8-15; Hamilton 1997, 60ff. 
323 O.S. 16.23.1-25.3; Oem. 6.22; 9.26f., 32f.; 19.260, 325ff.; Paus. 10.3.1ff. See too 
Parke and Wormell, i.233-242; Hammond 1986,565-567; Munn 1997, 98ff. 
324 See Aiskhin. 3.113-31,140; Oem. 11.4, 18.143-52; FGH328F 56b - Philokhoros. 
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he was at the Boiotian border to emphasize his demand before a response could 
even be given. In alarm, Thebes and Athens united to protect Amphissa, and 
confronted Philip in a series of inconclusive skirmishes which culminated in 
Philip's seizure of Amphissa.325 In 338 B.c., Philip, in formation with his son 
Alexander and the experienced Parmenion, attacked at Khaironeia, where the 
allies had retreated and where the plain was narrow and more defensible. Philip's 
feigned retreat duped the Athenian ranks, under the command of Khares, Lysikles 
and Stratokles, into an attack that broke the allies' formation; Alexander's cavalry 
simultaneously fractured the Theban line and routed the allies' right wing. The 
two-thousand-strong cavalry had been the decisive factor in the battle, and 
Alexander would not forget the advantage of employing such tactics, for a similar 
manceuvre again proved decisive at Issos.326 Athenian losses at Khaironeia 
totalled one thousand, with a further two thousand taken hostage; the Thebans 
suffered too and although exact numbers are unknown, the three-hundred-strong 
Sacred Band died to a man.327 
Ka.; t.7"'tMlpa.p.OlmIJV Q,7TQ,lmIJV upilJlI ... Ka.6' ;; TI /ill a.VroI~ &t<tfi: Following the disaster 
at Khaironeia, there was great apprehension in Athens that Philip would invade 
immediately, and emergency decrees were rapidly passed. One such decree 
defined flight as prodosia.328 Other decrees legislated for trials of public officials 
on charges of treason: Lysikles himself was successfully impeached by 
Lykourgos, a case which was probably motivated to mitigate the political failure 
and to attribute the catastrophe to abject military incompetence, though the 
prosecution of unsuccessful generals was far from unusual. 329 
325 See Aiskhin. 3.140-51; Dein. 1.74; Oem. 18.174-188,211-217; D.S. 16.84.2-85.4; 
Plut. Dem. 18; see too Hammond 1986, 566f.; Hammond and Griffith, 585-595; Munn 
1997,98ff. 
326 See D.s. 16.85.5-86.6; Just. 9.3; Plut. Alex. 9.2,20.4; Hammond 1938,201-218; 
Pritchett 1958, 308-311; Hammond and Griffith, 596-603; Hammond 1986, 568ff. 
327 See too Paus. 9.40.5; Plut. Pel. 18; Str. 9.2.37. See too Hammond 1986, 569f.; 
Hammond and Griffith, 598f., 603; Munn 1997, 100; §§46-51, below. 
328 See §§52-54, below. 
329 See too Oem. 4.47; D.S. 16.88; [Plut.] Mor. 8430; Durrbach 1890, 147ff.; Conomis 
1961, 136ff.; Pritchett 1974-1991, ii. 4-33, esp. 20; Hansen 1975, 58f., 103f. #112; Will, 
22f.; Humphreys 1985a, 219; Sinclair, 146-152; §§36-39, 40-41,52-54, below. 
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Lykourgos cites three proposals passed in this panic-stricken atmosphere. The 
first, here, relates to a vote to gather women and children from the countryside 
inside the walls of the Peiraieus, and to permit the strategoi to organize Athenians 
and non-citizen residents for the defences as they thought appropriate. The 
second, in §§36-39, is a reading of a decree authorising the Boule to go to the 
Peiraieus fully armed to take any such measures as appropriate, but especially to 
protect the harbour which, despite Leokrates' assertion to the Rhodians, had not 
been blockaded.330 Finally, in §41, he records the approval of the motion to free 
the slaves, to give citizenship to aliens, and to re-enfranchise atimoi. 331 Despite 
the emphasis in these decrees on the Peiraieus, a land invasion was much more 
likely, though Macedonian siege machinery had been used to great effect at 
Amphipolis and it may have been feared that the walls linking the city to the 
harbour, as well as the newly refurbished Peiraieus ship-sheds and the naval 
arsenal in Zea, products of Euboulos' financial guardianship from 354 B.c., were 
at risk.332 According to Plutarch, these measures were proposed by Hypereides, 
though it is unclear whether they were passed collectively or as individual items, 
since the impression is of one decree rather than severa1.333 
§§ 17-18. AEClJKPOff"Y/fi a€ -roVicdIl O~E~ ••• TrP~ n}1I )lQ,w Trpournt..EIJUE: Lykourgos 
will shortly describe how the defendant made financial arrangements to dispose of 
his property and how he sacrificed his share in the pentekoste: Leokrates' wealth 
is evident from his membership of such a consortium and the sale of his house and 
slaves: these raised one talent and further sales raised an additional 35 minai. 334 
There was also a bronze statue of his father in the temple of Zeus Soter, calculated 
to be worth around 3000 dr. 335 Presumably, the slaves who helped to load the boat 
were left to maintain Leokrates' property in Athens under the supervision of his 
330 See §§17-18, below. 
331 §§4~1, below. 
332 See too [Plut.] Mor. 851A; Xen. Por. 3.13, with Gauthier 1976; Cawkwell 1963, 
passim; Garland 2001, 43ff.; Garlan 1994,682-692. 
333 [Plut] Mor. 848F-849A. 
334 See too Kriinzlein, 76-82; introduction, 39, above; §§21-23(i), 55-58, below. 
335 See § 1 with n.161, above, 25, below. 
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brother until the date of their sale. To set the scene, however, Lykourgos paints a 
graphic picture of the defendant's actual departure. 
~€fA'Y}V ot/;fav indicates late afternoon or early evening: it was thus likely still to be 
light when Leokrates left for the coast.336 Eirenis' description as an hetaira may be 
somewhat pejorative, for Demosthenes distinguishes clearly between a rraMaK'Y;, 
effectively a common-law wife or concubine, who lacked the legal protection of a 
formally married citizen woman and whose children could not be admitted to the 
citizen register, and an €Talpa, a high-class, often foreign, prostitute. 337 A rraMaK-Y; 
could, however, formerly have been an eTaipa: Aspasia lived first with Perikles 
and then, after his death, with Lysikles, during and after the time when she was an 
€Talpa. 338 The terms are perhaps somewhat interchangeable, but Eirenis, who was 
prepared to abandon Athens with her lover, should probably be seen as Leokrates' 
common-law wife rather than a prostitute. The reason for her concubinage, if such 
it was, is unclear: Lykourgos makes no mention of any legal wife of Leokrates, so 
marriage would have been possible if Eirenis was a citizen; the implication is, 
therefore, that she was non-Athenian, for marriage between citizens and non-
citizens, which was previously discouraged by the politically disadvantageous 
status of the children of such unions, became subject to stringent discriminatory 
legislation in the fourth century.339 
The gate through which the couple gained access to the coast is described by a 
diminutive noun and is therefore probably not one of the fifteen or more main 
entrances in the city wall, like the Dipylon and the Sacred Gates. 340 Although 
336 In the southern Mediterranean, darkness descends at around 8 to 9 p.m., far more 
rapidly than in more northerly countries because the sun sets nearer to the perpendicular: 
these factors are unaffected by the passage of time. See too W.F. Richardson, 51 f.; §§5-6, 
above. 
337 Dem. 59.122. Pornai (perhaps 'hookers') were another category of available women: 
Dem. 59.114. 
338 Plut. Per. 24, 30.4, 32; see too Dem. 59.118; Harrison 1968-1971, i. 13ff.; Davies 
1971, 458f.; Pomeroy, 88-92; MacDowell 1978, 89f. 
339 See [Arist.] Ath. 26.4, with Rhodes 1993; Harrison 1968-1971, i. 25-29; MacDowell 
1978, 87; Pelling, 189-196, 218-245. 
340 City walls and the problems posed by gateways: Wycherley 1978, 7-25; Lawrence 
1983, 299-308; Knigge, 10, 36, 39f., 56-73. Specific survey and comprehensive 
discussion of the Dema wall: Munn 1993, passim; general discussion: Camp 2000, 
passim. Thouk. 4.110-112, demonstrates the vulnerability of such gates during Brasidas' 
capture of Amphipolis. 
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there was both a Peiraieus Gate and a Gate to the Sea, the latter's presence 
confirmed by evidence of a road leading to Phaleron, there were also several small 
gates, or posterns, which were simple slits in the wall closed by doors. 341 
Lawrence argues that the siting and spacing of these gates strongly suggests an 
intended peace-time use, probably servicing bridle paths to and from the country 
for agricultural traffic. 342 The secretive nature of Leokrates' and Eirenis' 
departure suggests that they probably used such a gate, though it is puzzling that, 
despite the panic and exigencies of the situation, steps do not appear to have been 
taken to set guards or erect barricades. 
Ka, ~ETO ~VrWll ••• fK TWlI K'lI~WlI rn'KWtreTQ,,: Lykourgos paints an emotive 
picture of Leokrates looking back at the Acropolis, visible even from the coast, 
and the temples of Zeus Soter and Athene Soteira in the Peiraieus. 343 There were 
often such temples in harbours, Soter typically being conceived of as the 
manifestation of Zeus who cared for sailors: no trace remains of these particular 
temples, but Strabo reports that the colonnades of the temple of Zeus Soter 
contained works of art by famous artists. 344 Lykourgos again anticipates 
Leokrates' defence and, in this instance, the reason for his precise reference to 
Zeus and Athene as Saviours is clear, for the bronze statue of Leokrates' father 
was abandoned in the temple of Zeus Soter.345 It is, therefore, implicitly 
sacrilegious for Leokrates to call upon him again in these circumstances, and his 
intention to do so is thus further evidence of his impious nature. 346 The rhetoric is 
emotive, and the jurors' outrage is evoked with a tricolon which emphasizes the 
now familiar themes of flight, abandonment and betrayal, and the shamelessness 
of the defendant who will request pity, and demonstrate fear, despite feeling 
neither as he himself fled. 
341 Wycherley 1978, 17. See too Lawrence 1979, 246, 335-342; Garland 2001, 166f. 
342 Lawrence 1979, 336f.; see too Stroud 1998, 104ff. 
343 See too Paus. 1.28.2. 
344 Str. 9.1.15; see too [Arist.] Ath. 56.5 with Rhodes 1993; Paus. 1.1.3; Farnell, i. 47, 60, 
164 n.128a-b; Wycherley 1978,265; Garland 2001,137; Parker 1996, 238-241. 
Wycherley 1978,42, also notes that the fifth century stoa just south of the Stoa of the 
Basileus in the Agora was also dedicated to Zeus 'under the title of Soter or Eleutherios, 
because he had saved the freedom of Athens from the Persian threat'. 
345 See too §§14-15, above, 25, 55-58,135-137, below. 
346 See §§90-92, 94-97, below. 
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Ka/ra,x6e,~ ~ Ka.' Iub'KO#J.EVO~ f;~ ·PO~I.I: Before Rhodes' incorporation into the fifth-
century Delian League, the Rhodian poleis paid tribute to the Persian kings; in 
411 B.C., with Spartan support, the island's oligarchic rulers revolted from 
Athens. After Alkibiades' campaign against the island in 408 B.c., Ialysos, 
Kameiros and Lindos united, the poleis' synoecism probably intended to obviate 
further attacks by providing 'strength through sympolity' in the new Rhodian 
republic, with the new city of Rhodes providing excellent harbours on the 
northeast tip of the island. 347 
Following a democratic revolution in 395 B.C., and the King's Peace of 386, 
Rhodian autonomy was guaranteed, and despite the island's enrolment in the 
second Athenian League, its revolt alongside Cos, Chios and Byzantium in 357 
resulted in Athenian recognition in 355 of the four rebel states' independence.348 
Almost immediately, however, Rhodes fell under the control of the Hecatomnid 
ruler, Mausolus: Berthold suggests that 'given the proximity and growing power, 
particularly naval, of its Carian neighbor, the revolt from Athens and cooperation 
with the ambitious dynast had entailed a certain gamble for the island, and now 
the Rhodian democrats found themselves the losers'. 349 Oligarchic rule followed, 
and Hecatomnid control over Rhodes survived Mausolus' death in 35312 B.C., 
and continued, under Artemisia, his sister/wife and successor, until the invasion 
of Alexander the Great. 350 
/lxmfP -rW Trt1/rp'" ••• tron"r/Pia.1.I TrpotrtV(O(Jf~: In the Kleisthenic distributions of 
Attika, aCTTlJ represented the city of Athens together with the plain, extending as 
far as the coast itself, of which most was designated rra.pa.)..'a.: the third designation 
was IJ.€U(yyf'O(j.35 I In general terms, however, Athens was conceptually divided 
347 See A. Pers. 889ff.; D.S. 11.3.8, 13.69.5,75.1; Str. 14.2.10f.; Thouk. 8.44; Meiggs 
1972, 55f., 368f.; Berthold 1980, 32-35; Berthold 1984, 19-22; Gabrielson 2000, passim. 
348 See Oem. 15. passim; D.S. 14.79.4-7, 15.28.2ff., 16.7.3f., 21.1 f.; Xen Hell. 4.8.20-
5.1.36; Berthold 1980,35-43; Berthold 1984, 23f., 28-31; Hammond 1986,455,515; 
Ruzicka, 115-123. 
349 Berthold 1984, 31 f.; see too Berthold 1980, 43f. 
350 See Arist. Pol. 1304b 27-31; Oem. 15.11 ff., 19,27; D.S. 16.36.2; Pliny, HN, 36.4.30; 
Berthold 1980,43-49; Hornblower, 34-137, esp. 123-130; Berthold 1984,31 ff.; 
Ruzicka, 123-129. 
351 See [Arist.] Ath. 21.4, with Rhodes 1993; Whitehead 1986,25-28; Hansen 1991, 47f. 
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between the upper city, or asty, and the harbour of the Peiraieus.352 The two were 
linked by the long walls which, Garland notes, effectively sealed the city and its 
main harbour from the rest of Attika; with Macedonian use of siege machinery, 
however, such fortifications became 'increasingly obsolete', though Philip still 
needed inside help in Byzantium, and in Athens, allegedly relied on Antiphon to 
set fire to the docks. 353 Osborne envisages an additional conceptual division 
between the asty and' an undifferentiated countryside', which is 'almost universal 
in the classical writers'; he argues that such a view indicates 'prejudices and 
assumptions ... that the asty was perceived to have features, advantages, not 
shared by ... the countryside,.354 The opposite, indeed, is also true, with honesty 
and simplicity capable of portrayal as intrinsic rural characteristics in apposition 
to urban sophistication.355 
oVrw ~€ u~po. ... TV.,Ao. ~:ro. ~ltl. TOVroV: The wide diffusion and enormous 
volume of eastern-Mediterranean trade, predominantly with Egypt, was heavily 
focused on the Rhodian 'entrepot'.356 Naval operations, as well as trade, were 
controlled by what Gabrielsen has called the 'Rhodian naval aristocracy', whose 
activities included the control of piracy. It was, presumably, the efficient 
organization of this maritime expertise, together with the use of the fast and 
manreuvrable ships, phylakides, which patrolled and protected the coastline, that 
would have permitted the recall to harbour of merchants after Leokrates' report of 
Athens' situation, particularly his false report of the blockade of the Peiraieus.357 
The Rhodians' recall of merchant ships would not only help the native traders of 
the island, but would also allow the islanders to take advantage of Athenian ones. 
As Berthold asks, where better to dispose of a cargo if Philip was blockading the 
Peiraieus?358 Indeed, traders might have received a better price in Rhodes than in 
352 See e.g. [Arist.] Ath. 50.2, 51.1ff., 61.1, with Rhodes 1993; Arist. Pol. 1303bl0ff.; 
Thouk. 1.93.7; Xen. Hell. 2.4.10f. The administrative duplication in these sectors was 
perhaps intended to allow logistical continuity in the event of the destruction or invasion 
of either. See too Wycherley 1978,261-265; Whitehead 1986. 394ff.; Roy 1998, passim. 
353 Garland 2001,22-26,43. See too Oem. 18.132; Dein. 1.63; D.S.16.77.2. 
354 R. Osborne 1985b, 18f.; see too Sinclair, 107ff.; Hansen 2000b, 202ff. 
355 See too Arist. Pol. 1318b9-17; Dover 1994. I 12ff. 
356 Gabrielsen 1997, 71ff.; see too Garnsey 1988,150-164. 
357 Gabrielsen 1997, 108ff.; see too Berthold 1984, 42-49; § 16 above. 
358 Berthold 1984,33. 
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Athens, particularly in the circumstances as portrayed by Leokrates.359 In Athens, 
therefore, this could easily be turned into a cause for complaint, for produce that 
should have brought an economic and physical benefit had been made 
advantageous to others, and Lykourgos is clearly aiming to lay such losses at 
Leokrates'door. 
§ 19. Ka.1 OTt mOr' Q).,,,fnj Af'YCJJ ••• AfCJJKpaT7J' mOr' Q,m1rrfAAf: To reinforce the 
claims he has made, Lykourgos now moves to narrative evidence from witnesses 
to the general circumstances surrounding Leokrates' departure from Athens and 
arrival at Rhodes. Here he simply summarizes the evidence to be presented: the 
jurors will hear from former neighbours of the defendant; then from the Rhodians 
themselves; and finally from Phyrkinos. This evidence is not, technically, 
different in kind from that presented in §23(ii); neither set of evidence is, strictly 
speaking, documentary or contractual. It is, however, theoretically distinct, for the 
witnesses in this section are presented as disinterested, if not impartial: they were 
not involved in any dealings with Leokrates, but were, effectively, simply 
bystanders at the events Lykourgos has described.360 None the less, this evidence 
could be intended to do more than just flesh out and substantiate the narrative of 
events; it could also be meant to imply the outrage generated even in those who 
may once have been predisposed towards Leokrates, or whom he had alienated 
even before his treachery, a motive which could perhaps underpin Lykourgos' 
claim, in §23(ii), that he would have produced the defendant's brother-in-law had 
he still been alive.361 
~ ~ mOra. ~11 ~UPK;lJOU ••• 1t'ElIT7JK~lI, ~CJJlI a.~: Phyrkinos is not 
mentioned either in APF or PA, and seems to be unknown but for this reference to 
his accusation of Leokrates Ell TqJ ~#J-CP. Hansen suggests that Phyrkinos 'testified 
against Leokrates in the Assembly, presumably during the meeting when 
359 See de Ste Croix 1974,48-52; see too Dem. 56. passim; §§26-27, below. 
360 See too §§20, 21-23(i), 23(ii)-24, below. 
361 See too Bonner 1905, 39f.; §20, below. 
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Lykourgos brought his eisangelia,.362 Yet Lykourgos claims that Phyrkinos 
accused Leokrates of damaging the pentekoste in which he had a share, an 
allegation which forms no part of the wide range of charges of the eisangelia. The 
remark is, itself, strange. Lykourgos must be referring to an allegation of harm 
caused to Leokrates' partners in the consortium, rather than to any disservice 
Leokrates had done to himself, but the grounds for the accusation are unclear: it 
would make a little more sense if Phyrkinos was himself an associate member and 
had been personally harmed. The text, however, is less than secure at this point, 
and this may be just what Lykourgos means, and perhaps formed the basis of 
Phyrkinos' evidence itself. 
Also unclear is the nature of KaT'rrYOpouIITa, and whether Phyrkinos prosecuted or 
denounced Leokrates, though Ell TcP ~lkqJ is, perhaps, suggestive of denunciation 
by means of a phasis. A successful phasis, indeed, resulted in the prosecutor 
receiving half the fine imposed on the defendant, and would have given 
Phyrkinos, had he been one of the group, the chance to recoup any losses he may 
have incurred.363 Moreover, the procedure was available for trading offences and 
is notably attested in one case of the importing of grain to a market other than 
Athens.364 This was a crime which Lykourgos chose not to include in his 
eisangelia, but of which he accuses Leokrates; it is, however, impossible to 
determine whether this formed any part of Phyrkinos' charge. 365 Hansen's 
suggestion is not impossible, however: Phyrkinos may have been one of the 
speakers in the assembly reinforcing, with arguments not strictly linked to the 
charges, the motion passed by Lykourgos as principal denunciator, or a synegoros 
presenting just one aspect, perhaps the specific aspect of illegal import, of a 
prosecution team's argument for an eisangelia on the grounds ofprodosia.366 
362 Hansen 1975, 108 #121 n.2; see too §§5-6, above, 55-58, below. 
363 Oem. 58.13; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 218-221; Stroud 1974, 158, lines 28f.; 
MacDowell 1978, 158f.; R. Osborne 1985a, 47f. Harris 2000,70, seems to take it for 
granted that Phyrkinos had invested in the contract for collecting the tax. 
364 Oem. 35.50-53; MacDowell 1978,62. 
365 §§26-27, below. 
366 See too Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 56; Hansen 1975,31; §§3 with nn.178, 179, above, 
31-35 with nASI, below. 
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The pentekoste, also known as the' fiftieth', or 'two per-cent tax' was a tax upon 
imports and exports which was levied on all incoming and outgoing goods.367 It 
was collected by the pentekostologoi, having been leased to the highest bidder by 
the TrWA'r}Tal, or 'sellers', ten officials responsible for the state leasing of contracts 
for the mines and tax collection.368 Lessees paid over the contracted amount and 
retained any surplus; if, however, they failed to keep to the terms of their contract, 
they were registered as state debtors, and their names and the price they had paid 
for the lease were recorded on whitewashed tablets which were retained by the 
Boule. There was clearly a substantial profit to be made, and not only by the 
lessees: Andokides records how bribes were accepted by lease contractors to keep 
the bidding low and how they themselves formed co-operatives and took shares in 
cut-price taxes.369 
Lessees undertook to make payments either periodically or in a lump sum: some 
were required to pay once in each prytany; some, three times annually; others had 
to make full payment in the ninth prytany. Although attempts have been made to 
argue that mining leases were to be paid in each prytany and that tax contract 
payments were due as a lump sum in the ninth prytany, Rhodes notes that it is not 
actually possible to assess the determinants in these practices, nor to be precise 
about when contractual payments for tax leases were actually due.37o 
§20. IJpO ~ TOO o.w4Ja,'JlEIII ••• -rVk ~IUJKpa.Ti~ KA'r}TfUUfJIUlI a.Vro~: Lykourgos 
argues that his advice to the jurors not to allow witnesses to stray beyond 
evidentiary boundaries is in the interest of the laws, the jurors themselves, and 
democracy.371 These are, of course, the fundamental principles which he stressed 
367 And. 1.133; Oem. 21.133,166, 35.29f., 59.27; Harp. & Suda, s.v. Trfll"M}KOtrrt7; Pollux 
8. 132.4ff. From 413 B.C., there was also a 5% tax levied on all goods passing through the 
emporia of Athenian allies: Thouk 7.28. See too Hasebroek 1933, 16lf.; §§36-39, 55-58, 
below. 
368 [Arist.] Ath. 47.2f., with Rhodes 1993. 
369 And. 1. 133f. 
370 Rhodes 1993, 555f.; see too And. 1.73f.; Oem. 24.40, 96ff., 59.27; Hopper 1953, 210-
216,224-239; Rhodes 1972a, 149ff. 
371 See too §§ 11-13, above. 
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at the outset, and which he argued were worthy of the utmost honour and 
protection. Witnesses are also, therefore, worthy of the same honour and 
protection only if they comply with his definition of those principles. 
§20 
Witnesses were, for Aristotle, one of five pisteis atekhnoi, and therefore 
represented concrete evidence which required no rhetorical expertise, In 
opposition to pisteis entekhnoi, intrinsically skilful types of evidence such as 
arguments from probability.372 Other pisteis atekhnoi were laws, including 
decrees; agreements, including contracts but also private documents generally; 
slave testimony from torture; and oaths. Todd considers that the conceptualisation 
of laws as a type of evidence rather than the rules by which a case is judged 
reflects a fundamental difference between ancient and modem evidentiary 
practice; thus the laws have 'persuasive not compelling force' and, as such, this 
type of evidence was effectively 'supporting arguments', rather than proofs 
per se.373 
Not all witnesses to a case were eligible to give testimony: women, children and 
slaves were precluded. Women could, however, take an evidentiary oath, which 
did not actually make them witnesses. MacDowell suggests that this was perhaps 
because they could not be seen in public, but as Todd notes, the evidentiary oath 
was a public undertaking. 374 Although children could not be witnesses, they could, 
as adults, testify to events which occurred in their minority and the reason for 
excluding them at the time of any such event is unclear.375 
The production of eligible witnesses was the responsibility of litigants. Although 
there was no juridical power to locate them, witnesses could, however, be 
compelled in one of three respects: they must either testify to the accuracy of the 
372 Arist. Rhet. 1375a, 22-25; see too Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 133-154; Mirhady 1991b. 
13-16; Carey 1994a, passim; Carey 1997, 14-17. 
373 Todd 1990b, 32; see too Soubie 1973, passim; Soubie 1974,passim; Mirhady 1991b, 
passim; Todd 1993, 58ff.; D. Cohen, passim, esp. 245: Davies' comment; §§5-6, above. 
374 MacDowell 1978, 243; Todd 1990b, 26; see too Mirhady 1996,125-131; Allen 2000a, 
103-107; §§28-30, below. 
375 See Dem. 49.42; see too Leisi, 12; Lipsius, iii. 874, n.32; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 137; 
Todd 1990b, 26. Child witnesses possibly in homicide cases: MacDowell 1963, 102-109; 
MacDowell 1978, 119. 
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text of their evidence; deny knowledge under an oath of disclaimer, exomosia; or 
pay a fine of 1000 dr., which seems to be what is meant by kleteusis. 376 Exomosia 
was taken 'with hands on the sacrifice', and in the name of Zeus, Apollo and 
Themis, if Plato is quoting actual practice.377 Sliced victims were placed on a 
stone in a process also used in the dokimasia of archons and by arbitrators before 
giving their jUdgement. 378 
Witnesses also faced a fine, imposed in a dike lipomarturiou, for lack of 
attendance, though only one case is known and that was unsuccessful, and Todd 
argues that it could only be used against witnesses who had agreed to come and 
then failed to tum Up.379 A recalcitrant witness, however, only needed to 'forget' 
what he knew: there was little redress against such amnesia, and Lykourgos 
clearly feels the need to pre-empt such tactics here.38o 
Todd argues that since witnesses were there essentially to support the litigant for 
whom they were giving evidence, the practice was a privilege bestowed on the 
citizen body; as such, it carried the risk of prosecution for false witness in a dike 
pseudomarturion.38J There is very little evidence for such cases, but it is clear that 
the procedure was altered at some point for a hearing to be held ahead of the 
execution which would otherwise have followed the original tria1. 382 Todd notes 
several uses of the association of witnessing with risk, and suggests that it was 
376 See Aiskhin. 1.46f., 67ff.; Dem. 19.176,59.28; Is. 9.18; Poll. 8.37,55; Leisi, 54ff., 
67ff., 114-119; Lipsius, iii. 884f.; Bonner and Smith, ii. 136-139, 163f.; Harrison 1968-
1971, ii.l39f.; MacDowell 1978, 243f.; Humphreys 1985c, 321 with n.27; Todd 1990b, 
23-30; Carey 1995, passim; ThOr 1995, passim; Carey 1999,372; §§21-23(i), below. 
377 PI. Lg. 936e6-937al. 
378 Stone found in front of the Stoa ofthe Basileus: [Arist.] Ath. 7.1,55.5, with Rhodes 
1993. See too Burkert, 252; §79, below. 
379 Dem. 49. 18ff.; see too Bonner and Smith, ii.139-143; Todd 1990b, 25. Graphe 
pseudokleteias for those falsely appearing as witnesses following summons: [Arist.] Ath. 
59.3, with Rhodes 1993; And. 1.74; Dem. 53.15; Harp. S.V. t/;EIJ~OK).,'rJTE;~; Poll. 8.44; 
Suda, s.v. t/;E1J~oK).,'rJtT;a; Lipsius, ii. 446ff.; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 85f. 
380 See too §§55-58, below. 
381 Todd 1990b, 27-30. See too Aiskhin. 2.170; [Arist.] Ath. 59.6,68.4, with Rhodes 
1993; Lipsius, ii. 771, 778ff., iii. 957; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 192-197; Carey 1999,372. 
Dike pseudomarturion for use of inadmissible evidence: Dem. 46.6-10, 57.4f.; 
MacDowell 1978, 245. Synegoroi not liable, and thus effectively character witnesses: 
Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 158; §§138-140, below. 
382 Dem. 34.l8ff.; possibly Dem.27.51; Lys. 12.87; see too And. 1.7; Ant. 5.69ff.; [Arist.] 
Ath. 68.4, with Rhodes 1993; Dem. 48.45; Lys. 19.4; MacDowell 1978, 244; Todd 1990b, 
24. 
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precisely because women, children and slaves could not be sued that they were 
not pennitted to be witnesses. 383 Osborne argues that women were excluded as 
witnesses for fundamentally the same reasons as slaves, namely that their 
inclusion would 'allow them shares of honour' with male citizens, but Todd's 
perhaps juridically sounder and more pragmatic argument is reinforced by Plato, 
who suggests that women and slaves should be allowed to be witnesses if they 
could supply sureties to appear at a subsequent dike pseudomarturiOn. 384 Anyone 
convicted three times of giving false evidence was automatically disenfranchised, 
and in what MacDowell considers an interestingly humane measure, anyone who 
had been convicted twice was therefore made exempt from compulsion to 
testify.385 
Prior to ca. 380 B.C., witnesses delivered oral statements in front of the court; 
reforms from that date required them to swear to the truth of a written deposition 
which had been prepared previously, either personally or by the litigant himself. 
Demosthenes indicates that this change was intended to obviate any dispute in the 
event of a subsequent dike pseudomarturion, an argument which Bonner supports, 
though MacDowell views it as a measure that was probably meant to save court 
time or make the evidence easier to follow. 386 Clearly, this would have been an 
advantage, but Demosthenes', and Bonner's, arguments are bolstered by another 
and apparently contemporaneous reform, whereby litigants made their initial 
formal statements in writing: the two changes, taken together, imply a concern 
over verifiable and permanent evidence.387 Although witnesses were not cross-
examined on their evidence in any modem sense, they appear not to have been 
deterred from using their appearance to plead for compassion for the defendant on 
the basis of their own euergetism or eugeneia, a tendency which Lykourgos will 
deprecate specifically in respect of Leokrates' synegorOi.388 
383 Todd 1990b, 28, citing AntJ.a.7; Oem. 34.19,43.30,45.13; Is.12.4. 
384 R. Osborne 2000a, 79ff.; PI. Lg. 937a5-b3. 
385 MacDowell 1978, 245; citing Ant. 2 a.7; And. 1.74; Hyp. 2 (Phil). 12. 
386 Dem. 45.44f., 46.6; Bonner 1905, 46ff.; MacDowell 1978, 242f. See too Rhodes 
1980b, 315; Rhodes 1995b, passim. 
387 See too Calhoun 1919, 192, who dates the latter reform to 37817 B.C.; Gamer, 136-
140; Todd 1990b, 29 with n. 
388 See too Bonner and Smith, i. 353-362; Carawan 1983, passim; Humphreys 1985c, 
321f., 335ff.; Rubinstein 1998, 135-139; Rubinstein 2000, 212-231; §§135-137, 138-
140, 141-145, below. 
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AE'YE ~ p.apTlJpj~: Documents were read out in court by one person, probably 
elected for the purpose: this is true, at least, in the case of the Boule and the 
assembly and Rhodes notes that election makes sense since not everyone would 
be capable of performing such a function well, or sufficiently well. 389 Little real 
importance was attached to original documents; Bonner notes, indeed, that it was 
typical for Athenian courts rather to rely on witnesses; in the case of contracts, 
both litigants usually retained a copy for their own protection to preclude 
alterations, but the tendency generally to favour witnesses over documentation 
was clearly problematic when the witnesses were dead. 390 
Water clocks were stopped when evidence was read in private cases but the 
citation of testimony in public cases ate into the overall allocation of time in the 
measured-out day; Rhodes notes that although there are plentiful references to this 
practice in private suits, 'there are none in speeches in what are unquestionably 
public suits' .391 
Speakers addressed jurors twice in many, if not all, private cases as well as in 
homicide cases: prosecution and defence thus offered logoi proteroi and 
hysteroi.392 The length of the speeches depended upon the value of the case: in 
cases involving less than 1000 dr., five and two khoes were measured for logo; 
proteroi and hysteroi respectively; of between 1000 and 5000 dr., seven and two; 
and of more than 5000 dr., ten and three.393 Speakers therefore would have had 
between fifteen and thirty minutes per logos proteros and between six and nine 
minutes per logos hysteros, for it appears from the surviving Agora klepsydra that 
389 See [Arist.] Ath. 54.5, 67.3 with Rhodes 1993. 
390 Bonner 1905, 39ff., 54ff., 6lff., 64ff.; see too Humphreys 1985c, 323ff.; Garner, 136-
140; Thilr 1995, 326ff.; §§21-23(i), 23(ii)-24, 36-39, below. 
391 See [Arist.] Ath. 67.2f., with Rhodes 1993; Harrison 1968-1971, ii.162; MacDowell 
1978,250. 
392 See e.g. Ant. Tetralogies, & 6.14; Dem. 48.51; [Arist.] Ath. 67.2, with Rhodes 1993; 
Lipsius, iii. 910f.; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 16Of.; MacDowell 1978, 249. The situation in 
diadikasiai, private cases of disputed rights or obligations, is unclear. Dem. 43.8 implies 
two speeches, but [Arist.] Ath. 67.2 one only: Rhodes 1993,721, and MacDowell 1978, 
249, see a possible change of rule, though MacDowell also suggests different procedures 
for different types of claim. 
393 See [Arist.] Ath. 67.2, with Rhodes 1993; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 162; MacDowell 
1978,249; Carey 1997, 13f. 
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one measure was equivalent to three minutes. As MacDowell notes, however, it is 
unsafe to assume that every klepsydra would necessarily have had identically 
sized drainage holes, and Rhodes suggests that calculations based on hours of 
daylight in Poseideion, a winter month, indicate that four minutes per khous is 
possible.394 This makes a difference in private cases of between only seven and 
thirteen minutes in total speaking time, though the difference would be more 
significant in 'measured out days'. 
In public cases, litigants had only one attempt at persuasion. The day, known as 
~/aIkEIkET'P'YIIk€V"fJ TJlkfpa, was divided into three equal parts. The third section was 
allocated to the discussion of the penalty if a guilty verdict was secured, though if 
the case was an agon atimetos, the final third would clearly be superfluous. 395 
Rhodes notes a contradiction between the interpretations in Xenophon and 
Aiskhines of the function of the third part of the measured out day: Xenophon 
allocates it to the jurors, Aiskhines to the assessment of the penalty.396 There is 
not necessarily a conflict here, however, for not only is Xenophon relating an 
argument for a trial in the assembly, but his subject matter dates to 406 B.C., 
whereas Aiskhines is detailing practice in the Dikasteria of the late fourth century. 
Xenophon's description is also of a heated debate about highly irregular 
procedures, and in any case, might not accurately reflect what was actually said. It 
is, therefore, far from clear that Xenophon and Aiskhines are discussing the same 
thing. A change in practice cannot be ruled out, however, though it is difficult to 
see what changes could have been made that would account for the di fferent 
descriptions. 
There is also uncertainty over the water allocation for each party in these cases. 
Harrison suggests that Aiskhines shows that eleven amphoreis, i.e. 132 khoes 
were allocated to the defence alone.397 MacDowell, however, following Lipsius, 
argued that this figure was the allocation for the entire day, with one-third of the 
394 MacDowell 1978, 250; Rhodes 1993, 721, 726. 
395 Aiskhin. 3.197; [Arist.] Ath. 67.3, with Rhodes 1993. 
396 Xen. Hell. 1.7.23; Aiskhin. 3.197; Rhodes 1993, 722f.; Harp., Phot. Bibl. & Suda, s.v. 
~/04LEILET'P'YJ,uV7J ~Epa; MacDowell 1978,249; Worthington 1989, passim; MacDowell 
2000a, passim. 
397 Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 162, referring to Aiskhin. 2.126. 
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amount, i.e. 44 khoes, being awarded to the defence, an allocation of between 132 
and 176 minutes.398 He has since modified his argument, and 'now think[s] it 
more likely that ... equal shares of the day were allocated to the prosecutor, to the 
defendant, and to the speeches on the penalty'. 399 The share of eleven amphoreis 
appears, though, to be the natural reading of Aiskhines' KPIlIO/ULI and rrp6~ with the 
accusative, with the defence allocated a share in relation to the eleven amphoreis 
allowed for the whole day's sitting. Moreover, it is clear that if the equation of 
khoes to time allowed based on the surviving klepsydra is remotely accurate, 
speakers in public cases would have needed at least six and a half hours each for 
Harrison to be correct. An equation that allows for an allocation of between two to 
three hours each is far more credible, and would also fit much more neatly with 
Harrison's own suggested total day length of nine hours.4oo 
The length of penalty speeches poses a similar problem. Harrison interprets 
Aristotle as indicating that only half a khous was allocated, an amount that equates 
with one-fourteenth of the shortest total speaking time in private cases, namely 
five plus two khoes; this would allow only one and a half to two minutes. 
depending on a three or four minute allocation for each measure.401 MacDowell, 
however, whilst agreeing that Aristotle refers to one-half, argues that the text is 
severely corrupt at crucial points and that the reference may be to the actual 
speaking time allocated rather than the water allowance, particularly in view of 
Aiskhines' statement that a third of a day was granted for this part of the trial. 402 
This is plausible, and might have been the practice in both private and public 
cases where timesis was required, for Aristotle, having turned his attention to 
public cases in the middle of67.3 has not indicated that in 69.2 he has returned to 
discuss only private cases. Thus, anywhere from roughly ten (5 + 2 khoes x 3 
398 MacDowell 1978,249; see too Lipsius, iii. 915ff. 
399 MacDowe1l2000a, 565, replying to Worthington 1989, who suggests that some public 
prosecutions lasted for more than one day. 
400 Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 162; see too [Arist.] Ath. 67.3f., with Rhodes 1993; Hansen 
1991, 187f. If four minutes per khous is a correct calculation, the time for 132 khoes 
increases to nearly nine hours, which is still within the bounds of possibility, but leaves 
little room in a nine and a half hour day for distributing jurors, voting procedures etc. 
401 [Arist.] Ath. 69.2, with Rhodes 1993; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 166. Rhodes 1993,734, 
suggests that this is, in fact, a reference to the allowance for private cases. 
402 See MacDowell 1985, passim. See too MacDowell 1978,254; MacDowell 2000a, 565; 
Worthington 1989,passim. 
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minutes -:- 2) to twenty-six minutes (10 + 3 khoes x 4 minutes -:- 2) may have been 
allocated to speeches on the penalty in private cases, and in public agones tirnetoi, 
from around one to one and a half hours (44 x 3 or 4 minutes -:- 2). This does not 
seem unreasonable in view of the severity of the possible penalties, and it 
corresponds with Aiskhines' tripartite division of the day; it also accords, 
moreover, with the time he clearly assumes to exist for prosecutors to wait until 
their final speech before detailing their demands for penalties and requests for the 
jurors to be lenient, inappropriate matters with which, he argues, they fill their 
initial speeches.403 
§§21-23(i). METa. min-a. TO;lIW ... a.vrolJ Tra.TP;ao, fJ,ETO'KWlJ: Lykourgos resumes his 
narrative and moves on to set the scene for the further evidence he will now 
present: the extent to which he paves the way for this evidence, however, suggests 
that it is, somehow, insufficient in some respects.404 
Lykourgos' comments here are also indicative of the timing of his prosecution. 
Leokrates is said to have been away from Athens for over five years; it appears, 
later, that he was, in fact, away for a total of six years, for five of which he 
conducted trade from Megara.405 Presumably, the extra year is accounted for by 
his stay in Rhodes before his fabrication was discovered, and allows for a time 
before which Leokrates could not have traded with Kleopatra, though Lykourgos 
will also claim that the defendant was absent for a total of eight years.406 His 
return to Athens, therefore, can tentatively be dated to 332 B.C., and it is clear that 
Lykourgos did not begin his prosecution before this date, for he explicitly states 
that he was forced to initiate his eisangelia by the sight of Leokrates barging into 
the agora, and the possibility of his participation in cults and sacrifices, and public 
403 Aiskhin. 3.198; see too Oem. 30.32. 
404 See §23(ii)-24, below. 
405 See §§55-58, below. Nothing is known of Leokrates' patron in Megara. Apparently, 
however, the requirement for metics to have a prostates was not restricted to Athens: see 
too §§36-39, below. 
406 See §§26-27, 43-45, 141-145, below. 
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. . 407 
spaces which should be reserved for unpolluted and honourable cItIzens. 
Lykourgos probably initiated his eisangelia, therefore, sometime in 331, with the 
case coming to court in 330 B.c.408 
1Ca.; oVrw~ a.Vrou ICa.Tf'Y!lWlCfl ••• 1Ca.; TOVroJII UP.'II ~ IJAPTlJpia.t;: Amyntas, Antigenes 
and Timochares cannot be identified in the sources, though Lykourgos' comments 
at least demonstrate that Leokrates had two sisters.409 A Lysikles of the deme 
Leuconoe is, however, mentioned by Hypereides: the reference may allow a 
tentative identification, for Hypereides' Lysikles also receives documents 
confirming an agreement relating to a sale, though whether he is doing so as a 
friend, or a banker, or in another capacity, is unclear.410 
407 §§5--6, above. 
408 There seems little reason to conceive a delayed prosecution, whether in the context of 
the loss of all hope for Athens or as a vexatious prosecution: Burke 1977. 337f.; Will, 
102. There is equally little reason to conceive a prosecution immediately upon Leokrates' 
return: Hansen 1975, 108 #121. 
409 Amyntas: PA 745; LGPN ii. 26 #1; Antigenes: PA 994; LGPN ii. 34 #57. Timochares: 
PA 13832; LGPN ii. 433 #1. 
4\0 Hyp. 3 (Ath). 9; see too Millett 1991, 139 n.16; §§21-23(ii), below. 
~ 97 ~ §§23(ii)-24 
§§23(ii)-35. 
The second transitional #LE)I 01))1 moves the speech on to specific evidence from 
interested parties to the facts that Lykourgos has just presented.411 The contractual 
nature of the argument in this section is supplemented by the inclusion of the 
written challenge to slave torture issued to Leokrates, which was refused. It is, 
therefore, significant that Lykourgos incorporates into this section argument and 
detail of alleged crimes for which he has no evidence whatsoever. 
§§23(ii)-24. e; ,uv OW 'W~ ~a.II~ ••• Tp,Q,KOvra. ILIIWlIt Ka.; ~ t1'V1I67iK~: 
Lykourgos first presents evidence for his claim that Leokrates' house and slaves 
were bought by the husband of his elder sister, Amyntas.412 It is not possible to 
recover the nature of this evidence, but it is not unreasonable to sunnise that it 
was a statement by Antigenes, whose function was probably to act as witness to 
the agreement that Amyntas would pay one talent for his brother-in-Iaw's 
property.413 
The second item of evidence concerns the claim that Amyntas paid off Leokrates' 
debts and loans, paying what was left from one talent to the defendant. Since 
Amyntas is said to have paid forty minas in honour of debts and loans, it can be 
inferred that Leokrates actually received twenty minas from Amyntas. The 
evidence which Lykourgos produces, however, relates specifically to the receipt 
by Philomelos and Menelaos of forty minas from Amyntas himself. Too little is 
known about these two individuals for any identification to be made, and it is 
unclear whether their loans had been made as bankers or in a private capacity; it is 
also impossible to know whether the actual evidence produced comprises their 
statements, or documents concerning the transaction.414 Clearly, however, the 
411 , ... tru . d . 37 b IkElI OVlI s cture: mtro uctlOn, ,a ove. 
412 §§21-23(i), above. 
413 See too introduction, 39 n.142, above; §20, above. 
414 Philomelos: PAIAPF 14671; LGPNii.457 #10; not the same individual mentioned by 
Isok. 15.93 (PAIAPF 14670; LGPN ii.457 #28). Menelaos: PAIAPF 9963; LGPNii. 306 
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extent to which it confirmed the debt as that of Leokrates, whether partly or 
entirely, is unknown, and perhaps even questionable, for since Arnyntas himself 
was dead, he was unable to contradict the prosecutor's claims. 
The third piece of evidence is intended to demonstrate that Amyntas resold the 
slaves to Timochares of Achamae, Leokrates' other brother-in-law by marriage to 
his younger sister. The evidence comprises Timochares' own statement and the 
agreement, lodged with Lysikles, which detailed the transaction whereby 
Timochares paid 35 minas to Amyntas, belatedly and with interest.415 Again, 
however, the evidence is not necessarily straightforward, for whether it 
specifically identified the slaves as those who originally belonged to Leokrates 
can also be questioned; it may have documented no more than a private agreement 
relating to a transaction between the two brothers-in-law which had nothing 
whatsoever to do with Leokrates. Its relevance would therefore be extremely 
suspect, as might the previous item, and it is perhaps this characteristic that 
induces Lykourgos to pave the way for it so extensively, and to follow it almost 
immediately with emotive, but notably unsupported, allegations.416 
§25. Trull pD ~(JfJJ)) tiKwr}KOa.'rE ••• ~II ME,),a.pEWII 'n'oA'1I E;8,op£vo,~: Lykourgos 
here adduces Leokrates' removal of his ancestral images to Megara to his charge 
of prodosia. It is, as Parker notes, a little inconsistent to call this treachery, for it 
could be taken to indicate a devotion which Lykourgos does well to attempt to 
negate.417 None the less, the pity he incites for the defendant's ancestors is 
#6); not the same individual mentioned by Dem. 4.27 (PA 9961). See too Calhoun 1926, 
81-131; Hasebroek 1933, 14f., 85f.; Pringsheim, 46f.; Bogaert 1968, 332; Isager and 
Hansen, 88f., 96f.; Millett 1983, passim; Humphreys 1985c, 327ff.; Bogaert 1986, 24-29; 
E.E. Cohen, 14-18; Todd 1993,250-257; Shipton, 417-421. 
415 See §§21-23(i), above; see too Pringsheim, 130f., 245f.; Bogaert 1968,373. Finley 
1952, 215 n.60, notes that verbal agreements were common, and that this item of 
evidence represents one of the few written ones. Millett 1991, 138f., suggests that this 
'formality' might reflect 'the remoteness of the connection' between Amyntas and 
Timokhares, though Amyntas' readiness to accept a deferred payment with interest 
implies a substantial income-earning potential on his investment. See too Millett 1990, 
175-182. 
416 See §§20, 21-23(i), above, 26-27, below. 
417 Parker 1996,251; see too §§5-6, 8,17-18, above, 94-97,135-137, below. 
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manipulated into disgust by the presentation of their images as exiles, of 
Leokrates' disregard for their need for a patron in Megara, and by their lack of 
choice in their removal, a contrast with the defendant which is unmistakable.418 
Since Leokrates left the bronze statue of his father behind, it is likely that the 
images which he did remove were portable. Such small anthropomorphic votive 
figurines could represent both deities and their worshippers, and Burkert suggests 
that anathemata were placed in temple precincts in the same way that large 
statues were set up by individuals who wanted to give expression to what they 
considered to have been a special connection with a god.419 He also notes how 
'the pious act of dedication is thereby transfonned into an act of public 
ostentation', with the individual creating his own memoria1.42o The removal of 
this mnema is, therefore, an affront not only to those ancestors depicted in the 
votive images, nor just to the gods in whose precincts they were established, but 
to the polis which housed those precincts and which had bestowed fame and 
honour only to see its gifts summarily rejected. 
§§26-27. 1Ca.' 0; ,uv TW/rEpe, ... a.Vrfj ,wAIIi wi} f'YICa.TQ)..;TrWIT/: This passage has been 
much emended, but the sense is reasonably clear: the city was named in honour of 
the patron deity Athene so that those who honoured the goddess would equally 
honour and protect her eponymous city. Welwei suggests that the name, deriving 
from 'ein vorgriechisches Sprachsubstrat ... , HiBt sich aber nicht befriedigend 
erkHiren'.421 Burkert argues that the goddess' Athena' is 'more properly Athenaia, 
Ionian Athenaie, Attic Athena, shortened in epic to Athene': he notes that 'whether 
the goddess is named after the city or the city after the goddess is an ancient 
dispute, though since -ene is a typical place-name suffix ... the goddess most 
probably takes her name from the city' .422 For Burkert, the unifying factor is 'the 
force of civilization', and Athene clearly seems to represent an amalgamation 
418 See too Humphreys 1985c, 350; Antonaccio, 263; Millett 1998, 204ff. 
419 Burkert, 92ff. 
420 Burkert, 93. 
421 Welwei 1992, 1 n.l; see too P6tscher, 160-177. 
422 Burkert, 139; see too Nilsson 1949, 26ff.; Nilsson 1950, 490--501. 
-100 - §§26-27 
encapsulating all the desirable elements of Athenian life; perhaps, as Pomeroy 
suggests, she is 'the most complex of the goddesses ... [whose] activities are 
better documented than those of other goddesses since she plays an important role 
in the works ofHomer,.423 
A ' ~'" , " "~-..' TT1. .. LJ KI d h fWKpa,~ 0 Ovrf JIOI£'#UlJlI ••• fO'IT"11'YE' Kal EKE'~ EI, J.VJpnIf101l: eopatra, aug ter 
of Philip II and Olyrnpias, and sister of Alexander III, was married to Olympias' 
brother, Alexander of Epeiros. Although Epeiros was a Greek-speaking monarchy 
like Macedon, it was dependent upon Macedon, for after Neoptolemos, Olyrnpias' 
father, had died, his brother, Arybbas, had attempted to seize power: only Philip's 
intercession had established Alexander on the Epeirot throne.424 Philip himself, 
however, had every reason to avoid dispute with Epeiros since the territory 
represented access to the Corinthian gulf and to western Greece, and it is probably 
in the context of a strategic alliance that he gave his daughter as wife to Alexander 
in an attempt to pour oil on the waters troubled by his own new marriage to 
another Kleopatra, variously described as the daughter, niece or ward of the 
Macedonian general Attalos.425 
Those waters were indeed severely troubled, for at the celebration of Philip and 
Kleopatra's wedding in 337/6 RC., the bride's father had apparently prayed for a 
legitimate heir. Alexander III, purportedly furious at the slight to his mother's 
decency, but more obviously concerned at the threat to his own monarchic 
ambitions, narrowly avoided a lethal quarrel with Philip and removed himself and 
his mother to Epeiros.426 The birth of a son to Philip's new wife might in one 
respect have played into Olyrnpias' hands, in that it provided a justification to 
Alexander III and Alexander of Epeiros for her machinations. Philip was fatally 
attacked at the Epeirot Alexander's marriage to Kleopatra at Pel1a in 336 B.C., 
purportedly by a certain Pausanias, an obscure figure who seems to have been 
423 Burkert, 141; Pomeroy, 4. 
424 See Oem. 1.13; Just. 7.6.10ff., 8.6.3ff.; GHlii.173; Hammond 1967a, 554; Hammond 
1989,33; Hammond 1994,436-443; Davies 2000, 244f. with n.36. 
425 See Busolt 1920-1926, ii. 1470-1477; Berve, i. 3-7; Hammond 1967a, 533f.; 
Hammond and Griffith, 214f., 677f.; Errington 1990, 35-102. 
426 Athen. 13.5.23-30; Plut. Alex. 9.4ff.; Hammond and Griffith, 153,215,675-698; 
Errington 1990, 44f. 
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wronged by Attalos, and whose grievances had not been redressed by Philip. 
Whatever the truth of Philip's death, Olympias had obtained the succession for 
her son and revenge for her own displacement.427 Alexander of Epeiros himself 
was murdered by a Lucanian exile in Pandosia in 331 B.c., but Kleopatra acted as 
regent whilst he was at war in Italy fighting for Tarentum, whose former 
champion, Arkhidamos, had been killed.428 
Ka.;TOI, cL Q,1I,)pe, ... TO', ae,IlO', OP'YI~OIJ.EVOI: Notably, Lykourgos does not offer the 
jurors any evidence of the charge that Leokrates dealt in com from Megara, even 
though the transport of grain to places other than Athens was deemed a 
sufficiently severe offence to be classified as a capital charge. The law expressly 
stated that any Athenian citizens or metics resident in Athens might not import 
grain to any market except that of Athens, nor lend to finance the import of grain 
to any other market; indeed, of that com imported into the Peiraieus, two-thirds 
had to be transported into the asty itself. Prosecutions for infringement of these 
laws were brought before the epimeletai tou emporiou, the supervisors of the 
emporion who were also responsible for ensuring the compliance of dealers with 
the requirement to deliver two-thirds of grain imports into the city.429 
Aristotle reports that there had once been ten com guardians, sitophylakes, five of 
whom were based in the Peiraieus and five in the city, but that their numbers had 
been increased to twenty in the city and fifteen in the harbour. Their 
responsibilities included ensuring that unground com was sold fairly, that millers 
sold the grain in accordance with the price they had paid for the raw ingredients, 
that the bakers sold their bread in accordance with the price they had, in tum, paid 
for the wheat, and that their loaves were of the weight prescribed by the 
sitophylakes.43o These com laws were clearly strictly observed, and the patent 
concern with the supply of grain clearly underpinned the discussions of the matter 
427 See too Pomeroy, 122; Ellis 1976,211-217; Hammond 1989,34,61,139,175; 
Hammond and Walbank, 1-12; Carney, 358f. 
428 See Aiskhin. 3.242; Livy 8.24; see too Hammond 1967a, 557f.; Hamilton 1982, 
passim; Talbert, 161; Davies 2000, 257, with 248 (05). 
429 [Arist.] Ath. 51.4, with Rhodes 1993; Oem. 34.37, 35.50f., 56.3,10; Wilamowitz 1893, 
i. 219ff., ii. 374ff.; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 27, 221; MacDowell 1978, 157f.; Salmon, 
128ff., 159; Garnsey 1988,139-142; Stroud 1998, 104ff. 
430 [Arist.] Ath. 5l.1-3, with Rhodes 1993. See too Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 26. 
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which were allocated to each kyrios assembly.43J Changes were made in the range 
of the duties of the sitophylakes and the epimeletai in the fourth century. A 
currency law of 375/4 B.C. implies that under contemporary practice, the 
sitophylakes were responsible for both wholesale and retail trade in corn; by 
Aristotle's time, however, these duties were split between them, the change 
perhaps occurring during a period of severe shortage and being enacted at the 
same time as the increase in the sitophylakes' numbers and the introduction of the 
law whereby two-thirds of grain was required to be allocated directly to the 
asty.432 
Lykourgos' lack of evidence for these charges is suspicious, and may explain 
what appears to be a rejection of the capital charge of illegal trade: perhaps there 
was no evidence at all for these activities. It is conceivable, however, that he was 
attempting to involve Leokrates in a 'Catch-22' trap, whereby the only defence 
against prodosia was to admit to such a charge. Such a manoeuvre could not work 
in reverse, since a denial of trade would not automatically result in an admission 
of treason. In any case, through such a manipulation of a likely defence argument, 
Lykourgos is able to make a pre-emptive strike and claim simultaneously that 
Leokrates did not leave Athens to trade, that he traded illegally from Megara, and 
that any defence which rests upon the claim that the initial departure was 
motivated by trade should be dismissed on the grounds that such conduct was 
illegal and itself carried an automatic death penalty which should be enforced by 
the jury for these alternative charges.433 
§§28-30. Ka.i TQ,Vra, ~' .0. Ka.; IUJ' AE'YE TQ,VrrJlI: Lykourgos implies that he has 
already shown his good character in the prosecution of the case; Leokrates, 
conversely, is demonstrably and thoroughly to be distrusted, and his witnesses 
undermined by guilt by association.434 Notably, Lykourgos has immediately 
431 See [Arist.] Ath. 43.4, with Rhodes 1993; Dem. 20.32f., 34.37, 56. passim; Lys. 22. 
passim. 
432 See Stroud 1974, passim. See too Xen. Por. 3.3, with Gauthier 1976. 
433 See too §§55-58, below. Other calls for death penalty: §§8, above, 43-45, 46-51, 52-
54,66-67,77-78,79, 120-121,123,133-134,141-145,below. 
434 See too §§20, above, 138-140, below. 
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drawn attention away from the conjectural nature of the charges of illegal trade in 
§§26-27, and the fact that he has only his original witnesses to provide a 
supposed verification of his allegations, and moves on to a typically emotive 
discussion of his written challenge of the defendant to produce his slaves for 
torture, 'TTp6KA"fJ(J'I~. Whether issued in writing, or orally, challenges were made in 
the presence of witnesses, stating which slaves were to be tortured, what questions 
would be asked, and how the torture should be applied and by whom: normally 
the torturer was the basanistes, an appointed official, but one of the litigants 
themselves might also undertake the procedure.435 
'AKOVfT£ cL ;;'1I~pE) T'ij) 'TTPOKA~CJJ' ••• TOD a.VrWII ~fO"7r6-roIi Ka.~V(J'a.IITO: Dorj ahn 
notes that slave evidence from torture never appears in any suits from extant 
forensic oratory of fifth- and fourth-century Athens. Conversely, evidence 
preserved in Valerius Maximus demonstrates that evidence extracted by torture 
was used in Rome. Dorjahn thus concludes that since this evidence was clearly 
not trusted, and since Greek courts were no more gullible than Roman ones, and 
indeed Greek slaves were no more trustworthy than their Roman counterparts, 
Athenian sources cannot be taken at face value when they attach paramount 
. I· 436 Importance to s ave testImony. 
Aristotle offers a rhetorical explanation for what Todd calls 'so much noise and so 
little action': torture is one of five pisteis atekhnoi which, he argues, ~oKoD(J'I TO 
, " " , 437 F Ari I b d 
'TTIfJ'TOII, OTI Q.1IQ.'YK"fJ TI~ 'TTPO(J'EfJ'TIII. or stot e, arguments can e generate to 
demonstrate both that it provides the only true evidence, and that it is of no value 
whatsoever because slaves would say anything just to please their torturers, or to 
incriminate their owners for past maltreatment. This was also expressly noted by 
orators themselves; thus despite frequent complaints about the freedom of speech 
granted to Athenian slaves, and examples of close relations between masters and 
servants, it was held to be dangerous to allow them to be in receipt of information 
435 See Ant. 1. 1 Of.; Ar. Ran. 615-630; Oem. 37.40ff., 45.61,54.28, 59.123f.; Isok. 
17.15f.; Lys. 7.34ff.; see too Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 147-150; MacDowell 1978, 245ff. 
436 Dorjahn 1952, passim, citing Val. Max. Facta et Dicta Mem. 8.4.1-3. See too Dem. 
30.37; Is. 8.12; Isok. 17.54; Harrison 1968-1971, ii, 147; Soubie 1973,226-238. 
437 Ar· Rh 1St. et. 1376b31-1377a7; Todd 1990b, 34. See too §20, above. 
-104 - §§28-30 
which might give them a hold over their masters should they ever be subjected to 
such close scrutiny.438 
A challenge, proklesis, thus appears to have been accepted on only two of forty-
two known occasions, the remainder meeting a flat rejection: notably, on these 
two occasions, the challenge was not carried OUt.439 Todd argues that torture was, 
in any case, only carried out on slaves who were guilty parties, and never in cases 
where they were only witnesses, though MacDowell cites three examples where 
this is clearly not SO.440 The evidence is none the less minimal, a factor which 
Headlam interpreted as resulting from the fact that its use obviated a hearing in 
court.44I Thompson, however, responded that this explanation did not account for 
the appearance of arrangements for the production of slave testimony, and most 
scholars have subsequently rejected Headlam's analysis.442 Thilr has argued 
convincingly, moreover, that most references in the orators can in any case be 
taken with a large pinch of salt as rhetorical posturing.443 Todd agrees: it is not 
only patently nonsensical to claim that 'witnesses have often been convicted of 
perjury, but slaves under torture have never been shown to be lying', it is also 
tautologous, because 'there is no procedural opportunity whereby the statements 
of slaves could be tested' .444 
It was the procedure itself, therefore, or more precisely the rhetorical advantage 
arising from it, that was at the root of the importance attached to issuing a 
438 Arist. Rhet. 1377a3-5; see too Ant. 5.29ff.; Lys 7.34ff.; Lys.7.16, 34f. [Xen.] Ath. 
1.10; Hunter 1994, 71-89; Allen 2000a, 109ff. Slaves none the less protected from 
hybristic abuse: Aiskhin. 1.17; Oem. 21.46. 
439 Oem. 37.4~; Isok. 17.13-17; see too Todd 1990b, 33f. 
440 Todd 1990b, 33f. with n.25; MacDowell 1978, 246, citing And.l.64; Lyk.l.l12; 
POxy, 2686. See too Todd 1990b, 34 n.26, who argues that the cases cited by MacDowell 
are instances of judicial, rather than evidentiary, torture; §§112-115, below. 
441 Headlam 1893, passim. 
442 C.Y. Thompson,passim; See too Headlam 1894, passim; Bonner 1905,72; Lipsius, iii. 
889 n.91; Thiir 1977, 205-214, 310; Todd 1990b, 34; Gagarin 1996, 5ff. Johnstone, 74f., 
and Mirhady 2000,54, argue for Headlam's view, and Johnstone suggests that the idea 
that 'acceptance of a dare terminated a legal claim most economically accounts for the 
complete absence of the evidence from any completed oaths or tortures introduced as the 
result of a dare'. 
443 Thiir 1977, 269ff.; see too Gagarin 1996, passim, for whom the references to basanos 
are a legal fiction whereby the evidence of slaves could be introduced into court. 
444 ThOr 1977,310; Todd 1990b, 35; see too Ant.2.~.7. 
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challenge which was almost certain to be rejected. It was a loaded weapon for 
litigants, who could either claim the manifest and admitted guilt of the party 
refusing to submit his slaves to torture, or the moral and legal high ground of the 
person issuing the rejected challenge. Conversely, a litigant might offer his slaves 
for torture only to be rejected by his opponent, which supports the interpretation 
of the challenge as intentionally refusable: it was precisely because it might result 
in compelling, irrefutable and unwelcome evidence that it was undesirable to both 
sides.445 It is, therefore, not unreasonable to presume that Lykourgos' own, 
unpreserved, challenge was phrased in such a way. 
Johnstone takes issue with Todd's connection of challenge and information, and 
argues that dares should not be seen as having anything at all to do with providing 
evidence. For Johnstone, the discrepancy between frequency of dares and 
insistence on their value, and the lack of of evidence that challenges should have 
yielded has resulted in the paradoxical conclusion that a process for introducing 
evidence was never, or almost never, used for this purpose at all: he suggests that 
dares are, rather, a legal fiction intended to impart 'evidentiary authority on a 
claim' .446 This does not seem, however, intrinsically to invalidate Todd's 
argument, for rhetorical advantage could be gained whether the underlying 
intention of the dare was to provide information or to invest a charge with 
authority, or indeed both. Todd, indeed, accepts that scholarship has emphasized 
either the 'dispute resolution' or 'information provision' interpretations, but does 
not fully agree with Johnstone's exploration of 'the challenge as ritual of 
authority' .447 Like Thtir, Todd sees the process more as a socio-political one: thus 
the very possibility of torture emphasized the difference in status between slave 
and free and performed a powerful social function independent of the ostensible 
aim.448 Todd notes, indeed, that the overwhelming implication of the evidence is 
that there was little, if any, real interest in what the slave actually had to say. 
445 Thlir 1977,233-61; Todd 1990b, 35f. Dike blabes perhaps possible against 
transgressor of broken proklesis agreement: Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 148[. 
446 Johnstone, 86[. 
447 Todd 2001 ,passim. 
448 Todd 1990b, 27ff., 32-36; see too Bonner 1905, 31f., 67ff., 73f.; Leisi, 20-26; 
Harrison 1968-1971, i.166-177; Soubie 1973,226; MacDowe111978, 245ff.; Hunter 
1994,89-94, 133[f., 154-173; Hunter 2000,passim. 
-106 - §§3t-35 
§§31-35. xwp;~ , TOIIIW , TOIJTWII 
Lykourgos is again at pains to distance himself from possible allegations of 
sykophantia, but is himself guilty of the quibbling which he attributes to 
sykophantai.449 Despite his claim that he was prepared to risk damaging his case 
by accepting the testimony of Leokrates' slaves even though they would probably 
have defended their master, he proceeds to argue that torture results in completely 
trustworthy testimony which would have proved his charges. 
The herald's curse appears to be lost, but Demosthenes refers to its 
pronouncement at each Ekklesia and Boule meeting; it was probably dictated to 
the herald who made the official pronouncement: this, at least, was one of 
Aiskhines' roles as a functionary of the ekklesia and Boule.450 The curse was 
parodied in Aristophanes' Thesmophoriazusai and may have called upon the 
Olympian, Pythian, Delian and other gods to curse the individual, and his 
household, who planned harm to the demos, was guilty of Medism, or was 
attempting to establish a tyranny or overthrow the democracy.45I Lykourgos is 
setting up a characterization of Leokrates as anti-democrat and would-be tyrant 
that he will make explicit in the latter part of the speech.452 For the moment, 
however, he is concerned to round off his discussion of details specific to the 
defendant, and to pave the way for a much more generalized, but extremely 
emotive, treatment of the impact of Leokrates' behaviour. 
449 Sykophantia: §§ 11-13, above. Foreknowledge of defence arguments: §§ 14--15, above, 
55-58, below. 'Everybody knows' topos: §§93, 104-107, below. 
450 Oem. 19.70. 
451 Ar. Thes. 331-351. Lykourgos' use of ~Ik€~ may be an allusion to other speakers in a 
team who are engaged to prosecute different aspects of the eisangelia: see too §§3 with 
n.179, 19, above. 
452 See §§ 124--127, below. 
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§§36--54 
The third transitionall1-€v oi5v shifts the focus of the speech from the alleged crime 
of the defendant, to the circumstances in which it was committed.453 The new 
section introduces a decree of the demos, and a narrative account of the reaction in 
Athens to the defeat at Khaironeia. A eulogy to those who died in that battle 
follows, being presented, effectively, as an epitaphios in its own right, and as a 
stark contrast to any description that could be applied to the defendant's 
behaviour. The section ends with examples of juridical precedents which will be 
balanced by precedents from history and ancient history in § § 11 0-123. 
§§36-39. IIEp; ,uli oOv ~ 1rPOK'}..i}uE~ ••• ~ 1r0A'~ Ka.; ~ xwpa.: The transcript of 
Hypereides' decree which Lykourgos requests the clerk to read would have been 
supplied to the court personally, for litigants were themselves responsible for 
gathering evidence for the trial and for securing whatever copies of laws or 
decrees they deemed necessary.454 As MacDowell notes, however, 'we do not 
hear of any procedure for checking that the text which he brought was 
accurate' .455 It is likely, although the evidence is extremely poor, that documents 
for disputes which did not involve public arbitration could be gathered by the 
prosecutor up to and including the date of the trial; this would, at least, be in line 
with the encouragements and lack of discouragements given to prosecutors in 
such cases.456 
Members of the Boule, together with the unfit, were granted military exemption, 
ao-rpa.'rEia.: so too, however, were lessees of the pentekoste. Leokrates would, 
453 , " . d . 37 b I'fV OIJV structure: mtro uctlon, ,a ove. 
454 See too §20, above. Hypereides' decrees: §§ 16, above, 40-41, below. Demos' decree 
after Khaironeia: §§S2-S4, below. 
455 MacDowe111978, 242; see too Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 134f. 
456 Evidence was otherwise sealed into a container at arbitration, and any proofs 
subsequently produced were inadmissable. See too [Arist.] Ath. 53.1-5, with Rhodes 
1993; Dem. 39.17, 45.57f.; Bonner 1905, 48ff.; Lipsius, iii. 838; Bonner and Smith, i. 
283ff.; Dorjahn 1935, 274ff.; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 18-21,64--68, 97f., 10lf.; 
MacDowe111978, 207-211; Humphreys 1985c, 321; Garner, 136-140; Todd 1993,129; 
Rhodes 1995b, 305ff.; Allen 2000a, 42, 317-322; §§2, 3, 20, above, 128-132, below. 
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therefore, himself have been astrateutos at the time of the crisis, for Lykourgos' 
remarks imply that despite the 'state of emergency' reflected by Hypereides' 
emergency decree, such dispensations, at least in the case of Bouleutai, remained 
unaffected.457 Lykourgos' depiction of the armed Councillors going to the 
Peiraieus despite their own military exemption is, however, rhetorically and 
emotively pre-emptive: Leokrates would have found it harder to play on his own 
excused status when the Councillors had surrendered their own, and particularly 
when the jurors have been reminded that Phyrkinos charged Leokrates with 
damaging the pentekoste which provided that exemption. 
Ka;-rol KaT' EKE;JlOIJ~ ••• Ep.'rrpoo&v XPOJlO/~ ErrlaE~KW~: Metics were resident aliens 
who had set up home in Athens, a privilege for which they were liable to the 
metoikion, a tax levied at the rate of 12 dr. per annum.458 They were required to 
register with a prostates, or guarantor, a procedure known as JlEll-flll 7TPOflTO:T'7}l1, 
and failure to do so or to pay the metoikion could result in being sold into 
slavery.459 Harpokration suggests that metics were legally registered within a 
short period of time of their arrival, though he does not define the period. 
MacDowell, however, argues that this is not certain, and that metic status may 
have been determined by the setting up of a household.460 
The function of the prostates is also unclear: he may have been responsible for no 
more than a character reference at the time of registration, but his sponsorship 
may have had longer-lasting effects. MacDowell notes that there is no evidence 
whatsoever for any continuing responsibility, and suggests that the ancient 
grammarians' arguments for guarantors needing to speak on behalf of their 
457 Dem. 39.16, 59.27; see too MacDowell 1978, 160; §§ 16, 19, above. 
458 See [Arist.] Ath. 58.2, with Rhodes 1993; Dem. 25.57; Harrison 1968-1971, i. 187-
199; MacDowell 1978, 76f. See too Clerc, 15-22; Whitehead 1977, 75ff.; Whitehead 
1986, 82ff.; Garland 2001, 64f., 109; Roy 1998, 196f. Foreigners who intended to trade in 
Athens were also subject to the xenika: Dem. 57.31-34. Grant of isoteleia, liability only 
to taxes payable by citizens: Dem. 20.29; Harp. S.v. 'IuOTEA7}~ Ka; ;UOT€AEla; Xen. Hell. 
2.4.25; Harrison 1968-1971, i. 189; MacDowell 1978, 78. 
459 The legal framework for enslavement for having no sponsor was provided by the 
r~ Q,1rpOUTaulov: see Arist. Pol. 1275aI1-14; Harp. s.v. Q,7fpOUTau/ov, ILETO/KIOIl, 
7fpoUTa1"l1~; Hesykh. s.v. Q,7fPOUT(UT/OV, ~TOIKOI, 7fpOUTaTOV; Isok. 8.53; Phot. S.V.lLfTOIKIOIl; 
Pollux 8.35, 99; Suda, S.V.lLfTO/KIOIl, 1I€lLf/ll7fpoUTa1"l111, nWA'l'}n7~ Kat nwA'l'}Ta/; Lipsius, ii. 
370 n.5; Harrison 1968-1971, i. 165; MacDowe111978, 77f. 
460 Harp. s. v. ILfTO/KIOIl; MacDowell 1978, 77. 
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charges in any legal proceedings are wrong, the result of mistaken comparisons 
with the patron us in Roman law.461 Harrison, however, argues that this may have 
been precisely the case in the fifth century but that the practice could have fallen 
into disuse in the fourth as metics came to represent themselves in legal 
proceedings, a change which he attributes to Athens' increasing influence as a 
commercial centre and a great increase in the number of metics. He notes that 
Lysias' speech against Eratosthenes was delivered in special circumstances and 
with the exception of those circumstances, Lysias was required to speak through 
the mouth of his prostates.462 For Whitehead, however, there was no occasion on 
which a metic had to be represented by in court by a prostates, though the 
relationship between the pair was lasting, even permanent. 463 
The question, as Harrison notes, 'must be regarded as still open', though he 
plausibly argues that since it is 'difficult to envisage circumstances in which a 
man could have laid himself open to' a 'Ypac/YY} a7Tpou-raulou, in view of the fact that 
the registration procedure which must have existed could only have been 
circumvented by the complicity of Athenian officials, the germane offence must 
have been of wider-ranging consequence.464 The responsibility of the prostates, 
however, may have been no more than a legal liability for any penalty which a 
metic incurred: sureties, €-r'YU'YITai, could at least be required by a prosecutor 
whose case was against a metic.465 An on-going function, indeed, perhaps arose 
from fears of metics purporting to be citizens, a crime for which enslavement 
might again be imposed.466 
461 MacDowell 1978, 78; see too Harrison 1968-1971, i. 190r. 
462 Harrison 1968-1971, i. 19lff.; see too [Arist.] Ath. 58.2-3, with Rhodes 1993; 
Harrison 1968-1971, i. 193-199; MacDowell 1978, 220-234. Metics' access to courts as 
synegoroi: Rubinstein 2000,18 with n.l0, 47-50. 
463 Whitehead 1977, 90-96, largely accepting the view of P. Gauthier, 'Les xenoi dans les 
textes atMniens de la second moitie du ye siecle avo J-C', REG 84 (1971) 44-79. 
464 Harrison 1968-1971, i. 192f. See too MacDowell 1978, 77f.; Rhodes 1993, 497; 
Hunter 2000, 15-23; Patterson,passim. 
465 See Oem. 24.131 f.; Isok.17 .12; MacDowell 1978, 76. 
466 The legal framework was provided by the 'YPa</YfJ ;fll;~: [Arist.] Ath. 59.3, with Rhodes 
1993; Oem. 40.41 f., 49.66, 59.52; Hesykh. S.V. ;fll;~ aiK'1}; Lys. 13.60; Harrison 1968-
1971, ii. 24, 193 n.l; Todd 1993, 139, 174 n.9, 18If. 
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Lykourgos' remarks imply that metics were believed to feel less passionately 
about their new home city than its citizens did; this is unsurprising perhaps, not 
least in view of the restrictions placed upon them with regard to property 
ownership and marriage.467 Patterson suggests that the metic's lack of 'connection 
to the Athenian land or to Athenian household and kinship structures ... 
jeopardized the exercise of legal privilege and fostered the creation of the topos of 
the rootless metic whose loyalty and services might be held up to rebuke the 
wayward citizen, but whose crimes clearly revealed the dangers of the "xenos 
within'" .468 They were, none the less, expected to provide at least an outward 
appearance of devotion, as well as military service, and it is clear from 
Hypereides' prosecution speech against Athenogenes that the law provided for the 
summary arrest of a metic who had departed in war-time and returned when the 
crisis had passed.469 
It is, however, unclear whether this law, not mentioned in any other source, 
applied before Khaironeia or whether it was passed in the state of emergency 
which followed the defeat. It is possible that it pre-dated 338 B.C., since 
Athenogenes' departure occurred before the battle, though Hypereides delivered 
the speech between 330 and 324 B.C., and it is possible that Hypereides was 
misleading the jurors, or assuming that their knowledge had been dimmed by the 
passage of time. Certainly the atmosphere in which the demos forbade citizens to 
depart would provide a context for its institution after the defeat.470 None the less, 
this outward appearance of loyalty, Lykourgos implies, was more even than 
Leokrates, a full citizen, was able to supply. There is, therefore, a rationale for the 
unsupported claim that Leokrates was turned out by everyone he approached in 
his self-imposed exile: a citizen who fled the peril faced by his own polis would 
certainly not be expected to face danger for one to which, as a metic, he owed less 
allegiance. 471 
467 See Oem. 34.3 7, 36.6; Xen. Por. 2.5f., with Gauthier 1976; Harrison 1968-1971, i. 
24ff.; MacDowell 1978, 75f., 87. 
468 Patterson, 94; see too Whitehead 1977, 69f.; Allen 2000a, 107ff. 
469 Hyp. 3 (Ath.). 29,33, with Whitehead 2000. Metics' military service: Thouk. 2.13.7, 
2.31.2; Whitehead 1977, 82-86; MacDowell 1978, 77. 
470 See too §§52-54, below. 
471 §§ 133-134, below. 
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T;~ ~' ~11 Otmo) .r; P.1U~fJ.O~ ••• o,VrOIl VrrOp.elllQ" ;~EIII: Cowardice in battle, in the 
form of astrateia or lipotaxion, was severely punished: the jury consisted of the 
deserter's erstwhile comrades who would be more likely to avail themselves of 
the punishment of atimia. 472 Lykourgos' use here of aTaKTolI is clearly intended to 
bring such offences to mind, for the word was used not only in the sense of 
disorder in the ranks, but also of not being called up, a connection which 
implicitly expresses disapproval of civilians who had not volunteered for service. 
Thus although Leokrates was exempt from military duty, further opprobium could 
be generated for his failure to volunteer for service, and the implication of 
disorderly conduct reinforces Lykourgos' earlier description of Leokrates' 
behaviour since his retum.473 
7JViKo, 7J ,uv fn'o, .•. ~KOliT' f-rr} 'YE'YOVOu' Ko,(JE/(rrrfJKEtTQ,V: Military service was a 
civic duty imposed upon the top three census groups to the age of 59, with thetes 
serving mainly as oarsmen in the fleet. 474 Although it is unclear how or when a 
change occurred, the sources indicate that in the fifth century and for the first half 
of the fourth, military call-up was based principally on rotation of service from the 
muster roll, but that in the second half of the fourth century, liability to call-up 
was determined by age groups.475 It is possible that this change had a detrimental 
effect on volunteer service and may have been responsible, at least in part, for the 
increasing need to rely on mercenary service.476 The 20-29 and 30-39 age groups 
were the first to serve in any conflict and the burden perhaps fell more heavily on 
the younger cohorts in part because they were debarred from jury service and 
magisterial office until the age of 30, even though they were eligible for the 
strategia.477 Garland argues that the term presbutes and its cognates might have 
been reserved for those in the 50-59 age group, after which they were liable to act 
472 See Aiskhin. 1.29, 3.175f.; And. 1.74; Oem. 15.32,21.103; Lys.14.5ff.; see too 
MacDowell 1978, 160; Hamel,passim, esp. 376-379. 
473 See §§5-6, above, 43-45, 128-132, below. 
474 See too [Arist.] Ath. 27.1, with Rhodes 1993; Arist. Pol. 1274a12-15; Thouk. 6.43; 
[Xen.] Ath. 1.2,2.14; Xen. Hell. 1.6.24; Meiggs 1972, 439ff. 
475 See Aiskhin. 2.133,168; Ar. Eq. l369ff.; [Arist.] Ath. 26.1,53.7, with Rhodes 1993; 
Oem. 3.4; Xen. Mem. 3.4.1. See too Pritchett 1974-1991, ii. 105, 23Of.; Andrewes 1981, 
passim; Garland 1990, 200ff.; Sinclair, 55; Rhodes 2000a, 470f. 
476 S ee e.g. Oem. 1.6,24,2.13,24, 3.34f., 4.19ff., 27, 29, 37, 46,10.19; Isok. 8.41-48. 
477 See [Arist.] Ath. 4.3,63.3, with Rhodes 1993; Oem. 24.150f.; Xen. Mem. 1.2.35. See 
too Garland 1990, 280ff. 
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as arbitrators for a year before passing on to the threshold of old age as 
gerontes.478 This last group to be called up was apparently not in service at 
Khaironeia, and was perhaps perceived to add little more in battle, in practical 
terms, than its experience to the physical strength of their younger comrades, 
though it seems that there was no upper age limit for strategoi, since Phokion 
appears to have been elected at the age of eighty.479 They are, in any case, 
presented here as a hope of last resort for the city.48o 
§§40-41. 0pQ.1J~' iIJ m; pkv ••• a.IJ04;w~ o.VrWlI Ko.; T'ij~ 7rOAEW~ Opwp.bo.~: Lykourgos 
evaluates the spectacle of wives, mothers and sisters cowering in doorways as 
unworthy of free women. What lies behind this view of their degradation is, 
however, unclear. Perhaps he considers that the terror which the news of the 
defeat at Khaironeia engendered was degrading, though his mention of their status 
may imply that their visibility was considered to have demeaned them. This 
should not, however, necessarily imply that the ideal of the seclusion of Athenian 
women equates with misogyny, or with a view of female inferiority, for Garland's 
argument with respect to the elderly is equally applicable to women: 'what passes 
for esteem, homage and sympathy ... in one society may be interpreted as neglect, 
indifference or abuse in another' .481 
The women's desperation at this time is vividly depicted by Lykourgos: crouched 
in terror, some asked of husbands, some of fathers, others of brothers. The 
language is emotive, and somewhat reminiscent of Xenophon's account of how 
reports of the defeat at Aigospotomoi were received in Athens.482 There is, too, 
more than a passing resemblance to the image of Trojan wives and daughters 
clustering around Hektor at the Skaian gate begging for news of sons, brothers, 
478 Garland 1990,243; see too §§40-41, below. 
479 Plut. Phok. 24.3; see too Thouk. 1.105.4; §§ 16, above, 46-51, below. 
480 See too §§40-41, below. 
481 Garland 1990,244. See too Arist. Pol. 1300a4-8, 1323a3-6; Oem. 43.62, 47.53-56, 
60,59.110-114,122; Lys. 1.6-14, 3.6f.; Xen. Oik. 7.35f.; Pomeroy, 58[f., 65[., 71-74, 
79-84; Gould, passim; Walker, 81-84; Nevett, 89-95; Millett 1998, 207-211; §§141-
145, below. 
482 Xen. Hell. 2.2.3. 
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friends and husbands.483 Such an association may be intentional in view of the 
poetry, epigrams and oaths Lykourgos will produce later. 
'iWlI ~' a.lI~pWlI 1"OU) 1"01) fTwp.au,lI ••• ~I'7rAa. Ti l,."amo. EtJ:rrrnO~)lolJ): The 
presbutai, or those between fifty and fifty-nine, upon whom the the city's hopes 
rested seem here to be differentiated from the gerontes who were exempt from 
military service, though Lykourgos' use of the comparative presbuterous may 
suggest that it was cognate with gerontes.484 None the less, the elderly are 
portrayed as pitiful at a time of life when they might expect to receive respect, a 
point which will be reinforced in §§94-97. This mixture of respect, pity and 
contempt for the elderly is echoed elsewhere in the ancient sources, where respect 
for the aged co-exists with a view that they are also to be pitied, viewed with 
contempt, and equated with women and children because of their inability to fight. 
Their plight was thus twofold: physical, hence the desirability of a quick and 
painless death; and economic, hence their supposed dependence on jury pay and 
the legal requirement for a son to maintain his parents.485 
~'J) ~ Ka.' ~'vW'J) ••• fTva., Ka.' EAEU&p~ EtTfP.vWeTo: Hypereides was 
unsuccessfully prosecuted by Aristogeiton for the allegedly illegal proposal that 
the slaves should be released, that citizenship should be granted to metics, and 
that those deprived of citizenship should have their rights reinstated. Hypereides' 
response to the charges was that he could not see the law with Macedonian anus 
staring him in the face and that, in any case, it was not he but the battIe of 
Khaironeia that proposed the decree.486 He argued that the silver-mine slaves 
alone would have furnished Athens with at least 150,000 fighting men, though the 
motivation might have been the escape to Dekeleia of thousands of slaves at the 
end of the fifth century and the breakdown of cultivation and silver production; a 
483 Hom. II. 6.237-240. 
484 See too §§36-39, above. 
485 See e.g. Ar. Vesp. passim; Arist. Pol. 1329al4-16, 1329a29-34; Rhet. 1389b13-
1390a23; PI. Rep. 46Sa5-465b3, 563a3-563b2; Xen. Mem. 3.5.15. See too Garland 1990, 
242-287; Dover 1994, 102-106. 
486 Hyp. frg. 27-28; [Plut.] Mar. 848F-849A; see too Hansen 1974, 36f. #27; §§7, 16, 
36-39, above. 
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freed slave population might have been considered to be less harmful than an 
escaped one.487 
The concern behind Hypereides' proposals is fully demonstrated, however, by the 
proposal to grant citizenship to aliens and to allow the re-enfranchisement of 
atimoi. Citizenship and its associated rights were jealously guarded and it is clear 
from Lykourgos' remarks that the Athenian concepts of autochthony and freedom 
were grounded in the definition of the citizen. As Rosivach notes, 'the legend of 
autochthony was used as part of democratic ideology, asserting the political 
equality of all citizens and the superiority of even the humblest citizen to any non-
citizen' .488 MacDowell, indeed, notes that citizenship was only rarely granted and 
that the proposal attributed to Solon, whereby aliens were granted citizenship if 
they came to Attica to practise a trade, should refer, instead, to foreigners' rights 
to become metics rather than citizens.489 
In the fifth century, however, grants of citizenship were conferred as a means of 
expressing gratitude, and although Thrasyboulos' decree for such a proposal was 
also prosecuted as an illegal motion by Arkhinos on the grounds that some of the 
prospective citizens were not free, in other times of crisis, notably at the battle of 
Arginoussai, even slaves were granted citizenship.49o In the fourth century, the 
process was provided with a legal basis: citizenship, with some limitations 
concerning office holding and priesthoods, could be proposed in the Ekklesia for 
an alien who had displayed outstanding courage for Athens and, in what looks 
strikingly like a reversal of the procedure for ostracism, a quorum was required at 
the following assembly to decide upon the proposa1.491 MacDowell argues that the 
487 Hyp. frg. 29; see too §§ 120-121, below. 
488 Rosivach 1987a, 305. See too Isok. 4.22-25; Ober 1989a, 97f., 261-270; Loraux 1993, 
37-72; Connor 1994, passim; Parker 1996,138-141; §§36-39, above, 46-51, 98-101, 
below. 
489 MacDowell 1978, 70f., citing Plut. Sol. 24.4; see too §§ 1, 9, above. 
490 See Aiskhin. 3.195; Ar. Ran. 33f., 190f., 693f.; [Arist.] Ath. 40.2, with Rhodes 1993; 
Oem. 59.104ff.; Isok. 12.94; Lys. 13.72, 23. passim; Thouk. 3.55.3,3.63.2; IG ii2 1 0; ML 
94 = GHli.96; see too Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 207; Connor 1994, passim, esp. 40f. 
49\ See Oem. 59.88-92; GHI ii.178 = IG ii2 237; MacDowell 1978, 72f. 
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matter never became routine, however, since the wording of x is to become an 
Athenian reflects the honour and 'real assumption of a new nationality' .492 
Atimia involved the loss of socio-political rights and legal protection and could be 
imposed on citizen and alien alike. Harrison argues that there were two forms of 
atimia. One equated to outlawry and involved any or all of the following 
sanctions: confiscation of property; the extension of sanctions to the family of the 
atimos; permanent exile from the state, (},fUbU7/a,; and the eventual imposition of 
the death penalty. The other form was, effectively, exclusion from citizenship by 
means of a ban on entering the agora and holy places, on participation in sacred 
rites, and on addressing the Ekklesia and Boule, effectively the loss of all political 
rights. These two types, for Harrison, co-existed simultaneously.493 For 
MacDowell, however, the second, lesser, type of atimia was a development of the 
former and involved a change in procedure at some time after the middle of the 
fifth century. Previously, he argues, atimia was equivalent to expulsion since the 
loss of rights of protection made it unsafe to remain in Attica: this remained the 
case for outlawry, but atimia itself came to represent an exclusion from citizen 
rights and privileges, and might be only partially imposed, being better translated 
as disenfranchisement.494 
The sources do not permit a definitive resolution to the uncertainty and, as 
MacDowell notes, 'atimia remains one of the most difficult topics in the study of 
Athenian law' .495 It is, however, clear that arimoi were effectively demoted from 
citizen status: reprieve was possible, occurring for example after the fall of the 
Thirty, but a 1101-"0, E'Tr' all~p/ could only be proposed if an indemnity, a~€,a" was 
492 MacDowell 1978, 73; see too Oem. 57.30ff.; Is. 8.43; Whitehead 1986,103-109. 
MJ. Osborne 1981a-1983, provides a comprehensive survey of Athenian decrees 
conferring citizenship. 
493 Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 169-176. He suggests, 170, that the former type evolved into 
the imposition of a fine. If sufficiently heavy, of course, such a penalty would necessitate 
departure from Attica: Oem. 25.92. See too And. 1.33,73-76; [Arist.] Ath. 53.5,67.5, 
with Rhodes 1993; Dein. 1.60; Oem. 20.135, 21.32, 43, 87, 95; Hdt. 6.136; Lys. 6.24. 
494 MacDowell 1978, 73ff.; see too [Arist.] Ath. 8.5,22.8, with Rhodes 1993; Hansen 
1976a, 54-90; Rhodes 1993, 282f. Atimia as evolving out of Solon's reforms, with loss of 
specific privileges becoming punishments from the point at which they were guaranteed 
by law: Manville, passim. Partial atimia as loss of the right to address Ekklesia, to be a 
Bouleutes, or to occupy a magistracy: And. 1.75f.; Oem. 51.12; Lys. 26.3. 
495 MacDowell 1978, 75. See too Todd 1993, 142f. 
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first accorded to the proposer by a quorate assembly.496 The re-enfranchisement 
or recall of atimoi, therefore, for practical purposes, equated to the granting of 
citizen rights to aliens. Although Hypereides' proposals seem to have been 
accepted in the panic-stricken atmosphere, they were not implemented, for it soon 
became clear that the situation was not as dire as at first imagined. Plutarch 
suggests, however, that the proposals themselves may have had the effect of 
Philip permitting the removal of the dead from Khaironeia, overturning his 
previous refusal to the heralds from Lebedeia.497 
§42 '~."'1' , M~"'''' ,~, ~.' . T'OOlJ,vrn 0 "1 1TOI\'S' fK~ ••• Q,KfOOIla.) VTrfP 'T"rJS' 'O'a.) K'1I0Wfllf'lI: 
Lykourgos' portrayal of Athens as former champion of the freedom of the Greek 
world and ruler of many barbarian lands displays the dual nature of Athenian 
hegemony in the fifth century.498 Athens' empire was dismantled after the 
Peloponnesian War, but the King's Peace of 387 B.c., which concluded the 
Corinthian War, permitted her retention of Lemnos, Skyros and Imbros despite 
the principle of autonomy for all Greek po!eis.499 A series of alliances up to 382 
B.C., purportedly for purely defensive purposes against a Persian threat, and 
which did not violate the terms of the Peace, bound Khios, Mytilene, Methymna, 
Rhodes, Euboia and Byzantium to Athens; these alliances were supplemented by 
others with victims of Spartan heavy-handedness. 50o Even Thebes joined the new 
league whose constitution of 377 B.C. is recorded on the 'Aristoteles decree' 
together with the league's determination that the Greeks must be autonomous and 
free from Spartan contro1.501 
496 See [Arist.] Ath. 34.3, with Rhodes 1993; And. 1.77; Oem. 24.45. Lipsius, iii. 963f.; 
Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 199; see too §§ 124-127, below. 
497 [Plut.] Mar. 848F-849A; Hammond and Griffith, 604ff.; see too §§ 16,36-39, above. 
498 See Plut. Aris. 24-25.3; Isok. 4.52, 71f., 80f., 100-109, 12.53f., 56f., 66-73, 97ff., 
114-118; Thouk. 1.96-99, 2.13.2f.; see too Busolt 1920-1926, ii. 1337-1360; Bonner 
1933,158-176; Hammond 1967b,passim; Meiggs 1972,42-67,205-272,324-339,459-
464,524-561; Andreades, 306-312; Hammond 1986, 225ff., 254-266, 324-328; 
Kallet-Marx, passim. 
499 Significance of these islands for Athens' com supply: Stroud 1998,passim; see too 
§§25-27, above. 
500 See D.S. 15.28.1-5; Cargill, 51-96; Hammond 1986, 485f.; Schwenk 1997, 19f. 
501 IG ii2 43 = GHlii.l23; D.S. 15.29.7-30.2; Busolt 1920-1926, ii. 1360-1389; 
Andreades, 312ff.; Cargill, 14-47, 115-128. R. Osborne 2000a, 86-90, interprets a 
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Thebes' victory over Sparta at Leuktra in 371 B.C., provided definitive evidence 
of the growth of Theban power and in 369 B.c., Athens negotiated another 
alliance with Sparta.502 After the battle of Mantineia in 362 B.C and the onset of 
the decline of Theban power following the death there of Epaminondas, however, 
it became apparent that no polis was sufficiently powerful to retain hegemony 
alone. 503 In 357 B.C., revolts in Rhodes, Khios and Kos were supported by 
Mausolos of Karia.504 Khares was forced to support the Persian satrap, Artabazus, 
in his rebellion against Artaxerxes III in order to obtain funds to quell further 
uprisings among league members: the King's response was to demand that Khares 
be recalled to Athens and that the rebel poleis be granted independence supported 
by Karian garrisons. 505 This so-called Social War severely undermined Athenian 
control of her allies, and Philip's annexation of Amphipolis, Potideia, Pydna, 
Krenides, Methone and, finally, Olynthos, exacerbated Athens' problems. The 
Peace of Philokrates in 346 B.C., sounded the death knell for a league which had 
for long been on its knees.506 
, '~ ", , , t... , ,,_ IJ_ L k ' rt I KQ" TOll "'I#JtOlI 011 'lrfJO'T€pOll ••• ETr'KOUP'Q,'V Q,V'TYp p.erT£7reIJ.'fNQ,I1Q,': y ourgos po raya 
of Athens as champion of Greek freedom plays to a fond self-image which is 
reinforced by implicit references to the Ionian revolt, and to the helot uprising of 
464 B.C.507 The four places which Lykourgos specifically names, however, had 
significantly negative associations for Athens. 
provision for slave informing as an indicator of Athenian imperial ambitions. He argues, 
88 n.26, that those who deny such ambition (e.g. Harding 1995) suppress the decree (e.g. 
Harding 1985): see too IG ii2 1128 =GHI ii.l62. 
502 D.S. 15.51.1-56.4, 62.3-66.1; see too Stroud 1974, 187, who suggests that 'peace with 
Sparta in 375 was hastened by Athens' financial distress', witnessed by the 'totally 
inadequate allocation of only thirteen talents to Timotheus' expedition'; Arist. Oik. 
2.1350a 25-1350b15; Isok. 15.108f.; Xen. Hell. 5.4.63-66,6.2.1. See too §93, below. 
503 D.S. 15.79.2; Xen. Hell. 7.5.25ff. See too Buckler, 220-227; Hammond 1986,499-
516; Roy 1994, passim; Munn 1997, 92ff.; Schwenk 1997, 25ff. 
504 See too §§17-18, above. 
505 See too Cargill, 131-188; Hammond 1986, 513-516; Schwenk 1997, 27f. 
506 See too D.S. 16.8.3-7; Hammond 1986,538-551; Errington 1990,45-102; Sealey 
1993,108-112,120-126,137-157; Harris 1995,63-77; Schwenk 1997,28-33. 
507 See Ar. Lys. 1137-1144; D.S. 11.64.1-4; Hdt. 5.96-106; Paus. 4.24.5-7; Pluto Kim. 
16.4-10; Thouk. 1.101-102; See too Meiggs 1972, 88f.; Forrest 1980, 101ff.; Hammond 
1986,204-210,262; Murray 1993, 258ff.; WeI wei 1999,27-31, 89ff.; §§14--15, above. 
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It had been a colony of Andros, Akanthos, that in 424/3 B.C. had opened the door 
for Brasidas' capture of one of Athens' most important settlements, Amphipolis; 
since Andros had been subjected to a cleruchy from around 450 B.c., Meiggs 
speculates that' Andrian ill feeling against Athens had influenced her colonies'. 508 
The island had also previously lent support to the Persians, an act of betrayal for 
which Athens had signally failed to exact revenge. 509 In 356 B.C., moreover, 
Andros had been a sufficiently direct source of concern for an Athenian garrison 
to be installed.510 Keos, too, had negative connotations, for while Timotheos was 
achieving successes in the eastern Mediterranean in the mid-360s, Thebes 
launched a naval offensive in the same arena: Keos revolted and in 362 B.C. had 
to be corralled back into the Second Athenian League. 5 I I 
Troizen and Epidauros had been both comfort and curse to Athens. Troizen, 
strongly associated with Theseus, was, by the latter half of the fourth century. 
equally associated with housing some of the refugees from Athens at the time of 
the battle of Salamis. Despite the significant controversy over the authenticity of 
the so-called Themistokles decree discovered at Troizen, it is likely that the jurors 
would have made such an association, whether the decree was genuinely fifth-
century legislation or fourth-century propaganda.512 Athens had, however, been 
forced to abandon Troizen in humiliating fashion as part of the terms of the 
Thirty-year peace of 446/5 B.C.513 Epidauros, home of the sanctuary of Asklepios, 
had joined with Corinth at the battle of Halieis in 459/8 B.C. against Athens' 
occupation of Megara, and had assisted the Megarian revolt.514 The city, allied 
with Sparta, had also successfully resisted Athenian attempts at capturing her and 
had maintained a fierce independence during the Peloponnesian War. S15 In 366 
508 Meiggs 1972,335; see too Plut. Per. 11; Thouk. 4.84-88. 
509 See Hdt. 8.111. 
510IG ii2 123 = GHlii.156; Cargill, 155f.; Harding 1985, 91 #69. 
511 Isok. 5.53ff.; GHlii.141; Cargill, 134-140; Harding 1985, 74ff. #55; Hammond 1986, 
505f., 513. 
512 See Habicht, passim; see too Paus. 1.27.8,2.1.4; Meiggs 1972, 493f.; Murray 1993, 
295-299; Raaflaub, 249ff.; §§72-74, 80-81, below. 
513 See Thouk. 1.115.1; 4.21-22; see too And. 3.3f. 
SI4 Links between Corinth and Epidauros from at least the early seventh-century marriage 
ofPeriandros to Melissa, daughter of Epidaurian tyrant, Prokles: Athen. 13.56.33-36; 
Hdt. 3.50ff.; Paus. 2.28.4; D.L. 1.94. 
SIS Thouk. 1.105.If., 114,2.56,5.77. See too Figueira 1981,170-192. 
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B.C., moreover, Epidauros had allied with Boiotia after the announcement of the 
terms of the Persian-brokered Peace of Pelopidas which were potentially 
disastrous for Athens.516 
Athens' humiliation at having to call on such neighbouring foes is magnified by 
the fact that these poleis would not have been considered to be remotely of the 
same magnitude as Athens in the great days of the empire, as it is by the refusal of 
one of her own citizens to offer any assistance. In rhetorical terms, therefore, 
Leokrates' betrayal is all the greater, and the need for the jurors to avenge 
themselves on this representative and cause of their humiliation is paramount. 
§§43--45. Wtrre 6J Q,li~PE~ ••• ~li T'ij~ 1r6AECJJ~ Ka; TOO ~II.OIJ O'CJJT'T}piav: Dover suggests 
that patriotism was primarily defined in archaic times as valour in war and 
wisdom in discussion: a 'twofold commendation' that indicated 'that a man was 
all that a man should be' .517 In the classical period, patriotism in its purest sense 
had democratic connotations, with danger shared equally by all; thus 
Demosthenes could present Khabrias as phi/opolis because he ran the same risks 
as the men under his command, a principle which Lykourgos will vividly 
illustrate by his quotation from Euripides' Erekhtheus.518 The concept is akin to 
philotimia, Leokrates' lack of which is repeatedly emphasized by Lykourgos; any 
desire for good repute, natural in others, is clearly lacking in the defendant, and 
demonstrably extends to his attitude to his family and to the polis.519 
Lykourgos argued, in §§14-15, that one of the characteristics that distinguished 
Athenians and set them apart from the rest of mankind was rrpo~ ~lI rraTp;~a 
q"AOTiIkW~ eX-fIll and that this was one of the main reasons why Athens remained a 
516 See Plut. Pel. 30; Xen. Hell. 7.1.33-40; Hammond 1986, 502; §93, below. 
517 Dover 1994, 161. 
518 Oem 20.82f; see too Aiskhin. 3.169f.; Dein. 1.31; Oem. 24.127; Ober 1989a, 239f., 
citing Oem. 18.170ff., though the terminology is actually fVVOU~ Tfj rroAf/; Dover 1994, 
162; §§14-15, above, 46-51, 98-101, below. 
519 See too §§25, 135-137, below; Aiskhin. 1.129; Oem. 19.223; Connor 1992, 91ff., 
102f.,105ff.,119 n.56; Dover 1994,230-234. Leokrates' alleged desertion: §§5-6, 8, 17-
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focus of interest for the outside world and why Leokrates' trial had generated such 
interest. The jurors are here placed in explicit counterpoint to Leokrates' 
prodosia: only a guilty verdict by patriotic jurors will redress the damage which 
the notoriety of the defendant's behaviour has engendered; only a guilty verdict 
will regain the good reputation which innately belongs to the city and its 
inhabitants, and which should, by right, be actively sought by every phi/opolis 
individual among them. 
The use here of phi/opolis may, however, have further significance, since another 
dikaios might reasonably have been expected. Thoukydides notably attributes to 
Perikles the claim of being phi/opolis in the context of seeing and explaining what 
needed to be done for the city, and of being above the influence of money.520 
Lykourgos is therefore perhaps alluding to his own reputation of incorruptibility, 
extending the flattering allusion to the jurors, and pre-emptively undermining the 
defendant's synegoroi, who are presumably the subject of the reference to a prrrwp 
.'\ {J , 521 
#(Ny/f1E' ~. 
08' ~ tdv xwpa, Ttl 00i~pa, •.• mz,pEUXE nJ4a" AECJJKfJQ,TfrJt;: In paving the way for the 
emotive contrast between Leokrates and the 'Khaironeiamakhoi' to come, 
Lykourgos offers a contrast between the defendant and those who had turned their 
hands to the defence of the city after the defeat at Khaironeia. Men of every age 
were involved in this defence, he alleges, a claim which clearly evokes the pitiful 
elders to whom he referred in §§40--41. Even trees, the dead, and temples are 
presented as having offered their support and assistance to the city, creating a debt 
which the jurors will be urged to repay in §§ 149-150, and a debt which is all the 
more poignant because these are the very aspects of city life that Leokrates has 
betrayed. 522 
This was not the first time, however, that the city's walls had been rebuilt in a 
hurry. After the Persians had sacked Athens, Themistokles urged the rapid 
18, above, 55-58, below; voluntary service and exemption from military duty: §§ 19, 36-
39, above; eusebeia: §§14-15, above; summons of witnesses, kleteusis: §20, above. 
520 Thouk. 2.60.5. 
521 See §§135-137, 138-140, below. 
522 See §§1, 8, above. See too Oem. 60.5; Lys. 2.70. 
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reconstruction and extension of the city's walls; the work was carried out so 
hurriedly that funerary stelai and sculpture were adapted to fit as necessary.523 
This is exactly the picture that Lykourgos himself depicts one and a half centuries 
later as the Athenians, again in haste and panic, prepared to defend their city from 
the onslaught imminently anticipated from Macedon. 524 
It is unclear which temples Lykourgos means, though the remark is perhaps little 
more than an emotive piece of rhetoric. Temples were the original repositories for 
dedicated spoils of war, though Burkert notes how, 'in the sixth century separate 
treasure houses, thesauroi, began to be set up' for the purpose. Rather than 
housing an abundance of such booty, however, these treasuries, which Lawrence 
calls 'satellite temples', probably represent alternative storage for occasions when 
the temple itself was not in a fit condition to house such votive offerings.525 These 
spoils of war were, none the less, clearly held by the god on a conditional basis, to 
be redeemed and used by their captors in the event of further crisis. 
,. ,\ • ..., ._..JJ' , ,~, ... , L k h WlI E'KO~ IJ~ rLlIa.p.II"pIiE~ ••• 'M]lI 7rrLTP'UrL rLlJTWlI 7rpourvyOp€IJWlI: y ourgos ere 
makes his third call for the imposition of the death penalty.526 The length of 
Leokrates' absence is elsewhere categorically stated to be six years, for five of 
which he traded from Megara, and it is likely that the claim of an eight-year 
absence is a rhetorical flourish; indeed, since Lykourgos appears not to have 
proceeded with his prosecution immediately, it is difficult to see how the case 
could have come to court in 330 B.C., if Leokrates did not return until then.527 
Moreover, although the later reference to an absence of over five or six years 
possibly betrays an uncertainty over when, exactly, the defendant left and returned 
to Athens, the claim allows Lykourgos neatly to bridge the narrative gap between 
events in the immediate aftermath of Khaironeia and the time of the trial, a period 
of almost exactly eight years. 
523 Thouk. 1.90.3, 93. If. 
524 See too §§ 16, 17-18, 36-39, 40-41, above; Ar. Av. 11 IO-1180; Wycherley 1978, 10-
16, 19f.; Ober 1980, 59f.; Knigge, 30, 35f.,49-55. 
525 Burkert, 94; Lawrence 1983, 113. 
526 Other cal1s: §§8, 26-27, above, 46-51, 52-54, 66--67, 77-78, 79,120-121,123,133-
134, 141-145, below. 
527 See §§21-23(i), above, §§55-58, below. 
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§§46-51. TIEP; WII cL lill~pE~ ... T'ij~ TrOAEW~ p.~ Tra,paJ..eiTrEIII: Despite berating those 
who strayed from the point in their prosecutions and insisting that he would 
introduce only relevant matters in his own speech, Lykourgos here has to argue 
that he is not guilty of the same offence.528 In this highly emotional passage, he 
insists that whilst he may appear to be breaking his own rule, his digression in 
respect of those who died at Khaironeia is not only contextually relevant, but 
intrinsically so in a trial before the whole polis for whose salvation they died. The 
function of such a digression, however, is clear: the dead of Khaironeia are 
effectively introduced as witnesses for the prosecution, their death providing an 
€AE'YXOII (Ta~ of Leokrates' behaviour, as of that of all cowards and traitors. The 
'Khaironeiamakhoi' are directly contrasted with Leokrates in precisely the way 
that the jurors' patriotism was earlier placed in counterpoint to Leokrates' 
prodosia.529 The jurors, as a result, are placed beyond any possible empathetic 
identification with the defendant. 
Lykourgos has already indicated that the jurors are being watched by the whole 
world, and has compared them to their ancestors, demanding that they maintain 
the same standards of excellence for all to see.530 Here, in language highly 
reminiscent of epUaphioi generally, he argues that the memorial of praise which is 
the immortal reward for such courage is nowhere more fittingly spoken than in 
public trials of treachery, which proclaim the fame of Athens and its heroes to the 
whole world. The 'agathos Khaironeiamakhos' is thus a hero of the stature of past 
Athenian veterans, and Leokrates' trial is itself an equivalent judicial agon. The 
arhian which the jurors will win ifthey condemn the defendant therefore is akin to 
the fame and the prize of valour gained by the ultimate warrior on the field of 
battle.53 ! 
EKE/WI ~ 1'V'~ TrOAeP.'Ol~ ••• Tra.TP'~ ETIla.I ~ EKE'IIWII t/Nx~: Every aspect of the 
actions of the 'Khaironeiamakhoi' offers an implicit contrast with Leokrates' 
528 §§ 11-13, above. 
529 §§43-45, above. 
530 §§ 14-15, above. 
531 See Thouk. 2.42.2-43; Demandt, 14; Loraux 1986, 209ff.; Parker 1996,131-137; 
§§14-l5, 16, 43-45, above, 104-107, below. 
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behaviour. Unlike them, he did not encounter the enemy, nor fight for freedom, 
but effectively and single-handedly surrendered the polis to the enemy.532 His own 
courage amounted to placing his trust in the city walls of Rhodes and Megara and, 
rather than being ashamed to see his country ravaged, was unashamed on his 
return to pass the graves of those who fell in the battle which he had fled. 533 
Whether or not there is an implicit reference to Thoukydides' claim that the polis 
comprises men, not walls, the tone of this passage is so similar to other funeral 
orations that it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it reflects a conscious 
modelling on epitaphioi in general.534 The prosecution thus becomes, itself, a 
eulogy to the dead. 535 They had shared danger with the best and bravest who, for 
Lykourgos, clearly did not include Leokrates. He who had not respected the 
images of his natural parents and ancestors could not respect the polis which was 
his by birth. His behaviour equates not with that expected of a citizen but of a 
metic who feels a lesser regard for the city in which he lives. It also undennines 
the doxa of his forebears and brings yet further shame on them, treatment which 
equates with treason in its own right. 536 The defendant's desertion of all which he 
should have treasured is perhaps explicitly contrasted with the bequest of the 
reputation of the 'Khaironeiamakhoi' by a play on (E-r)Ko,To,A€;7T€/V: the city was 
deserted by Leokrates whereas life itself was abandoned by the heroic dead; the 
martyrs of Khaironeia bequeathed their glory whilst Leokrates bequeathed only 
shame. 
There are, also, echoes of the Homeric thanatos kalos in a "Yap a,8Ao, TOO 7ToM/Wu 
TOIS" (7.')'a60lS" til ... apOnIIl EtTTIV, EA€u8€PIo, Ko" 0,p€T7) .... IJ.OYOu~ "Yap TOU)' Ell TOI~ 7ToMIJ.O/~ 
KaAW~ a7To8vfJ(TKovr~ ... €VKA€a 8aVaTOY o,ipoVvro,I. 537 Perikles, too, had reputedly 
exhorted his audience to ignore the dangers of war, ~'Y}I..W(To,VT€)' Ko" TO €Vao,l/WV TO 
532 See § 16, above, 59-64, below. 
533 See §§141-145, below. 
534 See Thouk. 27.77.7; Dem. 60; Hyp. 6; Lys. 2; Pohlenz,passim, esp. 50-53. 
535 See too Loraux 1975,passim, esp. 24-31; Loraux 1986, 120r., 132-171. 
536 S D ee em. 24.60; Lys. 13.91,31.20-23. See too §§36-39, above, 98-101,135-137, 
below. 
537 See Horn. II. 9.412ff., 12.322-328, 22.7lff., 110, 304f.; see too Vemant 1992,50-74; 
§§ 104-107, below. 
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€AelllepolI, TO ~' €AeuBepolI TO eiJtJ;uxoll KprllaIlTe.;.538 By relinquishing Athens' freedom 
and displaying extreme cowardice, Lykourgos implies, Leokrates is now worse 
than a metic, indeed he is no better than a slave and, unlike the dead who 
gloriously escaped such disgrace, has returned to claim the inglorious and 
disgraceful death which is the particular (dis)honour to which he has laid claim.5J9 
Athens is also, effectively, reiterated as champion of Greece. The defeat at 
Khaironeia was the result of misfortune, rather than lack of courage, and led to the 
whole of Greece falling into servitude. It would, therefore, be unconscionable if 
the defendant, who personally handed the city over to the enemy, was himself 
granted freedom by the jury: the people who once voted for the slaves to be freed 
must not do so again.54o It is debatable, however, whether any community actually 
felt itself to have been enslaved by Macedon. Thebes, perhaps, could have 
claimed such a fate after the Macedonian garrison that had been installed on the 
Kadmeia was blockaded upon rumours of Alexander's death, and proof that 
Alexander was still very much alive arrived within a fortnight: the Theban 
captives were sold into slavery and the city was razed to the ground. 54! 
Yet Thebes was the exception that proved the rule, for the Macedonians generally 
treated their defeated enemies more generously than might have been expected, 
and recovery in Athens itself, under the measures introduced by Lykourgos, was 
little short of spectacular. 542 For rhetorical purposes, however, if the jurors can be 
induced to feel the metaphorical weight of Macedon's yoke, then they will be 
inclined to punish the defendant more harshly. In this respect, the image of Greek 
freedom being buried with the bodies of the 'Khaironeiamakhoi' may not be 
incidental, for Aiskhines' reference to the outcome of the trial shows that 
Leokrates escaped being cast, unburied, outside the borders of Attica, by a hair's 
538 Thouk. 2.43.4. 
539 See too Ober 1989a, 27lf. 
540 See §§16, 36-39,40-41,42, above. 
541 Aiskhin. 3.156f.; Arr. An. 1.7.1-8.8; Dein. 1.18-21; D.S. 17.8.2-14.4; Just. 11.2.9f.; 
Plut.Alex. I 1. 3 ff; Dem. 23.lf.; Heckel, 192f.; Munn 1997, 102ff. 
542 See D.S. 16.89.1-3; Isok. Ep. 3; Plb. 9.28.1-4,18.14.13-15; Mitchel 1973,passim; 
Hammond 1986, 570-576; Sealey 1993, 196-212; Heckel, 189ff.; Munn 1997, 98ff.; 
Schwenk 1997,33-37; Shipley 2000, 114f.; see too introduction, 17-21, above. 
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breadth. 543 Perhaps, therefore, Lykourgos is paving the way here for a demand for 
just such a penalty worse than death so that Leokrates will properly be equated 
with the dead whom he, for his part, left unburied after the battle. 
Ka,; ~,' ;;, OUK a.A.Q.yw~ ... TrJ,'~ EOXa.TrJ,I~ Tlp.cJJp;a,I~ KoAa.'elv: Until the early fourth 
century when successful generals were so honoured, the tyrannicides were 
probably the only human figures represented in the Agora. 544 The statues of 
Harmodios and Aristogeiton seen by Pausanias were replacements by Kritios and 
Nesiotes, dating to 477/6 B.C., for originals by Antenor, dating to between 510 
and 490 B.C., which had been removed by Xerxes in the early fifth century when 
the Persians invaded Attica. 545 If Pausanias is correct, the originals were returned 
by Antiokhos, one of Alexander's successors, whereupon both pairs stood 
together in the Agora. 
Again the Athenians are noted as different, now because they alone know how to 
define and honour agatha;, not as athletic champions, but as liberators and 
avengers: ideal models, therefore, for the jurors themselves to emulate, for the 
stephana; with which athletes are rewarded are as nothing compared to the 
stephanas symbolized by the souls of the 'Khaironeiamakhoi' .546 As though his 
remarks had in themselves proven Leokrates' guilt, Lykourgos now makes his 
fourth call for the death penalty. 547 
543 Aiskhin. 3.252; introduction, 31 ff., above. 
544 Konon and Timotheos: Dem.20.69f.; Paus. 1.3.2; Isok. 9.57. Statues of the pair also on 
the Acropolis: Paus.1.24.3. See too Wycherley 1978, 136; Gauthier 1985, 96f., 102f.; 
Parker 1996,239 with n.76. 
545 See Paus.1.8.5: the statues he saw in the Agora of Pin dar and a certain Kalades were 
probably erected much later. See too [Arist.] Ath 58.1, with Rhodes 1993; Arr. An. 
3.16.7f.; Meritt 1936,355-358 #1; Wycherley 1972,155-160; Wycherley 1978, 73f.; 
Gauthier 1985, 92ff.; Taylor, 13-21; Castriota, 201-209, 213ff.; Spivey, 172-177; 
Hurwit, 138 n.l, 254; Raaflaub, 261-265. Posthumous bronze statue of Lykourgos in the 
agora: Paus.1.8.3. 
546 S ee too §§14-15, above; Isok. 4.2. 
547 Other calls: §§8, 25-27, 43-45, above, 52-54,66-67,77-78,79,120-121,123,133-
134, 141-145, below. 
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§§S2-S4. };K~~' 3J ;;'~pE~. ;;. .... 7TOA'TC~)II T"O'OVrOII 'T"' 7ro.pa.1I0P.~a..: Lykourgos 
here turns to three precedents which he argues have to be accepted as judicially 
binding upon the jurors. 548 First he singles out the Areopagos Council; his request 
not to be interrupted seems specifically to relate to the Areopagites' judgements 
and actions after Khaironeia, for he has already mentioned them with no such 
plea. 549 Although it is not possible to identify the individuals whom the Areopagos 
executed in 338 B.C., the Council's punishments were, at least in respect of the 
individual who tried to sail to Samos, evidently carried out with reference neither 
to the Ekklesia nor to the Dikasteria.550 
This exercise of power was clearly deemed deeply undemocratic and it raises 
questions concerning the measures which formed the basis of the powers to which 
the Areopagos apparently considered itself entitled. It seems clear that in the 340s, 
the Ekklesia passed a decree, proposed by Demosthenes, conferring the powers of 
apophasis on the Areopagos Council. Under the terms of this decree, the 
Areopagos acted as a commission of enquiry for the Ekklesia and Dikasteria, 
though it was also empowered to act on its own initiative: the two procedures 
have been labelled respectively apophasis kala prostaxin and apophasis aule 
proelomene.551 It is generally accepted that the Areopagos was not permitted, in 
either case, to inflict punishment, but was to compile a report.552 The commonly 
accepted reading of Deinarkhos 1.62f., moreover, is that Demosthenes was also 
responsible for a further decree empowering the Areopagos to enforce the laws 
and punish lawbreakers. 
This is certainly the impression gained at first sight, but the situation which 
Deinarkhos is describing may not offer as clear an interpretation as has been 
548 See too §§7, 9, 10, above, l1O(ii}-111, 122, below. 
549 See §§11-13, above. Powers and perception of the Areopagos: Aiskhin. 1.81-84,92, 
3.20,252; Oem. 18.134,23.65-70; Dein. 1.4ff., 9ff., 62f.; Isok. 7. passim; Xen. Mem. 
3.5.20; Wilamowitz 1893, ii. 186-200; G. Smith, 76-79; Bonner and Smith, i. 362-365; 
Carawan 1985, passim; Ostwald 1986, 517ff.; Cawkwell 1988, 10f.; Wallace 1989, 126f., 
196f.; Hansen and Pedersen, passim; Rhodes 1995b, 311 ff.; Millett 2000, 341. 
550 Aiskhin. 3.252. 
551 Carawan 1985, 135. 
552 See Dein. 1.50 with Worthington 1992; see too Carawan 1985, 125-138; Sealey 1987, 
56f., 137; Wallace 1989, 113-119; Hansen 1991, 292ff.; de Bruyn, 117-146; Wallace 
2000, passim; §3 with n.179, above. 
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supposed, for the examples which he proceeds to give all appear to be cases of 
apophasis.553 The cases of Antiphon and Kharinos, at least, date to around 343 to 
340 B.C., and as Wallace notes, it would have struck the jurors as odd if two cases 
of apophasis from around 340 were joined with two other cases resulting from 
Demosthenes' 'Areopagos legislation' dating to the time of Khaironeia. Wallace's 
argument is intended to demonstrate that this 'Areopagos decree' does not date to 
338 B.C., but it serves to demonstrate, in addition, that the two cases are probably 
not connected to any such decree, for in any case, as Wallace himself notes, 'only 
apophasis was directly relevant' to Deinarkhos' argument.554 Deinkarhos does 
not, moreover, use a single conjunction in his list of the effects of Demosthenes' 
legislation until he arrives at his coup de grace - KaTa ~E ualJTov - to 
demonstrate why Demosthenes cannot argue that his legislation is now 
inapplicable to himself.555 
Demosthenes' second, 'Areopagos', decree has, indeed, been notoriously difficult 
to date. Prevailing recent opinion places it in the immediate aftermath of 
Khaironeia, but Wallace has comprehensively demolished this dating, not least by 
taking account of the outrage expressed by the jurors in this passage of 
Lykourgos' prosecution: why, Wallace asks, would the dikasts be so outraged as 
much as eight years later by the Areopagos' exercise of powers which had just 
been expressly granted to it?556 Wallace therefore places Demosthenes' 
Areopagos decree 'earlier, under different circumstances, and for different 
purposes' - it was the result of an unknown but 'sudden crisis' where criminal 
behaviour was the concern, not treachery, hence the outrage when the powers 
which the measures bestowed were abused and used to punish purported 
553 See Dein. 1.6, 50, 62f.; see too Carawan 1985, 126, 130; Wallace 1989, 117f.; Hansen 
1991, 291f.; Rhodes 1995b, 313 with n.57; Wallace 2000, 584. 
554 Wallace 2000, 584. See too Worthington 1992, 357-362. 
555 Dein. 1.63: apophasis terminology is only specifically used in connection with the 
cases of Antiphon and Kharinos, but although Deinkarhos' use of TEfivarrl KomI. TO rroll 
rIAi<b,rrp,a for his first example might imply that he is referring to a particular decree 
unconnected with apophasis, the appearance of E~€ffn ... KaTa ,.0 rroll TrpofTTa'YP,a for the 
second suggests that he is simply attempting to find a different way of expressing the 
items of apophaseis in his list. 
556 Wallace 2000, 583; see too Mosse 1962, 280ff.;_Hansen 1975, 18f.; MacDowell 1978, 
191; Hansen 1979a, 38 = Hansen 1983a, 190; Ober 1989a, 101; Wallace 1989, 118; 
Hansen 1991. 29lf.; Sealey 1993. 186f.; Rhodes 1995b. 313. 
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traitors. 557 This seems illogical, however: the use of measures originally intended 
to permit the punishment of criminals would hardly occasion outrage when used 
against traitors in a civic emergency, at whatever date those measures were 
introduced. 
None the less, the Areopagos patently did overstep the mark in a way which led 
the Athenians to assess its actions as an abuse of power and the explanation has 
perhaps already been provided by Wallace's earlier suggestion that Demosthenes' 
apophasis legislation and Areopagos decree may be identified as one and the 
same measure, an explanation which, moreover, benefits from needing neither an 
unknown sudden crisis nor any particular date.s58 First, although Deinarkhos states 
that the Areopagos was empowered by Demosthenes to punish law-breakers, he is 
at pains to emphasize the power of the Council and Demosthenes' own part in its 
empowerment: this is especially so since he is prosecuting Demosthenes in 
particular, and he may thus be exaggerating the scope of the Areopagos' 
jurisdiction.s59 Secondly, if an earlier date is posited for the Areopagos decree 
than around the time of Khaironeia then, as Wallace acknowledges, the decree 
would have been passed around the time of the apophasis measures and the 
Ekklesia would unaccountably have been responsible for two pieces of legislation 
for effectively the same purpose at almost the same time; one measure is far more 
plausible.56o 
Moreover, a requirement for the Areopagos to refer to the courts any apophaseis 
warranting a penalty above a certain amount is strongly implied, if not 
demonstrated, by its attempt secretly to fine Theogenes, the Basileus, for failing to 
divorce his wife as required by law; the Council's covert action 'at least suggests 
that the Areopagites were acting in a way that exceeded their legitimate authority 
557 Wallace 2000, 583, 588, 590. 
558 See Wallace 1989, 118f.; see too Millett 2000,341 with n.7. 
559 Dein. 1.6, 62f., with Worthington 1992; see too de Bruyn, 118 n.33, 119 n.35; Rhodes 
1995b, 313; Wallace 2000, 584-589, citing Dem. 18. 132ff., and Dein. 1.56f. 
560 Wallace 1989, 118f. Wallace 2000, 587, now concludes, therefore, that the single 
legislative measure in this respect concerned criminal behaviour, and that there was no 
'general, preliminary enabling law or decree' for apophasis. Rather, the Areopagos was 
acting on the basis of its traditional rights when it conducted such investigations and 
reports, which accounts for its ability to instigate enquiries upon its own initiative. This 
argument is discussed and disputed in Sullivan 2003, passim = Appendix. 
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when they imposed that fine' .561 This is, as Wallace notes, consistent with 
Demosthenes' claim that the Areopagos did not have final authority to punish as it 
saw fit; the complexities of variously dating the criminal-behaviour legislation, 
Demosthenes against Neaira, and Theogenes' case at least strongly suggest that 
the Basileus' case took place shortly after the Areopagos was so empowered.562 
Wallace's argument is further supported, perhaps, by the procedural parallel of the 
Boule's power to impose penalties of up to 500 dr. in eisangeliai which fell within 
its jurisdiction, but its requirement to refer to the courts any cases deemed to 
warrant a heavier penalty.563 
Thus the troublesome Areopagos decree may be a mirage concealing a process 
whereby the Areopagos, specifically under the tenns of Demosthenes' apophasis 
decree, was pennitted to punish law-breakers up to a certain limit, but was 
required, like the Boule, to refer to the Ekklesia and thence to the courts any 
criminals deemed to merit a heavier penalty than it was pennitted to impose.564 It 
was arguably, therefore, the Council's recourse to execution in 338 B.C., a 
punishment well beyond its jurisdiction to impose, which occasioned such outrage 
both at the time and even at its mention in 330 at Leokrates' trial. 
The Areopagos' abuse of its powers may well have served indirectly to motivate 
the decree in 338 B.C. which effectively forbade flight by legislating for its 
categorization as prodosia. 565 This decree, although having no apparent effect on 
the Areopagos' existing powers, seems to have been intended, in the immediate 
aftennath of Khaironeia and, perhaps, of the Council's executions, to bring hoi 
pheugontes within the jurisdiction of the Dikasteria and, as a result, to empower 
the jurors to execute those deemed to be cowards in and after the crisis: to be able 
561 Allen 2000a, 45 citing Oem. 59.80ff. 
562 Wallace 2000, 583, 586. 
563 See [Arist.] Ath. 45.2 with Rhodes 1993; Oem. 24.63, 47.43; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 
56; Rhodes 1972a, 156, 164; Hansen 1975,24; MacDowell 1978, 189f.; Hansen 1980a, 
93,95; Hansen 1991,222,258. 
564 This seems to be implied, too, by Oem. 59.80. See too Sullivan 2003, passim = 
Appendix. 
565 Demosthenes was responsible for many more decrees between the mid-340s and 338: 
Dein. 1.78ff., cites a decree passed after Khaironeia which effectively put Demosthenes 
in control of manpower in the city and appointed him as envoy to Philip; Oem. 18.248 
lists what he considers to be his own significant services in this crisis, which include 
decrees for a range of defensive measures. 
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to exercise, therefore, powers equal to those which the Areopagos had usurped.5b6 
This perhaps indicates an immediate fear of an attempt at tyranny either by Philip 
or, more likely, by certain individuals within the polis, notably the Areopagites 
themselves: the decree was certainly followed by Eukrates' law in 337/6 B.c., 
itself closely modelled on Demophantos' decree of 410/9 B.C., the difference 
between the two measures being the express ban in Eukrates' proposals on 
Areopagites holding office or sitting in Council in the event of the democracy 
being overthrown. 567 Clearly, however, by incorporating the actions of the 
Areopagos into this section, Lykourgos is attributing to them the force of law, 
however unconstitutional they may have been deemed to be. 
ti.Ma. ~'11 AirroAulColJ ..• Vrrep VpiiJlI a.iIT(1)l/ lC'lI~Mo~: The second precedent 
which is argued to set the seal upon Leokrates' fate is provided by the Areopagite, 
Autolykos, who was apparently an honourable and highly respected, if somewhat 
aloof, figure. Aiskhines describes the farcical uproar which occurred during 
Autolykos' announcement of the Areopagos' disapproval of Timarkhos' proposals 
for the clearance of the region near the Pnyx for redevelopment: the Areopagite is 
presented as a pious and worthy figure left completely bewildered by his 
audience's uncontrollable laughter at his unintended but repeated double 
entendres.568 
Lykourgos' reference here indicates that his prosecution of Autolykos for treason 
took place in or soon after 338 B.C.569 It is noteworthy that the Areopagos did not 
itself prosecute Autolykos for treason under the terms of Demosthenes' apophasis 
aute proelomene legislation, nor under any terms of the putative decree by which 
Demosthenes may have empowered the Council summarily to arrest and punish 
criminals. Carawan suggests that the procedure under which Autolykos was tried 
566 See too §§5-6, above; MacDowell 1978, 178f., 185; Wallace 1989, 176-184; Hansen 
1991,291. 
567 Eukrates: SEG 12.87:::;: Harding 1985,127 #101; Schwenk 1985, 33-41 #6. 
Demophantos: And. 1.96ff. See too Meritt 1952, 355-359 #5; Ostwald 1955, passim; 
Conomis 1958, passim; Sealey 1958, 72f.; Raubitschek 1964, passim; Mosse 1970, 
passim; Reinmuth 1971a, 47f.; Will, 28ff.; Carawan 1985, 136; Ober 1989a, 101 f.; 
Wallace 1989, 179ff.; de Marcellus, 143ff.; see too §§ 124-127, below. 
568 Aiskhin. 1.81-84; see too PA 2746. 
569 S ee too §§5-6, above. 
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was an apophasis: Lykourgos could therefore have been appointed as prosecutor. 
Yet this seems implausible, for as Hansen argues, none of the sources mention the 
Areopagos in this context, and since they were so prominent in the procedure, it is 
extremely unlikely that they would be invisible in this instance.57o Autolykos' 
case was, therefore, probably an eisangelia and, specifically, one heard by the 
Dikasteria. Since the Areopagos is known to have fined and reported Areopagites 
on more than one occasion, it is possible that public reaction to its spontaneous 
executions was such that further actions against alleged traitors were impossible. 
It is also possible that the Council was strictly interpreting the terms of the demos' 
decree categorizing flight as prodosia, and was unwilling to act against an 
individual who had not personally fled Athens but who had removed only those 
unable to contribute to her safety.571 
Lykourgos' reference to his successful prosecution of Autolykos, together with 
his insistence upon the Areopagos' legal rectitude, conveniently paves the way for 
the third precedent of the demos' decree itself. The jurors were thus perhaps 
assumed to be prepared to interpret the laws more widely than the Areopagos, 
something that in his present prosecution Lykourgos would clearly be relying 
upon. Although Autolykos was evidently convicted, however, it may be unsafe to 
presume that he was sentenced to death. Lykourgos does not repeat the arreKTf/vf 
which he used for those seized by the Areopagos; instead he uses €T/f.J.WprfJU'o,ufJE, 
and repeats the word in suggesting that a greater punishment should be visited 
upon Leokrates for removing an able-bodied person from the crisis than on 
Autolykos for secreting away his wife and sons. Moreover, in what is effectively a 
fifth call for the death penalty, he adds T'Yj~ €O'Xa.T7}~ to indicate the appropriate 
timoria for Leokrates. Although this might imply that a punishment worse than 
death is being urged, it is also possible, pace Hansen, that Autolykos was heavily 
fined, rather than executed. 572 This would help to explain why Aiskhines, in 
focusing on cases where the death penalty was, or was nearly implemented, does 
570 Carawan 1985, 132; Hansen 1975,40, 104 #113. See too Lyk. frg. 3 (Conomis 1970, 
96f.); Cloche 1960,90; Conomis 1961, 93ff.; Will, 102; Sealey 1987, 56f., 137. 
571 One Areopagite was fined and reported for 'fare-dodging' and another was fined and 
expelled for trying to sell the Areopagos' portion - presumably of sacrificial meat: both 
were acquitted by the dikasteria. See Dein. 1.56; Wallace 2000, 585. 
572 Hansen 1975, 104 #113; see too [Plut.] Mar. 843D. 
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not mention the fate of Autolykos, a significant individual whose execution would 
have forcefully supported Aiskhines' argument. 573 It is possible, however, that 
Lykourgos' present use of this precedent backfired, with the jurors repeating the 
imposition of a heavy fine on the present defendant, Leokrates. 574 
Hansen claims that Lykourgos' third precedent is a decree empowering the 
Areopagos to pass sentence on all Athenians who fled the country in the 
immediate aftermath of Khaironeia. He is, however, conflating Demosthenes' 
Areopagos legislation which, whether as apophasis or criminal-behaviour 
legislation, seems in any case not to have conferred such powers onto the Council, 
with the decree of the demos which defined flight as prodosia, and which 
therefore effectively prohibited flight at that time.575 Lykourgos' use of this decree 
as an example of precedent strongly suggests that it did not in fact form the basis 
of his eisangelia, and the combination of the three precedents in this section adds 
weight to the argument that laws are being presented as a backdrop against which 
Leokrates' actions can be judged. 576 
Lykourgos brings this section of his speech to a close with a synopsis of his three 
precedents, and a reiteration of his praise of the Areopagos. An emotive tricolon 
emphasizes judgement, condemnation and severity - a ~ri} KaTE'YJIWOTal (.k€1I ••• 
KaT€tViJcb IOTa I ~' •.• o(J.OAo,,(€ITai ~€ napa, TiP ~(J.qJ -M1S (J.E"(I(JT(]S agio. ETllai TI(J.wplas 
- and the jurors are presented with the inevitability of the ultimate verdict that 
they must pass. 
m Aiskhin. 3.252. 
574 See introduction, 33, above. 
575 See Hansen 1975, 108 #121 n.8. 
576 See too §§5-6, above. 
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§§55-110(i) 
The beginning of this central section of the speech is signposted by a further 
transitionalll-€l1 01511. 577 The whole is, effectively, divided into three parts: §§55-74 
comprise presumed defence arguments, together with their refutation; §§75-89 
are an appeal to tradition and oaths; and §§90-110 offer a divine rationale for the 
trial, with the corollary of the divine requirement for the extreme penalty, an 
inevitably subjective perspective which needs, and is given, poetic authority from 
tragedy and Homer. At the heart of the speech, therefore, Lykourgos brings into 
the sharpest reliefhis own motivation for initiating the prosecution. In the process, 
he demolishes the various strands of Leokrates' presumed defence, and 
demonstrates the inexorability of a guilty verdict. 
§§55-58 .• ~ ~ ow fllOXO~ Errrl ... rnlT~IlI Q,VrcIJ 1I0IJ."w: As he moves into the 
central section of his speech, Lykourgos reiterates that Leokrates is liable in 
respect of all the charges with which his prosecution has been concerned so far, 
and he again implies a thorough knowledge of the likely arguments which the 
defence will use. 578 
All aspects of any possible defence are immediately tackled and seem to be 
comprehensively demolished. The departure was secretive and unaccompanied by 
well-wishers, whereas traders were normally waved off by all their friends. The 
defendant was not accompanied by a 7Tal~O'; TOO ~,aI<OllOOIlTO';, but by an hetaira and 
her maids. Traders did not need to stay away for five years, nor to remove 
ancestral images, nor to sell their property in Athens. Leokrates was no trader in 
any case, but a bronzesmith and, as such, had naturally imported nothing at all to 
Athens from Megara despite his six-year stay there.579 There was also that share in 
the pentekoste, the tax which represented one thing, at least, that he would not 
577 \ 'i' tru tu . d . 37 b ILf'll OU'II S C re: mtro uctlOn, , a ove. 
578 See too §§8, 14-15, above, 68-69, below. 
579 Departure: §§5-6, 17-18, above. Length of absence: 21-23(i), 43-45, above. 
Ancestral images: 25, above. Sale of property: 21-23(i), 23(ii)-24, above. Trade: 26-27, 
above. 
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have abandoned.58o The sarcastic tone of KaTaAmwlI in this context, and in that of 
a call for the jurors, and probably those on the periphery too, to prevent Leokrates 
from introducing any of these elements into his defence, is a continuation of the 
heavy irony of 7}~€w(j ~' all av.ou rnlioIIk7)lI, TIll' Ewrroplall €/O"a')'wlI X07)o"IIkWT€PO(j 
€,),€lI€TO all ,-.n rroA€I TOU rrapaO"X€IlI TO O"wlka Tasal TOI(j O"Tpa ... '}'Yo'i'(j Kat TOU(j €1fIOllTa(j 
, , -LJ ll" ~ , 581 
alkVllauoal IJ.€O UIJ.WlI lJ.axolJ.€lIo(j. 
Lykourgos argues that Leokrates' likely defence of leaving to trade has been 
exposed as lies, for a trader would not have given up an essential Athenian base. 
Thus the defendant has conclusively condemned himself as a traitor, and as such, 
cannot expect the jurors to reach a different conclusion. This was a typical 
extrapolation that the jurors might have anticipated, though Lykourgos is perhaps, 
in the belief that he can demolish the excuse, also trying to force his opponent into 
arguing that he did, indeed, leave Athens to trade and had certainly not fled in 
terror, and in particular is not trying to mislead the jurors in this respect. 582 This 
was, in fact, a general tactic which Hypereides denounced, albeit under particular 
circumstances which served his argument: accusers refuse to confine themselves 
to arguments relevant to their case, but offer trumped-up slanders which 
defendants must either rebut, thus neglecting a proper defence argument, or 
ignore, thus leaving the jurors with a false impression that the slander is 
accurate.583 
It is, however, difficult to see what alternative to trade Leokrates could offer as a 
defence, and the likeliest reason for Lykourgos' attention to this argument is that 
it causes him a particular problem if the jurors accept it. It is, therefore, perhaps 
the trade in corn specifically and the illegality of such trade that is questionable, 
certainly the evidence in this respect is suspect, at least. 584 It would, therefore, 
clearly be in the prosecutor's interests to characterize Leokrates as a craftsman 
rather than a trader, and as someone who fled from the crisis in Athens, carrying 
out from Megara any trade for which he later became known. Such activities 
580 See too § 19, above. 
581 See too §§ 11-13, above. 
582 Self-condemnation: see e.g. Dein. 3.21; Oem. 19.212. 'Catch-22': §§26-27, above. 
583 Hyp. 1 (Lyk). 8ff.; see too Dover 1968, 170. 
584 See §§ 19, 20, 21-23(i), 23(ii)-24, 26-27, above. 
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could thus be presented as the result of his inability to return home after his flight, 
rather than as his usual business. Notably, indeed, no evidence is introduced to 
support the claim that Leokrates had fonnerly been a bronzesmith. Lykourgos was 
clearly also uneasy about the witnesses to Leokrates' departure, who may have 
been prepared to swear an oath of disclaimer to any such description of flight as 
Lykourgos offered, or to the categorization of Leokrates as an artisan rather than a 
trader.585 Thus the demolition of the defendant's presumed defence strategy was 
perhaps not as comprehensive as it appears at first sight. None the less, Lykourgos 
can still hope to fall back on the implicit argument in the alternative that if the 
jurors believe him, then they must find Leokrates guilty of flight, but that if they 
believe the defendant, then he is guilty of a charge which itself carries the ultimate 
penalty. 
§§59-64. "HSE. ~' itTC.I.I, hr' EKE'VOV 1'01.1 Myov ••• tnu.v Q,vQ"l"m:ro. rEVWVT'Q,': 
Lykourgos continues his rebuttal of the anticipated defence case by asserting that 
a single individual, even one who was not responsible for strategic defences, 
could still be guilty of prodosia. His argument seems to be grounded in treason as 
a state of mind, a theme which he will shortly develop more fully, with c/JEPOlLfllO~ 
here implying a desperate attempt to evade conviction by improper use of 
inappropriate arguments suggested by the defendant's synegoroi. 586 Lykourgos 
appears to view such a treacherous state of mind as a moral decay which pollutes 
everyone with whom it comes into contact, a view which accords with his 
assessment of the defendant's character throughout the entire speech. Leokrates' 
total evasion of responsibility, therefore, was capable of subjecting the whole 
polis to complete disestablishment. As Dover notes, 'however clearly it was 
perceived that an individual's "nature" circumscribes his moral capacity, the 
community had a right to deal with its members according to the contribution, for 
good or ill, which their various natures made'. 587 
585 See §20, above. 
586 See too §§65, 68-69, 135-137, 138-140, below. 
587 Dover 1994,149. See too §§66-67, below. A contribution to the extent of self-
sacrifice was only to be expected of Athenians, according to Thoukydides' Perikles: 
Thouk. 2.43.lf. 
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This was true even when external compulsion was acknowledged to be so strong 
that members of the jury themselves would have been unable to resist, even if 
driven mad or led astray by divine forces. Lykourgos acknowledges but refutes 
this possible defence in §§90-92, arguing that an individual remained responsible 
for any error or wickedness which had resulted in metaphysical punishment. 
Dover suggests, indeed, that prodosia 'could be applied equally to deliberate 
betrayal through disloyalty and to failure through inadequate energy and 
enthusiasm', and it is the defendant's deliberate criminality, rrpoaipEfflll 
a~'K'r}wiTwll, which Lykourgos will stress in § 148.588 
After his claim in §50 that Greece was enslaved after her defeat at Khaironeia, 
Lykourgos here tacitly acknowledges that this was not so; rather, Athens would 
have been enslaved had others betrayed the city by deserting the posts to which 
they had been assigned. His rhetoric requires him to ignore Philip's clear 
disinclination to attack Athens, for the emphasis is on the extent to which 
Leokrates' actions would have caused the desertion, and thus the annihilation of 
Athens, whereas the habitation of even an enslaved city at least ensures its 
survival. The theme that inhabitants are the essence of a city rather than, or as 
well as, buildings and location, is a constant in the ancient sources, where poleis 
are denoted by hoi Athenaioi, hoi Lakedaimonioi, hoi Thebaioi, etc.589 Lykourgos 
can therefore rely on a common understanding of the nature of a polis to reinforce 
his argument by reducing it to the individual level of personal death which, 
naturally, Leokrates must himself suffer. 
e; -yQ.p ~; ~II QJ...,;}8ela.1I ••• TVXOllTWlI aiJpc.imc.t1ll O1JlIo,K,ofh'tra.II: Again Lykourgos 
refers to Athens' enslavement. Again, however, his emotive imagery glosses over 
the fact that Athens survived Leokrates' alleged betrayal, and indeed subsequently 
prospered. Lykourgos' problem is exacerbated by his own success as 0 Err; -rn 
aIOIKEtTEI: his very presence is a constant reminder of the city's prosperity after 
588 Dover 1994, 159. 
589 See e.g.: Arist. Rhet. 1398bll-20; Hdt. 5.74; Isok. 9.68; PI. Lg. 638b. See too, e.g. 
Murray 2000, 235f., with associated Bibliographia Hansenania. 
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Khaironeia.59o The argument, therefore, must focus more on Leokrates' supposed 
responsibility for facilitating the wholesale annihilation of Athens than on 
enslavement as such. Thus examples are offered of the differing outcomes of 
enslavement and desertion: as such, Athens' prosperity is implicitly the result of 
the patriotism, steadfastness, and courage of Leokrates' fellow-citizens and 
current judges, rather than of Philip's moderate treatment and beneficence to his 
defeated foes and of Lykourgos' own financial expertise. 
The rhetoric clearly requires that the archaic tyrants and the Thirty are presented 
as responsible for the enslavement, not the annihilation of Athens.59l Lykourgos is 
careful here to attribute the rule of the Thirty to Athens' native oligarchs: apart 
from allying himself with the ultimate democratic ideology, he will also shortly 
praise Sparta as a paradigm of virtue and good order in §§I05-108 and 128-130, 
albeit a paradigm which developed out of the teaching of the Athenian Tyrtaios. 592 
Thus, Athens' true SUbjugation began only after the walls were demolished by 
Lysandros in 404 B.C., and a reign of terror under men such as Kritias, 
Eratosthenes, and Theramenes commenced. That this regime was typical of those 
imposed by Lysandros, and that it was supported by a seven-hundred-strong 
Spartan garrison is conveniently forgotten in the equation of Spartan and Athenian 
courage and decency and the generation of emotive democratic responses 
reinforced by reference to Athenian hegemony, with Athens again presented as 
chosen guardian of freedom and democracy.593 
Lykourgos offers Troy and Messene as two examples of the consequences of the 
eradication of cities. Demandt suggests that the Homeric paradigm was the 
preferred yardstick for consequential relationships between past and present 
590 See introduction, 17-21, above. 
591 Peisistratid tyranny: [Arist.] Ath. 14-19, with Rhodes 1993; Pol. 1315b29-34; Hdt. 
1.59-64, 5.62-65; Andrewes 1956, 100-115; Ober 1989a, 65ff.; Hammond 1986, 163-
166, 179-185; WeI wei 1992,223-265; Rhodes 2000b, 120ff. The Thirty: Lys. 12. 
passim; Xen. Hell. 2.3-2.4; Krentz,passim; Hammond 1986,442-449; Buck, 60-79; 
Welwei 1999, 247-257; Rhodes 2000b, 134f. Nouhaud, 2 If., sees the correlation here 
between the Peisistratids and the Thirty as 'absurde historiquement', but one which fits a 
model in which the Peisistratids are 'symboles des malheurs d' Athenes'; see too Perlman 
1961, 164ff.; §§80-81, 11O(ii)-111, below. 
592 S § ee too § 104-107, below. 
593 Lysander's imposition of oligarchic juntas: Plut. Lys. 13; Spartan garrison: Xen. Hell. 
2.3.13f.; see too §42, above. 
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events and peoples, for by securing the values of the past and linking them with 
the present, they can be asserted and transposed onto the present. 594 Notably, the 
Trojan example is expressed as an historical event, albeit early: there is apparently 
no question that the Homeric tales represent anything other than fact to the 
jurors.595 None the less, Lykourgos' focus is, in a way, ahistorical here, for his 
arguments are grounded in his refutation of the likely defence case rather than in 
the precedent ofhistory.596 
Messene, therefore, can afford to be a muddled example. Lykourgos argues that it 
was desolate for half a millenium before being re-established, but the city was 
destroyed in the mid-seventh century B.C., and refounded in 369 B.C. by 
Epaminondas, a period of only three centuries. Even if Lykourgos is dating 
Messene's destruction from the First Messenian War in approximately 720 B.C., 
the period is no more than 350 years. 597 Deinarkhos, however, also used Messene 
as an example of cities' varying fortunes, which suggests that this was a common 
trope; his claim that four hundred years elapsed between its fall and re-
establishment further implies that the rhetorical requirements of prolonged 
devastation outweighed those of pure numerical accuracy. 598 
"ItT~ O~II TWII tTW'Yf'IOpCJJlI ••• a.~~ n7J1 Q)..fJ6ElaJl EVPEIJI: Lykourgos again 
appears to confront a possible defence argument, here presumed to arise from one 
of the defendant's synegoroi, though his call for the death penalty is probably 
nothing more than rhetorical posturing. This 'one individual' argument is, indeed, 
an intrinsic part of the 'non-responsible individual' argument, and probably does 
not reflect any actual defence plan, though it may represent a genuine supposition 
that the defendant would feel bound in his own speech to address such points.599 
594 Demandt, 14. See too §§102-103, 104-107, 110(ii)-111, below. 
595 See Perlman 1961, 158-162; Markle 1976, 97f.; Veyne, 14f., 20f., 79-93; Parker 
1996,224-227,252; see too Aiskhin. 2.31; Oem. 23.65f.; Isok. 4.28-33, 68ff., 6.24,42; 
Thouk. 1.73.2; §§83-87, 94-97, below. 
596 See §§55-58, above; see too 11 O(ii)-lll, below. 
597 See Huxley, 26-36, 53-60; Cartledge 1979, 98f., 113-119,293-299; Forrest 1980, 
28-34,69-77; Nouhaud, 303ff.; Hammond 1986, 105f., 135ff.; Murray 1993, 1 63ff., 171. 
598 Dein. 1.73; see too §§72-74, below. 
599 C . . f ontmuatton 0 argument: §§55-58, above. Defence foreknowledge: 14-15, above. 
Synegoroi: 68-69, 112-115, 135-137, 138-140, below. 
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Despite his own demands for the imposition of the death penalty, Lykourgos was 
not alone in his request that the jury should be left to decide the penalty according 
to its own view of the severity of the crime.6oo Aiskhines, too, argued strongly that 
OO"TI~ II-EII 01)11 Ell ...n TlII-rfJUE1 ~II t/niq,01l a;TEI, ~II OPrYIlI ~II UII-ET€pall rraparre'iTal' OO"TI~ 
a' Ell TcP rrpc.;.mp A/)'YlP ~II t/niq,01l aiTEI, OPKOII aiTEI, 11011-011 a;TEI, ~'Y}II-OKpaT;all a;TEI, eLlI 
Ov-rE aiT'ijual OU~EII OUIOII OU~EII;, ov-r' a;'T"r/J€lITa ET€PlP ~oDllal, KEAEvuaTE 01511 aUTov~, 
EaUallTa~ ~II rrpwT'r}1I VII-~ t/niq,01l KaTa TOV~ 1I01l-0!.J~ ~'EIIE'YKEIII, arrallTall E;~ ~II 
TiWYJtTl II , 601 There was clearly a tendency both to use some of the first speech to 
raise issues which properly belonged to speeches on the penalty, and to deplore 
this practice in the opposition. 
§65. €lCe'I/OI "Q.p ou ... eTI/a., ,.,]V ~'rJIl.;a.v: Despite his references to archaic law-
givers, the extremity of the prescribed punishments and the crimes for which they 
were prescribed suggests that Lykourgos is referring to Drakon in particular.602 
Figueira suggests that Solon's stature as a law-giver made praise of Drakon's 
severity difficult, and that Lykourgos' reference here is rare; certainly Lykourgos 
does not name Drakon, but other orators were less coy and it is not easy to detect 
the tone of disparagement or oligarchic ideology that Figueira notes.603 Lykourgos 
identifies three types of crime to illustrate his point: they seem carefully chosen, 
for under the tenns by which Lykourgos defines Leokrates' crimes as prodosia, 
the defendant stood accused of theft, impiety and effective sacrilege and 
homicide. For the jurors to emulate the ancient law-givers, and perhaps especially 
Drakon, therefore, only one penalty is available to them - death. 
Private theft: and public embezzlement were treated respectively by the dike and 
graphe k/opes, and a convicted thief was required to return stolen property, or to 
compensate for its loss if return was not possible, and to pay his victim double the 
amount of the stolen object's value as additional compensation, or ten times the 
amount for embezzlement of public monies; at the jury's discretion, the miscreant 
~§§8,26-27,43-45,46-51,52-54,above,66-67, 77-78, 79,120-121,123,133-134, 
141-145, below. 
601 Aiskhin. 3.198. 
602 Gagarin 1981, passim. 
603 Figueira 1993, 234f.; see too e.g.: Aiskhin. 1.6f.; Oem. 20.158, 24.211. 
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and any accomplice(s) could also be placed in the stocks for five days.604 Theft 
from a sacred precinct or embezzlement of sacred monies fell within the confines 
of a graphe klopes and appears to have been viewed as distinct from temple 
robbery; although the distinction is unclear, temple robbery, hierosylia, carried an 
automatic death sentence with additional penalties of loss of right to burial in 
Attica and confiscation of property. 605 
Slaves were the property of their masters and, technically, a slave-killer could 
have been liable to a prosecution under a dike blabes; Harrison argues, however, 
that the law went further and that such a killer was required to obtain purification, 
with a failure to undergo the necessary rituals rendering the killer liable to a 
graphe asebeias. 606 There are, however, two cases which suggest that a dike 
phonou could be used against slave-killers.607 Those accused of killing a slave 
were tried in the Palladion, where cases of unintentional homicides of citizens and 
intentional murders of metics and xenoi could also be heard. Ideas about 
premeditation were thus perhaps a function of issues of status, and Harrison 
tentatively suggests that the use of the Palladion could imply lesser penalties for 
defendants convicted there than for those found guilty of premeditated murders of 
citizens.608 
Lykourgos' use of eTp'Yoll TWII 1I01Lff.LWV suggests that he is referring to atimia, 
perhaps for involuntary homicide, rather than the death penalty for the intentional 
murder of a citizen, though he could be alluding to the possibility of a defendant 
going into voluntary exile at the end of his first speech.609 MacDowell suggests 
that this custom possibly derived from 'the fact that it was not practicable in early 
604 Ant. 2.a.6; [Arist.] Ath. 54.2, with Rhodes 1993; Dem. 22.26f., 24.105, 111-115, 127; 
Bonner and Smith, ii. 109f.; Harrison 1968-1971, i. 206-214, ii. 177; MacDowell 1978, 
147ff.; Todd 1993, 283f.; see too §4, above. 
60S See Ant. 5.10; Dem. 19.293; Isok. 20.6; Xen. Hell. 1.7.22; Mem. 1.2.62; Lipsius, ii. 
442f.; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 82; MacDowell 1978, 149, 176; R. Osborne 1985a, 51f; 
Todd 1993, 110; §90-92. 
606 Harrison 1968-1971, i. 169. See too Ant. 6.4f.; MacDowe111963, 20ff., 69, 126f.; 
Todd 1993, 190. 
607 Dem. 59.9f.; Isok. 18.52ff.; see too Dem. 47.72; Harrison 1968-1971, i. 169. 
608 Harrison 1968-1971, i. 169f., and 17lf., 196-199; see too Aiskhin. 2.87, with schol.; 
Ant. 5.47f.; [Arist.] Ath. 57.3, with Rhodes 1993; Dem. 21.43f., 47.70; Isok.18.52; PI. 
Euthphr. 3e7-4e8; MacDowell 1978, 80f., 114-117, 120. See too 36-39, above. 
609 See too §§40-41, above. 
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times to pursue a man beyond the boundaries of the state, perhaps combined with 
a belief that the state was not polluted by a man who had left it' .610 Harrison 
suggests that the practice became equivalent to timesis, whereby the death penalty 
'could be converted into banishment for life if the defendant fled the country 
before the end of the trial'; he accepts, however, that it is impossible to be 
'entirely dogmatic on the precise procedure in prosecutions for homicide, nor 
therefore on the rationale which lay behind it' .611 Conceivably, therefore, second 
speeches in homicide cases were for a different purpose than logoi hysteroi in 
other types of prosecution. It would, however, seem even more important in such 
cases, in view of the severity of the charge and the automatic penalty of death, 
that the defence and prosecution should be allowed to follow the standard practice 
and counter or expand upon points and arguments raised in the logoi proteroi in 
the hope of influencing the forthcoming verdict.612 
§§66-67. ou 'YQ.rJ TrpO~,.o ~'Oll ... ~1I trorrr1Plall e'~lI: It is unlikely that Athenian 
law expressly took individual circumstances into account at any stage, but 
litigants frequently used their particular condition, and especially their family, to 
elicit pity from the jurors who were hearing their case. 613 Dire poverty, however, 
seems sometimes to have been viewed as sufficiently compelling to account for 
criminal activity, and offered a possible mitigation of criminal intent, whether of 
self-prostitution or of receiving bribes as a juror: at the very least, Aiskhines 
makes use of his own moderate means to excuse a lack of litigiousness which 
might otherwise be interpreted as laxity or disinterest.614 Lykourgos is clearly 
attempting to present Leokrates' crimes and circumstances as obviating any 
610 MacDowell 1978, 119. See too Ant. 2.~.9, 4.a.l, 5.13; Dem. 23.69; MacDowell 1963, 
113ff.; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 75,186. 
611 Harrison 1968-1971, i. 198. Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 226, citing Ant. 5.10, notes that 
there is confusion about the apparent timesis in what is in fact an apagoge and which 
should therefore have been an agon atimetos. See too [Arist.] Ath. 52.1, with Rhodes 
1993. 
612 This is the impression given, at least, in the second speeches in Antiphon's 
Tetralogies. 
613 See e.g.: Ant. 3.a.2, 'Y.3; Ar. Vesp. 568-574,975-978; Athen. 13.63.1-7; Dem. 21.99, 
186,53.29; Hyp. 4 (Eux). 41; PI. Ap. 34d5-35a6. See too §§141-145, below. 
614 See Aiskhin. 3.218; see too Aiskhin. 1.74,88; Dem. 3.34, 21.182, 23.148, 24.123, 
29.22; Isok. 17.18; Lys. 7.14, 31.11f. 
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allowances that could be made; he is perhaps also intending to pre-empt any 
request that the jury take account of the services of Leokrates' synegoroi.615 
The ancient law-givers are presented as intending to inhibit activities which posed 
a clear and present danger to society, and the example is offered of the imaginary 
erasure of a single law, a crime provided with a hypothetical defence that an 
individual law was insignificant.616 The particular argument here has a twin 
aspect. First, that an individual, whether a single law or a person, does indeed 
make a difference, a stance which Lykourgos argued forcefully in §§59-64, 
above. Second, that the sophistic minimization of crimes which would devastate 
society if extrapolated to its logical conclusion inherently undermines democracy 
and can thus be categorized as a treasonable offence: consensual stability can only 
be maintained by all agreeing to abide by those laws which the community itself 
establishes and ratifies.617 
Leokrates is thus not only guilty, but as worthy of the ultimate punishment as the 
imaginary obliterator of the single law: there is every reason, therefore, for 
Lykourgos to make what is now his sixth call for the death penalty to be imposed 
on the grounds of setting a precedent for posterity.618 Since the defendant is 
mercifully one of only a small group of cowards and, in fact, the only one who 
sought personal rather than communal safety, Lykourgos argues that Leokrates 
deserves an even harsher treatment; it is therefore difficult to escape the 
impression that he is not simply urging the jury to imposing the death penalty, but 
actively paving the way for a claim for additional penalties.619 
615 See §§ 135-137, 138-140, below. 
616 Laws in the Metroon: §4, above. Forensic use and abuse of Metroon laws: Aiskhin. 
1.119; Lys. 6.8f., 30.1-6. Theory of changeability of laws: Arist. Pol. I 269a8-27 . 
617 This corresponds with Lykourgos' apparent predisposition to define even adultery as a 
threat to the democracy: introduction, 27, above; §§5-6, above. It also paves the way for 
his link between Leokrates' criminality and tyrannical aspirations: §§ 138-140, below; see 
too Plato, Rep. 571c1-576b9, who saw an intrinsic likeness between a natural criminal 
and a would-be tyrant. 
618 P d rece ent: §§7, 52-54, above. Other calls for death penalty: §§8, 26-27, 43-45, 46-
51,52-54,above, 77-78, 79,120-121,123,133-134,141-145, below. 
619 See too §§8, above, 88-89, 123, below. 
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§§68-69. 'A')'Q,J,lQ,KTW ~E ~,(J'T'Q, ••• KiJ,lauJ,loJ,l KaJ...W~ fjouMwa,uvO': The argument 
that Leokrates' behaviour could be equated to the Athenians' evacuation of the 
city during Xerxes' invasion is presented as being suggested by one of Leokrates' 
synegoroi. This was, perhaps, more an attempt at creating pre-trial influence 
through gossip than a genuinely intended defence strategy.620 It would certainly 
have been a risky ploy, for the argument could have engendered indignation more 
than resigned agreement: the majority of citizens, and therefore jurors, had after 
all remained in Athens after Khaironeia, and the decision to evacuate the city 
during the Persian wars had been a communal one intended to aid the eventual 
defence of the polis.621 
Nouhaud suggests that this would, however, have been a ridiculous defence; the 
jury simply would not have swallowed it. He argues that Lykourgos is attributing 
a ludicrous defence tactic to Leokrates in order to draw out the contrast implicit in 
the very behaviour which would have made its use as a defence theme 
impossible.622 Lykourgos is perhaps being more cynical, however. In §§ 11-13, he 
adopted a hectoring tone, criticising the jurors for their leniency towards speakers 
who strayed from the point. The line between justifiable admonition and outright 
contempt was, however, a fine one, and here he overtly argues that contempt for 
the jury is a signal characteristic of the defence. In the context of such emotive 
arguments, outrage would not only be natural, but easily manipulated and turned 
against the defence. As such, this is perhaps a conscious attempt at inciting the 
jurors with entirely specious arguments, and reinvoking the imagery of honour 
and shame with which his speech is infused. As Ober notes, 'the orator who 
succeeded in generating in his audience a group-versus-individual state of mind 
had won the day' .623 
620 Foreknowledge of defence arguments: §§14-15, 55-58, 59-64, above. 
621 Salamis: A. Pers.337-471; [Arist.] Ath. 23.1, with Rhodes 1993; Hdt. 8.40-97; Plut. 
Them. 10; Hammond 1986,237-244; Welwei 1999,57-67; §§70, 72-74, below. 
622 Nouhaud, 159f. 
623 ObeT 1989a, 166. 
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§70. 'ETE'OIl"C~ p.E1I 'Yap 0 AQ,KE~Q,'lljJIIIO(j ... TrAOOII El(j 'PO~OIl: Lykourgos is mistaken 
here, for Eteonikos was in fact responsible for blockading Mytilene in 406 B.C., 
with 50 ships, whilst Kallikratidas, assisted by Theban ships under the control of 
Thrasondas, attempted to launch a surprise night attack against the Athenian fleet 
at Arginoussai. A gale slowed the Spartans' progress and Kallikratidas was killed 
in the ensuing sea battle on the following morning. The Athenians despatched 
Theramenes and Thrasyboulos, amongst other captains, with 47 ships to rescue 
the survivors and to retrieve the corpses of the dead, the rest of the fleet sailing to 
confront Eteonikos. Again a gale intervened and the Athenians attempting to 
reach Mytilene turned back, allowing Eteonikos to escape.624 The Athenian 
generals who failed to ensure the success of the Arginoussai rescue mission were 
tried collectively and executed.625 Lykourgos should have named the Spartan 
general at Salamis as Eurybiades, who was in command of 271 triremes, 147 of 
which were under Athenian, Plataian and Khalkidian control. Themistokles held 
Athenian command but was under Eurybiades' nominal authority.626 
Adeimantos is, however, correctly named. The Corinthian commander wanted to 
withdraw his ships from Artemisium, but Themistokles prevented his desertion 
with a bribe of three talents. Themistokles had himself already been bribed by the 
Euboians, passing on one-sixth of the amount to Eurybiades together with threats 
that the Athenians would abandon Attica for Siris, an Athenian colony in Italy, if 
the Spartans withdrew, leaving the Peloponnesians to face the Persians alone at 
the isthmus.627 Herodotus reports that Adeimantos fled the battle anyway, but met 
a mysterious ship whose crew announced victory at Salamis. An incredulous 
Adeimantos was reassured that the report was true by the offer of hostages, and 
returned in time to join the victory celebrations. Herodotus notes, however, that 
this was Athens' version; the Corinthians maintained that they had played a 
624 D.S. 13.76.1-79.7,97.1-100.6; Xen. Hell. 1.6.26-38. 
625 [Arist.] Ath. 34.1; D.S. 13.101.1-7; Xen. Hell. 1.7.1-34; Mem. 1.1.18; PI. Ap. 32a9-
b7; FGH328F 142 - Philokhoros; Hammond 1986, 415f.; Buck, 49-60; Welwei 1999, 
236-240. 
626 Hdt. 8.lf., 4-15, 42-51. 
627 Hdt. 8.4f., 57-64. See too Plut. Arist. 8; Them. 11 ff.; Frost, 105, suggests that Plutarch 
incorporated the fears of all the Greeks in the single figure of Eurybiades. 
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significant and courageous role in the battle, and their version seems to have been 
generallyaccepted.628 
§70 
Lykourgos also seems to be wrong in claiming that the Aeginetan fleet wished to 
desert with Eurybiades and Adeimantos, for Herodotus records that the 
Aeginetans, especially Polykritos, provided the most distinguished service at 
Salamis. Indeed, despite their recent war with Athens, the Aeginetans aligned 
themselves with Themistokles' plans and argued, with the Athenians and 
Megarians, that battle should be joined at Salamis.629 Herodotus notes, in fact, that 
an Aeginetan vessel, trying to help an Athenian trireme under attack from a 
Samothracian ship, was itself stormed and captured in the process, and the 
Aeginetans were clearly even able to argue that they had joined battle first. 630 
The confusion of Eteonikos and Eurybiades is perhaps understandable given the 
similarity of their names and the passage of nearly a century and a half. Perhaps 
Adeimantos was remembered because his son, Aristeus, was captured in Thrace 
whilst on an embassy to Persia: being taken to Athens, he was summarily 
executed.631 Moreover, whilst the claim that the Aeginetan fleet inclined towards 
flight is contradicted by the sources, Athens and Aegina were old enemies and, 
following the defeat of the Persians, had again been at war in 458 B.C., when the 
Athenians landed on the island and besieged Aegina town. Corinth and Epidauros 
tried to help but the Athenians, under Myronides, prevailed. The Spartans, on the 
point of invading Attica under Nikomedes, engaged Athens at Tanagra and 
Aegina was spared capitulation.632 The reference could therefore reflect a tradition 
of ambivalence, if not hostility, towards Aegina. Figueira argues, indeed, that 
when Athenians and Aeginetans thought of each other it was in terms, primarily, 
of past violent encounters.633 Lykourgos clearly aims to reinforce the claim that 
628 Hdt. 8.94. 
629 Athens' war with Aegina: Hdt. 7.145.1; Thouk. 1.14.3,41.2; Hammond 1986,224, for 
whom the two powers were still at war; Figueira 1993, 130f., 146; We1wei 1999,41, 
47ff., 54ff. 
630 Hdt. 8.74, 84, 86, 90-93. 
631 Thouk. 1.60.2, 2.67. 
632 Thouk. 1.105.1-108; D.S. 11.70.2f., 78.3f.; ML 36 = GHI i.27. See too Figueira 1981, 
166-170; Figueira 1991,104-113; Figueira 1993,9-33; §§128-132. 
633 Figueira 1993, 35ff., 113-149. 
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Athens would have been abandoned by all of her allies had they not been forced 
to remain and fight, a motif which can thus be deflected onto Leokrates. 
Lykourgos' errors are, therefore, perhaps part and parcel of a somewhat 
inaccurate historicity in the orators generally. Indeed, Nouhaud suggests that the 
sources the orators used are so heavily veiled that we cannot ascertain how they 
conceived of history, let alone the sincerity with which it was used.634 Clearly 
their sincerity is suspect, though accusing them of excessive cynicism is perhaps 
unkind, for mistakes do not appear generally to have been corrected prior to 
publication.635 Various reasons might explain this fact, however, and errors do not 
necessarily indicate unawareness that a mistake had been made; speeches might 
have been intended as logo graphical advertisements or as teaching aids where 
mistakes provided valuable lessons, both as examples of what orators could get 
away with and of what should be avoided. 
Such errors cannot, in any case, be taken to indicate a general lack of historical 
knowledge, for the speed of delivery and the generally elite status of orators 
would probably serve to make their assertions appear sound. Indeed, it may even 
have been considered that such mistakes were irrelevant, since the point itself was 
generally clear and relevant.636 Most importantly, however, Lykourgos is not 
seeking to make historical points for their own sake; he will do that later: for now, 
his principal concern is to demolish potential defence arguments and to use events 
from the past to help him do so. 
§ 71. ~ 1r01I TtJ.Xe~ Ilv ~uxm TI, .•. IU'YQ)..Q,I, 41) ''rJ"iQ,I, fK//AQHQ,v: This account 
of Alexander at Athens does not accord with that of Herodotus, who reports that 
Alexander I of Macedon, son of Amyntas, acted as Xerxes' envoy under 
Mardonius' instructions. Alexander was to persuade the Athenians that, despite 
634 Nouhaud, 157, 354f.; see too Pearson 1941, passim; Habicht, passim; Ober 1989a, 
177f., 181; Worthington 1992, 18-24,37; Worthington 1994c, 113-118; §§110(ii)-111, 
below. 
635 S &'. ee too prelace, 7f., above; §§71, 122 below. 
636 S § ee §11-13, above. 
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their victory at Salamis, they could not hope to withstand Persian land forces. 
There is, however, no demand for earth and water in Herodotus' account. Rather, 
Alexander was to offer the Athenians the restoration of their erstwhile territory; 
the choice of any additional territory they desired; the renovation of temples 
destroyed by the Persians during their occupation of the city; and the retention of 
the polis' autonomy. The Athenians heard Alexander out but, to Spartan pleas not 
to capitulate to Persian demands, replied that their dignity required them to fight: 
the Spartans should have known better than to urge them to do that which was 
already in their nature.637 
Athens was, therefore, invaded for the second time in ten months. Again the city 
was found abandoned. Having discovered that the Athenians had returned to 
Salamis, Mardonius sent Mourykhides, a Greek from the Hellespont, to the island 
to urge the Athenians to see sense on the same terms as those outlined by 
Alexander. Herodotus suggests that Mardonius was hopeful that the Athenians 
might agree terms now that the whole of Attica was occupied. Mourykhides 
delivered his message to the Boule, but when the Bouleutes Lykidas suggested 
agreeing to the Persian terms, his fellow Bouleutai and the assembled crowd 
surrounded him and stoned him to death. Herodotus notes that Mourykhides 
himself escaped unscathed, but the Athenian women, incited by the news of 
Lykidas' death, gathered at the Councillor's house and stoned to death his wife 
and children.638 Lykourgos is probably conflating Alexander's reception with the 
fate of Lykidas and his family, though there were clearly conflicting accounts, for 
Demosthenes names the victim of the stoning as Kyrsilos.639 That Alexander did 
not in fact suffer the fate described by Lykourgos is further suggested by his help 
to the Athenians on the eve of the battle of Plataia. Alexander informed the 
Athenian commanders that although Mardonius was receiving unfavourable 
637 Hdt. 7.133, 8.136-144; see too Oem. 6.l1; Hammond 1986, 245f.; Hammond 1989, 
42-45; Hammond and Griffith, 98f. Earth and water: Kuhrt, passim. 
638 Hdt. 9.1-5; see too Pluto Arist. 10; § 122, below. 
639 Oem. 18.204; see too Rosivach 1987b, 240 n.22, 245, who finds the misnomer 
inexplicable in view of the rarity of the event and its translation into popular memory on 
this account; § 122, below. 
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omens from the sacrifices, he had decided to attack at dawn because of his anxiety 
at having to face possible reinforcements.64o 
§71 
There are few references to stoning to death, kataleuein, in the classical sources. 
Perhaps the most celebrated is Kassandra's threnody during Agamemnon's 
murder: other examples show Dikaiopolis threatened with stoning for treachery by 
Aristophanes' Akhamians; Demosthenes suggesting that stoning would not be 
inappropriate for those responsible for the destruction of the Phokians; and some 
Athenians stoning a band of Corinthians who had wandered onto private land 
whilst on campaign.641 Aiskhines claimed that someone who illegally hired an 
Athenian for immoral purposes should be stoned, and then sentenced to a fine of 
one obol in the drachma, the ep6belia, and convicted of hubris.642 This suggests 
that stoning did not always result in death, or at least was not meant to do so. The 
impression given by the sources, however, is that stoning was a rare and 
impulsive mass reaction rather than a legal punishment, and an excitable crowd 
might have found it difficult to stop short of killing its victim.643 Barkan, 
following Hirzel, argues that stoning represented a punishment by the community 
for crimes which affect the community as a whole.644 It would therefore perhaps 
not even have been classified as a crime, and it is in any case difficult to see how 
a mob could be prosecuted on a charge of murder. It might, however, have been 
seen as justifiable homicide, and Demosthenes could thus claim that no Athenian 
would associate his hypothetical killers with blood guilt.645 
640 Hdt. 9.44f.; Plut. Arist. 15; see too §§80-81, 82, below. 
641 See A. Ag. 1118 with Fraenkel; Ar. Akh. 285-295; Dem. 19.66; Thouk. 1.106; see too 
Hdt. 5.38,9.120; Hesykh. KamAeUel; Phot. s.v. KaTaAeUUIlLolI; Suda, S.Y. E>€ILIUTOKMov~ 
7TaiaE~, KaTaAEuuIlLolI, AEVU"T7}p. 
642 See Aiskhin. 1.163. Epobelia: Oem. 27.67, 28.18f., 45.6, 47.64,56.4; Isok. 18.3, 12, 
35; Pollux, 8.39; Harp. & Suda, S.Y. 'E7Tw$eAia; Harrison 1968-1971, ii, 183ff.; 
MacDowell 1978, 252f. 
643 Stoning as legal punishment in Macedon: Hammond 1986, 625. See too Rosivach 
1987b, passim. 
644 Barkan 1936a, 41, 49; Hirzel 1909, 247f.; see too A. Ag. 1118, 1616, with Fraenkel; 
Daube 1939, passim. 
645D em. 19.66; see too Allen 2000a, 141-146. 
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§§72-74. T'OI?,o,poW TOla.Vra.I~ %,DWIUlIOI ••• TO I<Et/>Q).o.IOII 'f"ij~ II;K'YJ~: The historical 
inaccuracies of §§70 and 71 above appear initially to be repeated here. Caution is 
necessary, however, for this is a continuation of the rebuttal of the putative 
argument that Leokrates' departure equated to Athens' evacuation, and a 
conclusion to the first part of his central section in which he tackles presumed 
defence arguments, and refutes them.646 As such, general historical accuracy is not 
at issue, though correct treatment of specific details was presumably desirable, 
and is less sacrificed to rhetorical requirements than subordinate to them. 
Thus, Kimon' s campaigns in the eastern Aegean, from Eurymedon to Cyprus, 
actions lasting from 467 B.c. to the so-called Peace of Kallias, usually dated to 
449 B.C., are dealt with in just 27 words.647 The period of Athenian hegemony is 
likewise generalized at seventy years, and there seems little point, therefore, in 
attempting to define it too closely: Demosthenes argued for seventy-three years, 
Isokrates for seventy and sixty-five, and Lysias for seventy.648 Presumably, 
Lykourgos is thinking of something like the gap between the founding of the 
Delian League in 478/7 B.C. to Aigospotamoi in 405 B.c.649 That he does not 
claim a perhaps naturally anticipated century-long hegemony might suggest that 
juror credulity was thought to have its limits. 
• ,. ~_'l_ .. "" ""-" .J. __ '~.lJ....' ... P . h h ou TO Ell ~IIII TpOTro.'OIl '" Eaeltnll O~ "/U~II"""I IJ~: ausamas saw t e trop y 
erected after Salamis.650 Although it remains unidentified, Lykourgos clearly 
assumes that the jurors are familiar with it. He seems, also, to assume that the 
jurors would understand his comment that opou) TOI) {3o.p{3ripOl~ m?~aIl'T'E) TOU) E;~ n111 
EAeu()eplo.lI 'f"ij) 'EMa<lo~, 1<0./ TOVrOU)' I<WAuO'o.lI'T'e~ Vrrep/3alllEIlI, O'UII87)l<a~ f1'(Ol~O'aIlTo. 
This seems to be a reference to the notoriously problematic Peace of Kallias, 
supposedly agreed between Persia and Athens and her allies, though Lykourgos is 
646 See §§59-64, 68-69, 70, above. 
647 Kimon's campaigns: D.S. 11.60.1-62.1; Thouk. 1.100-112; Plut. Kim. 12f., 18; 
Hammond 1986, 259f., 292f., 297f.; Meiggs 1972,73-87, 92ff., 101-108; WeI wei 1999, 
83-91. Athens' leagues: §42, above. Peace of Kallias: this section, below. 
648 Oem. 9.23; Isok. 4.106,12.56; Lys. 2.55. 
649 The original fllfll'l]KOliTa seems more natural than the emended i(3aO/.L'I]KOllTa, and would 
allow a more credible period of hegemony from Marathon in 490 B.C., though counting 
to Aigospotamoi in 405 still does not account for ninety years. 
650 Paus. 1.36.1. 
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not explicit despite apparently detailing some of its articles. Specifically, he 
mentions two clauses that could be considered to have particular relevance to 
Leokrates: the Persians should not sail away from their own land - they should 
not, at least, sail warships beyond Phaselis and Kyanea; and all the Greeks should 
be autonomous - an ideal overtly threatened by Leokrates' actions, as far as 
Lykourgos is concerned. 
These clauses appear elsewhere. Demosthenes, Diodorus and Isokrates all refer to 
the limitation on the Persians' freedom to sail.651 There are some slight variations: 
Demosthenes locates the boundary beyond which the Persians may not sail at the 
Khelidonian islands, though the region is clearly the same, and Diodorus repeats 
the autonomy clause, but presents it as referring only to the Ionian Greeks.652 
From these sources, however, other clauses can be added: the King was not to 
travel within one day's ride of the coast;653 his satraps were not to sail further than 
three days away from Persia, though presumably within the set boundaries;654 the 
Persians were not to invade Attica;655 and the Persian army was not to march 
beyond the Halys river.656 There is considerable consistency in such reporting, but 
all that can be said with reasonable certainty is that fighting appears to have 
stopped in or around 451 B.C.; that Thoukydides (and indeed all other fifth-
century sources with the possible exception of Lysias, if he can be taken to be a 
fifth-century source), fails to mention any such treaty; and that scholarly debate 
about the issue has been more vigorous and vehement than about perhaps any 
other issue in Athenian history.657 
651 Oem. 19.273f.; Diod. 12.4.5; Isok. 4.ll8ff., 7.80,12.59. 
652 Oem. 19.273f.; Diod. 12.4.5. 
653 Dem. 19.273f. 
654 Diod. 12.4.5. 
655 Diod. 12.4.5. 
656 Isok. 7.80, 12.59. 
657 Primary references to a Peace, to limitations imposed on the King, to non-specific 
negotiations, or obvious missed opportunities for a reference: Oem. IS .29, 19.273 f.; 
D.S. 12.4.4-6; Hdt. 7.151; Isok. 4.118ff., 7.80,12.59; Lys. 2.56f.; Paus. 1.8.3; Plut. Kim. 
13 - based on Krateros, there is notably no reference in Per. 12; Thouk. 3.10.4; FGH 
104F 1(13) - Aristodemos. Secondary treatments: Meiggs 1972, 129-151,487-495, 
with an extremely full list of references cited; see too, particularly, Sealey 1954, passim; 
Stockton, passim; Sealey 1960, passim; Meiggs 1963, 10-19; Meritt and Wade-Gery 
1963, 106f.; Eddy, passim; Badian 1993, passim. 
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Thoukydides' silence is not conclusive, however, for if he is guilty of suppression 
in this respect, it would not be the only occasion. He fails, for example, to 
mention the battle at Oinoe which was even depicted in the Stoa Poikile and seen 
by Pausanias - perhaps the engagement too clearly demonstrated Athenian 
aggression.658 Yet Theopompos too had reservations about the existence of a 
Peace, though it is far from clear what his argument against it was. All that can 
reasonably be reconstructed is a report that he claimed that the inscribed letters 
were Ionic and not Attic.659 This demonstrates, for Meiggs, that for a forgery, this 
was a publicly acknowledged one, but Theopompos cannot be taken at face value 
any more than Thoukydides, for he was not an Athenian, nor an admirer of 
Athens, and was writing more than a century after the events he was describing. 
Indeed, the issue of the Ionic letters may be a red herring, for Meiggs lists various 
alternative explanations: the style was perhaps a conscious gesture to the allies; 
the inscription might have been damaged, perhaps by the Thirty, and reinscribed 
in the fourth century; the stele itself was possibly from the late fifth century when 
Ionic lettering was more common, and perhaps recorded a renewal of the treaty in 
424-423 B.C., incorporating the text of the earlier one.660 Indeed, as Meiggs 
notes, 'it is difficult to see why, if there had been no previous agreement, Darius 
should wish to make a treaty with Athens in the middle of the Peloponnesian War. 
There is considerably less difficulty if the treaty was a renewal' .661 
The Peace of Kallias remains a matter of speculation and inference. If there was 
an official Peace, then it would have been public knowledge, and with the threat 
officially over, the allies could be expected to revolt from the Athenian Empire. 
Such revolts did occur, but this itself is not decisive, for if there was no official 
Peace, then there was no public decision to abandon operations against Persia, and 
Athens could keep applying pressure to her allies until they did in fact rebel.662 
Without a formal Peace, however, it is more difficult to explain the clear problems 
Athens had in procuring phoros between 449 and 446 B.C. In 449 itself, Andros, 
which had paid 12 talents in 450, paid only 6; others in that year paid in two 
6S8 Paus. 1.15. If.; see too Meiggs 1972,97,469-472. 
659 FGH 115F 154 - Theopompos = Harp. s.v. 'ATT'KO'~ 'YpaIl4LQnl lI. 
660 Meiggs 1972, 131, 136ff.; see too And. 3.29; Thouk. 4.50; IGii28 = ML 70. 
661 Meiggs 1972, 135. 
662 See too ML 45 = GHli.67; Mattingly. passim, esp. 161f.; Meiggs 1972,134,152-174. 
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instalments, others late. In 448, there was no tribute at all, at least there is no 
evidence for any payments. The list for 447 is the shortest except for that of the 
first year, and nine states paid late, whilst many paid only part of their tribute. 
More significantly, perhaps, many states are listed twice for 446, and there were 
widespread reductions when the terms were renegotiated at the Greater 
Panathenaia.663 It is difficult to see why these payments should be at issue in these 
very years if there was no Peace in 449 B.C. 
Clearly, any treaty between Athens and Persia is ignored by the fifth-century 
sources, and in Plutarch's Perikles. The fourth-century sources, particularly 
Demosthenes, Isokrates and Lykourgos are, too, part and parcel of a clear 
reinvention of fifth-century history which encompasses both the Themistokles 
decree and the oath of Plataia.664 It is impossible to ignore the issue, and equally 
impossible to reach a definite conclusion. On balance, although the silence of the 
fifth-century sources together with the nature of the fourth-century sources is 
deeply worrying, and at least creates a strong impression that there was no official 
Peace, Meiggs is probably right that 'the reasons for accepting it, though not yet 
decisive, are stronger' .665 None the less, whether there was a Peace of Kallias or 
not, its existence was evidently widely accepted by the second half of the fourth 
century, and its use before jurors, here by Lykourgos, and particularly by 
Demosthenes who specifically names it after Kallias, clearly implies that the 
jurors believed in it, and were expected to do so. 
§§75-76. Ka.'TQ, iJp.e'~ T;lIa TpOn-oll ••• Vrrep WII 6EwlI Tlp.trJptiyralriE: Lykourgos is 
now at the heart of his prosecution, an appeal to tradition and oaths.666 His 
personal involvement here probably cannot be overstated, though the usual 
attribution of widespread fourth-century reform of the ephebeia to Lykourgos 
663 See e.g.: ATL iii. 30-36, 59f., 281, 298ff.; ML 46; ML 50 = GHI i.38; Meiggs 1972, 
153f., 157-174, 242ff., 524-530, 538-561. 
664 See too §§ 77-78, 80-81, 108-l10(i), 11O(ii)-ll1, below. Themistokles decree: ML 
23, with references cited. 
665 Meiggs 1972, 133f. 
666 See introduction, 37f., above. Subordination of historical accuracy to these themes: 
§§70, 71, above, 110(ii)-lll, 122, below. See too 80-81, below. 
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lacks evidence, and seems to be based mainly on his honorary decree for 
Epikrates because of his law concerning the institution. Certainly Plutarch, despite 
describing Lykourgos' reforms at length, does not mention such a reform, and 
Stratokles' honorary decree is equally silent in this respect.667 None the less, 
Epikrates' legislation was passed in the Lykourgan period, and the reform of such 
an institution corresponds well not only with Lykourgos' own programme of 
regeneration, but also with the focus on past ideals and the reinvention of Athens' 
fifth-century history which belong to this period and which was, perhaps, most 
visible in Lykourgos' reforms.668 He can certainly rely on the full moral, social 
and political authority gained through all such services to his city. Indeed, his 
reference to the ephebeia itself, as an institution, is oblique: the jurors presumably 
know full well his involvement, or at least interest, in its development. His focus 
is rather on the oath that the ephebes swore, and on the divine opprobium 
inevitably generated by its violation.669 Lykourgos thus locates his entire 
prosecution in his own outrage and that of the gods, an outrage that the jurors will 
fail to share at their peril, not least because of the oath that they themselves have 
sworn.
670 
Lykourgos argues that Leokrates might have avoided taking the ephebic oath 
which, he asserts, was sworn by all citizens who were registered in the A'YJg,aPX'KOIl 
'Ypa/14MLTfloll. This register was kept at deme level and only those so registered at 
the age of eighteen counted as citizens.671 It is difficult to see how one could have 
avoided swearing the oath if this were really the case, but evasion was clearly 
considered possible. More important, however, is the characterization, both 
throughout the speech and specifically here, of Leokrates as the sort of person 
who would evade such a duty and who would, therefore, indeed flee Athens; such 
a person could not fail to bring divine displeasure and retribution upon his own 
667 See introduction, 20f., above. 
668 See too §§80-81, below. 
669 §§77-78, below. 
670 See §§11-13, above, 77-78, 79, 90-92, below. 
671 Aiskhin. 1.18, 103; [Arist.] Ath. 42.1, with Rhodes 1993; Oem. 57.26,61; Harp., 
Hesykh. & Phot. s.v. A'Y}SIfJ.PX1KOII 'YP04J.#I.aTEIOII; Is. 7.27f.; Harrison 1968-1971, i. 74, ii. 
205ff.; MacDowell 1978, 69f.; Whitehead 1986,97-103; Todd 1993,180. 
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head.672 Lykourgos is clearly trying on this occaSIon, moreover, to put the 
defendant in a dilemma: he either swore the oath, in which case he violated his 
vow, or he failed to swear it, and evaded a duty incumbent upon all pious and 
patriotic citizens.673 
Having taken the oath, ephebes served for two years, an apprenticeship in 
citizenship after which they received full political rights excluding, until age 
thirty, magisterial office and jury service. Similarly, they were not permitted to 
conduct prosecutions, except in cases of inheritance, during their service; they 
were, however, allowed to perform duties associated with hereditary 
priesthoods.674 The precise age at which service started is debated: Aristotle's 
';K'rWKa;~€Ka ET'Y} 'Y€'YOJ,lOTe~ has been interpreted both as age eighteen, and the start 
of the eighteenth year, i.e. age seventeen.675 In a society where the number six is a 
fundamental counting block, however, Rhodes' suggestion that registration and 
ephebic service both commenced after the eighteenth birthday, i.e. in the 
nineteenth year of the ephebe's life, seems more natural.676 In their first year, 
ephebes toured the sanctuaries, undergoing what both Schwenk and de Marcellus 
have suggested was effectively political and religious indoctrination.677 After 
proceeding to the Peiraieus, some were garrisoned at Mounykhia, others at Akte, 
and all underwent training in hop lite warfare, archery, javelin throwing and 
catapult firing. The cadets received four obols a day, most or all of which they 
seem to have handed over for maintenance.678 At the start of their second year, 
they assembled at the theatre, displaying the shield and spear which they now 
received from the city: they then patrolled the borders of Attica, garrisoned in 
fortresses around the polis' boundaries.679 
672 See too Arist. Rhet. 1376a30-32, 1395bl-1396a3, 1402aI8-22, 1402b13-1403al; 
§§90-92, 93, 94-97, below. 
673 'Catch-22' for trade defence: §§26--27, 55-58, above. 
674 [Arist.] Ath. 42.5, with Rhodes 1993. 
675 [Arist.] Ath. 42.1, with Rhodes 1993; see too Sealey 1957, passim; lM. Carter, 
passim; Golden, passim. 
676 Rhodes 1993, 497f. See too Pelekidis, 87-101; de Marcellus, 2lff.; §§36--39, above. 
677 Schwenk 1985, 126; de Marcellus, 155; see too Humphreys 1985a, 206ff. 
678 [Arist.] Ath. 42.3, with Rhodes 1993. 
679 See [Arist.] Ath. 42.4, with Rhodes 1993; Xen. Por. 4.51 f., with Gauthier 1976; 
Pouilloux, 80ff.; Ober 1980, 90f.; de Marcellus, 5-23, 50-84, 123-169. See too 
McCredie, 88-91; Bosworth 1988, 209f.; Sekunda 1990, 152f.; Hunter 1994, 15lff. 
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Cadets were supervised by sophronistai who were paid a daily rate of one 
drachma and who received and administered the ephebes' maintenance monies; 
three candidates of at least forty years of age were chosen from each tribe by the 
fathers of the ephebes, the demos electing one from each group of three. The 
demos also elected a single kosmetes who was responsible for the ten sophronistai 
and the cadets under their care.680 It is unclear whether these officers served for 
one year, or for the two years of a complete ephebic cycle, though at the end of 
their service they were often honoured with honorific decrees.681 Reinmuth argues 
that the 'earliest ephebic inscription', which honours the kosmetes Autolykos, 
demonstrates that the institution of the ephebeia pre-dated Lykourgos' reforms.682 
Mitchel disagrees, stressing that the inscriptional evidence is fragmentary and 
unsafe: from an epigraphical perspective, 'one would have to imagine a truly 
anomalous stele to believe that ... [the] fragments ever belonged together'; for 
Mitchel, Reinrnuth' s prosopographical evidence, too, is doubtful, and rather than 
underscoring an attempt to place the inscription in 361 B.C. in the archonship of 
Nikophemos, reinforces instead a dating in the mid_330s.683 
There was certainly a law concerning the ephebeia in some respect which was 
proposed by Epikrates and passed around 335 B.C., and which received an 
honorary decree from Lykourgos.684 The nature of the law, however, and the 
extent of Lykourgos' involvement in it, is far from clear. Reinmuth argues that 
any reform could not have concerned the compulsory nature of the ephebeia, 
since Aristotle clearly indicates that ephebic service became compulsory in the 
wake of Thrasyboulos' constitution, the eleventh, of 40312 B.c. Aristotle, 
however, despite claiming that the constitution of that time continued into his 
own, does not specifically mention the ephebeia. More convincing is the 
argument that the Athenians would have been unlikely to pass radical legislation 
in the immediate aftermath of Khaironeia and the decree against tyranny.685 
680 [Arist.] Ath. 42.2-3, with Rhodes 1993. 
681 One year: Reinmuth 1971b, 81; Two years: Rhodes 1993,504. See too Pelekidis, 103-
117; de Marcellus, 21ff. 
682 Reinmuth 1971b, 1-4, 123-138; see too Mitchel 1965, 197f. 
683 Mitchel 1975, passim, esp.238, 242f.; see too Harding 1985 #108 = IG ii2 156. 
684 Harp. s.v. 'E7I'IKpQ.'M}S'; Wilamowitz 1893, i. 193f.; Pelekidis, 12ff.; Reinmuth 1971b, 
123ff. 
685 Reinmuth 1971b, 126ff., citing [Arist.] Ath. 41.2. 
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Reinmuth therefore concludes that the likeliest reform in the 330s is that of 
continuous, as opposed to seasonal, service, together with syssitia lifestyle and 
extended pay for the entire period; this transfonned the institution from a military 
to an educational one and incorporates the innovation of the sophronistai, to 
whom honours are conspicuously lacking before this date.68b 
Such refonns have a Laconizing feel, however, and might be likelier in a post-
Leuktra context, when the Spartans were perceived as a reduced threat and 
imitation was more tolerable. Thus the refonns of around 335 B.C. were perhaps 
part of an on-going programme of reorganization stretching back into the fifth 
century. Certainly, one measure, clearly pre-dating Aristotle by some time, made 
one of the ten strategoi specifically responsible for the khora; epigraphical 
evidence seems to locate this reform no later than 352/1 B.C., and Ober connects 
it with ephebic refonns of386-351 B.c.687 There was also a change to the way in 
which ephebes were listed, their names being inscribed in bronze rather than 
painted on whitewashed tablets, though this is impossible to date.688 
None the less, de Marcellus suggests that the word 'ephebic' was used before 
335 B.C. only in the limited context of citizenship initiation and that 'ephebe' 
was, therefore, a technical term for one becoming a citizen. He sees the creation 
of the ephebeia as an institution per se by Epikrates during Lykourgos' 
administration, for which he was honoured by Lykourgos with a bronze statue for 
his law.689 Rhodes accepts that 'it was Epikrates in the 330s who converted the 
it/Yr}{3Ela, into a period of full-time national service for all young citizens', but 
argues that since the ephebes were supplied with equipment, service was limited 
to the hoplite class despite the fact that theres, too, were inscribed in the deme 
• 690 
regIster. 
686 Reinmuth 1971 b, 127-135. 
687 [Arist.] Ath. 61.1, with Rhodes 1993; IG ii2 204; FGH 328F 155 - Philokhoros; 
Ober 1980, 89ff. 213f. 
688 [Arist.] Ath. 53.4, with Rhodes 1993. 
689 d M e arcellus, 43ff., 48f., 136ff., 154f. 
690 Rhodes 1993, 495, 503; see too Ruschenbusch 1979, passim; Rhodes 1980a, passim. 
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For Reinmuth, it is asking too much of credulity to believe 'that a program so 
hostile to Macedonia in its intent could have been taken at this time, and that if it 
had been launched, it was not forthwith quashed'~ he suggests that 'it would be 
difficult to choose a more unlikely time for the establishment of a new military-
educational institution'. 691 Yet the oath taken by the ephebes has a primarily 
defensive feel, and de Marcellus claims that, in any case, Macedon had other 
concerns and was not necessarily interested in or worried about Athens in this 
period: this does not prove that the ephebeia was not reformed after Khaironeia.(J92 
Yet reform is not the same as creation, and although it is probably unwise to push 
the institution back too far, something clearly pre-dated the ephebic measures of 
the 330s.693 Indeed, Aiskhines insisted that he spent two years at the frontier 
immediately after registration~ he was presumably already middle-aged when he 
made the claim in 343 B.C., and his service perhaps coincides with reforms in the 
post-Leuktra period.694 Moreover, although Demosthenes later alleged that 
Aiskhines had instead served as clerk and menial of minor officials at this time, 
and then became a bit-part actor after being sacked, Aiskhines clearly believed 
that the jurors would at least find his claim plausible.695 
The origins, institution and reforms of the ephebeia are impossible to reconstruct 
fully, as is Lykourgos' own part in that process. The institution should be 
accepted as pre-dating the 335 B.c. reforms, not least because earlier measures 
are unlikely to be connected merely to a limited context of citizenship initiation. 
Lykourgos clearly had a powerful effect on the institution, none the less, and 
something happened in 335 B.C. that was sufficiently significant for Epikrates' 
legislation to be deemed deserving of particular honour by Lykourgos. It was 
sufficiently significant, too, for Lykourgos' involvement to be patently obvious to 
the jurors, and for him to be fully prepared to use it to his own advantage, and to 
Leokrates' disadvantage. 
691 Reinmuth 1952, 48f 
692 de Marcellus, 140f., 161-69. Oath: §§77-78, below. 
693 Ephebeia as ancient: Pelekidis, 71-79; Vidal-Naquet, 151-174, esp. 173f. See too 
Winkler, passim; Parker 1996, 253ff. 
694 Aiskhin. 2.167f.: notably service apears to be envisaged as continuous, which it should 
not be if such a reform belongs to the 330s. 
695 Oem. 18.26lf. 
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§§77-78. (3oUAolUJ.t~· V~ tUcoOuat -roD OPKOlJ ... TO') IJ.tKPO') p.O)J.Oll OP'Yt~O#UlIOt: The 
reference to ancient laws and traditional views in §§75-76 suggests that the 
ephebic oath was of some antiquity. This alone seems to negate the possibility that 
Lykourgos himself instituted the oath which is read to the jurors. Whether the 
official would have had, or needed, a text is unclear; the transcript presumably 
derives from a fourth-century inscription from Akharnai, though it is impossible 
to know when it was added to the text.696 
The oath, also preserved in Pollux, is as difficult to date as the ephebeia itself.697 
Although a fourth-century date would correspond with the contemporary 
idealization of the past, Siewert argues that the oath has echoes in fifth-century 
literature.698 Indeed, as he notes, the oath not only contains numerous archaic 
words and concepts, but the phraseology is also ancient; thus an even earlier date 
cannot be ruled out. There is, however, a clear possibility of intentional 
archaicism, as de Marcellus warns, and deliberate efforts to incorporate the 
elements that Siewert discusses cannot be dismissed.699 The oath was thus perhaps 
originally a traditional citizenship oath which became formally connected with the 
ephebeia at some point in the process of reform. Siewert, at least, suggests that 
loyalty to laws and authority are 'fundamental for the citizen's attachment to his 
polis, so one will hardly assume that the content of the oath depends upon the 
existence of the Athenian institution of cadet-training (ephebeia)'. 700 
The ephebic oath was sworn in the sanctuary of Aglauros on the north side of the 
Acropolis.701 There is an extensive list of witnesses to the oath. Naturally named 
first is Aglauros herself, the daughter of Kekrops who, with her sister Herse, 
disobeyed the injunction not to look into Athene's basket: discovering 
696 GHI ii.204, 5-20. See too §§80--81, below. 
697 Pollux 8.105f.; Harding 1985, 133ff. #109, also citing C. Stobaeus, Florilegium, 43.48. 
698 Siewert 1977,passim, citing A. Pers. 956-962, S. Ant. 663-671, Thouk. 1.144,2.37; 
see too Lofberg 1925, 332ff.; Reinmuth 1952, 40ff.; Pelekidis, 113; Garlan 1975, 174ff. 
Fourth-century views of past: §§72-74, above, 80--81, 11O(ii)-111, below. 
699 de Marcellus, 123; Siewert 1977, passim, esp. 109-111. 
700 Siewert 1977, 102. 
701 D em. 19.303; E. Ion, 492-498. 
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Erikhthonios inside, the siblings became mad and leapt to their death.702 Aglauros 
is followed by Hestia, goddess of the hearth of the oikos. Enyo, Enyalios and Ares 
form a distinct group of deities: Enyalios is attested as a Mycenaean war god 
whose partner is Enyo; in the Iliad, the name becomes an epithet of Ares, and 
Burkert notes that Ares Enyalios becomes a conflated individual identity who 
received a cult. 703 These deities seem to represent the defence and preservation of 
the home, the wider polis, and the religious life of both. Thallo, Auxo, and 
Hegemone appear conversely to be personifications of the success, prosperity and 
leadership which the ephebes swore to preserve and try to improve during their 
service; Herakles is one of the 'figures who cross the chthonic-Olympian 
boundary' and can, in this context, perhaps be seen as the personification of the 
deification of dead heroes, though Burkert suggests that Herakles is particularly 
appropriate for ephebes, 'for there is something forever youthful about the hero 
who is always wandering, fighting and nowhere at home' .704 
Lykourgos argued earlier that ancient law-makers intended to preclude serious 
offences by legislating harshly for minor crimes. 70S Here, with five rhetorical 
questions, he argues that major offences will be easy to commit if minor crimes 
alone are punished severely, a claim that sets up his seventh call for the death 
penalty to be imposed upon the defendant. 706 
§79. Ka.' pHJlI cL Q,1I~' ••• ri.~IUJ#' 1l~PITr;1rT'E': At the outset, Lykourgos argued 
that democracy was upheld by three fundamental safeguards: the organization of 
the laws, the jury's vote, and the procedure by which crimes were handed over to 
the Dikasteria.707 This tripartite arrangement is now adduced to the constitution 
702 Paus. 1.2.6, 1.18.2. A third sister, Pandrosos, obeyed Athene' s order and survived. Her 
sanctuary, the Pandrosion, was incorporated into the Western area of the Erekhtheion: 
Wycherley 1978, 143ff. See too Burkert, 229. 
703 Burkert, 169-171. 
704 Burkert, 208, 211. 
70S See §§9, 65, 66-67, above. 
706 0 h t er calls for death penalty: §§8, 26-27,43-45,46-51,52-54,66-67, above, 79, 
120-121, 123, 133-134, 141-145, below. 
707 §3, above. 
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itself, whose components are the archon, juror and idiotes who perform the 
functions of this division of political responsibility. What binds everything 
together is the oath, for the gods know perjurers even if humans cannot know 
when they are being deceived. 708 To avoid divine retribution on themselves or 
their descendants, therefore, the jurors must act in accordance with their dikastic 
oath, just as Lykourgos has fulfilled his own citizen's oath by bringing his 
prosecution.709 
§§80-81. ~,lnrEp W Q,lI~pE~ ••• D.uefJe;~: The oath of Plataia which is read out 
presents problems similar to those posed by the Peace of Kallias and the ephebic 
oath.7lO Siewert suggests that Lykourgos used an original document, a version of 
the oath being inserted in the speech later.711 Certainly the clerk's actual words 
cannot be reconstructed from our text, and it is impossible to know exactly which 
version of the oath was appended to the text, and when. Even greater difficulties, 
however, exist with regard to the content and authenticity of the oath, which 
Theopompos claimed to be nothing but a boastful fraud of the Athenians.712 
Meiggs defines two traditions for the oath: literary and epigraphical. He argues 
that the literary tradition derives from Diodorus, probably following Ephorus, 
whereas the epigraphical evidence is the fourth-century Akharnaian stele which 
preserves the ephebic oath.7\3 There are several differences between the two 
traditions. In the epigraphical tradition, the oath is taken by the Athenians, rather 
than by the allies generally, and although Lykourgos' generalized tithing clause, 
708 Archon's oath: [Arist.] Ath. 3.3, 7.1, 55.5, with Rhodes, 1993; §20 with n.378, above. 
Dikastic oath: §§ 11-13, above. Ephebic/traditional citizen oath: §§77-78, above, 80-81, 
below. 
709 See too Dover 1994,248-251; Burkert, 250-254; §§11-13, 14-15, above, 90-92. 93, 
94-97, below. 
710 §§72-74, 77-78, above. 
711 Siewert 1972, 9, 107f. 
712 FGH 115F 153 - Theopompos. See too Sealey 1960, passim; Siewert 1972, 14ff.; 
§§74-74, 77-78,above, 104-107, below. 
713 Meiggs 1972, 155f., 504-507, citing D.S. 11.29.2, GHI ii.204, 23-51. See too 
Raubitschek 1960,passim; §§77-78, above. 
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not mentioned by Diodorus, does appear, it refers specifically to Thebes.714 
Athens, Sparta and Plataia are explicitly named in the inscription, whereas the 
literary tradition has a general clause of protection. There is, moreover, no 
reference in the inscription to the clause, notable in the literary tradition, which 
forbade the rebuilding of temples and shrines. Meiggs suggests that the 
differences in the two traditions are understandable, as the stele, ca. 360 B.C., 
reflects a time of hostility to Thebes: the temples are not mentioned because they 
had already been rebuilt; and Medizers were not in fact tithed, though Thebes' 
enemies fondly envisaged such a fate. 7 I 5 
The temple clause of the literary tradition is mirrored by an oath attributed to the 
Ionians, presumably after the Ionian revolt; according to Isokrates, the Ionians 
called down curses upon anyone who disturbed or desired to renovate the ruins of 
their burnt temples.716 Isokrates notably fails, however, to mention any 
comparable oath taken by the mainland Greeks, and Meiggs' suggestions that the 
mainland Greeks copied the Ionians, or that the orator's memory was possibly 
faulty does not really explain the silence adequately, particularly since the 
reference to the Ionian oath immediately follows a discussion of the Persian 
devastation of Hellenic temples: the context seems to demand a reference. 717 Yet 
Isokrates is at pains to demonstrate the implacable hatred of the Hellenes towards 
the Persians, and the way in which it differed from that felt towards other 
enemies; thus he argues that although enmities were generally forgotten when 
peace had broken out, Persian atrocities were always remembered.118 He felt, 
perhaps, that the failure to observe the temple clause undermined his point. For 
Meiggs, the absence of the clause from the Akharnaian stele can also be 
explained, for the inscription was hortatory, and probably edited to suit the 
circumstances: there was little reason to include a clause that would have 
reminded the Athenians that they had broken this part of their oath.719 
714 Diodorus following Ephoros: Siewert 1972, 107f. Diodorus' source, probably 
Ephoros, ultimately derived from Herodotus 7.132, who places tithing clause before 
Thermopylai: Meiggs 1972, 504. 
715 Meiggs 1972,505, citing Xen. Hell. 6.3.20. 
716 Isok. 4.156. 
717 Meiggs 1972,505; Isok. 4.155. 
718 Isok. 4.157ff. 
719 Meiggs 1972,505. 
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Siewert, however, does not accept that the temple clause formed any part of the 
original oath. He argues that since the temple of Athene in Plataia was clearly 
rebuilt, and because the majority of Greeks would not have needed such a clause 
since their temples had not been damaged, it was added later.720 Siewert also notes 
several oddities in the wording of the clause and suggests that these, together with 
Isokrates' silence, point to a conflation with Ephoros. 721 Siewert's view has the 
clear advantage of not requiring an explanation for the rebuilding programme 
which followed: if there was no reference to temples in the oath then there is no 
problem with their reconstruction. For Meiggs, however, 'the positive reasons for 
accepting the clause are that it explains facts which need explaining and to forge 
an oath that was deliberately broken presupposes a perversity rare even among 
forgers,.722 Yet Meiggs' view of a cessation of building activity followed by a 
sudden resumption in the early 440s was based upon a survey of evidence which 
was updated in his supplementary bibliography to incorporate arguments that at 
least imply a continuity of such activity, and which serve to support Siewert's 
opinion.723 
Despite the possible explanations for Isokrates' failure to mention the temple 
clause, and its omission from the Akhamaian stele, the silence of both in this 
respect is worrying. Since, moreover, there appears to have been little or no 
interruption to Athens' building programme, it is difficult to accept the clause as 
part of an original oath despite the difficulties that exist in explaining its insertion 
if it is taken as a later addition. It is, however, just as di fficult, if not more so, to 
assess the authenticity of the oath of Plataia per se. Again, the fifth-century 
sources are silent, and the possible derivation of the literary tradition from 
Herodotus, suggested by Meiggs, is undermined by Herodotus' attribution of the 
tithe clause, the only part of the putative oath that he mentions, to the time of 
Thermopylai rather than Plataia.724 Herodotus' silence, indeed, is particularly 
720 Siewert 1972, 102-106. 
721 Siewert 1972,17-45. 
722 Meiggs 1972, 505. 
723 Meiggs 1972, 504-507, with supplementary bibliography: 596ff., citing Rhys 
Carpenter, The Architects of the Parthenon, London, 1970, and J.S. Boersma, Athenian 
Building Policy from 56110 to 40514 B.C., Groningen, 1970. 
724 See n.714, above. 
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damning because there is no reason for the oath to be ignored, especially given the 
context of his explanation for, and the opportunity to moralize about, the absence 
of Persian corpses in the precinct of Demeter after the battle of Plataia: the 
goddess refused to admit the Persians because they had burnt her sanctuary at 
Eleusis.725 As with the Peace of Kallias, the silence of the fifth-century sources, 
and the nature of those of the fourth, is deeply worrying.726 Here, though, there is 
at least a strong impression that there was no oath until it was 'invented' in the 
fourth century: on this occasion, Theopompos was perhaps right. 
Such an invention, however, reqmres an explanation, and despite Isokrates' 
failure to mention an oath of Plataia, his works provide at least a partial answer, 
for they trace the development of Athenian ideas of Athens' status and place in 
the fourth-century Greek world. The Panegyrikos of about 380 B.C. reflects a 
time of Spartan hegemony and increasing Theban power: Athens' decline is 
explicitly noted, and the Greek world urged to unite under the two former super-
powers.727 More significant, however, is the rosy view of the fifth-century empire, 
for despite recognizing the criticisms that could be made of Athenian imperialism, 
Isokrates is 'carried away by his own eloquence [and] ... can even expect his 
audience to believe that the cleruchies should have been popular'. 728 Isokrates 
clearly believed his own propaganda, for despite a tirade against the idiocy of the 
fifth-century democracy in On the Peace, ca. 355 B.C., his Panathenaikos, written 
in very old age probably in the late 340s, revisits the sentiments of the 
Panegyrikos of nearly 40 years earlier.729 Yet in the 380s, Athens was founding 
the second empire on a very different basis, and the fact that the allies did not 
share Athens' fond view of her former hegemony is demonstrated by the 
conciliatory wording ofthe so-called Aristoteles decree.73o 
72S Hdt. 9.65. 
726 See §§72-74, above. 
727 Isok. 4. 16ff., 120. See too D.S. 15.20.1-30.4; Isok. 14.13-28; Plut. Pel. 4.4-5.3; Xen. 
Hell. 5.2.1-5.4.66; Hammond 1986,466--470, 482ff.; Hamilton 1997, 53ff.; Munn 1997, 
75-78. 
728 Meiggs 1972, 399, citing Isok. 4.103-106; see too Isok. 4.107-109, 115-119. 
729 Isok. 8.77-89, 12.53-73. 
730 §42, above. 
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Moreover, although Isokrates had criticized the fonner empire, his complaint was 
located far more in the radical nature of the democracy of that time.731 This theme 
was expanded in the Areopagitikos, probably written, like On the Peace, in the 
mid-350s: a return to what was effectively an oligarchy, with power situated in an 
elite Council of Areopagites, is proposed as the sole safeguard for future 
prosperity and the only guarantee against the disaster confronting the city.732 That 
such ideas could be voiced might indicate no more, perhaps, than the inherent 
conservatism of a democracy under pressure. That they could be acted out in 
reality within a decade or so indicates that they were not merely the flights of 
fancy of just one politically-embittered rhetorician.733 
It is significant, however, that in the one discourse where Isokrates could be 
expected to place a Plataia oath, namely the Plataikos, he fails to do SO.734 Yet in 
such an environment, the past was clearly open to widespread reinvention, not just 
reinterpretation; indeed, Athens' claim to hereditary greatness seems to have 
facilitated the rewriting of more than just the history of the fifth-century 
empire.735 The Akhamaian stele may have been part of just such a process, hence 
it is specifically the Athenians who are parties to the oath and the Thebans who 
are to be tithed. The composite nature of the stele's version is, indeed, perhaps 
best demonstrated by this tithing clause, placed by Herodotus at the time of 
Thermopylai and thus ignored by Diodorus, and presumably by Ephoros too. A 
broken temple clause would clearly not suit such purposes, even if it really had 
been an early component of the literary tradition. The Akharnaian stele is not, 
however, necessarily a work of wilful misrepresentation even if there appears to 
be an intentional attempt at creating a veneer of authenticity by inscribing the 
Plataia oath immediately below the genuine ephebic article; the Athenians were, 
731 Isok. 8.75f. 
732 I k 7 . so .. passlm. 
733 Areopagos legislation: §§52-54, above. 
734 Isok. 14. passim. This is especially noticeable in 58ff., where Isokrates puts into the 
Plataian envoy's mouth explicit references to Plataian memorials to Athenian courage in 
the Persian wars, and to the honours due to the gods and heroes to whom successful 
sacrifices were the prelude to a decisive and critical victory for Greek freedom. 
735 See Fuks, 8ff., 95; Perlman 1961, 164ff.; Walters, passim; Fisher 1994, 356f., 362ff.; 
§§83-87, 104-107, 108-110(i), below. 
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after all, reworking their own history for their own purposes. It seems unlikely, 
however, that their history comprised any such swearing of such an oath. 
§82. OiiTw T'OllIlJlI ••• 'TrOlI'rJPIQ,1I KQ,-raJ..\JO~II: Lykourgos' claim that the Athenians 
won the greatest renown at Plataia is understandable within its own rhetorical 
context. Herodotos, though, saw things differently, and thought that the Spartans 
deserved the most praise.736 For Plutarch, however, Herodotus' claim that only the 
Athenian, Spartan and Tegean contingents actually engaged with the enemy is 
disproved by the casualty figures: the allies lost just 1,360 men, compared to 
around 250,000 Persians, but these figures clearly exceed the total of the 52 
Athenians, 91 Spartans, and 16 Tegeans who fell. 737 Athens and Sparta were 
therefore only the foremost of those who could claim the greatest contribution to 
victory, the primary dispute between the two principals settled, according to 
Plutarch, by Theogeiton of Megara, who advised awarding the prize for valour to 
a third city. The Corinthian suggestion of Plataia was approved, and Plataia 
received eighty talents with which the temple of Athene was rebuilt; Athens and 
Sparta set up their own independent trophies. 738 
§§83-87. Ka,;T'OI cL tZ~~ ~lIOI~ ••• nplJTQ,lIEicp a.1~'OIl UiT'rJfl'IlI E~OO'Q,II: Lykourgos 
rounds off his appeal to tradition and oaths with the legend of Kodros, King of 
Athens. The flattering description of Athens and the Athenians allows him not 
only to present the jurors' verdict as inevitable, but also to pave the way for his 
argument that there is a divine rationale for the trial, for the story of kingly piety 
provides a natural link with the impiety of those whom the gods punish, a contrast 
that will be reiterated when Lykourgos turns to Erekhtheus.739 As Parker notes, 
736 Hdt. 9.71. Battle ofPlataia: D.S.l1.29-33; Hdt. 9.24-65; Plut. Arist. 11-19; Hammond 
1986,245-250; Murray 1993,300; Welwei 1999,67-71. See too §§71, 80-81, above. 
737 Plut. Arist. 19.5ff., presumably following Kleidemos who is named as the source for 
the Athenian dead all being Aiantes; Hdt. 9.70 ; see too Murray 1993,300, who accepts 
Herodotus' figures. 
738 Pluto Arist. 20.1 ff.; see too Paus. 3.14.1, 5.23.1-3, 9.2.4f., 10.13.4; §§80-81, above. 
739 §§90-92, 93, 94-97, 98-101, below. 
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the examples 'demonstrate the rewards of piety, the wretched fate of the wicked, 
[and] the supreme value of patriotic self-sacrifice,.74o 
It is clearly impossible to date the events surrounding Kodros' salvation of 
Athens. The king himself perhaps derives from the eleventh century, yet the 
involvement of Delphi, and Spartan expansion, imply a date after the eighth or 
seventh centuries.741 Interestingly, however, the Delphian Kleomantis has a 
namesake in fourth-century Phokis where, indeed, the name is previously 
unrecorded.742 Parke and Wormell therefore suggest that 'the part played by 
Cleomantis and his subsequent reward are cleverly invented to make the story [of 
Kodros] more convincing,.743 The signal honour of dining in the Prytaneion at 
public expense, awarded to Kleomantis for forewarning Kodros, is clearly wildly 
anachronistic, but would have made perfect sense to a fourth-century Athenian. 744 
The reinvigorated legend was, therefore, probably part and parcel of the fourth-
century reconstruction of Athens' past. Parker suggests, indeed, that such 'use of 
myth as a pattern-book of patriotic conduct was much in fashion at just this 
period' .745 Certainly, extant references to Kodros are few, and although the tale of 
his self-sacrifice was known in the fifth century, at least to Hellanikos, Herodotus 
mentions the king almost in passing.746 An increase in Kodros' popUlarity in the 
fourth century, however, is implied by his positive treatment in several orators' 
works, and at least one fourth-century dialogue had the king as its subject; Plato's 
father, Ariston, also apparently traced his descent from the king.747 
740 Parker 1996, 251. 
741 Kodros: [Arist.] Ath. 3.3, with Rhodes 1993; Scherling; Hammond 1986,84. Delphi: 
Farnell, iv. 179-218; Parke and Wormell, i.5-11, 49-79; Morgan, 106-126, 148-152; 
Maass, 42f., 126-151; Murray 1993,243. Spartan expansion: Huxley, 17-25; Cartledge 
1979,102-130; Forrest 1980,28-39,69-77; Hammond 1986, 102-106; Murray 1993, 
161-173. 
742 LGPN iiia, iiib, s.v. Kleomantis: evidence disputed for a fourth-century 
Lakedaimonian soothsayer Kleomantis, with understandable arguments for the 
emendation of Kleomantis to Kleomenes. See too Plut. Alex. 50.3. 
743 Parke and Wormell, i. 297. 
744 See Miller, 4-11, 21-24; MJ. Osborne 1981b, 170. 
745 Parker 1996,251; see too §§80-81 above, 104-107, below. 
746 SchoI. PI. Smp. 208d2-31 = FGH 4F 125 - Hellanikos; Hdt. 1.147,5.65,5.76,9.97; 
see too Harp. s.v. , Epv8palol. 
747 Suda, S.v. EU,},EV€O'TfPOS' K6tlpov, navuaul" nA6,'rwlI, /f),A,iUKO,; PI. Smp. 208d. 
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§§88 89 %_.! ,., '..L!'1_ ' , '_.ll ' L k 
- . u.pu. l' OIJ.OICJJ) f!cpINJW ••• Ka.KItTT'O'll 7ra.lITW'II a.JIf1PW7rllJlJ: y ourgos 
concludes the heart of his speech by drawing an emotive contrast between the 
defendant and 0; TOT€ i3a.O'IAEUOll1"€~. The old Kings were like those who fought and 
fell at Khaironeia, prepared to outwit the enemy and die for the common good. 
They were, therefore, also analagous to the jurors, a flattering comparison which 
starkly defines Leokrates' behaviour as alien. Even the non-Athenian Kleomantis 
had had a greater regard for Athens than Leokrates.748 Thus the heroes of the past 
would be outraged if Leokrates was buried alongside them, an argument which 
conveniently, if hyperbolically, paves the way for Lykourgos' general demands 
for the defendant to suffer a penalty worse than death. 749 
§§90-92. Ka;TOI 1" hr~e;p7J(TE1I ... a.JlQ,'~;Q,~ .r}1J fxOIJt1"1'11: The third and final section 
of the central part of the speech is devoted to the divine rationale for both the trial 
and the requirement for extreme punishment. This rationale is reinforced by 
poetry which not only provides Lykourgos with what, for Aristotle, were among 
the most authoritative of witnesses, but which is also presented in such a way that 
it achieves the status oflaw.7S0 
The use of the aorist €TrEX€/ptr}O'EV implies that there was a particular occasion on 
which Leokrates asserted that he would not have submitted to trial if he had been 
guilty as charged. If so, then this probably occurred at the original pronouncement 
of the eisangelia in the Ekklesia, for there is no evidence to show that anakriseis 
were held prior to trial by eisangelia.7S1 Such a defence was probably far from 
unusual: Andokides explicitly argued that juries should be convinced of the 
innocence of those who faced trial of their own free will, and Aiskhines too 
claimed that since Philokrates was condemned for fleeing his trial he himself 
should be acquitted for appearing at court to defend the charges brought by 
Demosthenes.752 This is clearly a defence to which Lykourgos needs to pay 
748 See too §§46-51, 83-87, above, 98-101, below. 
749 See too Garland 1985, 7f., 88f. 
750 Arist. Rhet. 1375b26-35. 
751 MacDowell 1978, 242; see too Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 105. 
752 And. 1.2f.; Aishkin. 2.6; see too Lys. 6. 19. 
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attention, and it is, indeed, met head on with the argument that the defendant's 
mind has been turned by the gods to suffer a trial in which he feels safe but is, in 
fact, in real danger. The thieves and temple robbers of §65 reappear here, 
moreover, to emphasize the sort of person the defendant must be to incite such 
divine retribution.753 
OU ?,Q,p TOVTo &-, ..• ;11' E;~ ~h eLli ~lIEI: Lykourgos emphasizes with a 
tricolon the fact that Leokrates did not deny leaving the city. Notably he mentions 
neither the trade which Leokrates allegedly carried out nor its illegality.754 His 
principal concern here is Leokrates' presence in court, which is taken to be a 
conspicuous and ironic example of the gods' revenge, for they have brought the 
defendant to trial in the very place where his crime was committed. 
The author of the iambic passage attributed to TWlI apxarwlI T/lJ€~ 7TOI'Y}TWlI IS 
unknown.755 Notably, it is introduced as T€KlLrfJPla ToD 7Tpo/'YlLaTQ~. The poets and 
the gods themselves are thus presented as synegoroi for the prosecution.756 Parker 
notes that 'the old doctrine of ate ... is here given an explicitly moral twist' .757 
Dover, indeed, argues that 'direct manipulation of human thoughts and feelings by 
gods is taken for granted in Homer, and is openly postulated in fourth-century 
oratory; it is in fact the principal mechanism by which a god can determine the 
outcome of a complex event' .758 Lykourgos is certainly using a concept of great 
antiquity and general credence, but there is not the lacuna in the transmission of 
the concept implied by Dover, nor is the particularly moral sense in which it is 
applied here peculiar to the fourth century, as Parker hints. Indeed, Dodds traces 
the use and development of ate and daimon from Homer to the fourth century, and 
perceives a light-heartedness and unspecificity in the earliest treatments of 
daimones which has developed even as early as Theognis into something akin to 
753 The sort who would evade swearing the ephebic oath: §§75-76, above. 
754 See too §§26-27, 55-58, above. 
755 Trag. Adesp. frg. 296. 
756 S § ee too §2, 20, above, 98-101, 104-107, 128-132, below. 
757 Parker 1996, 251. 
758 Dover 1994, 136. 
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the moral treatment discernible in the fifth-century tragedians and the fourth-
century orators.759 
It is not surprising that Lykourgos glosses the poetic (Jaill-O])E) as 0; (JED;' For 
Burkert, the two terms are not 'simply interchangeable'; daimones are 'the 
necessary complement to the Homeric view of the gods as individuals with 
personal characteristics ... [, covering] that embarrassing remainder which eludes 
characterization and naming'. 760 By the time that Sokrates referred to his own 
personal daimon, however, there was 'reason enough to fear the daimon: '" [it] 
indicates a deep unease in the face of an uncanny power' .761 
Lykourgos is, however, perhaps prejudging the jurors' response to these concepts, 
for Leokrates could presumably claim that until he is actually condemned by the 
court, it is Lykourgos who is being misled into a hubristic claim of personal 
knowledge of the gods' intentions in order to suffer his own humiliating defeat. 762 
He could argue that the gods brought him to court precisely to display the lack of 
the cowardice with which he is charged and to humiliate a proud and arrogant 
prosecutor. 
§93. TI, ')'tlp ou ,u1£1I'r}TtIt' ••• T"Oj~ KaKouP'YO'~ t/Hl.i1l0'TO: In 367 B.c., four years after 
Theban supremacy was assured by victory over Sparta at Leuktra, Thebes sent an 
embassy headed by Pelopidas to Persia. Thebes' requirements were 
straightforward, and supported by Artaxerxes: Spartan claims to Messenia should 
be relinquished, and the Athenian fleet must be beached; war would be declared 
on those who did not agree. To add to Athens' concerns, this so-called Peace of 
759 Dodds, 10-18,38--41, citing Thgn. 402ff.; A. Pers. 354; A. Ag. 1486; Eur. Med. 122-
130; Hdt. 6.135.3; Aiskhin. 3.117,132; see too Burkert, 179ff. 
760 Burkert, 180. 
761 Burkert, 181. See too Dodds, 41 with n.7l. 
762 Andokides 1.113f. makes a similar attempt to turn the tables on his accusers. 
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Pelopidas required recognition of Amphipolis' independence.763 Timagoras, the 
Athenian envoy who agreed the terms, was executed upon his return, and in the 
following year, Oropos in Boiotia was seized from Athenian control by exiles and 
delivered into Thebes' hands.764 
For their part in Athens' failure to secure a Theban withdrawal from Oropos, 
Kallistratos and Khabrias were charged with treason by Leodamas, but were 
acquitted.765 In 362/1 B.C., however, following the battle of Mantineia, 
Kallistratos was again charged with treason on the grounds of corruptly offering 
the demos bad advice. He fled the prospect of another trial, and was found guilty 
in absentia, being executed upon his return in 355 B.C.766 Lykourgos claims that 
everyone knows the conveniently appropriate detail for which he is the only 
extant source, namely that Kallistratos was removed from his place of refuge for 
execution: not one of the twelve gods was prepared to save the suppliant who had 
been told by Delphi to expect 'fair' treatment. Kallistratos, like the Spartans who 
killed Kodros, and like Leokrates himself, was deliberately led to misunderstand 
his situation in order to bring divine retribution upon his own head. 767 As Sinclair 
notes, however, Kallistratos probably simply miscalculated the public mood. 768 
§§94-97. 'H-roiip,a" ~' E-rro'Y' ••• OUI( E;a.tT€ ~E'j'II: Lykourgos reinforces the points 
he has been making with an example intended to demonstrate that the greatest 
piety should be directed towards parents, the dead and the gods themselves.769 
Thus those who commit crimes in these particular respects are precisely those 
who are most likely to be punished by delusion. Here we see Lykourgos the 
763 Leuktra and aftermath: D.S. 15.51.2-56.4,62.5-66.1; Paus. 4.26.3-8, 9.13.3-4; Pluto 
Pel. 20-24; Ages. 28-32; Xen. Hell. 6.4. 1-6.5.32. Embassy: D.S. 15.76.3; Plut. Pel. 30; 
Xen. Hell. 7.1.33-40; see too Hammond 1986,491-502; Munn 1997,81-90; §42, above. 
764 Oropos: Aiskhin. 3.85; Oem. 5.16, 16.11-18, 18.99,21.64; Isok. 14.20,37. 
Timagoras: Oem. 19.135-142. Oropos restored to Athens by Philip in 338 B.C.: D.S. 
18.56.6f. 
765 Arist. Rhet. 1364a19-23; Oem. 21.64; D.L. 3.23f.; P1ut. Dem. 5; APF 8157 
(Kallistratos), 15086 (Khabrias); Hammond 1986,502; Sinclair, 157, 163-169. 
766 Hyp. 4 (Eux). 1-2; Hammond 1986,513,530. 
767 See §§83-87, 90-92, above; see too §§ 128-132, below. 
768 Sinclair, 157. 
769 See too §§25, 46-51, 90-92, above. 
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educator in full flow, and perhaps get a glimpse of the nature of the educational 
emphasis with which reforms of the ephebeia are linked, and with which 
Lykourgos himself might have been associated. 770 Significantly, too, Lykourgos 
acknowledges that his example is IJ.V(jW~€UTEPOJl, more myth than reality. He 
clearly does not view this story in the same light to his other references to the past 
and he evidently expects the jurors to share his ideas about what, exactly, 
constitutes history.771 
The Sicilian story is presumably the same as that related by Pausanias of a family 
from Katana which escaped an eruption of Etna when the two sons each carried a 
parent away from the lava. In Pausanias' version, the stream split in half to avoid 
the entire family, the sons being honoured locally even at the time he heard the 
tale.772 Pausanias also does not mention Lykourgos' TllW fUO'ft3WV xwpov: the only 
other reference to this in the sources relates to the destinations of good souls after 
their judgement by Minos and Rhadamanthos.773 The motif of a father's rescue 
from fire was perhaps familiar to the jurors in association with Aineas and 
Ankhises.774 The Trojan episode, however, would not have provided the imagery 
of spineless flight that Lykourgos needs, whereas the Sicilian tale offers clear 
links to the picture he has painted of Athens after Khaironeia; thus Leokrates' 
flight and abandonment of city, parents and gods, are explicitly equated to those 
Sicilians who abandoned all in their flight from Etna's eruption.775 
§§98-101. KoJTOI tTK~ ... ~tr6o" KWluou 6IJ'ya.-repa.: The original form of 
the Eumolpos legend is impossible to reconstruct and is, as Parker notes, 'largely 
a matter of curious conjecture' .776 By the later fourth century, however, 
Lykourgos could justly claim that the Euripidean version of a Thracian Eumolpos 
770 §§ 10, 75-76, above, 108-11 O(i), below. 
771 See §§59-64, 70, above, 108, below. 
772 Paus. 10.28.2. 
773 Stob. 1.49.47, discussing the Axiokhos attributed to Plato. 
774 Sophokles dealt, at least partly (frg. 373), with Aineas helping Ankhises to escape 
Troy. 
775 §§16, 40-41, 46-51, above. 
776 Parker 1996, 138; see too Parker 1987,201-204; Christopoulos, 126. 
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had become traditional.777 Cropp suggests that the original conflict behind the 
myth is almost certainly mythical, but that the Athenians would have fought 
Eumolpus and the Eleusinians for control of the Mysteries. 778 Certainly, the 
Eumolpid genos came to hold the right to charge initiates, and perhaps more 
prestigiously, to provide the hierophant; it was thus highly respected, though its 
members were apparently not of the liturgical elite.779 Lykourgos can claim no 
small amount of prestige himself, however, and clearly intends here to draw upon 
the unmistakable connections of the Euripidean quotation to his own genos. 
Indeed, MacKendrick sees the passage in terms of 'a foundation-charter for the 
Eteoboutadai . .. [which explains] their claim to the priesthood of Athena 
Polias' .780 
'PH~Il: ETPlIIlaOT ... lJ.HrnEP AEWKp/J.T'rJ~: Praxithea's speech from Euripides' 
Erekhtheus has only been preserved by its insertion into Lykourgos' text; it is the 
longest quotation in extant oratory.781 The length of time which Lykourgos is 
prepared to devote to the passage reflects not only the the popularity of such 
recitations, but also the connections he is specifically trying to make in the jurors' 
minds.782 Christopoulos has investigated the 'elements which connect the priestly 
office of [the cult of Poseidon-Erekhtheus] with the lineage of the orator 
Lycurgus': the mythological ancestry of the priesthood can be traced to Boutes 
himself, and it is particularly significant that the 'role of the priest was to recall 
the descent of the Athenians and to ensure their genealogical succession' .783 
It is just such ancestral institutions, 7!PO')'OllWlI 7!aJ..ala fJiO'lkl', that the queen 
promises in line 45 to preserve: they will, in tum, be preserved by Boutes' own 
descendant by means of this trial. The quotation itself is thus highly appropriate to 
both prosecutor and occasion: it is, indeed, appropriate even within its own 
immediate rhetorical context, for the queen's speech is a formal rhesis. It is not 
777 See Isok. 4.68f., 12.193. 
778 Collard, Cropp and Lee, 152. 
719 Feaver, 126-132; Ober 1989a, 254; Parker 1996, 293-297. 
780 MacKendrick, 22ff., and 73 n.l00; see too introduction, 15f. 
781 See Collard, Cropp and Lee, 148-194 (frg. 360); see too Christopoulos, 126. 
782 See too §§ 11-13, above. 
783 Christopoulos, 129f.; see too MacKendrick, 73; Humphreys 1985a, 217; Wilson, 313 
with n.18. 
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surpnsmg, therefore, that Cropp finds a 'clear rhetorical organization' to the 
queen's speech, with a gnomic introduction (lines 1--4), first justification (5-13), 
second justification (14-49), and conclusion and peroration (50_55).784 
Although there is no instruction to the clerk, it is unlikely that Lykourgos recited 
the passage himself, and his choice of words implies that a different voice is going 
to be heard: ;;'5101I~' ". Ka, 'T'WlI ialJ.{3€iwlI aKovual, a 7T€7TOi'1}K€ M'YoIJuall n)1I 1J.'1}'T'€pa 
~~ 7Tal~o~. ot/;€u8€ 'Yap Ell aUTO/)' '" . There was no pressure of time as such, 
because the water clocks were not stopped in measured-out days, and the 
recitation would not have eaten into any limited allocation of speaking time. 785 
None the less, both prosecutor and jurors would doubtless have appreciated the 
chance of a different voice or an entertaining change from the immediate subject: 
Dorjahn, indeed, notes that litigants would often have to perform their specialties 
informally to jurors, though it is unclear whether this was as a bribe or a 
reward. 786 
Yet the recitation of poetic quotations by litigants surely fulfilled other functions. 
Perlman has argued that they were used primarily to reinforce a weak case, or one 
where the law was open to interpretation.787 This is surely not the whole story, 
however, for the law was always susceptible to interpretation.788 The quotations 
themselves, moreover, focus on patriotic duty to such an extent that it is difficult 
to see them simply as providing a buttress for any particular case. Indeed, despite 
the claims and counter-claims made by Aiskhines and Demosthenes over each 
other's disingenuity in using poetry in their speeches, their cases are overtly 
concerned with charges of misleading the people over issues of national or 
international importance.789 The use of poetic quotations could thus be seen as a 
mechanism to heighten the emotional response of the jury with regard to the city 
qua city, to evoke the subordination of individuality to polis, and thereby to incite 
individual jurors to comply with the collective ideology of the litigant. 
784 Collard, Cropp and Lee, 178. 
785 See §20, above. 
786 Dorjahn 1927,passim; see too Ar. Vesp. 579f.; Hall,passim. 
787 Perlman 1964, passim, esp. 161-172; see too §§90-92, above, 102-103, 104-107, 
108-110(i), 128-132, below. 
788 See too §§5-6, 9, 11-13, above. 
789 See Aiskhin. 1.135-143; Oem. 19.243-251. 
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Something else must be going on, though, for extant quotations from poetry in 
forensic oratory appear only in this speech, and in Demosthenes and Aiskhines. 79o 
What becomes clear upon even a cursory examination of the passages used by 
these sparring partners is that Demosthenes uses quotations only to undermine 
Aiskhines' own prior use of them. There are only two exceptions to this, and both 
can easily be explained within their context. The first is a passage from 
Sophokles' Antigone which Aiskhines had performed on the stage, but had not 
quoted either in court or, more significantly (and understandably), before Philip; 
the other is a passage of Solon's elegiacs to demonstrate what the old law-giver 
qua law-giver, not poet, would have made of Aiskhines. 791 
It is therefore possible to attempt an alternative explanation of the function of 
poetic quotations in the law-court speeches. The quotations have to be relevant to 
the occasion, hence the agonistic excerpts from patriotically-charged poetry. This 
perhaps explains why Euripides is favoured to the virtual exclusion of all others 
except Homer and, to a lesser degree, Hesiod. For despite Dorjahn's clearly valid 
suggestion that only well-known lines were acceptable to avoid alienating juries 
by the appearance of elitism, only Euripides' tragedies provided a sufficient 
number of appropriately rhetorical passages.792 It was not just a case of Aiskhylos 
simply being too elitist, or too difficult: as Heath notes, 'it was open to a tragedian 
to compose rheloriki5s rather than ethiki5s. This style was not to everyone's taste, 
even in the ancient world: Sophocles is quoted as speaking of a style that is 
ethikOtaton and best ... , [about which] the scholia are unenthusiastic. But it was 
approved by some: by Euripides, evidently, and increasingly in the fourth 
century. ' 793 
790 Aiskhin.: 1.128 (Hom. location unknown; E. unknown tragedy), 1.129 (Hes. Erg. 
24Of.), 1.144 (Hom. II. 18.324-329), 1.148 (Hom. II. 18.333-335), 1.149 (Hom. II. 
23.77-91), 1.150 (Hom. II. 17.95-99), 1.151 (E. Stheneboia - Frg. 67IB), 1.152 (E. 
Phoinix - Frg. 809N), 2.144 (Hes. Erg. 240f.), 2.158 (Hes. Erg. 763f.), 3.135 (Hes. Erg. 
763f.). Dem.: 18.267 (E. Hek. 1; unknown poet), 19.243 (Hes. Erg. 240f.), 19.245 (E. 
Phoinix - Frg. 809N), 19.247 (S. Ant. 175-190), 19.255 (Solon). 
791 S. Ant. 175-190: Dem. 19.247; Solon: Dem. 19.255. See too ObeT and Strauss, 250f. 
792 Dorjahn 1927, 90; see too Ober 1989a, 177-181. 
793 Heath 1987, 130; see too Wilson, 314ff. 
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It was not enough, however, for quotations to be relevant to the occasion, they 
needed to be relevant to the speaker too. Thus Demosthenes uses quotations only 
in the context of Aiskhines' recitations and to expose him as someone who is as 
bad a citizen as he is an actor. 794 The real use of poetry in extant forensic oratory 
is confined to Aiskhines and Lykourgos, the one an actor and the other the 
statesman who redeveloped the theatre of Dionysos and canonized the tragedians' 
works.795 
Lykourgos earlier argued that laws are simply definitions of what mayor may not 
be done; he will shortly claim that they are too brief to educate. Poetry explains 
what the law cannot, however, and acts as a supplementary authority equal to the 
laws Leokrates has violated.796 Thus it is of little account that human sacrificial 
victims had no say in their fate, and that the desired success is undennined by the 
empathetic suicides of the other royal daughters. As Brock notes, although we 
cannot see Lykourgos' use of Praxithea's speech as a simple and uncomplicated 
expression of patriotism, this is precisely how Lykourgos presents it in the trial 
and he clearly expects the jurors to see it that way too, for Leokrates is presented 
as not only less patriotic than a metic, he is unequal even to a woman.797 
§§ 1 02-1 03. BovAo,uJ.. ~' iJp.III ••• E) TrQ,Tp;~ ')'tJ.la.lI: The usual problems apply to this 
quotation of Iliad 15. 494-499, though it seems to sit quite naturally within the 
text and the wording implies that it was an intrinsic part of Lykourgos' speech that 
he himself recited.798 The transmitted text, moreover, differs from the passage 
quoted here, and it is unclear how many versions existed in the fourth century, or 
when (and even if) a standardized, definitive version was canonized. This is an 
enonnous, and enonnously contentious, field of study with a vast secondary 
794 An explicit claim in 19.246. 
795 See introduction, 20, above. 
796 §§4, above, 102, below; see too Isok. 2.3; PI. Lg. 722c6-723d4; Dorjahn 1927,90; 
Humphreys 1985a, 216ff. 
797 Brock 1998, 237; see too Wilkins, passim; §§36-39, above, 108-11 O(i), 128-132, 
below. 
798 See §§20, 90-92, above, 104-107, below. 
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literature. 799 Traditionally, however, the so-called Homeric Recension, and the 
reorganization of the Panathenaia at which the poetry was recited, is attributed to 
the Peisistratid tyranny. 
Harpokration, citing Hellanikos, Androtion and Istros, claims that the festival was 
celebrated by Erikhthonios, before which it was known as the Athenaia. 8oo Parker 
argues that although the attribution to Peisistratos is probably an invention, the 
tyrant was almost certainly responsible for major reforms of the festival in the 
second quarter of the sixth century, including its transformation into an 
international celebration. so I It was his son Hipparkhos, however, who was most 
associated with the institution of Homeric recitations within the Panathenaia, 
which was celebrated in the first month of the Athenian calendar, Hekatombaion: 
in the third year of each Olympiad the festival was especially grand, being known 
as the Greater Panathenaia, and as the Lesser Panathenaia in the other three years 
of the quadrennium.so2 
As an international event, the festival was a partiCUlarly appropriate vehicle for 
fifth-century Athenian imperial propaganda, for after the transfer of the League 
treasury from Delos to Athens in 454 B.C., tribute brought to the city and 
displayed during the City Dionysia was reassessed at the Greater Panathenaia. A 
decree passed sometime around 450 B.C., recording the minimum offerings which 
Erythrai was obliged to supply, provides a preview of how the allies would all 
come to be required to participate in this show of Athenian greatness: the 
assessment of 425 B.C. was itself complemented by a decree requiring all cities to 
bring a cow and a panoply to the festiva1. 803 In the fourth century, however, 
imperialism was not only inappropriate, it was anachronistic. The requirement 
placed upon the Parians in 372 B.C. to bring a cow and panoply to the festival 
799 See e.g. Wace and Stubbings, 215-265; Willcock, 277f.; Kirk, i. 10-16,38-43, iv. 8-
38, vi. 20f.; Parry, 104-140; Taplin 1992,31-44,285-293; Nagy, 29-112. 
800 Harp. s.v. nallalh7l1ata; see too Schol. PI. Prm. 127a. 
801 Parker 1996, 68, 75f., 89-92. 
802 Hipparkhos: [Plat]. Hipparkh. 228b4-228c1; see too [Arist.] Ath. 18.1, with Rhodes 
1993; Panathenaia: [Arist.] Ath. 54.7, 60.1, 60.3, 62.2, with Rhodes 1993; Deubner, 22-
35; Mikalson, 34, 199; Parke, 33-50; Burkert, 232ff.; Sinclair, 53f.; Nagy, 65-108. 
803 Erythrai: IG i2 10 = ML 40 = GHI i. 29. Assessment of 425: IG e 63 = ML 69 (55-58) 
= GHI i.66. See too IG i245 = ML 49 (11-13) = GHI i,44; Ar. Akh. 505f.; Schol. Nu. 386; 
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looks, Parker suggests, 'like a first attempt to restore the conditions of the fifth 
century': if so, 'it led to nothing .. , and it is not until after the collapse of the 
Second Confederacy that we again find cities of Asia Minor sending cattle and 
panoply to the Panathenaea'; when they did so, moreover, it was a voluntary 
decision aimed at expressing' solidarity with their "mother-city'''. 804 
Lykourgos' interpretation of the function of the laws differs from that offered in 
§4, where he argued that the laws state what is forbidden. Here, he suggests that 
the laws define what must be done, but cannot provide an underlying reason, an 
understandable change of emphasis given his present reliance on the authoritative 
and educational nature of the poetic passages being quoted. This was not a new 
idea, however, for Plato had distinguished between IIO/LO~ and rrpOOI/LIOII TOU IIO/LOIJ, 
the latter 'preamble' providing a persuasive rationale aimed at making the 
intended recipient of the law-giver's bare rules more compliant.805 Here, however, 
it is the jurors who are the targets of Lykourgos' clear statement that the poetry he 
cites is not only relevant and complementary to the laws, but also that it has equal 
authority. 806 
§§ 1 04-107. TOVrwll TWlI brow tLcouovre~ ••• XE'iAo~ ~OtJ'l ~fCWJl: In what is, 
effectively, itself a preamble to his discussion of Tyrtaios, Lykourgos presents 
Athens' victory at Marathon as a response to just such verses as those which the 
jurors have heard.807 Indeed, despite the innate arete of previous generations of 
Athenians, the effectiveness of this sort of inspiration created a demand for 
Athenian leadership which Athens was only too happy to supply. 
Meritt and Wade-Gery 1962,67-71; Meiggs 1972,240,290-305; Hammond 1986,305, 
324; Burkert, 257; Parker 1996, 142f., 22lf. 
804 Parker 1996, 221; see too SEG 31.67; Meritt and Wade-Gery 1962, 70f.; see too §42, 
above. 
805 PI. Lg. 722e7-723b6. 
806 See too §§4, 90-92, above. 
807 Marathon: Hdt. 6.103-117; Just. 2.9; PI. Lg. 698c3-e5; Mx. 240c; Pluto Arist. 5; 
Hammond 1986,213-217; Murray 1993, 28lff.; Welwei 1999,31-39. Athenian 
hegemony: §§42, 70, 72-74, above. Preambles: §§102-103, above. 
- 178- §§IO~I07 
Carey suggests that praise of Sparta could present difficulties for speakers since it 
implied a criticism of their own polis. 80S Demosthenes, indeed, explicitly 
criticized those who praised Sparta: such arguments were provocative precisely 
because equivalent praise of Athens would not be possible in Sparta. 809 Yet 
Isokrates, although pulling no punches over what he saw as Sparta's faults, could 
end his Panathenaikos of the late 340s with a concession that he might, after all, 
have been a little harsh; he specifically claims, indeed, that most people would 
bestow at least moderate praise on Sparta. BID Lykourgos will, certainly, shortly 
offer the jurors examples of Spartan courage and will present Sparta as a 
paradigm of good order, any inherent difficulties being mitigated by his argument 
for Athens' part in creating the eunomia for which Sparta was famous. 811 
Powell calls the assertion that Tyrtaios was, in fact, originally an Athenian, a most 
striking historical claim.812 Fisher, indeed, notes the use of the 'everyone knows' 
topos, and suggests that the story that Tyrtaios was originally Athenian, and a 
lame teacher at that, has a place within the context of the fourth century, an 
'exceptionally fertile period for "the invention oftradition'" .813 Lykourgos' use of 
the Spartan example is, for Fisher, legitimized and made palatable by the 
emphasis on Tyrtaios as an Athenian, as well as by his location of Spartan 
triumphs safely in the past.814 Yet if Tyrtaios' Athenian background is part and 
parcel of the revisionist history of the changed circumstances of the fourth 
century, then Lykourgos is perhaps not so much consciously using acceptably 
long-gone Spartan victories as taking advantage of his ability to mention in 
positive terms a former enemy whose power had clearly waned; this is at least 
implied by Isokrates' ability to soften his view of the Spartans and to present them 
as not such bad old chaps, really, in their own way. Lykourgos seems to have little 
808 Carey 1999,388. 
809 Oem. 20.105-11lf. 
810 Isok. 12. passim, esp. 41, 200-261. 
811 See too Isok. 12.153-155; §§108-110(i), 128-132, below. 
812 Powell 1994, 311, citing PI. Lg. 629a. 
813 Fisher 1994, 362ff., 377f. See too Plut. Mor. 230D 9-11, attributing to the regent 
Pausanias the claim that Tyrtaios was made a citizen so that Sparta should not be seen to 
have a foreign leader; FGH 328F 215 - Philokhoros; Suda, s.v. TLiPTaIO~; Huxley, 127 
n.349; Ober and Strauss, 253. Invention of tradition: §§80-81, above. 
814 Fisher 1994, 377f. 
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problem, moreover, in advising the jurors to take heed of present Spartan eunomia 
in voting in accordance with their oath. 
Whatever Tyrtaios' provenance, his poetry traces Sparta's troubled fight for 
control of Messenia in the Second Messenian War of the seventh century B.C.sIS 
The passage recited here is similarly problematic in terms of documentary 
interpolation and textual variation as the Homeric quotation from the Iliad. 816 It 
has, however, inevitable and clear Homeric echoes which, if the jurors were 
sensitive to them, would have resonated with that earlier quotation. 817 It is perhaps 
not overly fanciful to imagine that they would make such an association, and that 
they would be expected to do SO.818 Thus Tyrtaios, the Athenian, is the equivalent 
of Homer, and the recitation of his verses has equal authority to those of the bard 
himself. More importantly, perhaps, the Spartans were inspired to contend with 
Athens for hegemony as a direct result of Athens' own legacy, and were 
responsible for providing the impetus to greatness which Leokrates has 
voluntarily relinquished. 
It is impossible to verify the law which Lykourgos cites.819 It would also have 
been extremely difficult for the jurors to do so, at least immediately. MacDowell 
notes that the 'organization of the Spartan army [was largely] ... a matter of 
military practice rather than law', and seems inclined to accept Lykourgos' 
assertion.820 Cartledge, however, is rather less emphatic, claiming simply that 
'poems of Tyrtaios were sung by the Spartans on campaign' .821 
815 See §§83-87, above. 
816 §§102-l03, above. 
817 See Hom. 11.22.66-76; see too Vemant 1992,64-68,88-90. Lysias' Epitaphios was 
perhaps inspired by Tyrtaios: Loraux 1986, 166. 
818 Fisher 1994, 378, suggests that there is perhaps also 'some ideological connection 
between this praise of Tyrtaios' patriotic verses and of the idealized, Tyrtaios-taught 
Spartan agoge and the Lycurgan renewal and reform of the ephebeia'; see too §§75-76, 
above. 
819 See too §§ 128-132, below. 
820 MacDowell 1986, 69f. 
821 Cartledge 2001, 43. See too FGH 328F 216 - Philokhoros; Bowie, passim, esp. 224-
229. 
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§§10S-110(i). KaAa. 'Y' cr, ;;'II.lpe~ Ko.' ~Ip.a. ••• TrONI ;,0;0.11 Ko.~JIeII: 
Lykourgos brings his central section to a close here, and it is in this context that 
his remarks about Marathon and Thermopylai should be seen, for he is less 
concerned with the history of the events as their relevance to the poetry he has just 
quoted.822 Thus the passage has few details, and a somewhat euphemistic feel. Yet 
the generalities also succeed in presenting Leokrates in specific and stark contrast 
to normal behaviour and fundamental values: he is unable to recognize or to 
utilize the basic and intrinsic Athenian qualities of deliberation, morality and 
courage. The jury, by implication and contrast, are perfectly able to recognize the 
importance of such values, and the value of poetry in forensic oratory. 
Within the immediate context, however, Lykourgos is setting up the recitation of 
the epigrams composed for the Spartan and Athenian dead of Thermopylai and 
Marathon. According to Pausanias, Leonidas' body was returned to Sparta by the 
regent Pausanias forty years after Thermopylai: annual speeches and games were 
inaugurated in honour of the fallen king, and a stone erected inscribed with the 
names, of all Spartans who fought in the battle, names which were committed to 
memory by Herodotus in honour of their heroism.823 The rest of the Spartan dead 
were buried on the hill where they had made their last stand, and Herodotus 
records two epigrams set up at Thermopylai by the Delphic Amphictyons for the 
dead. The first honoured the entire force that faced the Persians, and the second, 
which Lykourgos cites, the Spartiates specifically.824 The heroized 
Marathonomakhai were also buried where they fell, though Parker argues that this 
honour, interpreted since Thoukydides as exceptional, was normal at the time.825 
They were, however, publicly honoured in Athens in a painting in the Stoa Poikile 
822 Poetry: §§90-92, 98-101,102-103,104-107, above. History: §§ 70,72-74, 80-S1, 
above, 110(ii)-lll, below. Battle ofThermopylai: D.S. 11.4.1-11.6; Hdt. 7.175-225; 
Isok. 6.99; Paus. 3.4.7f., 10.20.2; Hammond 1986,228-237; Murray 1993, 293ff.; 
Welwei 1999, 51--6l. 
823 Paus. 3.14.1; Hdt. 7.224. 
824 Hdt. 7.228: a third, set up by the Lacedaimonians, honoured the seer Megistias. See 
too Bowra, 361f.; Page, 231-234. 
825 Parker 1996,132-135, citing Thouk. 2.34.l. See too Paus. 1.32.3f.; SIG 23b = ML 19 
= GHI i.14; Raubitschek 1940, passim: Jacoby 1944, 47, 56-66; Garland 1985, 89f.; 
Pritchett 1974-1991, iv. 249ff. 
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which showed various heroes and aspects of the battle, together with the gods who 
were reported to have come in person to help their favourites. 826 
Both epigrams recited by Lykourgos were attributed to Simonides of Keos, his 
Athenian commission seemingly arising from a competition in which Aiskhylos 
participated.827 Jacoby has grave doubts about the Marathon epigram, and argues 
that 'whether or not it was ever engraved on a stone, and whether or not it is a 
fifth-century poem (strictly contemporary it is not), it is certainly not an epitaph, 
and even in Lycurgan times it can hardly have stood on a stele at the Soros in the 
Marathonian plain,.828 The Spartan epigram, however, is of somewhat more 
secure provenance. It is quoted verbatim by Diodorus, and by Strabo, whose 
version is slightly different in the first few words, with W ;€II' o'rra~"reIAoll instead 
of w ;e,V, a'Y'Y€/Aoll. Herodotus has another, though again slight, variation, with the 
infinitive o''Y'Y€M€/II, and ~IL(J,(J'I instead of lIolLiILO/~; he also expressly states that 
the inscribed epitaphs were set up in Thermopylai. 829 
To conclude his central section, Lykourgos shows how the epigrams, the 
culmination of the poetic examples he has been citing, are as appropriate to the 
circumstances of their present citation as they were to the heroes for whom they 
were composed.83o Their relevance reinforces the direct and striking comparison 
which Lykourgos now draws between the defendant and all Athenians who in the 
past produced Athens' glorious reputation from the earliest times. Leokrates is the 
worst Athenian ever. 83\ 
826 Paus. 1.15.4. 
827 See too Jacoby 1945,157-185; Podlecki, 257-262. See too ML 26. 
828 Jacoby 1945, 160, 179-185; see too Bowra, 355ff.; Page, 225-231. 
829 D.S. 11.33.2; Str. 9.4.16; Hdt. 7.228. 
830 See too §§98-101, above. 
831 See too §§36-39, 98-101(i), above, 128-132, below. 
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§§IIO(ii)-123 
The speech now moves on, with the fifth ~11 O~II, to a section comprising four 
juridical precedents whose legal relevance is reinforced by the citation of the 
decrees directly relating to the cases.832 Lykourgos' first two examples are from 
the late- and early-fifth century respectively, a pattern repeated in the second pair. 
Thus legal incidents from Athens' two major conflicts prior to the threat from 
Macedon are utilized to demonstrate how, in similar crises, treachery was viewed 
and how traitors were treated, views and treatments that must apply equally to the 
present case. 
§§ 11 O(ii)-lll. EQ,V p£,; oW GVrOIl o.TrO~;V'rJTf ... ho",,'ov ETVG' ~ n-6AEW~: The 
examples of past judgements that occupy the whole of this section are introduced 
by arguments for their relevance. Thus a condemnation of the defendant will 
demonstrate that the jurors are indeed the true descendants of the great Athenians 
of the past. The alternative is unthinkable, for an acquittal would deprive the 
jurors' ancestors of their reputation and harm their fellow citizens, for crimes of a 
similar nature would inevitably follow: as such, the jurors will effectively be 
complicit in Leokrates' crimes. The rhetoric portrays the past and present as 
inextricably linked, with previous dikastic judgements being as binding upon the 
jury as those of the Areopagos.R33 No prior verdict bound a jury, of course, no 
matter how exactly the cases matched, but the argument that verdicts, being the 
view of the polis, should be the same when the circumstances being judged were 
so similar, would be little short of compelling to jurors who had been 
systematically and emotively equated to the greatest heroes in Hellenic and 
Athenian history.834 
There seem, none the less, to be clear divisions in Lykourgos' perception of the 
events he is discussing, for his examples appear to form a twin pattern of late- and 
832 , ... • d . 37 b #hEY OUli structure: mtro uctlOn, ,a ove. 
833 See §§7, 52-54, above. 
834 See §§46--51, 72-74, 88-89. 
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early-fifth-century incidents. Nouhaud argues for an increased rhetorical 
distinction between ancient and recent history in the fourth century. He suggests 
that ancient history, which ended at the start of the Peloponnesian War, was 
divided into two epochs, according to the image desired: the first, the Persian 
Wars, had become legendary by the time of the orators, signifying that it was 
already fixed with basic falsifications; the second, the Pentekontaetia, was 
idealized by or at the time of Isokrates' Panegyrikos. By the second half of the 
fourth century, these two epochs had already been rewritten to their fullest extent. 
Recent history started at the Peloponnesian War, and was still there to be 
rewritten. It was, therefore, much more susceptible to manipulation.835 
Lykourgos' precedents in this section seem to comply well with Nouhaud's 
schema, and are suggestive of a co-ordinated structure within the structure of the 
speech as a whole.836 They appear, indeed, to fonn two specific pairs of examples 
taken twice and alternately from recent and ancient history, and to be presented in 
a thematically mirrored image of each other, for whilst the first two respectively 
concern Phrynikhos, who actively betrayed the city, and Hipparkhos, who 
deserted by failing to appear at his trial, the presentation is reversed in the second 
pair, where those who deserted the city for Dekeleia are followed by an individual 
who actively betrayed the city with words. 
It is noteworthy that Lykourgos does not use any fourth-century examples. 
Presumably he is trying to show consistency of verdicts over time, and to avoid 
any precedents that could be controversial. The lapse of time might also explain 
why there is, at times, a significant lack of detail, and perhaps also accounts for 
what seems to be a somewhat unusual practice of relating a story and then 
appending the relevant decree, rather than citing the decree and then discussing it 
in detail.837 It seems, however, as if Lykourgos feels that the stories themselves 
are proof, with the decrees being merely supporting documents. Yet it is not what 
is, or is not, treason that he is trying to demonstrate, nor that Leokrates has done 
835 Nouhaud, 355f. Perlman 1961, 162, sees the Persian Wars as the 'turning point in the 
history of Greece, the dividing line between the "ancient" and the "modem" periods in 
Greek history'. 
836 See too Nouhaud, 364f.; introduction, 36-39, above. 
837 E.g. Aiskhin. 1.16ff, 21ff.; And. 1.76-89; Dem. 19.47ff.; Lys. 13.33-38, 59ff. 
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what is alleged: that is taken for granted. His proofs seem, rather, to be intended to 
show beyond any doubt what the verdict must be.838 
It is, none the less, noteworthy that it is in this particular section that Lykourgos' 
examples are complemented by decrees. This confers a legality and authority that 
his previous historical references lack, and reinforces the hypothesis that all 
previous historical references have fulfilled a purpose subordinate to the principal 
function of the section, whether that function is to refute potential defence 
arguments, to illustrate tradition and oaths, or to demonstrate the divine rationale 
for the trial and the extreme punishment the prosecutor is demanding. 
§§112-115. ~PIIJI;XOIJ 'YO,p aTrOrTt/JrvyivTo, ... TWlJ 'rOu (J)PIIJI;XOIJ tbiAwlJ: Although he is 
not named in the Aristotelian Athenaion Po/iteia, Phrynikhos was a leading 
member of the Four Hundred of 411 B.c. Rhodes suggests, however, that the 
identity of the three principals given in the Athenaion Po/iteia, namely 
Peisandros, Antiphon and Theramenes, derives from Thoukydides, who does 
include Phrynikhos.839 Despite an allegedly poor background and a reputation for 
sykophantia, Phrynikhos had been elected to the strategia and commanded the 
Athenian fleet at Samos.840 He was murdered upon his return from a failed 
embassy to negotiate a secret alliance with Sparta, as others set about fortifying 
Eetioneia. 
The motive for his assassination is unknown, though it seems likely that he was 
killed for political, rather than personal, reasons. The Four Hundred's regime 
838 Perlman 1961, 154, suggests that whilst 'it is the truthful and objective reconstruction 
of the past which is of paramount importance for Thucydides ... [, who] leaves complete 
freedom to his readers and relies on their ability to decide when a similar state of affairs 
has recurred ... [, for the orator] the present is of primary importance; he himself 
compares the past with the present, and draws his conclusions from the comparison in 
order to show the listeners the validity of his arguments .... Thus the historical example 
becomes a tool of political propaganda and a reflection of the views of the fourth 
century'. 
839 [Arist.] Ath. 32.2, with Rhodes 1993; Thouk. 8.68; see too Arist. Pol. 1305b22-27; 
Lys. 13.73f., 25.9. 
840 Lys. 20.1lf.; Thouk. 8.27, 50-54, 90-92; see too PA 15011; Hammond 1986, 40 If.; 
Welwei 1999,218-221. 
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lasted for only four months in 411 B.C., their gnp on power becoming 
increasingly tenuous as many, both in Athens and in the fleet in Samos, became 
increasingly dissatisfied with their rule. The promise of funds from Tissaphemes 
had evaporated. Worse, deep splits appeared within the Four Hundred themselves 
as some attempted to make alliance, rather than war, with Sparta. Moreover, the 
fortifications at Eetioneia seem to have been interpreted widely as a means of 
letting the Spartans in, rather than keeping the Samian democrats OUt. 841 In such 
an atmosphere, the position of someone who could be described as 'more 
enthusiastic than anyone for the oligarchy' would be unenviable. 842 
Lykourgos presents the murder occurring at night in the osier beds near the spring, 
perhaps one of the fountains in the agora. Thoukydides, however, places the event 
near the Bouleuterion in a crowded agora, presumably therefore in the middle of 
the day; Lysias, too, though merely saying that Phrynikhos was out walking, and 
giving neither time nor location, never implies a deserted scene.843 On the 
contrary, the killing was witnessed and an outcry ensued, though the culprits 
escaped in Lysias' version, whereas in Thoukydides' the killer's accomplice was 
captured. Lykourgos appears to be alone in arguing that both were, eventually at 
least, caught and imprisoned. 
Lysias, denying Agoratos' involvement in the affair, explicitly names 
Thrasyboulos, an Aetolian of Kalydon, and Apollodoros of Megara, which 
corresponds with Lykourgos' account. Thoukydides does not name the assailants, 
but agrees that there were two, one the assassin, who was one of the border patrol, 
and the other an accomplice who was an Argive, presumably the Megarian 
Apollodoros who, in Lysias' account, took no part at all in the actual murder.844 
Thoukydides' description implies that he considers Phrynikhos to have been the 
victim of a 'hit', not an unreasonable view under the prevailing circumstances. By 
the tum of the century, moreover, there were clearly some, like Agoratos, who, if 
not exactly queuing up to claim responsibility, were more than prepared to take 
841 Thouk. 8.70-92.2. 
842 Thouk. 8.68.3. 
843 Thouk. 8.92.2; Lys. 13.71. 
844 Metic military duty: §§36-39, above. 
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the credit for what could be presented as an overtly democratic political 
assassination. 
The procedure under which the culprit(s) was apprehended may have been an 
apagoge, the summary arrest of someone caught in the act of committing their 
crime, and their delivery to the Eleven, though it is far from clear that the law was 
operating normally in this period.845 Notably, apagoge could only be used against 
murderers who were defined as kakourgoi. Thus Antiphon writes for Euxitheos, 
the defendant charged with the murder of Herodes, that whilst he agrees TO "YE 
o;rrOKTEIIIEIII ,u"Ya KaKOVPrrJll-a Elllal, the proper procedure would have been a ~/K'Y} 
cbollou. 846 None the less, Phrynikhos' oligarchic friends can readily be imagined to 
have had little problem in categorizing his killer(s) in this way. If the murder 
occurred in the agora, indeed, there would perhaps have been a more immediate 
reason for apagoge to be used on this occasion, for Demosthenes records that a 
killer who was seen there, or in other sacred places, could be summarily 
arrested.847 MacDowell conjectures that the procedure was intended to allow for 
the apprehension of killers who were not immediately prosecuted, 'either because 
the killing was done in the last three months of the year ... or because the killed 
man had no relatives or the relatives failed to act' .848 
a;a&,uvo~ 0 ~ ••• a.lIOpU9lVTE~ ~K T"ij~ 'AT'TIK"ij~ E;WP'CTQ,V: It is unclear whom 
Lykourgos is representing as having been subjected to torture, basanos, by the 
demos, but he presumably means Apollodoros, perhaps with Thrasyboulos who, 
in Lykourgos' account, did not avoid capture. 849 For MacDowell there is 'some 
845 See Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 221-229; Hansen 1976a, 104, 107, 125f. #4-5; 
MacDowell 1978, 120ff., 148,238; Sealey 1987,56; Brock 1988, passim; Todd 1993, 
117f., 275f.; Hunter 1994, 134ff.; Todd 2000, 43ff. 
846 Ant. 5.10, 16,85. 
847 Oem. 23.80; MacDowell 1963, 130-140; MacDowell 1978, 12lf., suggests that this 
was the basis for Dionysios' arrest of Agoratos for denouncing and causing the death of 
his brother, Dionysodoros, at the hands of the Thirty: Lys. 13,passim. 
848 MacDowell 1978, 121. Homicide proceedings could not be initiated in the final three 
months of the year because the requirement for three prodikasiai, pre-trial enquiries, to be 
held in separate months, could not be completed within the Basileus archon's tenure: Ant. 
6.42; see too MacDowell 1963, 34ff. 
849 What is at issue in the case of Phrynikhos' murder seems to be judicial, unilateral 
torture rather than the privately agreed procedure whereby slaves were examined by 
mutual consent of the litigating parties: see §§28-30, above. 
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evidence that free aliens could ... be tortured as witnesses, but it is not clear in 
what circumstances this was possible', though his view is not shared by either 
Carey or Hunter. 8so Lysias notes, none the less, that after the investigation was 
completed, Thrasyboulos was granted Athenian citizenship and Apollodoros was 
given a piece of land which had been confiscated from Peisandros. 851 
Alongside the rewards for the killers, Phrynikhos was posthumously prosecuted. 
The decree was proposed by Kritias, presumably the subsequent oligarch and 
member of the Thirty, though the identification is no more than inferential. 852 
Kritias is perhaps not the likeliest candidate for populist prosecutor, though he 
might have been trying to distance himself from accusations of involvement, if 
not actual participation, in the Four Hundred. 8s3 The prosecution was probably an 
eisangelia to the Ekklesia, though it is unclear whether the case was heard by the 
assembly itself or by the Dikasteria. The trial, if it can be so called without a 
defendant, would have taken place in 411/10 B.C. under the rule of the Five 
Thousand, before the trial of Antiphon and Arkheptolemos under the same 
regime, for their sentence was to be inscribed and set up where the bronze stele 
bearing the decrees relating to Phrynikhos had already been placed.854 
lea, TO~ a.1rOAo-yoU,JvoU~ ••• a.'TI",wf"FlTOJI ~~: Either in the same or another 
decree, it was proposed that anyone who defended Phrynikhos should suffer the 
same punishment; thus their property was to be confiscated, and they were to be 
refused burial in Attica. Hansen accepts this assertion because some of 
850 MacDowell 1978,246, citing Lys. 3.33, Ant. 5.49. Mirhady 2000,64 n.41, suspects 
that the/ree man in Ant. 5.49 was probably a slave at the time of the torture. Hunter 
2000, 17 n.30, argues that Lys. 4.12, 14, is conclusive evidence that metics could not be 
tortured, but her claim is undermined by the rhetorical requirements of the particular 
argument, as well as by the lack of evidence for an extension of full metics' rights to 
freed slaves, despite their 'metic' status. See too Clerc, 104-107; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 
150; Carey 1988, passim; Allen 2000a, 215f. 
851 Thrasyboulos' citizenship: Lys. 13.72f.; Apollodoros' gift ofland: Lys. 7.4; see too /0 
i2 110 = ML 85 = GHli.86. 
852 See PAIAPF 8792 (Kritias IV); Hansen 1975, 82f. #62; Ostwald 1986, 402ff., 464. It 
is unclear whether the decree is the same decree that conferred citizenship on 
Thrasyboulos, though the conferral of such honours was probably passed separately. 
853 See Dem. 58.67; Avery, passim; Adeleye, passim; Rhodes 1993, 429f. 
854 Hansen 1975, 82f. #62, 113ff. #135-7; [Plut.] Mor. 834A I-B 8; Brock 1988, 136f 
See too [Arist.] Ath. 29-33, with Rhodes 1993; Thouk. 8.97-98; de Ste Croix 1956, 
passim; Rhodes 1972b, passim. 
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Phrynikhos' heirs might have appeared for the defence, particularly in view of the 
possibility of property confiscation. He does not, however, accept Lykourgos' 
identification of Aristarkhos and Alexikles as the two unfortunate supporters who 
received the same penalty as their friend. He argues that Lykourgos cannot be 
correct in his identification because Aristarkhos betrayed Oinoe to the Boiotians 
and was sentenced to death as a result some time before 406 B.C., and notes that 
Lykourgos is careful to name the pair after the decree has been read out.855 
Hansen's case is not conclusive, however, for although he builds his argument 
upon the claim that Aristarkhos' execution is a 'quite reliable' piece of 
infonnation, that reliability is based upon his own assumption that Lykourgos 
drew a false conclusion from Aristarkhos' execution, namely that since 
Aristarkhos was a friend of Phrynikhos, he was executed in that capacity. For 
Hansen, therefore, Lykourgos knew that Aristarkhos was executed, but got the 
reason wrong, and that, in fact, 'having betrayed Oinoe to the Boiotians ... 
Aristarchos is presumably sentenced to death and executed' (my italics). This 
might be methodologically suspect in its own right, but the source Hansen cites to 
reinforce his argument that Aristarkhos was executed for treachery at Oinoe, 
rather than for supporting Phrynikhos, is this very passage which he has deemed 
unreliable, and which expressly claims that Aristarkhos was executed for 
supporting Phrynikhos.856 
Hansen's conclusion is probably right, unless Aristarkhos was impeached 
immediately after his treachery at Oinoe but somehow supported Phrynikhos, and 
was executed for it, before his own eisangelia was heard: these were unusual 
times, and this was, to say the least, an unusual trial without a living defendant. 857 
855 Hansen 1975,83 #62 nn.7, 8; see too PA 1663 (Aristarkhos), 535 (Alexikles). 
856 Hansen 1975,83 #62 n.8, #63, also citing Thouk. 8.98 & Xen. Hell. 1.7.28, neither of 
whom give any explicit information about Aristarkhos' end. Hansen supported by 
Rubinstein 2000, 161 n.103; see too Ostwald 1986, 403f. 
857 Defendants in eisangeliai to the Boule would probably be imprisoned pending trial, 
though pace Harrison 1968-1971, ii.56, this seems to have been an option available to the 
Boule, rather than a legal requirement: Oem. 24.63, 144-148, insists that the measure was 
not a law, but part of the bouleutic oath intended in fact to restrict the Boule's ability to 
imprison. Although it seems likely that an option or requirement to imprison an 
impeached individual would also apply in eisangeliai to the ekklesia, there is no evidence 
that such rights or duties existed. It is perhaps not inconceivable that an individual 
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In the absence of solid evidence of Aristarkhos' fate, however, it cannot 
categorically be claimed that Lykourgos is wrong, and he may in any case simply 
be conjuring up names, familiar enough within the general context, to add detail 
and credibility to his description. 
§ 116. Kat TOO"OVrOli 7' EtTfu& ... 'iO;~ TO'OVTo'~ fP'YO'~ hroAfp.tJW: Lykourgos ended 
the previous section with a rhetorical question, and adds two more here to 
demonstrate why his example must lead to a guilty verdict in the present trial. 
Aristarkhos and Alexikles were executed merely for supporting a traitor with 
words: Leokrates has betrayed the city with actions as well as words and, unlike 
Phrynikhos, is at the jury's mercy in person to receive their punishment. 858 
Phrynikhos' posthumous prosecution, however, and the treatment of his 
supporters, could arouse suspicions that the events were so closely related to the 
particular circumstances of the late fifth century and the individuals involved in 
them that the cases were not comparable. Thus the second and fourth examples 
will be drawn from the early fifth century to demonstrate the consistency over 
time of verdicts in such cases, with the third being taken again from the late fifth 
century to show that the Phrynikhos affair was no isolated incident, but a 
precedent which the jurors cannot justify ignoring. 
§ § 11 7-119. "I~oll ~ TOll XQ,p,J,oIJ ••• 9alla.TqJ 'iOVroli ''r1IJt,WtraIlTf:~: Hipparkhos 
was probably the great-grandson of Peisistratos by the marriage of Hippias' 
daughter to Kharmos.859 He was ostracized, most likely in 48817 B.C., the first 
awaiting trial could have offered support to a defendant in another case even ifhis 
testimonial might be rather questionable: on this occasion, indeed, the defendant would 
not have been able to voice his opinion on the value of any of his supporters. See too 
Lipsius iii. 813f.; Rhodes 1972a, 179 n.3, 180; Rhodes 1979, 107, 112; Hunter 1994, 144; 
Hunter 1997, 302f. 
858 §§ 112-115, above. 
859 PAIAPF 7600 = 11793 ix (Hipparkbos II). 
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victim of the procedure.86o Hansen accepts Lykourgos' account of a trial for 
treason, concluding that Hipparkhos returned to Athens in 481 B.c., on the basis 
of the amnesty granted to exiles in the face of Xerxes' anticipated invasion;861 he 
was thus indicted for treason at some later stage, probably between 480 and 460 
B.C., but fled before his trial. For Hansen, therefore, Lykourgos' claim that 
H ipparkhos oUx lnrop.€;lIavra 'M]II 1r€pi ~.; 1rpo~oO';a.; Ell T4J 'MJ,.u.p KPIO'III, ill' €P'f)f.1,OIl 
TOil a'}'c!.IIIa Eauavra strongly suggests that there was a period during which 
Hipparkhos was back in Athens and in which he was prosecuted for prodosia.862 
hrel~ ~ ta"ci~ OUK EAafJoll ••• 1rP~ TOU~ 7rPO~ Ka.-m.A;7rOlfV: The bronze statue 
of Hipparkhos which Lykourgos claims was sited on the Acropolis was probably a 
votive offering. Hurwit notes that the only certain Peisistratid construction on the 
Acropolis is the Brauronian precinct, for Brauron, on the coast of Attica, was in 
Peisistratid territory; the sanctuary of Artemis may therefore have been an 
appropriate setting for Hipparkhos' icon as a votive offering.863 If the 
identification of Hipparkhos as eponymous archon in 496/5 B.C. is secure, 
however, then it was conceivably a public honour, though it is debatable whether 
such an honour of an individual with such hereditary tyrannical associations 
ld . b . 864 wou survIve a su sequent ostraCIsm. 
Hipparkhos' punishment was especially ironic since the stele is alleged to have 
been made from the metal of his own statue. The addition of traitors' names to 
such stela; was probably viewed as an extra punishment, for when Alkibiades was 
found guilty and sentenced to death by default in 415/4 B.C., the penalty later 
commuted to exile, his property was also confiscated, his name was inscribed on a 
860 See [Arist.] Ath. 22.3f., with Rhodes 1993; Plut. Nik. 11.8; Harp. s.v. "I1r1rQ.PXQS'. See 
too Arist. Pol. 1284aI7-b34; ML 21 = GHli. 15,45; Raubitschek 1958, 105-109; Dover 
1963, passim; Keaney and Raubitschek,passim; Thomsen 1972,61-108; Welwei 1999, 
42-46. 
861 [Arist.] Ath. 22.8. See too Raubitschek 1959, 127. 
862 Hansen 1975, 69f. #3. See too Rhodes 1979, 105; Hansen 1980a, 91; Ostwald 1986, 
28-40; Sealey 1987,69, 85f.; de Bruyn, 53ff. 
863 Hurwit, 117ff. 
864 D.H. 6.1.1; Develin 1989, 54; Rhodes 1993,272; Welwei 1999, 42. 
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stele, and he was publicly cursed.865 The traitors, beginning with Hipparkhos, 
whose names are inscribed are joined by aA'T'Y}PIOU';, though it is unclear what 
distinguishes these offenders. The word is not common in the orators and has 
connotations of both religious and sacrilegious crimes, and divine and fiendish 
vengeance, as well as of an ability to spread pollution.866 When Lykourgos 
instructs the clerk, however, to read out the inscription, now lost, from the base of 
the stele, together with the names of those inscribed, he refers only to the names 
of traitors. The aliterioi are therefore probably a generalisation of long-forgotten 
identities which is meant to evoke the civic and religious nature of the crimes 
being attributed to Leokrates. 
§ § 120-121. Aa,fJE !' a.Vro'~ KQ,I ,.0 rnpoll 1/A}t/JIap.a ••• fKfillWII TWII o'lI!pc1W: 
Syracusan and Corinthian envoys, seeking assistance against the Athenian 
campaign in Sicily in 415 B.C., found Alkibiades in the Peloponnese; the 
Athenian strategos advised Sparta to aid the defence of Syracuse and to occupy 
Dekeleia, a town in the North of Attica. His advice was followed, and Dekeleia 
was invaded by Agis and fortified by Sparta in 413 B.C.867 Funke notes that 
Alkibiades' advice was astute, for 'es kaum einen besseren Ort in Attika gab': 
Athens was effectively blockaded, for 'mit der Besetzung und Befestigung dieses 
Platzes hatten die Lakedaimonier ... mit einem Schlag die Kontrolle fiber die 
gesamte nordostattische Grenzregion gewonnen'. 868 Dekeleia became a sanctuary 
for deserters and escapee slaves, one major effect of which was the devastation of 
the production of the Laureion silver mines, one of Athens' main sources of 
revenue, and the city was forced to resort to minting silver-plated copper coins.869 
86S Nep. Ale. 4.5; Oem. 21.143-146; D.S. l3.69.1f.; Isok. 16.9,45; Plut. Alk. 19.22; 
Thouk. 6.61.7; Hansen 1975, 76f. #12. Razing of property symbolic of release from 
effective tyranny: Connor 1985, passim. See too Allen 2000a, 201f., 216f.; §8, above. 
866 See e.g. And. 1.51, l31; Ant. 4.0..4; Dein. 1.77; Lys. 6.52f., l3.79; see too Ar. Eq. 445; 
Thouk. 1.126.11; Phot. & Suda, s.v. 'AA,.r7Ip,o~, 'AA,T7JP'OI. 
867 D.S. 13.9.2; Thouk. 6.88.7-93.2, 7.18.1-20.1. 
868 Funke, 127. 
869 Ar. Ra. 718ff.; Thouk. 7.27.2-28.4; Ferguson 1932, 85-95, 160; see too Hammond 
1986,396, 399f.; Ostwald 1986,344; Welwei 1999,212,214; introduction, 20r., above. 
-192 - §§120-121,122 
The decree which Lykourgos requests the clerk to read out legislated for the 
automatic condemnation of those who abandoned Athens for Dekeleia. Ho 
boulomenos was empowered to apprehend any who returned and to hand them 
over to the thesmothetai for delivery TqJ br; ToD op{rY#J.aTo~; as kakourgoi, they 
would probably have been subject to an apagoge, an inference reinforced by 
Lykourgos' use of the verb a7!'a"Ya"Y€Iv.870 Lykourgos appears to be the only 
source for this decree, and its date and proposer are unknown, but the reference to 
the pit-man might imply a date in the fourth century.871 Possibly, the decree was 
intended to circumvent the general amnesty proclaimed by the restored democracy 
in 403 B.c. though later speakers would probably use contemporary terminology 
to describe something previously known under another name. 872 
Lykourgos is, of course, ho boulomenos himself in the present case, which is 
again a prosecution of a deserter. 873 Thus rhetorical questions illustrate the 
similarities between his example and the present trial, and he makes his ninth call 
for the death penalty.874 
§ 122. ., Ag,oll TOilMl tlKoiHnz., Ka, ••• QJucoWTwIl T'#£CUpj~ fKEKT'r}VTO: Lykourgos' 
reference here to the execution in Salamis noticeably lacks detail, perhaps because 
there was no definitive version of the events.875 It is likely that he means the 
Bouleutes Lykidas, whose stoning, followed by that of his wife and children, is 
related by Herodotus: almost certainly Lykourgos does not mean Alexander, 
whom he has already presented as being nearly stoned to death.876 Notably, 
a,Vr0xE,pi arrEKTEIVEV is used rather than KaT€AEVUElJ. The term is not especially 
870 See §§ 112-115, above. 
871 See §8, above. 
872 See And. 1.90f.; [Arist.] Ath. 38.~1, with Rhodes 1993; Xen. Hell. 2.4.43; Cloche 
1915,251-277,343-351; Hignett, 294; Ostwald 1986,497-509. 
873 See §3, above. 
874 Other calls: §§8, 26---27, 43-45, 46---51,52-54, 66---67, 77-78, 79, above, 123. 133-
134, 141-145, below. 
875 See §71. above. 
876 Hdt. 9.1-5; Allen 2000a, 142-146; see too §71. above. 
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common, and where it does not indicate suicide, it seems primarily to refer to 
murder. 877 
In this respect, the detail, which does not appear in Herodotus, of the Bouleutai 
removing their garlands before committing the act is interesting, for it is perhaps 
meant to indicate that although the Councillors recognized their act as homicide, 
they deemed it to be justifiable homicide.878 It is, however, probably no more than 
a Lykourgan gloss to assimilate himself with the Councillors, and to remind the 
jurors, however subliminally, that he too is a public official who has acted in a 
private, and thoroughly justifable, capacity to bring about the death of a traitor. 
Such a gloss might also explain his claim that there was a decree concerning 
Lykidas, though its relation to the killing is unclear. Herodotus' account and 
Lykourgos' remarks imply that the Councillors acted impulsively, or at least after 
only enough forethought to remove their garlands, and as Rosivach notes, 'mobs 
do not pass psephismata before lynchings'. 879 Any such decree might therefore 
have been less directly concerned with the victim than with vindicating the action 
of the Bouleutai themselves, and obviating any requirement for them to be 
purified. If so, its relevance to the present jurors is clear, and they are being 
presented with one more reason to condemn the defendant. For Rosivach, indeed, 
the difference between Herodotus' and Lykourgos' accounts suggests that a 
culturally-repulsive event, fairly accurately recounted by Herodotus, was 
legitimized, with Lykourgos' version reflecting how it was remembered.88o 
§123. Ti ow cL Q,~S" ••• VrrEP ~ TrQ,Tpi~ 1r~KEI 1rOlelll: Lykourgos rounds off 
this entire section with a list of rhetorical questions designed to bring together 
many of the themes he has repeatedly stressed throughout the speech, and to 
provide a framework for the proofs offered by his historical precedents. Desertion 
and active treachery are equally heinous crimes, and individuals who damage the 
877 E.g. Ant. 5.47; Dem. 20.158, 21.1 06; Isok. 4.111, 14.29, 19.19; PI. Lg. 872a 1-c6. 
878 See too Hirzel,passim, esp. 247f.; Parker 1983, 193ff.; §71, above. 
879 Rosivach 1987b, 237f. 
8S0 Rosivach 1987b, 238f. 
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city with actions or words commit equivalent outrages. This is the view of 
Athenians past and present, and must be the view of the present jury. Thus 
Lykourgos makes his tenth call for the death penalty, but Leokrates, who is guilty 
on all these counts, cannot therefore simply be executed, but must suffer extra 
penalties commensurate with his excessive treachery.881 
881 0 h t er calls: §§8, 26-27, 43-45, 46-51,52-54,66-67,77-78,79,120-121, above, 
133-134, 141-145, below. 
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§§124-140 
At first glance, §§124-140 seem to be simply a continuation of the historical 
precedents of §§ 11 0(ii)-123. Certainly, Lykourgos will refer to one example each 
from the late and early fifth century, in a pattern familiar from the previous 
section. There is, clearly, a large degree of continuity, but there is also a definite 
shift of focus which is signalled by a sixth J).€'II OU'II, and the emphasis switches 
from traitors against the city to traitors against democracy and to those aiming to 
establish a tyranny.882 This paves the way for Lykourgos' concentration in the 
second half of this section on the defendant's synegoroi, whose undemocratic 
abuse of their elite status underpins this redefinition of Leokrates' treachery and 
the indefensibility of his case. Notably, too, the examples are no longer introduced 
as precedents, but as norms which are, or should be, binding on the jury. Thus 
Demophantos' decree against tyranny is treated as if its accompanying oath had 
been sworn by the present jurors, and the Spartan law, introduced by the example 
of Pausanias who himself demonstrates how Athens' alter-ego deals with aspiring 
tyrants, is presented as an appropriate and necessary measure to be applied by 
Athenian jurors. It therefore also provides a direct opportunity to introduce the 
eleventh call for the death penalty, and indeed a penalty worse than death, in what 
is Lykourgos' final substantive section before he begins his closing remarks. 
§§ 124-127. 'IIC~va.,uv ow ICo.; TO.iIn& ••• IC~; 11-0' A.~ orO ~,ap.o.: Demophantos 
was one of the anagrapheis ton nomon appointed to revise the law code in 
accordance with Teisamenos' legislation of 403/2 B.C. The anagrapheis were to 
continue and complete the process started by Nikhomakhos in 410 B.c., 
collecting and publishing the laws in force, especially the laws of Solon and 
Drakon.883 It is unclear whether the original revision was actually complete by 
882 , -,. . d . 3 
/LEII OVII structure: mtro uctIon, 7, above. 
883 And. 1.81-85, with MacDowell 1962; Lys. 30.2, 25; IG e 114; IG i3 104; IG i3 105; 
ML 86 = GHli.87; F.D. Smith, 74-78; MacDowell 1978, 46ff.; Clinton,passim; Ostwald 
1986,414-420; Sealey 1987,35-41; Robertson,passim; §§2, 4, above. 
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404 B.C., or if it was interrupted by the regime of the Thirty.884 Two points are 
clear, however: that Lykourgos attributes Demophantos' decree against tyranny to 
the period after the Thirty, and that he is wrong to do so, for the legislation was 
passed in 410 B.c., before, not after, their rule.885 
Conomis suggests that this piece of misinformation was far from accidental, for in 
this way the jury would have the 'benefit of an argument ex silentio, namely that it 
was partly for lack of such a law that the Thirty were able to establish themselves 
as tyrants,.886 Lykourgos is probably being even more disingenuous than this, 
however, for whilst he claims that the decree permitted, indeed encouraged, the 
killing of someone who was merely thought to be about to overthrow the 
democracy and establish a tyranny, this clause is absent from the decree cited by 
Andokides.887 This implies a deliberate misdirection of the jury on Lykourgos' 
part, which strongly suggests that he wilfully misdated Demophantos' legislation 
in order to bolster his own prosecution and his argument that the jurors should be 
legislators as well as judges.888 Moreover, the association with aspirants to 
tyranny serves to justify the argument for Leokrates' condemnation and 
execution: the jurors' ancestors preferred to punish imagined CUlprits than take the 
risk of being enslaved, and since Leokrates is the sort of person who would aspire 
to overthrow the democracy, the jurors themselves must behave in the same way 
as their forebears. 
Ta.iha. cIJ a.~~ i'Ypa,tJ,u,lI ••• TQ.~ ~ ~ KA7JPOlIOIU'lI: Lykourgos' phraseology 
suggests that the wording of Demophantos' legislation was taken from the stele in 
the Bouleuterion in the agora, rather than from any copy of the nomoi preserved in 
the Metroon. 889 It is, indeed, unclear whether the measure was actually a nomos, 
even though Andokides states unequivocally that it was.890 In the fifth century, 
884 Revision complete by 404 B.C.: MacDowell 1978,47. Interrupted by the Thirty: 
[Arist.] Ath. 35.2, with Rhodes 1993. 
885 And. 1.96f.; see too Ostwald 1955, 111-114; Conomis 1958,6; see too §§52-54, 
above. 
886 Conomis 1958, 9f. 
887 And. 1. 96ff. 
888 See §9, above. 
889 See too §4, above. 
890 And. 1.95f., 99. 
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however, the distinction between decrees and laws did not exist as it did in the 
fourth; for Hansen, 'there is no demonstrable difference between nomoi and 
psephismata' and although the words cannot strictly be seen as synonymous, they 
have 'roughly the same meaning when referring to enactments of the 
Athenians' .891 MacDowell differentiates between the two 'overlapping tenns' by 
suggesting that pieces of legislation which had not been the subject of a vote, the 
laws of Solon for example, were strictly nomoi, whereas the type of law proposed 
by Demophantos was apsephisma.892 
Demophantos' measures, however they were defined, do not seem to have 
survived the process of reform to become one of the inscribed fourth-century 
nomoi despite the fact that they were 'the adopted report of a legislative 
commissioner' .893 This is probably because they were based on a pre-existing 
Solonian law which was itself inscribed in the revised codifications, though 
whether the decree was simply a reaffirmation of that law or whether it contained 
any innovations is unclear. Ostwald believes that Demophantos' legislation 
reaffirmed an existing law which itself incorporated an oath. 894 Rhodes, however, 
considers that the oath was the only innovation of Demophantos' measures, 
requiring the Athenians to observe the law that already existed.895 Yet although 
Demophantos' decree against tyranny can be imagined to have lapsed in 403/2 
B.C., the stele upon which it had been engraved remained in situ: this, at least, is 
the scenario described by Andokides. 
MacDowell, however, does not accept this interpretation. For him, Andokides is 
'speaking loosely. He does not mean that the law was completely invalid (for if 
this had been the case the law would not have remained on a stele in front of the 
Council-house), but only that it was not valid in Epikhares' case, because it could 
not now be enforced against persons who offended against it before the beginning 
of 403/2,.896 Such a reading, though, flies in the face of Andokides' explicit 
891 Hansen 1978b, 316; Hansen 1990b, 67; see too §2 with n.174, above. 
892 MacDowell 1978, 45. 
893 Bonner and Smith, ii. 47, 150. 
894 Ostwald 1955, 104-114. 
895 [Arist.] Ath. 16.10, with Rhodes 1993. 
896 And. 1.99, with MacDowell 1962; see too MacDowell 1978, 176. 
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statement that the law was aKvpo~, and that it was so because TOI~ 1I01hOI~ ~el xo~u8al 
arr' EDKAEi~ov lipxOllTO~.897 Indeed, Ostwald argues that for Demophantos' law to 
have survived the legal reforms of 40312 RC., it would have been 'a clear 
contradiction to the letter and the spirit of the amnesty of that year, if all those 
who had participated in the tyranny of the Thirty had been declared outlaws on the 
grounds that they overthrew the democracy. True [they] ... were excluded from 
the amnesty ... ; but ... the adoption of the procedure of eicra'Y'YEAia for overthrow 
of the democracy to replace the harsher measures prescribed by Demophantos 
would '" be consonant with the restraint expressed in the amnesty' . 898 
There are, in any case, other ways to explain the retention of the stele on which 
the decree was engraved. The Athenians did not always remove awkward or 
defunct monuments: Lykourgos has, for example, already mentioned the statue of 
Hipparkhos, which may have survived the Peisistratid's ostracism.899 Moreover, 
even as early as Andokides' speech in 399 RC., the storage of a written law in the 
Metroon was likely to have been the fundamental mechanism to establish validity 
and the mere fact that a stele existed did not, of itself, offer proof of legislative 
validity.90o Clearly, too, in the same way that the stele made from Hipparkhos' 
own statue provided a very particular memorandum of his treachery, the very 
location of the stele argued for its retention, since it provided a constant and 
visible reminder of democratic values to any who were currently serving as 
Councillors. Andokides may well be speaking loosely in calling a psephisma a 
nomos, but not necessarily in any other sense.901 
Lykourgos, however, is speaking not so much loosely as disingenuously. He has 
already misdated and misquoted Demophantos' legislation, but it is in his very 
choice of Demophantos' decree in its own right that his disingenuity is most 
apparent. For he could have cited Eukrates' anti-tyranny legislation, which had 
897 And. 1.99. Support for MacDowell's view: Thomas 1994,120 with n.5; Thomas 1996, 
19 with n.18. 
898 Ostwald 1955, 117f. 
899 §§117-119, above. 
900 Hansen 1990b, 71, dates this to 'undoubtedly as early as c. 400 when Diokles' law was 
passed'. 
901 See too Hansen 1978b, 316f.; Hansen 1990b, 66f. 
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been passed, by nomothesia, as recently as 337/6 B.C.902 The problem, though, 
was that Eukrates' law seems itself to have been repealed, a lapse which may have 
been better known, or at least better remembered, than that of Demophantos' 
decree, and the citation of a law which had become defunct not too long before 
the trial might not have escaped notice.903 Moreover, whilst Eukrates' legislation 
closely paralleled Demophantos' measures, which prohibited the holding of office 
if the democracy were overthrown, it specifically extended, or clarified, the ban to 
the Areopagites. 904 Apart from the fact, therefore, that Lykourgos might in any 
case have tried to avoid citing a law which post-dated Leokrates' alleged crimes, 
he would clearly try to avoid using as an example legislation directed specifically 
against the Areopagos, against the very Council which he has previously used as a 
paradigm of juridical rectitude. Thus, Conomis' interpretation that Lykourgos 
merely wished to avoid offending the susceptibilities of the Council appears 
somewhat naIve, though he is right to see a direct connection between Lykourgos' 
emphasis on oaths and the citation of Demophantos' decree.90s The legislation 
which perhaps specifically included this innovation is especially relevant to the 
inheritable nature of oaths. It is probably also significant that the law quoted by 
Andokides legislates for a penalty worse than death, something that Lykourgos 
has called for repeatedly, and which he will again urge upon the jurors at the end 
of this entire section. 
§§ 128-132. Oti plwoll TOIlIIIII ..; -rrfJut; '" 1101£',",,11 a.UTOUt; a,7rOO'T'EpoOvret;: It seems odd, 
initially, that having insisted throughout his speech on Athens' individuality and 
uniqueness Lykourgos should turn to a Spartan law to demonstrate that Athens 
902 See §§52-54 with n.567, above. 
903 Eukrates' decree perhaps repealed by 330 B.C., with the Nomos Eisangeltikos 
becoming again the proper measure for eisangelia;: Ostwald 1955, 120, 127f. Eukrates' 
decree lapsed in 322 B.C.: Meritt 1952,359. One of the two stela; inscribed with 
Eukrates' decree was found in the agora; one stele was to be erected near the Areopagos 
Hill, the other in the Pnyx. Raubitschek 1964, 333, suggests that 'die Stele mit dem 
Gesetz des Eukrates ist nur ein Abglanz einer viel klareren und bedeutenderen 
Einrichtung, namlich des Kultes der Demokratia, wozu ein Standbild, ein Altar und ein 
Priester gehOrt'. 
904 SEG 12.87, lines 11-26. 
90S Conomis 1958, 11 ff. 
-200- §§12S-132 
was not the only city to deal harshly with traitors. Yet, notwithstanding his own 
clear admiration for the Spartan polity, the concept of Spartan eunomia offered a 
perfect opportunity to show the jury an ideal law: they are to be law-makers, after 
all. 906 Yet the example of Pausanias also brings to mind Lykourgos' earlier 
arguments that the gods withhold protection from the impious and lead their 
minds astray. Kallistratos was removed from the altar of the twelve gods for 
execution, having been misled by the gods into taking refuge there. 907 Similarly, 
and more importantly, Leokrates himself has been deluded into standing trial and 
claiming that his presence is proof of his innocence.908 Given these twin functions 
of the reference, therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is another 
historical error, for although Pausanias is described as King of Sparta, he was in 
fact regent for Pleistarkhos, whose father, Leonidas, had died defending 
Thermopylai.909 
Pausanias was, however, an archetypal aspirant to tyranny, for his behaviour in 
the wake of the victory at Plataia resulted in his recall to Sparta, and a trial where, 
despite being acquitted of the majority of charges which included intrigue with 
Persia, he was replaced by Dorkis. Returning to Byzantium as a private 
individual, he again acted in a despotic manner and, after an Athenian siege, 
connived with Persia before being recalled once more by the Ephors. It seems, 
however, that the ephors were uncertain of the grounds of the allegations against 
Pausanias, even after receiving from Pausanias' erstwhile eromenos apparent 
confirmation of their suspicions in a letter, purportedly intended for Artabazus. 
Thoukydides reports that Pausanias' friend was supposed to have delivered the 
letter but had instead read it himself, fearing, apparently with good reason, that he 
would become yet one more in a line of messengers who had been sent out and 
906 See §§9, 59-64,104-107, above. Eunomia: Arist. Pol. 1306b37-1307al, 1326a25-27; 
D.S. 7.12.1; Pluto Lyk. 5.1-5.3; [Xen.] Ath. 1.8,29.6. Punitive measures against 
cowardice attributed to Solon: Aiskhin. 3.175f.; Oem. 24.103. 
907 §93, above. 
908 §§90-92, above. 
909 Hdt. 9.10; see too §§ 108-11 O(i), above. Historical function and inaccuracy: §§ 11 O(ii}-· 
111, above. 
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had not returned. Eventually, the ephors are said to have hidden behind a screen to 
hear Pausanias admit everything to his betrayed friend. 9lo 
Pausanias took refuge in the so-called Bronze House, where he was walled in and, 
according to Thoukydides, brought out at death's door, presumably to avoid the 
pollution attendant on an individual dying in the precinct itself.911 Diodorus' 
account, which corresponds with that of Lykourgos, is slightly different, with 
Pausanias being starved to death inside the temple.912 The gods, of course, do not 
take care of the sort of suppliants who use their sanctuary for unjust ends, or 
without due piety, as the case of Kallistratos had demonstrated. 913 
Etrr;a., IJ.,J.vveo&, TO~: MacDowel1 
accepts the existence of the law concerning the execution of those who would not 
risk danger for Sparta, despite conceding that 'no stone inscriptions of laws of the 
classical period have been found at Sparta'; there is, however, an air of circularity 
about what is effectively the argument that the law must have existed for 
Lykourgos to make use of it and that Lykourgos' use is evidence for its 
existence.914 Lykourgos has, in any case, been disingenuous before, and it is not at 
all clear that he is citing a real law here.915 Indeed, Fisher suspects that Lykourgos 
might well have made it up; at the very least 'he has certainly made [it] ... seem 
more general and extensive,.916 It would, in any case, have been extremely 
difficult for a juror to determine its authenticity, even if a transcript had existed in 
Sparta, and impossible for him to have done so on the spot. It is also arguable that 
any subsequent prosecution for the citation of a non-existent law could have been 
defended upon the grounds that the relevant law referred only to Athenian 
legislation.917 
910 D.S. 11.44-46,60; Thouk. 1.94.1-96.1,128.1-135.2; Pillt. Arist. 23; Kim. 6; Forrest 
1980,99-103; Hammond 1986, 254ff. 
911 Thouk. 1.134. See too Paus. 3.17.2-9; Suda, s.v. XaAl<ioll<o~; Parker 1983, 182ff. The 
story ofPausanias' escape to the Bronze Temple of Athene and his starvation seems to 
have had at least the one precedent of Kharilaos of Sparta: Plut. Lyk. 5.5. 
912D.S.l1.45.7. 
913 See §93, above. 
914 MacDowell 1986, 5, 70. 
915 See §§ 124-127, above. 
916 Fisher 1994, 378. 
m See too §§11-13, 104-107, above. 
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The authenticity of this Spartan law seems further undermined by evidence that 
atimia, not death, was the punishment in Sparta for cowardice. Thoukydides 
reports that the Spartan survivors of the blockade at Sphakteria were 
disenfranchised, though they were later reinstated; this was, however, perhaps a 
special measure at a time of oliganthropic crisiS.918 Plutarch, however, also 
suggests that after Leuktra Agesilaos urged the Spartans not to enforce laws 
against those who fled, the tremblers, and Diodorus explicitly names atimia as the 
punishment which was waived for survivors of the battle at Megalopolis in 
331 B.C.919 MacDowell thus argues for two distinct varieties of cowardice, 
punished alternately by death and atimia, though he also concedes that there 
might have been no such distinction and that Lykourgos might instead be referring 
to the right of the King on campaign to execute on the spot anyone caught 
attempting to desert.92o 
Lykourgos' tactics, at least, are clear. Fear of one's own community should be 
sufficient to ensure that everyone stands and fights; yet this is precisely what 
Leokrates failed to do. Thus, despite the fact that most Athenians did remain to 
face their peril, such a law is essential to constrain those, thankfully few, who are 
cowards. This is, by now, a familiar argument, as is what is effectively an appeal 
for substantive and pre-emptive legislation: indeed, by placing Demophantos' 
decree against tyranny after the Thirty, he can simultaneously imply that it was for 
lack of such legislation that the Thirty were able to seize power, and can avoid the 
impression that pre-emptive legislation, at least on that occasion, failed to achieve 
its aim.921 
IDa. p.OliO~ OOTo~ ,.001.1 ml.1.ITW1.I a.1.I6pW-,rWI.I ••• TO;~ TroAe,.,.io,~ E'YICa.-re).'TrE: All trace of 
the quotation which Lykourgos attributes to some of the old poets is lost.922 None 
the less, Leokrates has become not just the worst Athenian ever, not even simply 
918 Thouk. 5.34.2. 
919 Plut. Ages. 30.2-6; D.S. 19.70.5; see too MacDowell 1986, 44ff. 
920 MacDowell 1986, 70, citing Arist. Pol. 1285a7-10. 
921 See §§66-67, 124-127, above. 
922 Trag. Adesp. 297. 
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worse than metics, women and slaves, but incapable of actions which are 
instinctive even to animals.923 
§ § 13 3-13 4. -rol?,tIpOW oU~lJ.io, TrOAI~ o,u,.ov ••• ~v TrOAIV f?,lCo,-mAITrWV ICpivETQ,I: No 
evidence is offered for the allegation that Leokrates was not allowed to reside as a 
metic in any other polis, and it is in any case contradicted by the admitted fact that 
Leokrates spent five years in Megara with his prostates. 924 The argument IS, 
however, that he who was worse than a metic in his own city could not be 
acceptable as a metic elsewhere. This is presented as if it proves the claim, and 
offers an easy contrast with polluted murderers, who would clearly be more 
welcome, and presumably less polluted, than the defendant.925 The case of 
Phrynikhos alone, too, disproves the assertion that other traitors are always 
punished before their treachery can be carried OUt.926 Lykourgos is, however, 
clearly summing up, albeit in hyperbolic and contradictory style, his examples of 
would-be tyrants and traitors of democracy for whose treason pre-emptive 
legislation is needed, and setting the context for his eleventh call for the death 
penalty, and for his diatribe against the other enemies of Athens, the defendant's 
- ·927 synegorol. 
§§135-137. 8~CtJ ~ 1Ca.' ••• m,'YpQ,I/Io.,., ~II e;~;a.II: In setting up what 
will be a systematic attack on the democratic principles of Leokrates' synegoroi, 
Lykourgos uses the defendant's own father as a contrast, and claims that he would 
have condemned his son for deserting the bronze statue which he had set up in the 
923 See too §§36--39, 46--51, 98-101, 108-110(i), above. 
924 See too §§21-23(i), 43-45, 55-58, above. 
925 See too §§5-6, above. 
926 §§112-115, above. 
927 Other calls: §§8, 26--27, 43-45, 46--51,52-54,66-67,77-78,79,120-121.123. 
above, 141-145, below. Synegoroi: 135-137, 138-149, below. 
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temple of Zeus Soter.928 The contrast is significant because it might imply that 
Lykourgos is worried about the credibility of Leokrates' supporters: perhaps he 
feels that he needs to urge the jurors to bear in mind that whatever the synegoroi 
might say, Leokrates' own father would have condemned him. There is, too, the 
repetition of Zeus Soter: does Lykourgos think that the synegoroi are going to 
pronounce the god as Leokrates' saviour, whom the jurors cannot contradict? 
Such suspicions make it impossible to take at face value Lykourgos' claim that he 
was asked time and again why he failed to include Zeus Soter's name in his 
indictment. It may indeed be the case that the details of the forthcoming trial had 
been the subject of much speculation.929 There are, though, other possibilities. 
Perhaps some had asked, tongue-in-cheek, why such a pious prosecutor had 
omitted such a pertinent charge from his comprehensive list of accusations: that 
could explain the clear edge to the reply that he had not felt the need to add the 
name of Zeus Protector to his charges of treason. Perhaps, too, Lykourgos is 
trying to characterize the Athenians en masse as so outraged by Leokrates' 
behaviour that he himself was criticized for missing a golden opportunity to 
hammer a final nail into Leokrates' coffin: if so, the jurors will take the hint that 
these are not the fellow citizens they will want to meet after the trial if they fail to 
deliver the 'right' verdict. 
§§ 138-140. 'EIrniTrA"1?"#I41 ~ plJ)."fITG ... TrQ,Tp;~' Ka.; TOVroI, Et1'T' (I'IJ~poJmJ,: The 
emphasis on threats to democracy and aspirants to tyranny with which this entire 
section of the speech has been primarily concerned is made explicit now. For 
when Lykourgos introduced the particular topic of the synegoroi, he used 8a.v,ui,w 
to express what seems to have been his own personal view of those who supported 
anyone whom he considered to be a traitor.930 Now he uses €KTr€TrA'Y'fYIJA,I, but this 
928 Dover 1994, 243, citing this passage, notes the • flexibility of religious belief in the 
service of rhetoric': doubt, or even outright denial, might frequently be expressed that the 
dead are sentient (e.g. Aiskhin. 1.14, Isok. 19.42), but the opposite was strongly asserted 
when the need arose (e.g. Is. 9.4, Lys. 12.99f.). See too §§ 17-18,25, above. 
929 See §§ 14-15,55-58, above. 
930 §§ 135-137, above. 
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time in respect of the jurors themselves. What he is dumbstruck about is that they 
do not realize the explicit threat to the interests of TWlI 1I0ILWlI Kat -Mj~ ~ILoKpaT;a~ 
that the synegoroi represent, for such speakers have become skilful to act Ka(j' 
VILWJI, rather than Vrrip VILWJI. There is no real criticism here of the jurors. People 
such as the synegoroi are clever speakers, skilled at pulling the wool over 
everyone's eyes, and have accepted bribes specifically so as to mislead the jury. 
Indeed they needed to be able to do so successfully, for discovery of such a crime 
could result in their own prosecution.93I Lykourgos is effectively redefining the 
support of Leokrates' synegoroi as a threat to democracy akin to corruptly 
misleading the demos. 932 In the courts, moreover, such subversives did not even 
run the risk of a graphe doron, as they did in the assembly.933 Synegoro; were not, 
indeed, even vulnerable to prosecution for false testimony, for they were exempt 
from a dike pseudomartyrion.934 
Rubinstein notes that Lykourgos' use here of the topos of the similarities in the 
treacherous outlook between defendant and synegoroi is consistent with his 
reference to a previous jury's attitude towards Aristarkhos and Alexikles in 
§§113-115, above. She argues that Lykourgos is clearly assuming that one of the 
functions of friends who act as synegoroi is to offer a personal endorsement of 
their associate. This is itself consistent with the view of synegoroi as either 
friends, relatives, or philotimoi.935 Whilst relatives can evoke Aristotelian pathos, 
931 MacDowell 1978, 251, citing Oem. 46.26; Todd 1993, 94f., citing Oem. 32.31 f. 
932 Defined in Hyp. 4 (Eux.). 29, as saying what is not in the best interests of the demos 
after taking bribes from those acting for opposing interests. 
933 See Harp. s.v. awpw\l "Ypat/YYJ; Lipsius, ii. 401 ff.; MacDowell 1978, 180. Perhaps the 
most (in)famous example of the graphe doron is Hypereides' prosecution of Phil ok rates, 
who was convicted and sentenced to death in absentia: Hyp. 4 (Eux.). 29f.; Oem. 19.114 
119; Aiskhin. 2.6. On other occasions, however, the sentence was clearly atimia: Aiskhin. 
3.232. General treatment: Harvey 1985. 
934 Aiskhin. 2.170; Since Phokion appears as both witness and synegoros for Aiskhines, 
the fourth-century restrictions upon witnesses' verbal testimony could thus be 
circumvented, and a witness could refrain from contentious statements in his written 
testimony and wait to assert them aloud, with impunity, as a synegoros. Rubinstein 2000, 
72ff., argues that the reform which silenced the witnesses was, in part, perhaps intended 
to obviate rhetorical advantage: if she is right, then the attempt seems to have failed. She 
notes, none the less, that exemption from a dike pseudomartyrion is one of the more 
important differences between synegoroi and witnesses: see too Harrison 1968-1971 ii, 
158, more tentatively citing also Is. 12.4; §20, above. 
935 Rubinstein 2000, 151f.; see too Lys. 14.19ff. The typology is subverted in Aiskhin. 
1.194 to wasters, superannuated rent-boys, and degenerates. 
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however, friends are in a more ambivalent position, for they should renounce 
associates who are discovered to be criminals, rather than emphasize their 
friendship, and they certainly should not endorse them.936 Rubinstein notes this 
moral dilemma and argues that the very risk of guilt by association itself gave 
credence to friends' appearances in court, which could therefore be taken as a 
very real conviction that they believed their associate to be innocent: rhetorically 
there was thus no conflict of interest in reality, since they could have chosen not 
to appear.937 
Lykourgos might therefore need to argue that the relationship between Leokrates 
and his synegoroi is not a genuine relationship between philoi, but that the 
supporters have been bribed to offer their endorsement. Yet the topos of paid 
synegoroi seems to have been used so infrequently that his attack is better seen as 
an integral part of his theme that the synegoroi are anti-democratic .938 The point 
is, indeed, explicitly made by an assault on their abuse of their elite status, on their 
request for what Rubinstein calls 'transferable charis' .939 Horse breeders and 
choregoi already receive crowns, and need no further benefit from others; to 
deserve gratitude, Lykourgos argues, they should have been trierarchs or the like, 
providing something useful rather than ostentatious. Ober notes that 'Lycurgus is 
deliberately extreme in his rejection of all non-military liturgies. Certainly fourth-
century litigants expected charis for serving as choregos and in some cases felt 
that bringing up their horse raising and athletic victories would gain the jurors' 
respect' .940 
The distinction is valid, however, within the tenns of Lykourgos' own rhetorical 
requirements. In 357 B.C., the trierarchy had been modified by a reform of 
Periandros, with the 1,200 wealthiest liturgists being formed into 20 symmories 
936 See Arist. Rhet. 1413bl0. 
937 Rubinstein 2000, 152-166. 
938 Two examples: Aiskhin. 3.257; Oem. 21.139; see too Rubinstein 2000, 164, who 
omits Aiskhines. 
939 Rubinstein 2000, 212-231. 
94°Ober 1989a, 231 n.57. Liturgies: [Arist.] Ath. 56.3,61.1, with Rhodes 1993; APF, 
xvii-xxxi; Thomsen 1964,24-37,45-104,194-257; Davies 1967, passim; Pickard-
Cambridge 1968,75-78,86-93; Jordan, 61-93; Andreades, 322-348; Davies 1984.92-
96; Ober 1989a, 226-233. More generally: Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 232-238; MacDowell 
1978,161-164; Rhodes 1982, passim; Sinclair, 61-65. 
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sharing the heavy expense, and the glory.941 The defendant and his 'team' are, 
however, anti-democratic and self-serving war-shirkers who might entertain the 
jurors but would not, and did not, save them in a crisis. Worse, the very element 
of elite individuality that marks out horse breeding and the choregia and that 
allows them to be linked in this way demonstrates their potential danger to the 
democracy itself. The conclusion is easy to draw: the synegoroi are to be 
condemned by their association with the defendant, and Leokrates must be tarred 
with the same brush as them. He is no longer just a traitor, but an enemy of 
democracy and law, and a tyrant-in-waiting. 
Todd implies that there is little real evidential value in such rhetorical attacks on 
synegoroi: they are simply 'the regular technique of the conspiracy theorist', 
included to incite prejudice against prospective speakers, and, 'if no supporters 
appear, then the hearers' inference will be that the outspoken clarity of the 
prosecutor's case has frightened them into silence' .942 Thus abuse proves nothing 
about whether synegoroi were actually used in any given case. Rubinstein 
disagrees, claiming that synegoroi were very far from exceptional and that people 
often knew in advance about opposing litigants' tactics. As a result, she argues, 
there is 'no compelling reason to follow Todd's pessimistic assessment of the 
value of rhetorical passages which contain attacks on the opponent's 
synegoroi' .943 Certainly we cannot know whether Leokrates' synegoroi really 
appeared in court, or whether this passage was included in case they did so, 
perhaps being incorporated later into a published version without ever being 
delivered in court. It is, however, difficult to imagine that a defendant with friends 
(or the wealth to bribe acquaintances) of such a stature would have been prepared 
to stand trial without them, especially against this particular prosecutor. 
941 Oem. 14.16f., 18.102ff., 21.80, 154f., 47.2lf.; Isok. 15.145. A reform by 
Demosthenes in 340 B.C. reduced the number of those liable from 1200 to 300: Aiskhin. 
3.222; [Arist.] Ath. 61.1, with Rhodes 1993; Dein. 1.42; Oem. 18.102-109; APF, xxix; 
Ruschenbusch 1978, passim. 
942 Todd 1996, 113. 
943 Rubinstein 2000, 65. 
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§§141-150. 
The conclusion, beginning with the penultimate /-L€II QUII, is divided into a summary 
of the arguments and charges (§§ 141-148), and an emotional appeal (§§ 149-150), 
signalled by the final JL€II OUII, for the defendant's conviction and execution.944 
§§ 141-145. 'ExPijll,uv ow W a~~ ... rrWo'K~ U,uJJlI ?'E~,: The practice of 
defendants bringing their families into court to incite pity was widespread.945 
Here, however, it is turned on its head, with the argument that on this occasion it 
is the jurors' wives and children who should be in court as a reminder of the larger 
issues beyond the dikasterion. This allows Lykourgos not only to lay the ground 
for his reiteration of the principal themes of his prosecution, but also to locate the 
jurors' wives and families specifically and properly within their homes, providing 
a counterpoint to the defendant who deserted his own. There is also a strong hint 
that the jurors will be required to account for their verdict when they return home 
to these wives and families: this was probably not an unfamiliar tactic and was 
made explicit at least on one occasion by Demosthenes.946 There follows a 
summary of the main points of the speech. Leokrates the fugitive is presented in 
stark contrast to those who stayed in the city, and to those who faced danger and 
remained in their posts, fighting to save their country.947 Brazen and unrepentant, 
he returns against the backdrop of Athenian cults and sacrifices, the agora, and the 
laws and constitution, and the dead of Khaironeia themselves.948 
With heavy sarcasm, Lykourgos raises the rhetorical temperature by posing a 
typical short series of questions to which he provides his own answers, 
hypophora, to demonstrate that there is no approach open to the defendant that 
944 • ';' . d . 37 b IJ.€II OIJII structure: mtro uctlon, ,a ave. 
945 See e.g. Ar. Vesp. 568-574,975-983; Oem. 21.99, 186ff.; Lys. 20.34f.; PI. Ap. 34b6-
c5. 
946 Oem. 59.11Of. 
947 §§5-6, 16, 17-18, 19,36-39,40-41,43-45,46-51, above. 
948§§5-6, 7.8,9.25,52-54.59-64,65,66-67, 135-137, above. 
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can secure his acquittal.949 The generational division of the jury reappears to stress 
that both older and younger members have no reason whatsoever to pity the 
defendant.95o The older jurors' concerns of being cared for in their old age and 
burial in a free land were surrendered by the defendant as readily as the city itself. 
The younger jurors would effectively be stabbing in the back their fallen 
comrades at Khaironeia if they were to acquit the man who betrayed their graves. 
They would, moreover, be denouncing them as mad for defending their country if 
Leokrates were to be acquitted as sane for abandoning it. Acquittal would set too 
dangerous a precedent.95I The defendant has, in any case, already condemned 
himself once to banishment by deserting the city and living in Megara with a 
sponsor for five or six years.952 
§§146-148. BoUAo,..,a.,~' fT. {JpGxiQ, ••• mJ.P(i TWlIikroli T'#£lIlPif/.: It is not possible to 
identify the decree that Lykourgos has read out. He claims that it was passed by 
the demos, and that it concerned piety, though he does not name its sponsor. He 
has not done so consistently with the previous decrees that he introduced, 
however, naming Hypereides, Kritias, and Demophantos, but referring to decrees 
of the demos in other instances.953 This probably indicates that the proposer of the 
piety decree was unknown, at least to Lykourgos.954 One decree against impiety 
was attributed to Diopeithes; it was passed, according to Plutarch, shortly before 
the Peloponnesian War, and Ostwald suggests that this was the first time such 
legislation had existed.955 Indeed, whatever rules existed in this respect, they were 
949 See too, e.g.: Aiskhin. 3.230f.; And. 1.148f.; Oem. 35 47ff., 36.53f.; Hyp. 2 (Phil.). 10; 
Lys. 10, 22f., 30.26f. 
950 §§36-39, 40--41, above. 
951 §7, above. 
952 §§21-23(i), 33-34,43--45, 55-58, above. Lykourgos also used IJ/ry.,o{30TOv in his 
prosecution of Autolykos. The word is rare in the orators, appearing once each in Isok. 
12.31, Oem. frg. 64, and Aiskhin. Ep. 11.13; see too Suda, s.v. M'r}Ao,8oTO~ xWpa.. 
953 Hypereides: §§36-39; Kritias: §§112-115; Demophantos: §§ 124-127; Demos: §§52-
54,117-119,120-121,122,above. 
954 It is unlikely that it formed part of his own package ofreforms, for he would surely 
have said so. There is also no trace in Schwenk's 1985 collection of the dated laws and 
decrees of 'the Lykourgan era' of anything that could be reconstructed as a Lykourgan 
decree concerning piety. 
955 Pluto Per. 32.1 f.; Ostwald 1986, 528-535. See too MacDowell 1978,200; Parker 1996, 
208. 
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clearly in respect of impiety, rather than piety as such.956 Lykourgos' use of /J/YJlIUW 
might therefore be significant, for he is perhaps quoting or paraphrasing part of 
the decree itself.957 Thus he has informed against an impious individual, and it is 
now for the jurors to take vengeance on their own, and the gods', behalf. 
In accordance, perhaps, with the terms of the so-called decree of piety, Lykourgos 
emphasizes that those who fail to punish the guilty inherit the burden of their 
crimes. There follows an explicit warning that despite the secrecy of the ballot, 
the gods will see how the jurors vote.958 He reiterates all the elements of his 
eisangelia: Leokrates is guilty of treason, overthrowing the democracy, impiety, 
injuring his ancestors, and desertion of his post and failure to serve.959 These are 
all encompassed by the one eisangelia and the one vote on whether Leokrates is 
guilty or not.960 With a final flourish, Lykourgos asks whether anyone could be 
stupid enough to acquit Leokrates. The rhetoric is vivid and effective: saving the 
defendant will result in everyone's safety being delivered up to would-be 
deserters; pitying him is an active choice to be killed pitilessly by enemies; and 
providing any charis to the traitor of his country, and perhaps inferentially his 
supporters too, will lead to a scrutiny by the gods which can have only one result 
- condemnation.961 
956 See Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 62f.; MacDowell 1978, 197-200; Todd 1993, 106,307-
315. 
957 If so, he does not provide enough detail to allow a reconstruction, nor to search for 
similar expressions in the other orators. Menusis: Lipsius, i. 208-211; MacDowell 1978, 
181ff., citing especially Lys. 13. See too Lykourgos' use ofwrrvVElll in §4, above. 
958 See too §§90-92, 93, 94-97, above. 
959 Treason: §§5-6, 8, 26-27, 31-35, 36-39, 55-58, 59-64, 112-115, 123, 133-134; 
overthrowing the democracy: 79, 124-127, 128-132, 133-134; impiety: 8,25,31-35, 
36-39,55-58,59-64, 77-78, 90-92, 94-97; injury of ancestors: 9, 25, 55-58, 94-97, 
135-137; lipotaxia and astrateia: 17-18,36-39,43-45,55-58,59-64, 128-132. 
960 It is in this context that Lykourgos' reference to a single vote should be taken, rather 
than as implying an agon atimetos: see introduction, 33f., above; §§ 149-150, below. 
961 See too §§135-137, 138-140, above. 
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§§ 149-150. 'E'Yw p.& OW Ka.' -ri 7ra.TP;~' ... TWlI lIOlkWlI Ka.' TOO .1) UWT'rJP;a.,: 
With a final ,Mil OUlI, Lykourgos begins an emotive appeal intended to keep his 
prosecution in the forefront of the jurors' minds during the defence speech to 
come and when they are on the point of giving their verdict. His remarks about the 
voting itself seem odd, though, for his description of the procedure appears 
anachronistic. He claims that there are two urns. The first represents treason, and 
therefore the condemnation of the defendant: as such, it signifies safety and 
prosperity for Athens. The other represents delivery, and therefore the acquittal of 
the defendant: this signifies the destruction of Athens. The problem arises because 
the voting system had changed at some point during the fifth and fourth centuries. 
In the fonner system, a single pebble was put in one of two urns, one for a guilty 
verdict, the other for not guilty; the contents of both urns were counted to 
detennine the verdict. In the latter procedure, there were two urns, one of bronze 
and another of wood, and two bronze ballots; the ballot for acquittal had a solid 
axle and the other, for condemnation, was hollow. The ballot representing a 
juror's chosen verdict was placed in the bronze urn and the other was discarded in 
the wooden urn. Only the contents of the bronze urn were counted. Jurors were 
then allocated a token with which to collect payment. It is the fonner system to 
which Lykourgos appears to be referring when he emphasizes the votes contained 
within the two urns.962 
Worthington has reconsidered the possibility, however, that this apparent 
inconsistency might easily be explained by interpreting Lykourgos' statement as a 
rhetorical nicety rather than a procedural problem.963 Thus Lykourgos is 'asking 
the jurors not to discard the ballot for condemnation but to make that the one 
which counted in the present case, and so to deposit it in the "active" urn. In that 
way, with more condemnation ballots in that urn, Leocrates would be found 
guilty'. Worthington's argument is extremely persuasive, not least because of the 
overt and overwhelming rhetorical thrust of this final section. Lykourgos has, 
962 See Ar. Vesp. 986-996; [Arist.] Ath. 68.2-69.2, with Rhodes 1993; Lipsius, iii. 926f. 
n.98; Boegehold 1963, passim; Harrison 1968-1971, ii. 164ff., esp. 165 n.2; Boegehold 
1985, passim; Todd 1993, 132f. 
963 Worthington 2001, 303f., citing Lipsius, Boegehold 1985, and Harrison (previous 
note), and H. Sauppe, De Atheniensium ratione sufJragia in iudiciis ferendi (G6ttingen 
1883). 
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moreover, switched his emphasis from the Ka~;(],Kolll to the tVfJq,ov) which they 
contain: his principal focus changes and is no longer the urns, but the ballots 
themselves. Lykourgos is therefore setting up a contrast rather than reflecting 
actual practice. The urns represent the defendant's treason or his salvation. The 
ballots, conversely, represent the destruction of the city or its safety and 
propserity. It is a simple choice: save or destroy.964 
Lykourgos concludes by conjuring up personifications of the country, trees, 
harbours, dockyards and walls, temples and sanctuaries. For Usher, this is closely 
modelled on the closing prosopopoiia of Lysias' prosecution of Eratosthenes. 965 
There are similarities, it is true, but Lykourgos is clearly bringing together topoi 
that have been stressed through the speech. He began by offering a justification of 
his entire prosecution on behalf of the temples, shrines and precincts that 
Leokrates had betrayed, moving on to the harbours and walls that the defendant 
had not pitied, the land and the temples which had given up their trees and arms, 
and the dockyards which had been personally betrayed.966 There is, too, more than 
a passing resemblance to the ephebic oath which Lykourgos placed at the heart of 
his speech.967 Thus he urges the jurors to remember these personified appeals, to 
dismiss what is likely to be a pitiful and tearful defence spectacle, and to be 
necessarily hard-hearted when they vote. The sole reference to the outcome of this 
case, Aiskhines 3.252, probably refers to a second vote on the penalty, rather than 
on the verdict itself.968 If so, Lykourgos' plea seems to have been successful. 
964 This should not be taken to refer to a single vote covering verdict and penalty, but a 
rhetorical contrast similar to that in §§ 146-148, above; see too introduction, 33f., above. 
965 Usher 1999,328, citing Lys. 12.99. 
966 See §§2, 17-18,36-39,43-45,59-64, 141-145, above. 
967 §§77-78, above. 
968 See introduction, 31 fr., above; Sullivan 2002, passim. 
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APPENDIX 
DEMOSTHENES' AREOPAGOS LEGISLATION - YET AGAIN. 
In 330 B.C., Lykourgos prosecuted a certain Leokrates for treason. His charges were 
based partly on Leokrates' flight from Athens in the wake of Athens' defeat at the 
battle of Khaironeia in 338 B.C. The defendant's behaviour violated a decree passed 
by the demos at that time which categorized flight as prodosia, though the eisangelia 
is defined more generally, and not specifically based on that decree, for the demos' 
decree is the third of three precedents which Lykourgos uses in §§S2-S4, and which 
he argues should be judicially binding upon the jurors. The first precedent singles out 
the Areopagos Council for the exemplary provisions of its judgement. Its use, 
however, requires the orator to interpose a request not to be interrupted. 
~KEI/;a~E ~', w allape.;, OTI ovr Ell VIJ,IlI EaTIV o.7rOtVriq,lrTatrBal AEwKpaTOu,; TOUTOVI, TO. a'Kala 
7r%OrT/. TO 'Yap aaiK'Y)lJ,a TOO1"O KEKP/IJ,EVOV EaT; Ka; KaTE')'lIWrTIJ,EVOV. ,q IJ,EV 'Yap EV 'Apeicp 7ra')'qJ 
/3oUA7r-Kai wll~Ei.; 1J,01 8opum' TaVn,v 'Yap VrroAaIJ,/3avw IJ,E'YifTT"r]V ,.aTE 'YEV€~a/ ,-.n 7rOA€1 
rTw'M]piall-Tov,; q,U'YCIlITa.; nJV 1TaTpiaa Ka; E'YKQ.TaA/1TOVTa.; TOTE TOI'; 7rOA€#kiOl~ Aa.{300rTa 
a7r€I<TEIIIE. 
Consider, gentlemen, that it is not actually open to you to acquit this Leokrates if you act 
justly, for his offence has already been judged and condemned. For the Areopagos Council-
and you need not shout me down, because I contend that it was the greatest security the city 
had at that time-arrested and executed those who fled the country and abandoned it to the 
enemy. 
Lykourgos has, none the less, already mentioned the Areopagos with no such plea for 
forbearance. I His request here, therefore, seems specifically to relate to the 
Areopagos' judgements and actions in the immediate aftermath of Athens' defeat at 
Khaironeia. It is not possible to identify the individuals whom the Areopagos 
executed in 338 B.C., but in respect of at least one individual who attempted to flee 
to Samos, the Council's punishments were evidently carried out with reference 
neither to the Ekklesia nor to the Dikasteria.2 
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This exerCIse of power was clearly deemed deeply undemocratic and it raIses 
questions concerning the measures which formed the basis of the powers to which 
the Areopagos apparently considered itself entitled. It seems clear from Deinarkhos 
1.50 that at some point in the 350s or early 340s, the Ekklesia passed a decree, 
proposed by Demosthenes, conferring the powers of apophasis on the Areopagos 
Council. 3 Under the terms of this decree, the Areopagos acted as a commission of 
enquiry for the Ekklesia and Dikasteria, though it was also empowered to act on its 
own initiative: the two procedures have been respectively labelled as apophasis kala 
prostaxin and apophasis aute proelomene, and it is generally accepted that the 
Areopagos was not permitted, in either case, to inflict punishment, but was to 
compile a report.4 
Deinarkhos is, however, also commonly interpreted as implying in 1.62 that 
Demosthenes was further responsible for a separate decree empowering the 
Areopagos to enforce the laws and punish lawbreakers, a measure that we may 
perhaps call criminal-behaviour legislation. This is indeed the impression gained at 
first sight, but the situation which Deinarkhos is describing may not allow such a 
straightforward interpretation, not least because the examples which he proceeds to 
give all appear to be cases of apophasis.5 
This criminal-behaviour legislation of Demosthenes has been notoriously difficult to 
date. Prevailing recent opinion has placed it in the immediate aftermath of 
Khaironeia, but Wallace has comprehensively demolished this dating, not least by 
taking account of the outrage expressed by the jurors in the above passage of 
Lykourgos' prosecution: why, Wallace asks, would the dikasts be so outraged even 
eight years later by the Areopagos' exercise of powers which had only just been 
expressly granted to it?6 Wallace therefore places the measure 'earlier, under 
different circumstances, and for different purposes': it was the result of an unknown 
but sudden crisis where criminal behaviour was the concern, not treachery, hence the 
outrage when the powers which the measures bestowed were abused and used to 
punish traitors.7 This seems illogical, however, for the use of powers originally 
intended to permit the punishment of criminals would hardly occasion outrage when 
used against traitors in a civic emergency. 
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None the less, the Areopagos patently did overstep the mark in a way which led the 
Athenians to assess its actions as an abuse of power. Wallace had, however, perhaps 
already resolved the confusion with his earlier suggestion that Demosthenes' 
apophasis legislation and criminal-behaviour decree may be identified as one and the 
same measure, an explanation which benefits from needing neither an unknown 
sudden crisis nor any particular date. It is, therefore, worth briefly revisiting this 
suggestion and considering the arguments which make it remain highly attractive. 8 
First, although Deinarkhos states that the Areopagos was empowered by 
Demosthenes to punish lawbreakers, he is at pains to emphasise the power of the 
Council and Demosthenes' own part in its empowerment: this is especially so since 
he is prosecuting Demosthenes in particular, and he may thus be exaggerating the 
scope of the Areopagos' jurisdiction.9 Secondly, if a date earlier than 338 B.C. is 
posited for the criminal-behaviour legislation then, as Wallace acknowledges, it is 
datable to about the time of the apophasis measures and the Ekklesia was 
unaccountably responsible for two pieces of legislation for effectively the same 
purpose and at almost the same time; one measure is far more plausible. 10 
Moreover, a requirement for the Areopagos to refer to the courts any apophaseis 
warranting a penalty above a certain amount is strongly implied, if not demonstrated, 
by its attempt secretly to fine Theogenes, the Basileus, for failing to divorce his wife 
as required by law; the Council's covert action 'at least suggests that the Areopagites 
were acting in a way that execeeded their legitimate authority when they imposed 
that fine'. II This is, as Wallace notes, consistent with Demosthenes' claim that the 
Areopagos did not have final authority to punish as it saw fit; the complexities of 
variously dating the criminal-behaviour legislation, Demosthenes against Neaira, 
and Theogenes case at least strongly suggest that the Basileus' case took place 
shortly after the Areopagos was so empowered. 12 Wallace's argument is further 
supported, perhaps, by the procedural parallel of the Boule's power to impose 
penalties of up to 500 dr. in eisangeliai which fell within its jurisdiction, but its 
requirement to refer to the courts any cases deemed to warrant a heavier penalty. 13 
Wallace now suggests, however, on the basis of the foregoing arguments, that since 
Demosthenes' criminal-behaviour legislation must belong to a period in the 350s or 
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early 3405, and since this brings it into conflict with the putative dating for the 
apophasis legislation, and since it is also difficult to reconcile 'the power to punish 
any Athenian' to 'the power to investigate and report', there was no general 
apophasis legislation at all; he argues that 'apophasis was not instituted by either law 
or decree' but that each incident of investigation was separately decreed as deemed 
appropriate by the demos.1 4 He concludes that the Areopagos, in cases of apophasis, 
was acting on the basis of its traditional rights, hence its powers of instigating 
investigations on its own authority-as it did in the case of Theogenes-and that its 
executions in 338 B.C. were actions in excess of the powers bestowed by 
Demosthenes' specific criminal-behaviour legislation. 
There is clearly an advantage in denying the existence of one of the two legislative 
items, but Wallace might have chosen to reject the wrong measure. Thus it is 
significant that Lykourgos fails to mention any particular decree at the root of the 
Areopagos' executions in §52, despite explicitly citing the demos' decree in §53 and 
despite a legal basis, however restricted, to the Councillors' actions. Indeed, the 
second precedent he introduces is the case of Autolykos, an Areopagite who had 
secreted his wife and children out of Attica in the days of crisis in 338 B.C., and 
whom Lykourgos himself prosecuted, presumably for prodosia under the terms of 
the Nomos Eisangeltikos. The Areopagos was perhaps, at least on this occasion, not 
prepared to prosecute one of its own; perhaps, however, public reaction to its 
spontaneous executions was such that further actions against alleged traitors were 
impossible. It is also possible that the Council was strictly interpreting the terms of 
the demos' decree categorizing flight as prodosia, and was unwilling to act against 
an individual who had not personally fled Athens. IS Lykourgos does, indeed, insist 
upon the Areopagos' legal rectitude, and his reference to Autolykos conveniently 
paves the way for the third precedent of the demos' decree itself. The jurors were 
clearly assumed to be prepared to interpret the laws more widely than the Areopagos, 
something that in his present prosecution Lykourgos is relying upon. 
Lykourgos' precedents are patently more comprehensible if the Areopagos was 
acting on the basis of specific legislation when it conducted its executions, even if it 
had exceeded its powers by far. Such an excess was clearly a matter of interpretation, 
however, for Lykourgos presents the needs of the moment as justification for the 
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executions, despite recogmzmg that the jurors and surrounding audience will 
probably not share this view. This, indeed, probably accounts for his silence over the 
actual legal measures that were evidently widely interpreted as seriously abused. 
There is, however, no need for the elaborate scenario Wallace posits of a 'possibly 
isolated emergency sometime in the years 346-340, apparently unrelated to the 
struggle with Macedon, and for which Athens' cumbersome procedure of nomothesia 
was judged too slow'; there is also no need to imagine such an emergency being 
concealed by the 'absence of any record of daily events inside Athens, especially 
events unrelated to foreign policy'. 16 
The troublesome criminal-behaviour decree may instead simply be a mIrage 
concealing a process whereby the Areopagos, specifically under the terms of 
Demosthenes' apophasis legislation, was permitted to punish lawbreakers to a 
certain limit, but was required, similarly to the Boule, to compile a report for the 
Ekklesia about any cases deemed to merit a heavier penalty than it was permitted to 
impose; the Ekklesia would then refer the case to the courts for due process. It is 
more plausible to deny the existence of this criminal-behaviour decree, lacking as it 
does both date and context, than the reality of the apophasis legislation. 17 Thus the 
Areopagos' investigation of Theogenes, conducted under the apophasis measures, 
implies that even shortly after the legislation was passed, the Council felt that the 
powers it bestowed were too limited. IS It would therefore have been the Council's 
recourse to execution in 338 B.C., a punishment well beyond its jurisdiction, which 
occasioned such outrage both at the time and even at its mention in 330 B.C. at 
Leokrates' trial. 
The Areopagos' abuse of its powers may well have motivated the decree passed by 
the demos in 338 B.C. which defined flight as prodosia. 19 Hansen has claimed that 
this decree of the demos empowered the Areopagos to pass sentence on all Athenians 
who fled the country in the immediate aftermath of Khaironeia.20 He is, however, 
conflating it with Demosthenes' apophasis legislation; the separate nature of the two 
legislative items being demonstrated not least by Lykourgos' listing of them as 
individual precedents for the jury to follow; Demosthenes' apophasis decree did not 
in any case confer any such powers onto the Council. The demos' decree, however, 
although having no apparent effect on the Areopagos' existing powers, seems to have 
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been intended in the immediate aftennath of Khaironeia and perhaps, of the 
Council's executions, to bring hoi pheugontes within the tenns of the Nomos 
Eisangeltikos and, as a result, to facilitate the execution of those deemed to be 
cowards in and after the crisis: to reappropriate for the Dikasteria, therefore, powers 
equal to those which the Areopagos had just usurped. 21 
The demos' decree was quickly followed by Eukrates' law in 337/6 B.c., a measure 
which was itself closely modelled on Demophantos' anti-tyranny decree of 410/9 
B.c., with one particular difference: Eukrates' proposals expressly prohibited 
Areopagites from holding office or sitting in council in the event of the democracy 
being overthrown.22 Lykourgos clearly had good reason to request an uninterrupted 
hearing, and to plead for the jurors to refrain from shouting him down when he 
referred in positive tenns to actions by the Areopagos which abused the powers 
granted to it by Demosthenes' apophasis legislation, and which seem to have 
resulted in two consecutive pieces of legislation to redress the juridical balance in 
favour of the Dikasteria. Lykourgos' argument that the Areopagos had been the 
city's greatest security at the time of Khaironeia was patently still contentious, and 
the passage of eight years seems to have made little difference to the demos' fury at 
the way in which the Council had exceeded its authority. Such sustained anger was 
perhaps also directed at those who had abandoned Athens in 338 B.C., and may have 
resulted in Lykourgos' success in this prosecution despite his unpopUlar view of the 
value of the Areopagos' behaviour.23 
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